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Preface
Andrew James Johnston and Gyburg Uhlmann
Since its inception in July 2012, the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) 980 
“Episteme in Motion. Transfer of Knowledge from the Ancient World to the Early 
Modern Period”, based at the Freie Universität Berlin, has been engaging with 
processes of knowledge change in premodern European and non-European cul-
tures.
The project aims at a fundamentally new approach to the historiography of 
knowledge in premodern cultures. Modern scholars have frequently described 
premodern knowledge as static and stable, bound by tradition and highly depen-
dent on authority, and this is a view that was often held within premodern cul-
tures themselves.
More often than not, modern approaches to the history of premodern knowl-
edge have been informed by historiographical notions such as ‘rupture’ or ‘revo-
lution’, as well as by concepts of periodization explicitly or implicitly linked to a 
master narrative of progress.
Frequently, only a limited capacity for epistemic change and, what is more, 
only a limited ability to reflect on shifts in knowledge were attributed to premod-
ern cultures, just as they were denied most forms of historical consciousness, and 
especially so with respect to knowledge change. In contrast, the CRC 980 seeks to 
demonstrate that premodern processes of knowledge change were characterised 
by constant flux, as well as by constant self-reflexion. These epistemic shifts and 
reflexions were subject to their very own dynamics, and played out in patterns 
that were much more complex than traditional accounts of knowledge change 
would have us believe. 
In order to describe and conceptualise these processes of epistemic change, the 
CRC 980 has developed a notion of ‘episteme’ which encompasses ‘knowledge’ 
as well as ‘scholarship’ and ‘science’, defining knowledge as the ‘knowledge of 
something’, and thus as knowledge which stakes a claim to validity. Such claims 
to validity are not necessarily expressed in terms of explicit reflexion, however 
– rather, they constitute themselves, and are reflected, in particular practices, 
institutions and modes of representation, as well as in specific aesthetic and per-
formative strategies.
In addition to this, the CRC 980 deploys a specially adapted notion of ‘transfer’ 
centred on the re-contextualisation of knowledge. Here, transfer is not under-
stood as a mere movement from A to B, but rather in terms of intricately entan-
gled processes of exchange that stay in motion through iteration even if, at first 
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glance, they appear to remain in a state of stasis. In fact, actions ostensibly geared 
towards the transmission, fixation, canonisation and codification of a certain 
level of knowledge prove particularly conducive to constant epistemic change. 
In collaboration with the publishing house Harrassowitz the CRC has initi-
ated the series “Episteme in Motion. Contributions to a Transdisciplinary His-
tory of Knowledge” with a view to showcase the project’s research results and to 
render them accessible to a wider scholarly audience. The volumes published in 
this series represent the full scope of collaborating academic disciplines, ranging 
from ancient oriental studies to medieval studies, and from Korean studies to 
Arabistics. While some of the volumes are the product of interdisciplinary coop-
eration, other monographs and discipline-specific edited collections document 
the findings of individual sub-projects.
What all volumes in the series have in common is the fact that they conceive 
of the history of premodern knowledge as a research area capable of providing 
insights that are of fundamental interest to scholars of modernity as well.
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Introduction
Pietro Daniel Omodeo and Volkhard Wels
The role of universities in the developments of the scientific culture of early mo-
dernity has been the subject of intense scholarly debates and research for several 
years. New studies have changed the opinion, widespread only fifty years ago, 
that knowledge institutions were not particularly relevant to the advance of mod-
ern science. Such a negative judgement on the history of universities and their 
culture was connected to the predominant notion of the Scientific Revolution 
which was seen as an intellectual rupture with all that preceded the mathema-
tization of nature which culminated in Isaac Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis prin-
cipia mathematica (1687). Historians of science especially tended to dismiss Aristo-
telianism and scholasticism. They perhaps believed they could retroactively take 
a side in old polemics, namely those opposing Galileo Gali lei, the ‘Copernicans’, 
and the empiricist and mechanical philosophers against the ‘bookish’ professors. 
But the resulting narratives often neglected two fundamental aspects of science 
as a cultural phenomenon: first, the relevance of controversy as a motor of intel-
lectual advance, particularly in the natural sciences, and, second, the relevance 
of education, especially university formation, as a shared background against 
which conceptual innovation can be appreciated. Moreover, the canon of disci-
plines and contexts relevant to the history of science cannot be restricted to a few 
select sciences—basically the mathematized natural sciences that were cherished 
by nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century epistemologists in the wake 
of positivism. But closer scrutiny of the reality of early-modern scientific culture 
forces us to embrace a broader conception of science, one capable of addressing 
the interdisciplinary entanglements of paradigmatic disciplines such as astron-
omy and mechanics with astrology, alchemy, natural philosophy, theology, and 
so forth. The Aristotelian environment of reformed universities and institutions 
of early modernity offers a suitable area of inquiry into the dialectics of tradition 
and innovation which characterized a time of scientific transformation. This vol-
ume is dedicated to the study of early-modern ‘episteme in motion’: the evolution 
of scientific knowledge and its categories within confessional and cultural-polit-
ical institutional settings.
Studies on the institutional foundations and university embodiments of in-
tellectual history flourish today. The importance of institutions of higher edu-
cation for early modern science has been at the center of influential works such 
as those by Charles B. Schmitt on university Aristotelianism during the Italian 
Renaissance, Mordechai Feingold on the mathematical apprenticeship at English 
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institutions, and Antonella Romano and Ugo Baldini on the teaching of science at 
Jesuit colleges.1 Specific studies have been devoted to the socio-cultural settings 
of early-modern universities in Catholic Italy, Protestant Germany, and more 
broadly in Europe that point to their cultural-political dimensions as well as to 
the habitus of an academy that passed from a fundamentally oral to a written and 
ultimately printed culture.2 The encounters, negotiations, and hybridization of 
scholarly traditions and novel approaches to nature have been variously treated. 
Among many possible instances, in this volume we will address Cartesian scho-
lasticism, rhetoric and epistemology in Renaissance Germany, and the Aristote-
lian metaphysics that guided the developments of post-Copernican astronomy 
in northern European Protestant centers.3 Moreover, Edward Grant has helped 
us to understand the complexity of lasting the transformations of scholastic phi-
losophy, which survived the end of the medieval system of education and be-
came part of the scientific discourse of modernity.4 Studies on the connections of 
Protestantism and science have often stressed the cultural and theological back-
ground of scientific debates. Among others, Sachiko Kusukawa looked at the con-
cept of providence underlying Me lanch thonian scientific culture, whereas Theo 
Verbeek and Rienk Vermij reconstructed Calvinist theological-philosophical 
controversies over the introduction of Copernicus and Cartesian philosophy into 
Dutch reformed universities.5 Astronomical culture in Protestant environments 
1 Charles Schmitt, Studies in Renaissance Philosophy and Science, London 1981; Mordechai Fein-
gold, The Mathematicians’ Apprenticeship: Science, Universities and Society in England 1560–1640, 
Cambridge 1984; Antonella Romano, La contre-réforme mathématique: Constitution et diffusion 
d’une culure mathématique jésuite à la Renaissance, Rome 1999; Baldini, Ugo, Saggi sulla cultura 
della Compagnia di Gesù (secoli XVI–XVIII), Padua 2000; also see Marcus Hellyer, Jesuit Natural 
Philosophy in Early Modern Germany, Notre Dame 2005.
2 See Paul F. Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance, Baltimore 2002; William Clark, 
Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University, Chicago 2006; and Ku-ming 
Chang, “From Oral Disputation to Written Text: the Transformation of the Dissertation in 
Early Modern Europe,” in: History of Universities 19/2 (2004), pp. 130–187.
3 See, among others, Roger Ariew, Descartes among the Scholastics, Leiden 2011; Riccardo Pozzo, 
Adversus Ramistas: Kontroversen über die Natur der Logik am Ende der Renaissance, Basel 2012; 
Pietro Daniel Omodeo, “Metaphysics Meets Urania: Daniel Cramer and the Foundations 
of Tychonic Astronomy,” in: Unifying Heaven and Earth: Essays in the History of Early Mod-
ern Cosmology, ed. Miguel A. Granada, Patrick Boner and Dario Tessicini, Barcelona 2016, 
pp. 159–186.
4 Edward Grant, Much Ado about Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to 
the Scientific Revolution, Cambridge 1981 and id., Planets, Orbs and Spheres: The Medieval Cos-
mos (1280–1687), Cambridge 1994.
5 Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Me lanch thon, 
Cambridge 1995; Theo Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy 
1637–1650, Carbondale 1992; and Rienk Vermij, The Calvinist Copernicans: The Reception of the 
New Astronomy in the Dutch Republic, 1575–1750, Amsterdam 2002. Also, see Johan Arie van 
Ruler, The Crisis of Causality: Voetius and Descartes on God, Nature and Change, Leiden 1995. On 
the interplay of Protestantism and science, cf. Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and 
the rise of natural science, Cambridge 1998; Charlotte Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen: Stimulus to a 
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has received much attention, including in seminal studies by Robert Westman.6 
However, the inquiry into the contributions to science of smaller religious groups 
such as the Socinians is still a desideratum in the history of science.
Although accurate studies on early-modern German Protestant universities 
already exist,7 there is still much work to be done to clarify their roles in the 
scientific advances of the seventeenth century. The editors of this volume have al-
ready contributed to the study of early university culture in connection with Me -
lanch thon’s curricular reforms and their impact and dissemination through the 
networks of Protestant universities and gymnasia.8 This volume aims to continue 
this line of inquiry, substantially integrating existing scholarship on early-mod-
ern intellectual history within its institutional settings, and contributing to the 
overarching, comparative study of epistemic networks.9
We specifically deal with forms of the institutionalization of science and the 
role of Aristotelianism as the backbone of knowledge at early-modern Protestant 
universities. This was a dynamic tradition, which we regard as a form of ‘mobile 
episteme’ in line with the research program of the Collective Research Centre 
Episteme in Motion and the ERC endeavor EarlyModernCosmology. The transfor-
mation of academic science depended on its circulation through institutional 
and intellectual connections. Every passage, transfer, and exchange of knowl-
edge implied a reformulation and often deep alteration, even in those cases in 
which the explicit intention of the historical actors was to preserve and secure 
a received canon of knowledge such as the corpus Aristotelicum or Aristotelian 
methodologies of inquiry. As a matter of fact, an inter-pollination of ‘early’ forms 
of knowledge and ‘modern’ perspectives produced changes of content, theory, 
and experience. The fields concerned with major hybridizations and shifts range 
Theological Mathematics, Aldershot 1998; and Dino Bellucci Science de la nature et Réformation: 
La physique dans l’enseignement de Philippe Mélanchthon, Rome 1998.
6 Robert S. Westman, “The Me lanch thon Circle, Rheticus and the Wittenberg Interpretation of 
the Copernican Theory,” in: Isis 66 (1975), pp. 163–193.
7 See, among others, Barbara Bauer, (ed.), Me lanch thon und die Marburger Professoren (1527–
1627), Marburg 1999; Heinz Kathe, Die Wittenberger philosophische Fakultät 1502–1817, Vienna, 
Cologne, Weimar 2002; Rolf Darge (ed.), Der Aristotelismus an den europäischen Universitäten 
der frühen Neuzeit, Stuttgart 2012.
8 Volkhard Wels, “Me lanch thon’s Textbooks on Dialectic and Rhetoric as Complementary 
Parts of a Theory of Argumentation”, in: Scholarly Knowledge. Textbooks in Early Modern Eu-
rope, eds. Emidio Campi, Simone De Angelis, Anja-Silvia Goeing and Anthony T. Grafton, 
Geneve 2008, pp. 139–156; id., Manifestationen des Geistes. Frömmigkeit, Spiritualismus und Dich-
tung in der Frühen Neuzeit. Göttingen 2014, pp. 89–130; Pietro Daniel Omodeo with Karin 
Friedrich (eds.), Duncan Liddel (1561–1613): Networks of Polymathy and the Northern European 
Renaissance, Leiden 2016; id., “Institutionalized Metaphysics of Astronomy at Early-Modern 
Me lanch thonian Universities,” in: Iteration und Wissenswandel, ed. Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum 
and Anita Traninger, Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 51–78.
9 This topic is presently being investigated by the ERC project “Institutions and Metaphysics 
of Cosmology in the Epistemic Networks of Seventeenth-Century Europe,” at Ca’ Foscari 
University of Venice (Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, GA n. 725883 Ear-
lyModernCosmology).
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from astronomy to astrology, medicine, soul theories, alchemy, physics, and bi-
ology. In this process, methodology was reassessed and transformed as well. In 
this respect, logic, rhetoric, theories of argumentation and epistemology should 
be regarded as an integral part of the early-modern transformation of episteme.
The encounter between Aristotelians and novatores who proposed new nat-
ural viewpoints should be considered in its ambiguity and complexity. Such 
encounters could take various forms ranging from adaptation to assimilation, 
transformation, demarcations, and exclusion. Aristotelian and scholastic philos-
ophy have often been judged as an intellectual dead end, intrinsically flawed by 
excessive reliance on tradition and written sources instead of curiosity and the 
exploration of the book of nature with ‘unprejudiced eyes’. The historical catego-
ry of the ‘Scientific Revolution’ once epitomized the idea of the abrupt emergence 
of a new science of nature in contrast to preexisting, prejudiced knowledge. The 
contributions in this volume question the static vision of pre-modern academic 
culture, despite its reliance on received forms of knowledge. They explore the 
intricacies of a story in which conflict and negotiation are important elements 
together with the harmonization and synthesis of eclectic elements. In the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, Aristotelianism was not a fossilized relic of 
the past, an unchangeable set of norms and doctrines. Rather, it was a movable 
philosophy capable of interacting and merging with—and reacting to—impulses 
coming from many directions, for instance Parcelsism in medicine, Cartesianism 
in physics and physiology, and Ramism in methodology. 
The confessional element of early modern philosophy and science continu-
ously emerges as a significant epistemic drive. In the context of Protestant in-
stitutions, Aristotelianism was often connected with ‘Philippism’, that is to say, 
Me lanch thon’s intellectual and pedagogical legacy. The curricular reform that 
Me lanch thon introduced at Wittenberg and spread throughout its institutional 
network was not restricted to theological faculties. The confessional implemen-
tation of a humanistic Lutheran culture with marked Aristotelian bias in vested 
astronomy (Erasmus Reinhold, Kaspar Peucer), physics (Paul Eber), alchemy (An-
dreas Libavius), and medicine (Daniel Sennert), to mention some of the most rele-
vant fields (and authors). The essays in this volume will address the main figures 
of this tradition, which was particularly lively in late-humanistic centers such 
as the universities and gymnasia of Rostock, Helmstedt, Frankfurt (Oder), Co-
penhagen, Königsberg, Altdorf, and Marburg. Much research is still required to 
fully clarify the relevance of this intellectual process for the natural science that 
radiated far beyond German-speaking territories.
In addition, Aristotelian-Me lanch thonian natural philosophy can be considered 
in its more or less intended opposition to competing currents that were marked 
by different religious tendencies and alliances. Me lanch thon’s followers confront-
ed philosophical projects (such as Ramism in the sixteenth century and Carte-
sianism in the seventeenth) that were considered to be tinged with Calvinist bias 
for contingent historical reasons, namely, their geographical origin. However, 
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
5Introduction
philosophical currents did not threaten the Philippist hegemony as much as theo-
logical ones, for instance the Gnesiolutheran rejection of methodological Aristo-
telianism for theological reasons during the sixteenth century. At a different lev-
el, neo-Platonic and philosophically heterodox tendencies backed anti- academic 
attitudes. The explosive potential of intellectual divergences clearly emerges from 
the conflict opposing the Paracelsists, on the one hand, and Thomas Erastus and 
Andreas Libavius, on the other. In this and many other cases, both sides of the 
polemic should be taken into consideration in order to comprehend the cultural 
strategies and scientific policies underlying different scientific programs.
In chapter one, Volkhard Wels explores the link between Me lanch thon’s logic 
and rhetoric, which the Philippists saw as the methodological basis for natural 
investigations, particularly alchemy. Wels particularly deals with the rhetorical 
definition of a pedagogical genre (genus didascalicon), which Me lanch thon intro-
duced in 1530 in his Rhetoric. The aim of this genre was to secure knowledge and 
information on specific themes and to present them in a plain and comprehensi-
ble manner. Andreas Libavius’s ‘alchemy’ is an illuminating case of the applica-
tion of such requirements. In following Me lanch thon’s rhetorico-methodological 
requirements, Libavius undertook a reformulation of alchemical knowledge, in 
which the usefulness of Philippist Aristotelianism was magnified through its ap-
plication to empirical knowledge. Libavius proposed a new codification of alche-
my by moving away from the arcane language that was typical of the discipline 
in the Middle Ages.
According to Günter Frank in the second essay of this collection, the relevance 
of natural knowledge for Protestant theology was mainly due to Me lanch thon’s 
conception of the providence of God, seen as the architect who created the well-or-
dered machina mundi and keeps it in motion. In his conception nature is not only 
God’s creation but also the genesis or the ‘origin’ of worldly beings, according to 
the etymology of the Latin word ‘natura’. Me lanch thon especially looked at na-
ture as an important medium of divine revelation, equivalent to the Sacred Scrip-
tures. Therefore, he defended the idea that humans can grasp God’s wisdom and 
justice through nature on the basis of anthropocentric premises. In this manner, 
he supported a ‘creationist optimism’ in contrast with Luther’s rather pessimistic 
rejection of the notions of man as God’s image (imago or similitudo Dei).
Sascha Salatowsky expands on these topics in chapter three. His contribution 
deals with the question of the relevance of physics in early modern religious cul-
ture. He engages in an inter-confessional comparison which takes into account 
various religious settings. These settings are relevant to assess the transforma-
tions of the conception of the divine in connection with the ‘new physics’, espe-
cially insofar as time and space are concerned. Salatowsky compares viewpoints 
on the essence of God that go beyond scriptural exegesis and which are marked 
by different confessional contexts. Specifically, he deals with the Catholic scho-
lastic Francisco Suárez, the Calvinist and crypto-Socinian Conrad Vorstius, the 
Lutheran Johann Gerhard and the Socinian Christoph Stegmann. Salatowsky ar-
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gues for the proximity between the arguments of the Catholic Suárez and the 
Lutheran Gerhard as far as God’s relation to time and space are concerned. By 
contrast, the other natural theologians considered here, Stegeman and Vorstius, 
rejected the paradoxes entailed in the idea of a God-space-time relation for dif-
ferent reasons. In fact, they embraced a pre-enlightenment position directed to-
wards a rational foundation for religion.
Pietro Daniel Omodeo and Jonathan Regier readdress a classic theme in the 
history of Renaissance astronomy, namely the Wittenberg reception of Copernicus 
(chapter four). Luther and Me lanch thon’s skepticism or even criticism relative to 
the Copernican hypotheses did not lead to the rejection of his astronomical work, 
but rather to its transformative reception. The reconstruction of the institutional 
context of the earliest reception of Copernicus’s De revolutionibus orbium coe lestium 
(1543) helps us understand the reasons for attempts to transpose Coper ni can pa-
rameters and models onto a geocentric framework, and eventually onto a geo-he-
liocentric one, which became typical of Protestant circles from the 1580s on wards. 
Attentive consideration of the manuscript version and various editions of Me -
lanch thon and Eber’s Introduction to Physics (Initia doctrinae physicae) sheds new 
light on the intricacies of the so-called ‘Wittenberg interpretation’ of Copernicus.
In chapter five, “Nicolaus Andreae Granius: Physics and Cosmology at Helm-
stedt,” Stefano Gulizia outlines the epistemic and pedagogical foundations of 
teaching Aristotelian cosmology against the background of the universities of 
Rostock and Helmstedt at the turn of the seventeenth century. These objectives 
are achieved by the case study of a Swedish mathematician, Nicolaus Andreae 
Granius (ca. 1569—1631), who, in addition to being a cross-cultural mediator in the 
Baltic region, was also appointed as a professor of natural philosophy in Helm-
stedt and had strong ties among the ‘Caseliani’, a circle of Protestant humanists 
interested in theology, logic, and medicine. Granius was educated in Germany 
as part of a new class of intellectuals who used Lutheran academic relations in 
a climate of relative tolerance to reevaluate the methodological ramifications of 
Zabar el la’s Aris totle within their work. As Gulizia shows in his chapter, Granius’s 
experience reveals the polycentric cultural processes that were animated by aca-
demic disputes and circulated through humanist techniques of note-taking.
Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer (chapter six) discusses the progressive decline of 
astrology as a science, specifically looking at the Socinian contribution to the de-
bates. The profound changes in astronomy during early modernity did not im-
mediately marginalize astrological practices. Rather, the two sides of the science 
of the heavens coexisted and reinforced each other for a while. Yet, the legacy of 
medieval allegations against astrology on theological and ethical grounds en-
tered the Renaissance debates, and was eventually received and reinvigorated by 
Socinian and reformed scholars. Andreas Dudith-Sbardellati’s circle in Breslau is 
a case in point: religious motives accompanied a keen interest in astronomy to-
gether with the rejection of astrology. The intellectual legacy of this group lasted 
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up to the late seventeenth century in connection with cometary apparitions and 
controversies (in 1618/19, 1652–1654, 1664/65 and 1680–1682).
Anna Jerratsch describes the Aristotelian elements underlying Protestant con-
ceptions of comets in chapter seven. Her overview of sixteenth-century and sev-
enteenth-century developments of cometary theories begins with a presentation 
of the Renaissance attempts to cope with comets as ‘challenging objects’. Initial-
ly, comets were treated as multilayered objects that integrated elements derived 
from natural philosophy, astrology, and theology. The German-speaking litera-
ture on comets offers a wide body of sources on the phenomenon. In such pop-
ular texts, comets were seen as harbingers of famine, war, and diseases and in-
terpreted in accordance with astrological viewpoints, theological doctrines, and 
natural philosophical theories. Jerratsch considers the progressive dissolution of 
the integrated view of comets (astrological-theological-physical) and especially 
points to the marginalization of astrology.
In chapter eight, Miguel Ángel Granada considers the Danzig professor of 
philosophy Bartholomäus Kecker mann as an early modern defender of the Ar-
istotelian doctrine of comets as sublunary meteorological phenomena. Kecker-
mann saw the mathematical determination of the heavenly nature of comets as 
an attack against scholastic physics. He raised fundamental doubts concerning 
the reliability of astronomical instruments and mathematical computations as 
a counter-argument against their celestial nature. In contrast to mathematical 
astronomers, he believed that comets are produced by atmospheric exhalations 
and allotted them a theological overdetermination as signs of divine intervention 
into nature. Mathematicians promptly reacted to his allegations. Among them, 
Christoph Hu ni chius defended the thesis of comets’ superlunarity and argued 
for their exclusively natural origin. The polemic opposing Kecker mann and Hu -
ni chius is paradigmatic of the institutional development of the natural sciences at 
the crossroads of tradition and innovation.
Bruce Moran’s contribution deals with alchemy (chapter nine). He shows that 
the Latin terminology of logic, as taught at Protestant universities on the basis of 
Aris totle, Ramus, and Me lanch thon, was at the basis of the linguistic choices of 
Andreas Libavius’ chemical Œuvre. Libavius acted in a context in which many 
scholars were dismissive of Aristotelian logic in the name of a Ramist reform, 
but his efforts were directed at creating a synthesis of Aris totle and Ramus. Such 
an eclectic sythesis formed the basis for his chemical science, a two-sided theo-
retical-practical project resulting from the interconnection of scientia and ars. In 
spite of his intention to purify chemistry from the metaphysical implications of 
hermetic alchemy, Libavius did not succeed in establishing the teaching of his 
old-new science at universities.
Libavius is also at the center of Elisabeth Moreau’s essay (chapter ten). She 
deals with the development of his pharmaceutical theory of elemental mixtures 
based on a merging of Hippocratic-Galenic humoral pathology with medieval 
alchemia medica. Such an endeavor was rooted in the conception that every human 
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being has his or her own inner principle. This principle is marked by a similitude 
to the creator and is the result of the composition of materia, forma, and privatio. 
This triad was directed against the Paracelsian tria prima doctrine embraced by 
the physician Petrus Severinus. Libavius accused his opponents of unduly aban-
doning the Aristotelian ground of alchemical concepts and principles.
Bernd Roling (chapter eleven) presents the occult doctrines of the hermetic 
thinker Johann Ludwig Han ne mann in Kiel in the passage from the seventeenth 
to the eighteenth century. These occult doctrines constituted a special path to 
natural philosophy informed by Platonism and Paracelsism that implied the re-
jection of key terms and concepts of Aristotelian philosophy, especially forma 
specifica and privatio. As an alternative, Han ne mann proposed a dynamic concep-
tion of reality as a material stream, which is organized by God and animated by 
the world-soul of Platonic origin. Materiality was reduced to three Paracelsian 
principles, sal, sulfur, and mercurius, which Han ne mann traced back to a mythical 
Nordic alchemical tradition.
Simon Rebohm (chapter twelve) looks at the editorial practice of commenting 
as documented by the Miscellanea curiosa, a multi-volume medical and natural 
encyclopedia that was published under the auspices of the scientific society Aca-
demia naturae curiosorum (later Academia imperialis Leopoldina) from 1670 onwards. 
The early volumes of the Miscellanea are marked by the large presence of com-
mentaries referring to Aris totle. These references often had a rhetorical mean-
ing, as they served to introduce new natural viewpoints. After 1676, references to 
Aris totle abruptly disappeared as a consequence of the new scholarly direction 
of the editorial project.
Martin Urmann concludes the volume with a comparative study on the French 
academic context (chapter thirteen). He specifically discusses the change in the 
relationship between natura and ars that occurred when Cartesian language theo-
ries penetrated conceptions of rhetoric during the seventeenth century. The essay 
first considers the reception of Descartes by the French universities and collèges in 
order to explore what can be called the epistemic transfer between Aristotelian-
ism and the new Cartesian philosophy. The focus then shifts to Bernard Lamy’s 
conception of rhetoric as presented in his principal work De l’art de parler (1675). 
Based upon the Cartesian theory of passions, Lamy’s book redefines rhetoric in a 
way that current research has labelled a ‘grammar of affects’.
The essays in this volume thus bring into focus the institutional mechanisms 
of the transformation of traditional knowledge and its capacity to merge, adapt, 
or react to novelty against the background of early-modern religious reforms. The 
‘stability’ of received forms of knowledge, particularly Aristotelianism, resided 
in its ‘mobility’. In Protestant institutional contexts, Aristotelian thought proved 
to be adaptable and compatible with the natural and theological views brought 
forward by Me lanch thon and, later, with the mechanical philosophy and other 
conceptions linked to contemporary advances in science. Explicitly anti-Aristote-
lian currents, such as Ramism, Paracelsism, radical Platonism, and hermeticism, 
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were more difficult to integrate into the university curricula. Aristotelianism 
sometimes acted as a transformative force that was deeply theoretical as was the 
case with the geocentric reception and transmission of Copernicus in the Wit-
tenberg connection. Alchemy, astronomy, and astrology, alongside cometary the-
ories, natural philosophy, and theology are the most important dimensions of 
early modern science investigated in this volume. They are reconstructed in their 
cultural embedment as part of a science that was established, continued, and con-
stantly revised in the mobile settings of knowledge institutions. 
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Me lanch thon’s Logic and Rhetoric  
and the Methodology of Chemical Knowledge  
in Libavius’s Alchymia
Volkhard Wels
The point that I make in this paper is relatively simple. I aim to show that Andreas 
Libavius’s methodical treatment of chemical knowledge in his 1597 book Alche mia 
has its roots in the method developed by Philip Me lanch thon in his textbooks on 
rhetoric and logic half a century earlier. This is my first claim. My second claim 
is that the method that Me lanch thon laid out in his books and that Libavius later 
took up and applied to chemistry has bearing for the content of the knowledge 
that it is applied to. For both Me lanch thon and Libavius, the methodical treat-
ment of knowledge is informed by a strong rationalist, anti-speculative thrust. It 
is precisely the speculative and religious dimensions of knowledge that Me lanch -
thon’s method excludes from the domain of natural philosophy. As Bruce Moran 
has already demonstrated in detail, Libavius’s pointed critique of Paracelsus fol-
lows out of his methodical treatment of chemical knowledge,1 which, as I want to 
show in this paper, is wholly reliant on Me lanch thon. 
I’ll begin by saying a few basic things about Me lanch thon’s concept of method. 
Then I will show how Libavius draws on the concept in his own textbook on logic 
and applies it in his Alche mia. Both the structure and the content of the chemical 
knowledge described in the book make clear that Libavius was a student of Me -
lanch thon. Third, I will show how Libavius’s concept of method sets him apart 
from both the older traditions of alchemy and the Paracelsians. In contrast to 
them, Libavius treated chemistry as a body of technical knowledge, and in doing 
so, he drew on technical texts on smelting. Finally, I would like to show how 
1 Bruce T. Moran, Andreas Libavius and the Transformation of Alchemy. Separating Chemical Cul-
tures with Polemical Fire. Sagamore Beach, Ma 2007. Among Moran’s other works on the 
subject, see Bruce T. Moran, “Medicine, Alchemy, and the Control of Language: Andreas 
Li ba vius versus the Neoparacelsians”, in: Paracelsus: The Man and His Reputation, His Ideas 
and Their Transformation, ed. Ole Peter Grell, Leiden 1998, pp. 135–149; Bruce T. Moran, “An-
dreas Libavius and the Art of ‘Chymia’. Words, Works, Precepts, and Social Practices”, in: 
Bridging Traditions. Alchemy, Chemistry, and Paracelsian Practices in the Early Modern Era, ed. 
Karen Hunger Parshall a.o. Kirksville, Missouri 2015, pp. 59–78. See also his contribution to 
this volume. Owen Hannaway, The Chemists and the Word: the Didactic Origins of Chemistry. 
Balti more, London 1975, pp. 124–151 already discussed Libavius’s concept of method and its 
relation to Me lanch thon and Ramus.
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method functions as an anti-speculative, anti-metaphysical epistemological prin-
ciple in the works of both Me lanch thon and Libavius. 
1 Me lanch thon on Method
In an oration from 1536 with the title “On Philosophy”, Me lanch thon makes the 
following praise of method: 
Furthermore, there are two things for the acquiring of which great and 
varied knowledge and long practice in many arts are necessary, namely 
method and style of discourse. For no one can become a master of meth-
od, unless he is well and rightly versed in philosophy—indeed in that one 
kind of philosophy that is alien to sophistry, searches for and discloses 
truth properly and by the right path. Those who are well versed in these 
studies, and have obtained for themselves the habit (hexin) of relating to 
method everything that they want to understand or teach to others, also 
know how to represent methods in religious discussions, how to clear up 
what is complicated, pull together what is scattered and shed light on what 
is obscure and ambiguous.2
Thus, Me lanch thon holds method and rhetoric, “methodus et forma orationis”, 
to be the decisive elements of the transmission of knowledge. Method is the pro-
cedure one has to follow to find the truth and present it in a systematic fashion 
(“ordo et recta via”). While method provides guidelines for the orderly presenta-
tion of knowledge, rhetoric deals with the linguistic form this presentation takes. 
The points that Me lanch thon summarizes in his short text from 1536 are things 
he had discussed in detail in his textbooks on logic and rhetoric: the book on logic 
dealt with method, that on rhetoric on linguistic form.
Logic and rhetoric were Me lanch thon’s two core interests.3 The first version of 
his textbook on logic was published in 1520, the last in 1528. The first version of 
the book on rhetoric was published in 1519, the last in 1547. Both were bestsellers 
2 Philipp Me lanch thon, De philosophia, in: idem, Werke in Auswahl Bd. 3: Humanistische Schriften, 
ed. Richard Nürnberger, Gütersloh 1969, pp. 88–95, here p. 91: ‘Deinde duae res sunt, ad quas 
comparandas opus est magna et varia doctrina, et longa exercitatione in multis artibus, vi-
delicet, methodus et forma orationis. Nemo enim fieri artifex methodi potest, nisi bene et 
rite assuefactus in philosophia, et quidem in hoc genere philosophiae, quod alienum est a 
sophistica, quod veritatem ordine et recta via inquirit et patefacit. Qui in eo studio bene 
assuefacti <hexin> sibi paraverunt, revocandi omnia ad methodum, quae intelligere aut tra-
dere aliis cupiunt, hi norunt etiam in disputationibus religionis informare methodos, evol-
vere intricata, dissipata contrahere, obscuris et ambiguis addere lumen.‘ I quote the English 
translation by Christine F. Salazar, see Philip Me lanch thon, “On Philosophy,” in: Orations 
on Philosophy and Education, ed. Sachiko Kusukawa, transl. Christine F. Salazar. Cambridge 
1999, pp. 126–132, here p. 128. 
3 On the close relation between dialectics and rhetoric see Volkhard Wels, “Me lanch thon’s 
Textbooks on Dialectic and Rhetoric as Complementary Parts of a Theory of Argumenta-
tion”, in: Scholarly Knowledge. Textbooks in Early Modern Europe, eds. Emidio Campi, Simone 
De Angelis, Anja-Silvia Goeing and Anthony T. Grafton, Genf 2008, pp. 139–156.
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in the sixteenth century, and about 100 editions of each were published in the run 
of the century. It is nothing contentious to say that most students who studied at 
Protestant universities in the sixteenth century used Me lanch thon’s textbooks in 
their basic studies in the artes faculty. 
But what exactly does this method that Me lanch thon develops in his book on 
logic consist of? The answer actually seems pretty banal. Me lanch thon describes 
his method as a sequence of ten questions that should guide research on any 
given object of study. The questions are: 1. What does the word or concept that 
signifies this object mean? 2. Does the object exist? 3. What is the object? In other 
words, how should it be defined? 4. What parts make up the object? 5. What are 
the object’s types and subtypes? 6. What causes it (both its efficient cause and 
its final cause)? 7. What are its effects? 8. What things belong to it (“adiacentia”)? 
9. What is related to it? 10. What are its opposites? According to Me lanch thon, if 
one can answer these ten questions, then one knows the most important things 
about the object in question.4
By formulating these ten questions, Me lanch thon was the first to bring the 
concept of method into European theory of science.5 From the very beginning, 
Me lanch thon’s method was both a method for determining what knowledge is 
relevant for a given object of study and a method for presenting this knowledge 
in a clear, didactically efficacious form. Me lanch thon’s ten methodical questions 
are a sort of checklist that one can use to see if one knows everything pertinent 
there is to know about a given object of study and if one has put this knowledge 
in the right order. Thus, Me lanch thon’s method is not yet the kind of method for 
acquiring knowledge like those developed in the seventeenth century. It is just a 
method for presenting knowledge, which is an important point to keep in mind.
While Me lanch thon’s method is supposed to help guide research into the 
content of an object of study, its linguistic form—“forma orationis”—is treated 
by rhetoric. Me lanch thon’s textbook on rhetoric lays out the complement of the 
method of dialectic: the genus didaskalikon.6 Me lanch thon’s concept of genus didas-
kalikon adds a new category to the Antique doctrine of the genera dicendi. Ancient 
rhetoric had three genera dicendi: the genus iudiciale, the genus demonstrativum and 
the genus deliberativum—speech at a court of law, advisory speech, and speech 
that praises and chastises. Me lanch thon supplemented this classification with a 
4 Philipp Me lanch thon, Erotemata dialectics, in: idem, Opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. Carl Gott-
lieb Brettschneider. Bd. 13, Halle 1846, col. 508–752, here col. 573–578.
5 On the concept of method in the Early Modern period in general see Neal W. Gilbert, Renais -
sance Concepts of Method, New York, London 1960, as for Me lanch thon there pp. 121–128. A more 
recent survey can be found in Peter Schulteß, “Die philosophische Reflexion auf die Me tho de”, 
in: Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts. Bd. 1: Allgemeine Themen, Iberische Halbinsel, Ita lien, ed. 
Jean- Pierre Schobinger, Basel 1998 (= Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, be grün det 
von Friedrich Ueberweg, völlig neubearb. Ausg. Hg. von Helmut Holzhey), pp. 63–120.
6 See Philipp Me lanch thon, Elementa Rhetorices. Grundbegriffe der Rhetorik, ed., transl. and com-
ment. Volkhard Wels, Berlin 2001, pp. 41–59. Available in open access: http://nbn-resolving.de/ 
urn:nbn:de:kobv:517–opus-51446
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fourth genus because he thought that it failed to account for a wholly distinct 
type of speech act, namely, speech that does nothing but transmit knowledge. 
According to Me lanch thon, the genus didaskalikon has the exclusive purpose of 
docere, of transmitting what we would today call information. If one only wants 
to inform his listeners and readers and make things comprehensible for them, 
says Me lanch thon, he has to use clear, grammatically correct language that dis-
penses with all ornaments and flourishes. In his book on rhetoric, Me lanch thon 
describes in detail the criteria that exclusively informative speech acts and texts 
should adhere to.
Me lanch thon’s concept of the genus didaskalikon puts rhetoric and logic in close 
relation to one another, making them practically interdependent. The genus di-
daskalikon makes the method that Me lanch thon developed in his book on logic 
into a central aspect of rhetoric itself. It constitutes the rhetorical complement to 
the logical method of describing an object in a clear, correct, systematic fashion. 
For Me lanch thon, every explanation—in the broadest sense of the term—is an 
instance of the genus didaskalikon. The genus didaskalikon is the speech act that de-
scribes an object in a methodical, clear, comprehensive way using sober, matter-
of-fact language.
Me lanch thon was before his time. In the early sixteenth century, he was calling 
for something that the Royal Society in London would still be calling for in the 
mid-seventeenth century when laying out how they thought their new form of 
knowledge learned through experiment should be presented: namely, for a “plain 
style” that dispenses with all rhetorical ornamentation. The following passage 
from Thomas Sprat’s 1667 History of the Royal Society of London is relatively famous: 
They [that is, the members of the Royal Society] have therefore been most 
rigorous in putting in execution, the only Remedy, that can be found for 
this extravagance: and that has been, a constant Resolution, to reject all the 
amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style: to return back to the 
primitive purity, and shortness, when men deliver’d so many things, al-
most in an equal number of words. They have exacted from all their mem -
bers, a close, naked, natural way of speaking; positive expressions; clear 
senses; a native easiness: bringing all things as near the Mathematical 
plainness, as they can: and preferring the language of Artizans, country -
men, and Merchants, before that, of Wits, or Scholars.7
This is pretty much what Me lanch thon was saying more than a century earlier.8
7 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London for the Improving of Natural Knowledge, 
London 1667, p. 113. The context of this quote is reconstructed in Werner Hüllen, “Their man-
ner of discourse”. Nachdenken über Sprache im Umkreis der Royal Society, Tübingen 1989. Tina 
Skouen, “Science vs. Rhetoric. Sprat’s ‘History of the Royal Society’ Reconsidered”, in: Rhe-
to rica 29 (2011), pp. 23–52 treats Sprat’s position in the history of rhetoric.
 8 The only difference between the demands of Me lanch thon and those of Sprat—and it is a 
very important difference—is that Me lanch thon is aware that the “plain style”—or the genus 
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2 Method in the Works of Libavius
This brings me to my second point: Andreas Libavius’s adoption of Me lanch -
thon’s teachings on rhetoric and method. Published in 1597, Libavius’s Alche mia 
has rightfully been crowned as the first ever textbook on chemistry. The work 
constitutes nothing other than the first attempt to give a systematic account of 
chemical knowledge in sober, clear, unembellished language. In doing so, Libavi-
us fulfills the prescriptions set forth by Me lanch thon in his concept of genus didas-
kalikon, which, as is easy to show, is not a matter of coincidence. In 1595, two years 
before publishing his Alche mia, Libavius published a textbook on logic whose title 
itself lays bare the work’s reliance on Me lanch thon: “Two books on logic, the first 
book containing the rules of logic taken from the best authors, especially from 
Aris totle, Petrus Ramus and Philipp Me lanch thon […]”.9
It is easy to understand why Aris totle is named first, because every textbook 
on logic is ultimately based on the works of Aris totle. I can’t say much about the 
extent of Ramus’s influence, but it seems to not have been nearly as significant as 
that of Me lanch thon. In some places, sections of Me lanch thon’s books on logic 
and rhetoric are simply transcribed word-for-word, and in others, they are para-
phrased or reformulated. Perhaps most importantly, Libavius imitates the struc-
ture of Me lanch thon’s textbook on logic. Because the book was written based on 
lessons Libavius held, one can probably imagine that Libavius simply rephrased 
parts of Me lanch thon to fit his own needs as a teacher, adjusting them to fit the 
newest principles laid out by Ramus.10 At any rate, Libavius’s book is not an orig-
inal work, but a remake of Me lanch thon’s textbook on logic.
So naturally, Libavius’s book also has a chapter on method.11 And like Me -
lanch thon’s, Libavius’s method is a method for presenting and organizing knowl-
edge, not a method for acquiring or producing it. Using Me lanch thon’s words, 
Libavius says that every methodical presentation begins with precise definitions 
and proceeds by naming the object’s parts, its subcategories, its causes, etc. This 
is doubtless drawn from Me lanch thon’s ten questions. 
But Libavius’s logic is not really what interests me here, which is why I’d now 
like to turn to Libavius’s application of Me lanch thon’s method in his Alche mia. His 
use of the method enabled him to do nothing less than write the first real chemistry 
didaskalikon—is a rhetorical art that is difficult to achieve. In contrast, Sprat seems to be-
lieve—like so many other natural scien tists in the following centuries—that the “plain style” 
is simply a matter of dispensing with all rhetoric and attempting to come as close as possible 
to mathematics. Me lanch thon’s view that the “plain style” is itself a rhetorical artifice is 
much more modern than this naïve view. There is no non-rhetorical language.
 9 Andreas Libavius, Dialecticae emendatae libri duo in quorum hoc priore continentur praecepta dialec-
tica ex optimorum autorum, praecipue Aristotelis, P. Rami et Ph. Me lanch thonis sententiis usuque ra-
tionis eruta, congesta, itaque exposita, ut ubivis discentibus possint esse usui, Frankfurt/M. 1595.
10 Libavius strongly distances himself from Ramism in the foreword to the Alche mia, f. b2 r: “Ra-
misticas argutias ineptasque nugas quas ineptiunt hodie multi, ad Cynosares abire iubeo.”
11 Libavius, Dialecticae emendatae libri duo p. 287. Here, too, Libavius combines ideas—and 
phrases—from Me lanch thon and Ramus. 
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textbook. The title page itself makes clear that Libavius wants to provide his readers 
with a methodical presentation of chemical knowledge. The work was composed 
“primarily by bringing together scattered bits of knowledge from the best of the 
older and newer authors and various general writings; on the basis of theoretical 
contemplations and extensive practical experience, they are then presented in a 
careful methodical fashion (Methodo accurata explicata) and forged into a complete 
work.”12 “Methodo accurata explicata” is a clear reference to Me lanch thon’s method. 
The textbook is structured in line with the method. Libavius begins with a 
definition of chemistry and then goes on to a chapter on the constitutive parts of 
alchemy, thus following Me lanch thon’s ten questions. The first part of the Alche-
mia deals with the “Encheria,” or “equipment and tools,” along with chemical 
processes like sublimation, filtration, distillation, calcification, and rotting. The 
12 Andreas Libavius, Alche mia […] e dispersis passim optimorum autorum, veterum et recentius ex-
emplis potissimum, tum etiam praeceptis quibusdam operose collecta, adhibitisque ratione et experien-
tia, quanta potuit esse, methodo accurata explicata et in integrum corpus redacta, Frankfurt/M. 1597. 
A German translation was published in 1964: Die Alchemie des Andreas Libavius. Ein Lehrbuch 
der Chemie aus dem Jahre 1597, transl. Friedemann Rex, Weinheim/Bergstraße 1964.
Fig. 1a: Graphic depicting the structure of the Alche mia
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second part treats “Chymia,” or the end products of chemical processes. Exam-
ples include liquids, extracts, elixirs, essences, powders, and oils. A diagram on 
the first pages of the Alche mia gives a visual depiction of the system of chemical 
knowledge, a form of presentation clearly influenced by Ramus.
But Me lanch thon’s method doesn’t just guide the overall structure of the 
book—it is also used to organize the individual chapters. Every chapter begins 
with a definition of a chemical process and the requisite instruments and mate-
rials, then proceeds to a description of its subcategories and parts, which is then 
followed by a description of the process’s chemical qualities and its practical uses. 
It is this methodical, systematic form of presentation that distinguished Libavi-
us’s Alche mia from all its predecessors and made it the first textbook of chemistry. 
Indeed, Libavius too thought that the methodical structure of the Alche mia—
both as a whole and in its parts—was his primary accomplishment. The intro-
duction and the preface are nothing other than a justification of the method. The 
first sentence of the introduction states that he, Libavius, systematized chemical 
knowledge “led by a method that aims to convey knowledge” (“ductu methodi 
scientiis informandis attributae”).13 He continues by writing that, while there are 
of course many extant observations and bits of knowledge, he was trying to de-
13 Libavius, Alche mia f. a2 v. 
Fig. 1b: Graphic depicting the structure of the Alche mia
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duce the general categories for classifying them. In other words, chemistry as a 
discipline was not, in his eyes, lacking concrete knowledge. What it lacked was a 
methodical presentation of this knowledge in clear language.14 Libavius states in 
no ambiguous terms that readers should not expect to learn “new experiments” 
(experimenta, which might also be translated as “new experiences”) from his book, 
because he had simply brought together what others had already observed before 
him. He simply provided the form of presentation, “expositio et modus docendi.” 
And if he is successful in this venture, he says, he’ll be happy: “If the presentation 
and form of exposition are mine, that’s enough for me.”15
3 Libavius’s Concept of Chemistry: Critique of Traditional Alchemy  
and Paracelsus and the Use of Technical Literature on Smelting
Libavius’s consequentially methodical treatment of chemical knowledge distin-
guishes his work from both traditional alchemy and from Paracelsus and his 
followers. The method alone is what separates his work from traditional alche-
my, not the discrete knowledge itself. Indeed, Libavius held high the findings 
of traditional, pre-Paracelsian alchemy. What Libavius disliked about it was its 
obscurantism and secretiveness, the fact that the old alchemists didn’t make their 
findings accessible to a broad audience. He criticizes them for either not publish-
ing their work or, when they did, only distributing it in manuscripts that were 
difficult to obtain and were written in a highly codified language that used all 
kinds of obscure terms. Of course, he was talking about the imagistic language 
of traditional alchemy with its green lions, unicorns, dragons, hermaphrodites, 
bathing kings, and beheaded ladies. 
Nevertheless, he offered a defense of what this language concealed, writing 
that it was wrong to believe that it was just a bunch of charlatanism and fraud: 
Of course I know that excellent, reliable authors referred to one and the 
same thing with all kinds of different terms, and strange terms to boot, in 
order to keep their findings secret and protect them from being maligned; 
however, I would like you to share in my conviction that their thinking 
was always genuine and sound, because it was not just deceptive chatter, 
but represented the correspondence of facts and experience: there is no 
reason to put these men on the same level as frauds and tricksters.16
14 Libavius, Alche mia f. a2 v: ‚Catholica silent, nec est amussis ad quam revocari singularitates et 
iudicari queant. Itaque evenit ut cum plures eiusdem rei extent formulae, non sit promptum 
iudicare, nec ad quod caput artis pertineant, quove nomine sint appellandae, nec quam legi-
time sint descriptae.‘—‘There is nothing said of general concepts, and there is no guiding rule 
that would allow us to order and analyze the discrete facts. Thus, when there are multiple “for-
mulas” for the same material, it is difficult to say where they belong in the canon of chemistry, 
what name they should be referred to by, and if they are described in an adequate fashion.’
15 Libavius, Alche mia f. a4 r: ‘Si mea est expositio et modus docendi, sat est.’ 
16 Libavius, Alche mia f. a3 r: ‘Non quidem ignoro, etiam praestantes probatosque autores oc-
cultandi sua inventa et arcendi improbitatem caussa, variis, iisque monstrosis nominibus 
eadem appelalsse: sed tibi persuasum velim, concordem constantemque ipsorum fuisse 
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Thus, for Libavius, the imagistic language of traditional alchemy was not a sign of 
charlatanry. Rather, he viewed it as what we would today call a technical language:
For people who are unfamiliar with the key precepts of the discipline of 
chemistry, everything sounds, as one says, mysterious, even if they are 
expressed in clear, well-defined concepts that the adepts can understand. 
Thus, all the arts remain foreign to outsiders, particularly when they are 
not translated into vernacular and the termini technici (vocabula disciplinae) 
change.17 
He criticizes traditional alchemy for its failure to present its findings in a system-
atic manner, its habit of merely making lists of discrete observations without try-
ing to integrate them into a system, and for its obscurantism and secretiveness. 
He writes that lots of alchemists make you promise a hundred times that you 
won’t tell anyone about what they say before they entrust you with their arcane 
knowledge.18 Libavius thought that the end effect of this secretiveness was that 
alchemy never made any real progress: if people can’t publicly discuss and test 
the alchemists’ findings, then they can’t try to verify or falsify them either: 
There are also people of the opposite conviction who believe that it is dis-
graceful that certain arcana be published in such clear words. They claim 
that you have to do it like the philosophers and adepts, who conceal oth-
erwise clear things through obscure words and teachings and reserve 
science for their followers (filii doctrinae). I have no need to counter these 
people; for me there are no arcana; if there are any, God has made them 
accessible through science (disciplina), keen minds, and experience.19
For this reason, Libavius did not give the “concealed procedures” a place in his 
text, because, as he states in no uncertain terms: “In order to test them, they have 
to have been public for a long time. Thus, if they are kept secret, they cannot be 
counted as part of the art.”20 
Thus, it is clear that, beyond its strict scientific function, Libavius viewed his 
methodical presentation of chemical knowledge as a plea for openness and ac-
semper mentem, quam cum non dictio fallax, sed rerum concursus et experientia aperuerit: 
non est ut hos impostorum similes facias.‘
17 Libavius, Alche mia f. a4 r: ‚Qui disciplinae Chymicae morem non callent, ab his occulta sunt 
omnia quae dicuntur, etiamsi manifestis exponantur, suisque notis, quas intelligent satis 
initiati. Ita omnes artes ab extraneis sunt remotae, praesertim si non in vulgi transferantur 
sermonem et vocabula disciplinae mutent.‘ 
18 Libavius, Alche mia f. a2 v.
19 Libavius, Alche mia f. a3 v: ‚Audies aliquando etiam in adversam partem inclinantes, qui turpe 
iudicabunt arcana quaedam publicari tam mnaifestis verbis. Imitandum esse Philosophos, 
qui rem manifestam nominibus, modoque docendi occultarunt, filiisque doctrinae relique-
runt. Non opus est mihi adversus hos responsione: arcani enim mihi nihil est: si quid es, 
Deus patefecit per disciplinam, artificesque praestantes et experientiam.‘
20 Libavius, Alche mia a4 v: ‚Ut comprobentur, diu in publico esse debent. Non ergo habentur pro 
artificiosis, si sunt occulti.‘
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cessibility in science and the publication of chemists’ findings. He believed that 
scien tific progress could only be made if alchemists put an end to the obscuran-
tism and secretiveness of traditional alchemy. Not only must findings be verifi-
able and falsifiable, he claimed—they also have to be made public.21 Thus, Libavi-
us was already stressing the need for scientific community half a century before 
Robert Boyle made similar claims.22
While Libavius’s criticisms of traditional alchemy are thus relatively moderate, 
his criticisms of Paracelsus and his school are considerably harsher. He writes 
that while traditional alchemy strove to be difficult to understand, Paracelsus 
and his followers didn’t want to be understandable at all. He complains that even 
in those places where Paracelsus says something about real chemical knowledge 
and not just about theological and metaphysical speculations, you still have to 
proceed with caution, “because he deliberately covers everything with all kinds 
of mysterious references, obscuring even the most obvious things, and doesn’t 
want people to be able to understand him.”23 Thus, Libavius takes pains to un-
derscore that people should in no way confuse chemistry with what Paracelsus 
had made of it: 
Chemistry is not a discovery of Paracelsus; it should not be traced back 
to him; and this book, along with the commentary, will make clear that 
only the most miniscule part of chemistry has anything to thank the work 
of Paracelsus, even though the public already has access to works much 
superior to anything that grubby magician could have ever achieved. It 
would be a sad state of things for chemistry if it had to build on the works 
of Paracelsus.24
Because Bruce Moran has said pretty much everything there is to say about Li-
bavius’s critique of Paracelsus, I would like to turn to another part of the preface 
to the Alche mia, which leads back to the concept of method. In the preface, Libavi-
us doesn’t limit himself to distancing his project from Paracelsus and stating his 
partial affinity with traditional alchemy. He also explicitly mentions the techni-
21 In the same section in the first edition of the Alche mia, Libavius wrote that he would gladly 
amend his text and asked readers to write him if they were to find any errors, which he 
would then correct. Libavius, Alche mia a4 v: ‘Qui boni sunt et liberali ingenio nati, in quibus 
videbunt me deficere, aut ipsi edent meliora, aut ad me edenda in commentariis mittent.‘ 
22 See Stephen Clucas, “Alchemy and Certainty in the Seventeenth Century”, in: Chymists and 
Chymistry. Studies in the History of Alchemy and Early Modern Chemistry, ed. Lawrence M. Princi-
pe. Sagamore Beach 2007, pp. 39–51. Clucas compares the claims of Boyle and Libavius, argu-
ing that while Libavius plead for clarity and verifiability in order to make chemistry a scientia 
in the Aristotelian sense, Boyle wanted to make experiment into the bedrock of chemistry.
23 Libavius, Alche mia f. br: ‘Sed eo pauciora valde trepidanter allegavi, quod studiosissime om-
nia implicet aenigmatis et obscuret etiam manifestissima, nec velit intelligi.‘ 
24 Libavius, Alche mia f. bv: ‚Chymia non est inventum Paracelsi: ad eum referri non debet et 
mi ni mam etiam artis partem huius notitiae deberi, ostendet hic liber cum commentariis, 
quan quam iam in publico existant longe nobiliora, quam unquam impurus ille magus po-
tuit assequi.‘
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cal knowledge of the “steel works people” (“Metallhüttenleute”), that is, smelters 
who worked at the mines. Libavius was in all likelihood referring to works like 
Georg Agricola’s De re metallica (published in 1556), so-called smelting manuals, 
“Probierbüchlein,” or books on assaying silver and gold, and other purely techni-
cal writings. These kinds of technical works had always existed alongside strictly 
alchemical writings. Indeed, Agricola’s De re metallica contains a critique of alche-
my that is in many ways similar to that of Libavius.25
Libavius explicitly states that he wants to raise the technical knowledge of 
these workers to the level of a philosophy, which is to say, to the level of an ars, a 
university discipline:
I also don’t have anything to fear from the judgment of those who will say 
that my work has given smelters and other craftsmen a place in the world 
of philosophy, people who have up to now been held far from philosophy 
and demeaned to the level of menial workers. Because when chemistry 
is no longer just the servant of medicine, but comes to be recognized as a 
noble part of the knowledge of nature (contemplatio physica), then the engi-
neers (mechanici) will ascend the throne of physics.26 
This is a remarkably prophetic statement: if chemistry is founded on the knowl-
edge of craftsmen, then the engineers will ascend the throne of physics. While 
Paracelsus based his chemical knowledge on theological and metaphysical spec-
ulation, Libavius wanted to base chemical knowledge on the technical knowl-
edge of the artisans. 
This brings me to my next point. I would now like to return to Philip Me lanch -
thon’s concept of method as a systematic presentation of knowledge. Me lanch -
thon’s method is not just a formal procedure that leaves the knowledge that it is 
applied to untouched. The knowledge produced by methodical procedure is not 
the same as knowledge brought forth by speculation or divine revelation. 
A simple reference to Descartes’ Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison, 
et chercher la vérité dans les sciences (1637) suffices to demonstrate this claim. Like for 
Descartes a century later, method had a critical function for Me lanch thon. In other 
words, the rationalism expressed in Me lanch thon’s method determines the very 
content of the knowledge that it structures. Thus, Descartes was not the first one to 
conceive of method as the enemy of speculative knowledge and modes of acquiring 
knowledge based on speculation. Me lanch thon, too, had the very same aim. 
25 Georg Agricola, De re metallica, Basel 1556. Widmung, f. a3 r: ‚Sunt alii multi de hac re libri, 
sed omnes obscuri: quod scriptores isti res alienis, non propriis vocabulis nominent: et quod 
alii aliis atque aliis vocabulis, a se confictis, utantur, cum res nun mutent.‘
26 Libavius, Alche mia a4 v: ‘Nec formidanda mihi est eorum iudicum sententia, qui dicent mea 
opera effectum ut et fabris metallurgis, aliisque opificibus hactenus e Philosophica libertate 
ad servilia abiectis, sit tutus in philosophia locus: cum enim Chymia non tantum ministra 
sit medicinae, sed et physicae contemplationis pars honoratior, in solium physicae evehentur 
mechanici.‘
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4 Method as an Anti-Speculative Principle of Knowledge in the Works  
of Me lanch thon and Libavius
The implications of Me lanch thon’s method become clear when one takes a look 
at the way he applied it to theology in his 1521 Loci communes theologici. Me lanch -
thon’s Loci communes theologici has rightly been called the first dogmatic textbook 
of Lutheranism. Following the plan laid out in his works on logic and rhetoric, 
Me lanch thon defines the central concepts of theology, identifies its subcategories 
and its parts, describes its causes and effects, and explains what is related to them 
and what their opposites are. In doing so, Me lanch thon subordinates theology to 
the rules of logic. This is not something that should be taken for granted, and it 
stands in sharp contrast to the works of the early Luther.27 
The preface of the Loci states clearly and precisely that the truths of Biblical 
revelation have the same degree of certainty as the statement “two multiplied 
by four equals eight.”28 It continues that all the other principles of belief can be 
deduced from these truths of revelation with the same certainty. Belief and logic 
are not contradictory for Me lanch thon. For him, logic is, as the universally appli-
cable method of knowledge, no less an instrument of theology than it is for ev-
ery other discipline. Sure, in contrast to disciplines like mathematics, theological 
propositions cannot lead us to demonstrative, absolutely necessary proofs. But 
the deduction of these propositions out of the contents of the Bible can be tested 
with the hermeneutic-philological principles that Me lanch thon formulates in his 
rhetoric and the laws of method laid out in his logic.29 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that Me lanch thon subordinates the whole of 
theology to reason as Descartes’s followers would do later on. One of the first sen-
tences of the 1521 Loci theologici states that theology contains “mysteria divinita-
tis” that are inaccessible to reason. Me lanch thon counts among these “mysteria” 
the Holy Trinity, the incarnation of Christ, and the Divine creation of the world ex 
nihilo. These “mysteria divinitatis,” Me lanch thon writes, cannot be analyzed—
they can only be marveled at.30 They are beyond the grasp of reason and method, 
which for Me lanch thon means that they mark the end of theology as science and 
the beginning of the domain of speculation. This makes the method’s signifi-
cance for theology quite clear. 
I think we can well illustrate Me lanch thon’s position with the famous con-
cluding sentence of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus: “Whereof 
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” Like Wittgenstein, Me lanch thon 
27 See Volkhard Wels, Manifestationen des Geistes. Frömmigkeit, Spiritualismus und Dichtung in der 
Frühen Neuzeit, Göttingen 2014, pp. 77–84.
28 Philipp Me lanch thon, “Loci praecipui theologici von 1559” (1. Teil), in: idem, Werke in Aus-
wahl. Bd. 2.1, bearb. v. Hans Engelland, fortgeführt von Robert Stupperich, Gütersloh 1978, 
praefatio p. 190.
29 Me lanch thon, “Loci praecipui theologici von 1559”, praefatio p. 190.
30 Philipp Me lanch thon, „Loci communes rerum theologicarum seu hypotyposes theologicae. 
1521“, in: idem, Werke in Auswahl. Bd. 2.1, bearb. v. Hans Engelland, fortgeführt von Robert 
Stuppe rich, Gütersloh 1978, p. 19. 
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was a logician who saw his task in demarcating the limits of language, which he 
thought were identical with the limits of reason.31 What one can and must speak 
about are the central concepts of Christian theology, which are of the utmost 
significance for the life of a Christian. These are the “loci communes theologici,” 
which God revealed in the Bible: the power of sin, the law, grace. These make up 
the bedrock of dogmatic theology. But about the “mysteria divinitatis,” like the 
Holy Trinity, the incarnation of Christ, and the creatio ex nihilo, one cannot speak. 
They cannot be grasped with reason, and thus cannot be grasped with language. 
Conclusion
That brings me to my conclusion: my basic claim is that the way Libavius applied 
Me lanch thon’s method to chemical knowledge is grounded in reason, which 
means that it is explicitly against mixing chemical knowledge with religious 
speculation. 
Libavius’s methodical organization of chemical knowledge paved the way for 
a new conception of chemistry as a science free of metaphysics that built on the 
knowledge of craftsmen. This new orientation of chemistry was an explicit attack 
on Paracelsus, because he and his followers were engaged in nothing other than 
investing chemical knowledge with metaphysical subtleties. The chemistry of 
Paracelsus and his followers was only marginally interested in empirical knowl-
edge and observation, primarily drawing its insights from divine inspiration and 
religious, metaphysical speculation. 
The examples are countless, so I’ll just take up three here chosen more or less 
at random: Oswald Croll, Alexander von Suchten, and Heinrich Khunrath. Os-
wald Croll’s Basilica Chymica (1609) has the metaphysical speculations of the Para-
celsus school written all over its cover.32 The title page states that the book seeks 
to use chemistry to clarify the Holy Trinity by bringing it into analogy with all 
kinds of other trinities. It is precisely the Holy Trinity—the fact that God is at 
once one and three—that Me lanch thon claimed could not be grasped by reason. 
Thus, Croll treats chemistry less as a form of technical knowledge and more as a 
complement of Kabbalah and magic. 
In his De tribus facultatibus (written before 1590, published in 1608), Alexander 
von Suchten seeks to give a chemical explanation of the act of creatio ex nihilo 
31 The comparison of Humanist philosophy of language with Wittgenstein’s “ordinary language 
philosophy” has been around for some time now. I make this comparison in the same vein as 
Lodi Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense. Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy. 
Cambridge, Mass; London 2009, pp. 269–291. On page 288, Nauta claims that both share “the 
basic conviction that philosophical problems are rooted in a misunderstanding of language.”
32 Oswald Croll, Basilica chymica continens philosophicam propriam laborum experientiam confir-
matam descriptionem et usum remediorum chymicorum selectissimorum e lumine gratiae et naturae 
desumptorum, Frankfurt/M. [ca. 1611]. Ndr. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York 1996. On the dif-
ferences between Libavius and Croll see Owen Hannaway, The Chemists and the Word: the 
Didactic Origins of Chemistry, Baltimore, London 1975.
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by using Paracelsus’s doctrine of principles.33 According to him, salt, sulfur, and 
mercury are the three principles that can explain the act of creation described in 
Genesis; importantly, mercury represents the divine spirit that entered the world 
itself on the first day of creation. Suchten was not the only one to try his hand at 
such speculation. The followers of Paracelsus made nothing less than the creation 
of the world into a choice object of speculation, seeking to study its chemical 
dimension. The “physica mosaica,” or chemical interpretation of Genesis, pretty 
much became its own text genre among the Paracelsians. Heinrich Khunrath’s 
33 Alexander von Suchten, De tribus facultatibus, in: idem, Chymische Schriften, ed. Ulrich c. Da -
gitza, Frankfurt/M. 1680, pp. 357–382.
Fig. 2: Title Page of Croll’s Basilica Chymica
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Am phit heatrum sapientiae aeternae solius verae, christiano-kabalisticum, divino-magi-
cum, nec non physico-chymicum, tertriunum, catholicon (1595/1609) is probably the 
most famous among them.34 Khunrath seeks to provide an alchemical, kabbalist, 
magical explanation for nothing other than Me lanch thon’s “mysteria divinitatis”: 
the creatio ex nihilo, the Holy Trinity, and the incarnation of Christ. 
Libavius wasn’t interested in any of this. His Alche mia contains no theological 
speculations and no metaphysics. Instead, Libavius gives the reader definitions, 
classifications, and descriptions of concrete chemical instruments, materials, and 
processes. This is what I meant at the beginning of this paper when I said that 
Libavius was a student and follower of Me lanch thon. The application of Me lanch -
thon’s method to chemical knowledge had massive consequences for what count-
ed as chemical knowledge and what did not. 
Chemical knowledge was cleansed of all theological speculation and—again 
in Libavius’ own words—ascended as technology the throne of physics. 
34 See the new edition: Heinrich Khunrath, Amphitheatrum Sapientiae Aeternae—Schauplatz der 
ewigen allein wahren Weisheit, vollständiger Reprint des Erstdrucks von [Hamburg] 1595 und des 
zweiten und letzten Drucks 1609, eds. Carlos Gilly, Anja Hallacker, Hanns-Peter Neumann and 
Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2014.
Fig. 3: Rebis—Etching from Khunrath’s Amphitheatrum
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Nature as Revelation
Philipp Me lanch thon’s Image of Nature
Günter Frank
1
The question of a possible connection between religion—or, more precisely, the 
emerging confessions—and the modern image of nature has led to a broad and 
ongoing discussion in the twentieth century, especially in the Anglo-American 
tradition of the ‘social history of science’. In a pioneering study from 1938 that built 
on the Weberian thesis, the American sociologist Robert King Merton argued 
that the modern image of nature had been primarily the work of English Puritans 
and German Pietists.1 In the period that followed, this thesis was frequently crit-
icized, supplemented, and expanded, and various aspects were re-evaluated—for 
example, in the studies of the British historian of science Alfred Ruprecht Hall2 
and the British historian Christopher Hill.3
Research on Me lanch thon in the twentieth century was rather unimpressed 
by this discussion and considered the question of his image of nature from var-
ious other perspectives. Usually, it was discussed against the backdrop of the 
oft-observed significance of astronomy and astrology to the humanists and Re-
formers and specifically in the context of the (alleged) Me lanch thon-Copernicus 
controversy, that is, the contrast of the geocentric and heliocentric astronomical 
models. Me lanch thon’s so-called conservative attitude toward Nicolaus Coper-
nicus and his insistence on ancient and Christian astronomy and astrology were 
interpreted from different viewpoints. From the perspective of the Reformation, 
this astronomical-astrological inertia was an ‘unfortunate canonization of an-
tiqui ty’ based on a dogmatic faith in Aris totle and the Stoics, who had suppos-
1 Robert King Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, New York 
1970; orig. pub. Osiris 4, no. 2 (1938), pp. 360–632.
2 Alfred Ruprecht Hall, From Galileo to Newton, 1630–1720, London 1963; idem, “Merton Revisit-
ed, or Science and Society in the Seventeenth Century”, in: History of Science 2 (1963), pp. 1–16.
3 Christopher Hill, “Puritanism, Capitalism and the Scientific Revolution” in: Charles Web-
ster, ed., The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, London 1974, pp. 243–253. From 
the literature in German, see Ruth Groh and Dieter Groh, Weltbild und Naturaneignung: Zur 
Kulturgeschichte der Natur, 2nd ed., Frankfurt am Main 1996. A kind of interim assessment 
of these extensive discussions can be found in H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A 
Historiographical Inquiry, Chicago 1994, here pp. 314–377.
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edly blinded Me lanch thon to more recent scientific findings.4 Wilhelm Maurer 
descended into speculation on this point: He argued that Me lanch thon had a 
basically positive view of the new scientific discoveries. The real conflict, how-
ever, was said to be of a more religious nature in that Me lanch thon had feared 
that the heliocentric worldview would revive a new astral divinity, which would 
conflict with the Reformist faith and the freedom of God and human beings.5 
Karl Hartfelder, in turn, traced Me lanch thon’s conservative tendency, his ‘mind 
inclined to superstition’, back to a biographical, characteristic trait rooted in his 
Swabian homeland that distinguished him from Luther and that was supposedly 
even more influential than his humanism.6
All these interpretations found their impetus in Me lanch thon’s commentar-
ies on Aristotelian physics, the Initia doctrinae physicae of 1549, which they either 
considered irreconcilable with Luther’s theology or understood as a hindrance to 
modernity in view of the emergence of the early modern natural sciences. The lat-
ter argument was based above all on Me lanch thon’s handwritten note on the first 
printed version of his physics in which, without naming names, he spoke of the in-
novation-addicted revolutionaries of astronomy, but in the editions from 1550 on-
ward he essentially withdrew this sharp criticism.7 In the later editions, of course, 
he did speak of the De revolutionibus orbium caelestium, which Copernicus, the canon 
of Thorn (now Toruń), had published in 1543. According to this view, therefore, 
Me lanch thon had rejected the heliocentric model and thereby prevented innova-
tions in science in Wittenberg. This (biased) judgment does not—as we know in 
the meantime—do justice to the historical circumstances. Since it is now generally 
agreed that Copernicus’ heliocentric model was only gradually accepted by scien-
tists and became widely accepted only during the seventeenth century,8 so that 
now the question that must be answered is how to explain this history of the belat-
ed influence of De revolutionibus. In his pioneering study published in 2002,9 Owen 
4 Heinrich Bornkamm, “Kopernikus im Urteil der Reformatoren”, in: idem, Das Jahrhundert 
der Reformation: Gestalten und Kräfte, 2nd ed., Göttingen 1966, pp. 177–185.
5 Wilhelm Maurer, Me lanch thon-Studien, Gütersloh 1964, pp. 36, 65–66.
6 Karl Hartfelder, Philipp Me lanch thon als Praeceptor Germaniae, Berlin 1889, pp. 190–197. On the 
context, see Günter Frank, Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Me lanch thons, 1497–1560 (Erfur -
ter theologische Studien 67), Leipzig 1995, here pp. 301–314.
7 Me lanch thon’s relationship to Copernicus has been discussed thoroughly and convincingly 
in Walter Thüringer, “Paul Eber (1511–1569): Me lanch thons Physik und seine Stellung zu Co -
per nicus”, in: Heinz Scheible, ed., Me lanch thon in seinen Schülern (Wolfenbütteler Forschun -
gen 73), Wiesbaden 1997, pp. 285–320; the handwritten note on the addiction to novelty (‘amo -
re novitatis’) is published there: ibid., pp. 319–320.
8 On this, see the highly instructive references in Dieter Groh, Schöpfung im Widerspruch: Deu -
tun gen der Natur und des Menschen von der Genesis bis zur Reformation, Frankfurt am Main 
2003, here pp. 613–621.
9 Owen Gingerich, An Annotated Census of Copernicus’ ‘De Revolutionibus’ (Nuremberg 1543 and 
Basel, 1566), Leiden 2002. On this, see also the review by Christoph Lüthy, “Verspätete Wen -
de: Wie Kopernikus im sechzehnten Jahrhundert gelesen wurde”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung, no. 150 (July 2, 2003), p. N 3.
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Gingerich was able to demonstrate using all the surviving copies of the Nurem-
berg first edition and the Basel second edition with marginal notes, commentaries, 
calculations, and hypotheses by readers that many contemporary astronomers re-
mained rather indifferent to the heliocentric model as long as its theories remained 
unproven empirically. For Copernicus had, strictly speaking, advanced two main 
theses: First, the famous thesis of the heliocentric model and, second, the thesis 
that all movements in the heavens were symmetrical in terms of structure and 
movement (the axiom according to which all celestial motions are uniform and 
circular or result from the composition of uniform and circular motions). This sec-
ond thesis, however, was problematic. Based on the measurements Tyco Brahe had 
presented of the orbit of Mars, Johannes Kepler felt compelled to assume that it was 
neither circular nor regular. A significant empirical confirmation of heliocentric 
model, albeit partial, came only with Galileo’s telescopic discovery of the phases 
of Venus in 1616. Only after Keplers and Galileos concurring achievements did the 
true career of the heliocentric model begin for the modern sciences.10
Me lanch thon’s relationship to Copernicus’ heliocentric model was then again 
interpreted in connection with nominalism, insofar as his image of nature was 
said—by Hans Blumenberg, for example—to have consisted essentially of an an-
thropocentric teleology derived from Cicero and basic ideas of the Stoics.11 So-
called nominalism,12 however, has to deal first with the problem of universals, 
that is, the question whether universal concepts truly exist or whether they are 
human constructions. This question is thus part of ontology, that is to say, a dis-
cipline Me lanch thon did not address at all in his extensive scientific oeuvre. De-
10 Hans Bieri, Der Streit um das kopernikanische Weltsystem im 17. Jahrhundert, 2nd ed., Bern 2008.
11 Hans Blumenberg, “Me lanch thons Einspruch gegen Kopernikus: Zur Geschichte der Dis-
soziation von Theologie und Naturwissenschaft”, in: Studium Generale 13 (1960), pp. 174–183. 
Similarly, Groh, Schöpfung im Widerspruch, pp. 620–621, who refers to Thüringer, “Paul Eber”, 
who does not, however, speak of nominalism or ‘via moderna’ in this context.
12 David Malet Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder, Col., 1989; Joseph 
M. Bochenski, Alonso Church, and Nelson Goodman, eds., The Problem of Universals: A Sym-
posium, Notre Dame, Ind., 1956, esp. Bochenski, “Zum Universalienproblem”, in: item, ed., Lo -
gisch-Philosophische Studien, Freiburg/München 1959, pp 131–152; Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian 
Meditations, transl. Richard Nice, Stanford, CA, 2000; Carl Friedrich Gethmann, s.v. “Allge -
mein heit”, in: Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe, vol. 1., 2nd ed., Munich 2003, pp. 32–51; 
see also s.v., “Universalien, Universalienstreit und Universalienstreit, moderner”, in: Enzy-
klopädie Phi lo sophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, vol. 4, ed. Jürgen Mittelstrass, Stuttgart 1996, 
pp. 406–413; Gui do Küng, Ontologie und logistische Analyse der Sprache: Eine Untersuchung zur 
zeitgenössischen Universaliendiskussion, Vienna 1963; Wolfgang Künne, Abstrakte Ge gen stän de: 
Semantik und Ontologie, Frankfurt am Main 2007; Alain de Libera, La querelle des uni ver saux: De 
Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge, Paris 1996; Wolfgang Stegmüller, Glauben, Wissen und Erkennen. 
Das Uni ver salienproblem einst und jetzt, 3 rd ed., Darmstadt 1974; idem, ed., Das Uni ver salien-
Problem, We ge der Forschung 83, Darmstadt 1978 (an anthology with an introduction by Steg-
müller); Peter Frederick Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London 
1971; Hans-Ulrich Wöhler, ed., Texte zum Universalienstreit, 2 vols., Berlin 1992.
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spite these two distinct traditions, whose content could never be reconciled, Me -
lanch thon has often been called a nominalist Aristotelian.13
Finally—and this is the third approach to Me lanch thon’s image of nature—
these commentaries on Aristotelian natural philosophy are said to have trans-
formed it into a ‘Lutheran discipline’ in that it was determined by Luther’s es-
sential theological principles, above all Luther’s distinction between the Law in 
the Gospel.14 In noting this Sachiko Kusukawa had indeed identified an essential 
theological principle that characterizes Me lanch thon’s adaptation of the Physics. 
But it does not seem reasonable to me to call this a ‘Lutheran’ natural philosophy. 
That thesis assumes that Aris totle’s natural philosophy became ‘Lutheran’ when 
13 The suggestion that Me lanch thon’s belonging to the ‘via moderna’ in Tübingen made him 
an adherent of nominalism can be traced all the way back to a note by his friend and first 
biographer: Joachim Camerarius, De vita Philippi Me lanch thonis Narratio, recensuit, Notas, Doc-
umenta, Bibliothecam Librorum Me lanch thonis Aliaque Addidit Ge. Theodor. Strobelius, Halle 1777, 
pp. 22–23. Camerarius is describing here the Platonic theory of ideas from which particu-
lars are constituted, as the doctrine of ‘reales’ or as ‘via antiqua’, whereas the doctrine of 
‘Nominales’ or of the ‘moderni’ is characterized by the doctrine that universal concepts are 
constituted from particulars in cognition: ‘Quarum una veluti Platonicam de Ideis seu formis 
abstractis separatisque ab iis, quorum moles corporum sensibus subiiceretur, sententiam 
tuebatur. Haec de eo quod generalis cogitatio comprehendit, ut Hominem, Animantem, 
pulcritudinem, etiam spondam atque mensulam, quia natura et res singularis constituitur, 
Reales isti sunt nominati. Altera pars Aristotelem magis sequens, speciem istam de iis, quae 
suam naturam ipsa haberent, universis colligi docens, et concipi intelligendo notionem hanc 
ex singulis quibusdam existentem atque contractam, neque naturas esse has per se ipsas pri-
ores ingulis, neque re, sed nomine tantum consistere: Nominales appellati fuere et moderni.’ 
(ibid., p. 22) This is not the place to examine further whether Camerarius’ characterization 
accurately depicts either so-called Tübingen nominalism or Me lanch thon’s. Me lanch thon’s 
so-called nominalist Aristotelianism became a main concept of the twentieth century. See, 
for example, Hartfelder, Philipp Me lanch thon, p. 42; Hans Maier, An der Grenze der Philoso-
phie: Me lanch thon, Lavater, David Friedrich Strauss, Tübingen 1909, pp. 29–30; Wilhelm Dilthey, 
“Das natürliche System der Geisteswissenschaften im 17. Jahrhundert”, in: idem, Aufsätze 
zur Philosophie, ed. M. Marquardt, East Berlin 1986, p. 241; Ulrich Leinsle, Das Ding und die 
Methode: Methodische Konstitution und Gegenstand der frühen protestantischen Metaphysik, Augs-
burg 1985, pp. 15–16; Heinz Scheible, s.v. “Me lanch thon, Philipp”, TRE 22 (1992), p. 371; idem, 
Philipp Me lanch thon: Vermittler der Reformation; Eine Biographie, Munich 1997, p. 26. The ques-
tion of Me lanch thon’s ‘nominalism’ can also be approached via his position on the problem 
of universals, which he discussed repeatedly (CR 20, pp. 714–715; CR 13, pp. 519–520, 529, 
750–51; CR 13, pp. 142–143, 145–146, 165–166). But the rather minimal importance of the ques-
tion of universals in comparison to his oeuvre as a whole, as well as in its consequences for 
his understanding of philosophy, suggests rather a certain restraint is in order when judg-
ing his nominalism. On this discussion, see Siegfried Widenhofer, Formalstrukturen humanis-
tischer und reformatorischer Theologie bei Philipp Me lanch thon (Regensburger Studien zur The-
ologie 2), 2 vols., Berlin 1976, pp. 102–106; and Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, pp. 33–37.
14 Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philipp Me lanch thon 
(Ideas in Context 34), Cambridge 1995, on this, see also the review by Maija Kallinen, “Nat-
ural Philosophy ‘Me lanch thonized’, or How to Create a Lutheran Discipline?”, Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science 27, no. 3 (1996), 381–386. See also Sachiko Kusukawa, “The 
Natural Philosophy of Me lanch thon and His Followers”, in: Sciences et religions: De Copernic 
à Galilée, 1540–1610; Actes du colloque international organise par l’École Francais de Rome, Rome 
1999, pp. 443–453.
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Me lanch thon adapted it because one of Luther’s theological principles, the dialec-
tic of the Law and the Gospel, found its way into the physics of the Stagirite. Here 
the paradigm of confessionalization, which has recently become an important 
hermeneutic key for the early modern history of science,15 seems to claim validity 
for the history of science in general that as a Lutheran natural philosophy Me -
lanch thon adaptation of Aristotelean physics is itself part of confessionalization.
Before we can answer the question of how to categorize his image of nature, 
it is necessary to describe the character of Me lanch thon’s commentaries on Aris-
totelian natural philosophy and present their central ideas. It should be pointed 
out first that his adaptation is neither a commentary nor a paraphrase of Aristote-
lian physics. In keeping with his topical understanding of science, Me lanch thon 
instead used this model to develop a few of his own basic questions of physics.16 
At the same time, it is striking that a chapter of the physics is dedicated to the 
philosophical concept of God.17 In Aris totle, reflections on the idea of God are 
found not in the Physics but rather in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, in which 
Aris totle explained his theory of the νοῦς that thinks itself. What concept of God 
does Me lanch thon develop in his physics?
15 Only the most fundamental studies from the enormous literature on this subject can be men-
tioned here: Die katholische Konfessionalisierung: Wissenschaftliches Symposium der Gesellschaft 
zur Herausgabe des Corpus Catholicorum und des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte, Münster 1995; 
Ar no Herzig, Der Zwang zum wahren Glauben: Rekatholisierungspolitik vom 15. bis zum 18. Jahr -
hundert, Göttingen 2000; Maximilian Lanzinner, “Konfessionelles Zeitalter”, in: Handbuch der 
deutschen Geschichte, ed. Wolfgang Reinhard, 10th ed., Stuttgart 2001, pp. 3–203; Ernst Wal ter 
Zee den, Konfessionsbildung: Studien zur Reformation, Gegenreformation und katholischen Re form, 
Stutt gart 1985; Heinz Schilling, ed., Die Reformierte Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland: Das 
Pro blem der ‘Zweiten Reformation’ (Wissenschaftliches Symposium des Vereins für Re for ma -
tionsgeschichte 1985), Gütersloh 1986; Hans-Christoph Rublack, ed., Die Lutherische Kon fes -
sionalisierung: Wissenschaftliches Symposion des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 1988, Gü ters loh 
1992; Wolfgang Reinhard, “Gegenreformation als Modernisierung? Pro le gomena einer Theo-
rie des konfessionellen Zeitalters”, in: Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 68 (1977), pp. 226–251; 
idem, “Sozialdisziplinierung, Konfessionalisierung, Moderni sie rung: Ein his to rio gra phi scher 
Diskurs”, in: Nada Boskovka Leimgruber, ed., Die Frühe Neu zeit in der Ge schichts wis sen schaft: 
Forschungstendenzen und Forschungserträge, Paderborn 1997, pp. 39–55; Harm Klueting, “‘Zweite 
Reformation’: Konfessionsbildung, Konfessionalisie rung: Zwan zig Jahre Kon tro versen und 
Ergebnisse nach zwanzig Jahren”, in: Historische Zeitschrift 277 (2003), pp. 309–341; idem, Das 
Konfessionelle Zeitalter, 1525–1648, Stuttgart 1989; Kaspar von Greyerz, et. al., eds., Interkonfessio-
nalität, Transkonfessionalität, binnenkonfessionelle Pluralität: Neue For schun gen zur Konfessionalisie-
rungsthese (Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschich te 201), Gütersloh 2003.
16 For details on Me lanch thon’s understanding of science, see Günter Frank, Topik als Metho-
de der Dogmatik: Antike, Mittelalter, Frühe Neuzeit (Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann 179), 
Berlin 2017, here pp. 172–79; idem, “Zum Wissenschaftsverständnis: Me lanch thons Topik”, 
Me lanch thon-Handbuch, ed. Günter Frank, Berlin 2017, pp. 321–331.
17 See “De Deo”, in: Initia doctrinae physicae (CR 13, pp. 198–202).
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2
Me lanch thon’s philosophical definition of the concept of God is: ‘God is the eter-
nal mind, the cause of good in nature.’18 Just as the Pythagorean Timaeus had 
spoken of the composition of the world according to mathematical numbers, Me -
lanch thon follows Plato in speaking of God as a geometer in whom the wisdom 
of a divine architect is said to be revealed.19 And, as Me lanch thon emphasizes at 
the beginning of his natural philosophy, this concept of God should explicitly be 
preferred to the Aristotelian understanding (in the sense of the Metaphysics).20
These initial observations already make it clear that Me lanch thon’s natural 
philosophy is superimposed with Platonic or Neoplatonic ideas.21 Following Au-
gustine,22 he derived his understanding of nature from the creation myth of Ti-
maeus, and it amounted to a justification of the intelligibility of reality, insofar 
as the whole of reality with its quasi-mechanic causal connection—Me lanch thon 
explicitly speaks of the machine of the world (machina mundi)—has emerged from 
the ideas inherent in the divine spirit. In a fundamental sense, this belongs to the 
18 Ibid., p. 199: ‘Talis est haec Platonica: Deus est mens aeterna, causa boni in natura’.
19 CR 12, pp. 246–247.
20 CR 13, p. 195: ‘Notum est, Aristotelem initio dicere de materia elementorum. Sed nos ordie-
mur a prima causa efficiente, et a corporibus coelestibus, ut Plato in Timaeo, ut studiosi initio 
ordinem rerum praecipuarum in natura considerent.’
21 On the Platonic superimposition of Aris totle’s natural philosophy, see Me lanch thon’s own 
reference at the beginning of his Initia doctrinae physicae (CR 13, p. 195; see note 20). This 
Platonic superimposition of Aris totle’s natural philosophy following on Timaeus’ Platon-
ic myth of creation has yet to be taken into account in the scholarship on Me lanch thon. 
As far as the current discussion is concerned, Me lanch thon continues to be interpreted as 
an Aristotelean (on the discussion of this, see Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, pp. 15–30). 
It is, however, completely overlooked in this discussion, which is made more difficult by 
W. Maurer’s scarcely tenable references, that Me lanch thon had not only explicitly developed 
a Platonic concept of God as the culmination of his philosophical theology (more on this 
later), but that his commentary on the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul is also superimposed 
platonically (for detail on this, see Frank, Die theologische Philosophie). Me lanch thon also ex-
plicitly wrote commentaries on the Platonic laws, that have not yet been studied at all for 
their significance to moral philosophy. It is more important in our context, however, that in 
March 1534 a large commentary on the collected works of Plato, above all on Timaeus, was 
published in Basel. This monumental commentary written in Greek, which is in the library 
of the Protestant ministry of St Augustine’s Monastery in Erfurt and bears the significant 
title “ΑΠANΤΑ ΠΛATΩNOΣ: Platonis omnia opera cum commentariis Procli in Timaeum & Po-
litica, thesauro veteris Philosophiae maximo”, has not only remained almost entirely unknown 
to Me lanch thon scholarship but has not even been discussed as part of his biography. The 
same is true for research on the early modern period in general. After Marsilio Ficino’s first 
publication of it in Florence in 1482–84, published in Latin translation in Venice in 1513, 
Me lanch thon’s handwritten commentaries in Simon Grynäus’ edition of Plato’s Opera om-
nia, Basel: Johann Walder 1534, is probably the second extensive commentary of the early 
modern period in the Latin Occident. Finally, it is notable, though no longer surprising after 
these references, that Me lanch thon himself justified the history of creation explicitly based 
on Plato’s Timaeus in his foreword to Martin Luther, In librum Mose enarrationes, Wittenberg: 
n.p., 1544, (CR 5, pp. 258–268, here: p. 261).
22 Augustine, De diversis Quaestionibus octoginta tribus liber unus, XLVI, 2; MPL 40 (Op. omn. 6), 
p. 30.
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Platonic or Neoplatonic tradition, however strong the echoes of Aris totle may be. 
On the basis of this Platonic concept of God, moreover, a wealth of statements 
on the divine essence are derived that go far beyond the tradition of medieval 
and Scholastic theology. As Me lanch thon emphasizes, this concept of God—and 
this is made particularly clear by the optimistic possibility of knowledge in this 
theological/philosophical conception—that God is a spiritual being, intelligent, 
eternal, cause of the good in nature, that is, true, good, just, omnipotent creator 
of all good things, and so on. These reflections on the human mind (cogitationes 
humanae mentis) are also contained in the Platonic definition; as Me lanch thon em-
phasizes, they are true, learned, and founded on certain proofs, even if it is neces-
sary to supplement them by knowing how God revealed himself.23
The Platonic idea of God has other implications as well. We should mention 
here first the theory of the relatedness of the essence of the divine and the human 
mind. This theory is at the same time the philosophical basis for Me lanch thon’s 
concept of God, which he repeatedly and exclusively traced back to Plato: ‘God is 
the eternal mind, the cause of good in nature.’24 This concept of God represents 
in the sense the culmination of his image of nature, but central intelligence of 
the theology are also linked to concerns of the philosophical theology and that 
is precisely, according to Me lanch thon, what turns the understanding of nature 
into ‘natural theology’, although he does not use that term. This is true first and 
23 This argument is especially detailed in CR 21, p. 610: ‘Platonica haec est: Deus est mens aeter-
na, causa boni in natura. […] Deum esse mentem aeternam, id est, essentiam spiritualem, 
in tel li gentem, aeternam, causam boni in natura, id est, veracem, bonam, iustam, omnipoten-
tem conditricem bonarum rerum omnium et totius ordinis in natura et humanae naturae ad 
cer tum ordinem, id est, ad certam obedientiam. Haec omnia complexus est Plato. Sed hae 
sunt adhuc humanae mentis cogitationes, quae etsi verae et eruditae sunt et ex firmis de-
mons tra tionibus natae, tamen addendum est, qualem se Deus ipse patefecerit.’ 
24 He did so explicitly for the first time in his Enarratio in Evangelium Johannis of 1536 (CR 15, 
p. 103): ‘Alii sunt, ut Plato, Cicero, qui moventur ratione, ut sentiant Deum esse aliquam men -
tem aeternam, sicut Plato dicit, causam boni’. On the many citations of this Platonic concept 
of God in Me lanch thon’s writings, see Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, p. 211 n. 83. In his 
fore word to Luther’s De novissimis verbis Davidis, transl. Caspar Cruciger, Leipzig 1550, with 
an eye to the knowledge of God and the associated concept of God, Me lanch thon himself 
referred to Plato’s knowledge, which was to be taken seriously even if, like all pagan knowl -
edge, it needed to be supplemented (CR 7, pp. 581–585). In addition to this widespread Pla-
tonic concept of God, there is just one passage in the Erotemata dialectices of 1547 in which 
Me lanch thon seems to suggest an Aristotelian concept of God in that he relates the concept 
of substance to God (CR 13, p. 528). The extent to which this application of the concept of 
substance to the concept of God is significant can ultimately only be demonstrated by this 
philosophical significance of the theory of categories. Like many humanists, however, Me -
lanch thon interpreted the theory of categories rhetorically, that is to say, he was interested 
not in the ontological significance of the categories but in a real relationship of ‘res et verba’. 
Moreover, this passage in the dialectic later contains a reference to the human mind being 
too weak to penetrate the interior of the thing, which shows that the concept of God in this 
dialectic is Platonic as well and based on the theory of ‘notitiae’. (CR 13, p. 529: ‘et Deo gratias 
agamus, quod aliquo modo et sese et naturam rerum nobis ostendit, et aliquas notitias certas 
tradidit’).
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foremost for the justification based on the theology of creation for a philosophical 
knowledge of God. ‘God wanted to be known and be seen. So he both created 
all creatures and established the wonderous work of art in order to prove to us 
irrefutably that reality does not exist by chance but rather that an eternal, archi-
tectural mind exists, good and just, who sees and judges the deeds of human 
beings.’25 In Creation, God communicated the best things in him to the human 
mind, namely, wisdom, justice, joy, and free will.26 But that means in a fundamen-
tal sense that for Me lanch thon nature should always be understood as creation. 
In his idea of nature’s creation, that is, as a place of revelation in which the final 
reality of the world appears, resonates throughout the ancient idea of the im-
age of nature.27 In Greek philosophy, the concept of ‘nature’ was expressed both 
as κόσμος and as φύσις. They understood κόσμος to mean the beautiful order. 
The word φύσις was translated into Latin as natura. Natura, in turn, derives from 
nasci, or ‘to be born’. Its counterpart in Greek is γένεσις, or ‘coming into being’, 
whereby this always meant a kind of appearance, a being-brought-to-light. The 
Latin concept of nature emphasizes less appearance and showing oneself than 
being produced and becoming. But both meanings come together in the under-
standing of nature as creation that is characteristic of Me lanch thon. Nature is at 
once the place of revelation, that is, of the appearance of its ultimate reality, and 
also that which has been made by the Creator. This concept of nature is thus still 
an attempt to reconcile physics with biblical Creation. The first to separate the 
two perspectives, and hence introduce the modern concept of nature tied only to 
empirical practice, was probably Francis Bacon.28
3
At the center of this nature understood as creation is the human being. This out-
standing role of the human being in nature is already clear by Me lanch thon’s 
Platonic or Neoplatonic theory of the relatedness of the essence of the human 
and the divine spirit.29 The core of this philosophical definition of the essence 
of the human mind is the theory of exemplarism, which ultimately goes back to 
25 CR 21, p. 637: ‘Voluit Deus innotescere et se conspici. Ideo et condidit omnes creaturas et 
miram artem adhibuit, ut convinceret nos, non extitisse res casu, sed esse aeternam mentem, 
architectatricem, bonam, iustam, spectantem hominum facta et iudicantem.’
26 CR 12, p. 592; 13, pp. 124–125, et passim. The theological foundation of Me lanch thon’s image 
of nature is also emphasized in Peter Barker and Bernhard R. Goldstein, “Theological Foun-
dations of Kepler’s Astronomy”, Osiris 16, no. 2 (2001): pp. 88–113, here pp. 94–95.
27 For a detailed discussion of what follows, see Georg Picht, “Die Entwicklung des Naturbe-
griffs”, in: idem, Der Begriff der Natur und seine Geschichte, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1990, pp. 79–95.
28 See Friedrich Kaulbach, s.v. “Natur. V. Neuzeit”, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 
vol. 6, Basel 1984, 468–478, here p. 469.
29 I restrict myself here to the essential aspects of the theory of the relatedness of human and 
divine essence. For a detailed discussion of this complex theory, which in the ‘notitiae na-
turales’ is linked to aspects of the philosophy of mind, epistemology, cognitive and noetic 
psychology, epistemology, and gnoseology, see Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, pp. 112–
29; idem, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens: Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit 
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the Platonic—and (since Augustine30) Christian-baptized—theory of methexis.31 
Me lanch thon interprets the particular-form relationship of the divine and the 
human mind as a relationship of participation,32 in which the human mind and 
the ‘notitiae naturales’ with which it is endowed represent more than just a light 
of divine wisdom. In the faculties of the soul, the human mind even participates 
in the divine rule of the world.33
This central position of the human being in nature understood as creation 
clarifies a programmatic parenthetical remark in his physics in which Me lanch -
thon addresses the question what the world is: ‘This so great and wondrous work 
was created by God so that it could be the home of human nature in which God 
wanted to be known and seen, and the goodness of God and his enormous love of 
the human species must be made known again and again, because in truth such 
a great work has been undertaken for our sake’.34 Me lanch thon was thus part of 
an early modern ‘trend toward the establishment of an optimistic-metaphysical 
worldview’ and of an ‘anthropocentric theology’.35 For not only does the human 
mind, because of its essence of relatedness, stands in a special relation to God, but 
it is also the instrument through which God can be known. For that reason, God 
created human beings so that a knowledge of God which can shine in them and 
so they themselves would be the clearest evidence of God’s existence.36 Although, 
as Me lanch thon adds, this light of the knowledge of God is darkened by the Fall, 
at least rays of light (scintillae) remain, so that, for example, there is no doubt 
(Quaestiones 13), Stuttgart 2003, here pp. 58–64. On this, see also the discussion in Groh, 
Schöp fung im Widerspruch, pp. 630–634.
30 De ordine II 18, 47.
31 Parmenides 132–36; Phaidon 100 b–d.
32 CR 13, p. 5: ‘Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagine parva’; see also in the Doctrina anatom-
ica of 1550 (CR 11, p. 941): ‘hominem esse parvum mundum, quia mens imago Dei est.’ For 
additional citations from various writings that are relevant to this theory of the relatedness 
of human and divine essence, which is central to Me lanch thon’s thought, see Frank, Die 
theologische Philosophie, pp. 88–89 esp. nn. 154–159.
33 CR 11, p. 942: ‘Nec tantum convincit nos hic ordo, ut esse Deum fateri cogamur, sed etiam 
qualis sit, monet, et imaginem gubernationis di vi nae in nobis circumferimus. Tota antiqui-
tas hoc modo distribuit homines vires.’
34 CR 13, pp. 213–14: ‘Quid est Mundus […] conditum esse hoc tantum et tam mirandum opus a 
Deo, ut sit domicilium humanae naturae, in qua Deus innotescere et conspici voluit, ac saepe 
cogitanda est bonitas Dei, et erga genus Humanum, ingens amor, quod vere nostra causa 
tantus labor institutus est.’
35 For more detail on this, see Günter Frank, “Philipp Me lanch thons ‘Liber de anima’ und die 
Etablierung der frühneuzeitlichen Anthropologie”, in: Michael Beyer and Günther Warten-
berg, eds., Humanismus und Wittenberger Reformation: Festgabe anlässlich des 500. Geburtstages 
des Praeceptor Germaniae Philipp Me lanch thon am 16. Februar 1997, Helmar Junghans gewidmet, 
Leip zig 1996, pp. 313–326, here p. 316.
36 For example, in Me lanch thon’s Liber de anima of 1553 (CR 13, p. 138): ‘Sicut autem homo con-
ditus est, ut in eo luceat notitia Dei, et ut ei Deus communicet suam sapientiam et bonitatem, 
ita mentem humanam voluit evidentissimum de ipso testimonium esse.’
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about numbers.37 And based on this ability to recognize God, which can even be 
lost though the Fall, proofs of God become possible for Me lanch thon, which he 
then lays out in detail both in his physics and in his commentary on the Epistle 
to the Romans of 1540: the proof of causality, movement, finality; the proof from 
the ‘ordo naturae’ from numbers, Providence, the order of the world, astronomy 
and astrology, as well as—the strongest proofs—the human mind itself and the 
ability with which it is endowed distinguish between good and evil as well as 
the experience of conscience.38 For Me lanch thon, proofs of God are ‘true rational 
reasons that are endowed to the human soul’.39 ‘For from the many vestiges, that 
of God is inferred. But such inference would not be possible if the [human] mind 
were not endowed by God with certain “notitia” or πρόληψις’.40 Nature is not just 
the place of the appearance of God as final reality but becomes at the same time 
the place of the knowledge of God.
In this context, already in the tradition, the doctrine of human beings being 
the image of God and the consequences of the Fall play a special role. The fact that 
the human being can use reason is an expression of being made in the image of 
God.41 Already in the early church, this question was discussed in direct connec-
tion with the problem of the consequences of the Fall. How far did the faculties of 
the human soul reach when it had perhaps been destroyed by the Fall? From the 
time of Irenaeus of Lyon (d. 202), it had been a universal conviction of Christian-
ity that the consequences never went so far as to eliminate the human abilities of 
reason and will—it was called the ‘imago’—whereas the human being as image 
of Christ (similitudo) had been lost because of sin. According to Me lanch thon, the 
Fall had led to the loss of the ‘imago’ and of the state of original righteousness; 
nevertheless ‘even now after the Fall, the mind and the true “notitiae” in the 
mind are evidence that God exists and that he is an intelligent being, a true, just, 
beneficent, pure deliverer from the wicked’.42 ‘Notions of God’ (notitiae de Deo) are 
indications of the structural similarity to God that human beings did not lose as 
a result of the Fall and that therefore form the basis for the possible knowledge of 
37 Ibid.: ‘Esset autem haec lux in nobis multo clarior, si natura hominum non languefacta esset, 
sed tamen adhuc religquae sunt scintillae tantae, ut, de numeris nulla est dubitatio.’
38 For more detail on this, see Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, pp. 227–334.
39 See the references following the proofs of God in the commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans: ‘Postea profecto ad confirmandas bonas opiniones, multum prodest tenere infi-
xas animo veras rationes, quae testantur esse Deum conditorem et conservatorem rerum’ 
(CR 15, p. 566).
40 Ibid., 564: ‘Nam ex multis vestigiis ratiocinatur ista de deo. Neque tamen hae ratiocinaretur, 
nisi etiam insita esse menti quaedam notitia seu πρόληψις de Deo.’
41 Christoph Markschies, s.v. “Gottebenbildlichkeit. II. Christentum”, in: Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, vol. 3, 4th ed., Tübingen 2000, pp. 1160–1163; Leo Scheffczyk, s.v. “Gotteben -
bild lichkeit. III. Theologie- und dogmengeschichtlich”, in: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, 
vol. 4, 3 rd ed., Freiburg im Breisgau 1995, pp. 874–876.
42 CR 12, pp. 591–592: ‘nunc post lapsum tamen mens et verae notitiae in mente testimonia 
sunt, quod sit Deus et quod sit essentia intelligens, vera, bona, iusta, benefica, casta, vindex 
scelerum etc.’
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God. And, finally, what is characteristic of the relationship of philosophy and the-
ology as a whole is also true for the knowledge of God: philosophical knowledge 
of God is the knowledge of the Law43 and must therefore be distinguished from 
the Gospel, that is, whatever is accessible to the human mind in the knowledge 
of God is insufficient in terms of the theology of revelation and soteriological-
ly irrelevant. Me lanch thon made this distinction, which goes back to Luther’s 
dialectic of the Law and the Gospel, clear terminologically as well. Statements 
about the existence of God and statements about the essence of the divine that 
are accessible to philosophical knowledge of God are ordinarily placed under the 
heading of ‘qualis sit Deus’, whereas the term ‘essentia Dei’ refers exclusively to 
those predicates of essence such as the divine Trinity or to soteriology, which are 
the subjects of revelation.44 Nevertheless, despite this insufficiency in terms of the 
theology of revelation and soteriology, it is clear for Me lanch thon in any case that 
there is a knowledge of God that is possible for all human beings even outside of 
the church and the theology of revelation.45
4
From the discussion thus far, we can already bring out central aspects of Me -
lanch thon’s image of nature:
1. Nature is the result of creation by a divine, architectural mind. In this respect, 
nature is always creation and at the same time revelation of this architectural 
creator.
2. At the center of the understanding of nature as creation stands the human 
being. The human mind not only has an essential relatedness to the divine 
mind, weakened by the Fall but not lost, but can also recognize the architec-
tural creator in nature.
But what does the true image of nature that Me lanch thon provided in his writ-
ings look like?
Nature is characterized by a thorough intelligibility that not only has its foun-
dation in the eternal, architectural mind as its creator but is also manifested in 
mathematical structures that constitute the order of the cosmos.46 Just as the Py-
43 CR 24, p. 865: ‘Intelligitne natura esse Deum. Respondeo: Ratio naturaliter intelligit esse 
Deum, et agnoscit aliquo modo, qualis sit. Nam mens habet aliquam notitiam legis: sicut 
Plato dicit: Deus est mens aeterna, causa boni in natura.’
44 CR 7, pp. 582–585; CR 14, pp. 415–417; CR 21, pp. 609–610; CR 23, p. 497.
45 CR 23, p. 213: ‘Platonica (descriptio), etsi est insufficiens, tamen eas proprietates continet, 
quae utcunque luce naturali de Deo sine patefactione di vi na cerni possunt. Est autem haec 
descriptio Deus est mens aeterna causa boni in natura.’
46 For more detail on what follows, see Günter Frank, “Gott und Natur: Zur Transformation 
der Naturphilosophie in Me lanch thons humanistischer Philosophie”, in: idem and Stefan 
Rhein, eds., Me lanch thon und die Naturwissenschaften seiner Zeit (Me lanch thon-Schriften der 
Stadt Bretten 4), Sigmaringen 1998, pp. 43–58. See also the references in Groh, Schöpfung im 
Wi derspruch, esp. pp. 605–608.
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thagorean Timaeus spoke of the composition of the body of the world based on 
ratios of numbers,47 Me lanch thon follows Plato in speaking of God as a geometer 
in whom the wisdom of the divine architect is revealed.48 This also justifies the 
primacy given to the teleological thinking that determines this image of nature. 
But to the extent that nature in general and the teleology of nature are the place 
of the revelation of its creator, the teleology of nature becomes the theology of 
nature. Corresponding on the other side to this fundamental reflection based 
on the metaphysics of numbers is the outstanding importance of the geometric/
mathematical method as a model to a general methodology for all scientific disci-
plines;49 more than that: mathematics itself becomes a proof of God.
Me lanch thon’s idea of nature—he himself speaks of the physics of the ‘machina 
mundi’50 or of the ‘universa machina’51—is characterized by a continuous causal 
nexus and by mathematical structures that are not separate from the divine rea-
son for the world but is itself the work of an ordering, intelligent reason, a work 
that can also be recognized by the human mind. This idea inevitably leads to an 
understanding of nature that presents an almost optimistic image of the world 
and is characterized by three aspects:
1. The idea of a continuous causal nexus to explain nature that has its counter-
part in the human mind, which can also make true statements about nature
2. The idea of a machine of the world (machina mundi) as the work of an ordering 
and intelligent reason, which
3. to the extent all of nature is created for human use, leads to (theological) 
anthropocentrism.52
This metaphysical optimism had been established under the guise of Me lanch -
thon’s theology, above all the theology of creation and the human being as image 
of God. That is to say, despite the absolute primacy of the theology of salvation, 
the rationality and intelligibility of the world are recognized. It is clear that the 
47 Timaios 31c–32b, 53b–54c.
48 CR 12, pp. 246–247.
49 For more detail on this understanding of science, see Frank, Die theologische Philosophie, 
pp. 159–182.
50 CR 13, p. 206.
51 Ibid., p. 294.
52 This theological anthropocentrism is illustrated by various motifs: everything is created for 
the use of human beings because God cares for them (CR 13, pp. 204–205: ‘Cum autem mani-
festum sit haec ordinata esse propter hominum utilitatem, fatemur vitam hominum Deo cu-
rae esse. Xenophon hoc argumentum recitans, inquit, Deum esse φιλόζωον, id est, amantem 
animantium, quia instituerit temporum distributionem, convenientem rebus nascentibus, 
quae necessariae sunt ad tuendam vitam animantium’.); the world was created as a ‘domi-
cilium’ for human beings (ibid., p. 213: ‘propterea quod miranda est pulchritudo coelestium 
et terrestrium corporum, et humanae naturae, propter quam hoc tantum et tam ornatum 
domicilium conditum est’); and the Ciceronian motif that everything in nature exists for the 
sake of human beings (ibid., p. 214: ‘omnia in natura rerum propter homines nasci, homines 
autem natos esse propter Deum, videlicet, ut innotescat et celebretur Deus’).
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theology of salvation and the theology of creation will compete with each oth-
er somewhat. Since even outside of revelation—and here Me lanch thon takes up 
Augustine’s theme of the ‘book of nature’53—nature is a book or mirror in which 
God reveals himself.54 This talk of the ‘book of nature’ is of course already natural 
theology, since just as God reveals himself in the book of the Holy Scriptures, so 
too he reveals himself in the (second) book of nature.
Such an image of nature determined the early modern image of the world and 
is documented for scholars such as Copernicus, Galileo Gali lei, Isaac Newton, 
Robert Boyle, and Giambattista Vico.55 Me lanch thon’s metaphysical optimism 
joined with the return of the Platonic myth of creation and the Stoic idea of an 
anthropocentric theology of nature. Scholars today largely agree that this Pla-
tonic conception, which is essentially ‘natural theology’, was superimposed on 
Aristotelian nature philosophy and became established at the threshold to the 
early modern period. And this worldview had a successful career, as studies in 
the social history of modern science, in particular by Anglo-American scholars, 
have been able to show.
However—and here I return to the point mentioned at the beginning, which 
Sachiko Kusukawa raised with her interpretation of Me lanch thon’s physics as 
a Lutheran discipline—this metaphysical optimism of Me lanch thon’s image of 
nature is subordinated to a salvation doctrine. For all the metaphysical optimism, 
intelligibility of the world, and teleological anthropocentrism that characterize 
his image of nature, it is merely the recognition of the Law. ‘As in the doctrine of 
the church’, as Me lanch thon emphasizes in the chapter ‘Deo’ in his physics, ‘it is 
necessary to remind people frequently of the difference between the Law and the 
Gospel, so I remind my reader that the natural philosophical knowledge of God 
is knowledge from the Law and not from the Gospel’.56 This theological struc-
tural principle, which Me lanch thon took from Luther’s theology and applied to 
all of his scientific works, amount to a recognition that all human knowledge is 
insufficient soteriologically, that is, for the state of human salvation before God. 
Does this soteriological proviso turn Me lanch thon’s commentaries on Aristote-
53 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, MPL 34 (Op. omn. 3.1), pp. 219–222.
54 CR 13, p. 198: ‘Hanc doctrinam de Deo mens humana circumferens, tanquam liber est et spe -
cu lum monstrans Deum.’ On the theological and philosophical assumptions and their tra-
dition by the early church fathers up to Augustine, see Ruth Groh, “Theologische und Phi lo -
so phi sche Voraussetzung der Rede vom Buch der Natur”, in: Aleida Assmann, Ulrich Gaier, 
and Gisela Trommsdorff, eds., Zwischen Literatur und Anthropologie: Diskurse, Me dien, Per for -
man zen, Tübingen 2004, pp. 139–146, and Dieter Groh, “Die Entstehung der Schöpfungs theo -
lo gie oder der Lehre vom Buch der Natur bei den frühen Kirchenvätern in Ost und West bis 
zu Augustin”, in: ibid., pp. 147–160.
55 On the whole picture with relevant literature, see Frank, “Gott und Natur”; Groh and Groh, 
Welt bild und Naturaneignung; Dieter Groh, Göttliche Weltökonomie: Perspektiven der Wissenschaft -
li chen Revolution vom 15. bis zum 17. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main 2010.
56 CR 13, p. 198: ‘Ut autem in doctrina Ecclesiae, necesse est saepe commonefieri homines de 
discrimine Legis et Evangelii, ita hic praemoneo auditores, physicam de Deo notitiam, esse 
Legis notitiam, non Evangelii.’
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lian physics into a ‘Lutheran discipline’? This question combines various motifs 
from Luther’s theology that seem to contradict such metaphysical optimism, for 
example, his radical doctrine of Original Sin or even his theological critique of 
Aris totle, which led to his epistemologically resigned principle: ‘Reason cannot 
grasp and understand even the natural work of God’s creation’.57 Hardly anyone 
has taught that a philosophical knowledge of God could lead to human salvation. 
I am only aware of the treatise—very influential in early modern discussions—
Liber naturae sive creaturarum (written 1434–1436) by the Catalan physician and 
philosopher Raymond of Sabunde (d. 1436), which over the course of its publi-
cation history was also known as Theologia naturalis.58 Sabunde’s treatise was, in 
general, written to counter the idea that reason and faith, philosophy and theol-
ogy, were irreconcilable opposites. On the contrary, according to Sabunde, the 
latter science is said to easily teach all the necessary truths about God and human 
beings and everything that is necessary for salvation of human beings, so that 
they can achieve through it (natural theology) eternal life.59
Unlike for Sabunde, for Me lanch thon it is clear that however far-reaching the 
human ability to know God and nature might be, they are fundamentally in-
sufficient for their salvation. And perhaps that is also the reason why there is 
no surviving critique by Luther of Me lanch thon’s metaphysical optimism or the 
teleological anthropocentrism of his image of nature.
57 WA Tr 3, p. 426.
58 Raymond of Sabunde, Incipit theologia naturalis siue liber creaturarum: Specialiter de homine et 
de natura eius, Deventer ca. 1485. On Rabunde’s natural theology, see David Matzke, Die na -
tür li che Theologie des Raymundus von Sabunde: Ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte des 15. Jahrhun -
derts, Breslau 1846; Gabriel Compayré, De R. Sabundo ac de theologiae naturalis libro. Paris 1872; 
F. Cicchi ti-Suriani, Sopra R. Sabonda, teologo, filosofo e medico del secolo XV, L’Aquila 1889; Jo -
han nes Schenderlein, Die philosophischen Anschauungen R. von Sabunde, Leipzig 1898; Konrad 
Feiereis, Die Umprägung der natürlichen Theologie in Religionsphilosophie: Ein Beitrag zur deut -
schen Geistesgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Erfurter theologische Studien 18), Leipzig 1965, 
pp. 6–10; Jaume de Puig, “Escriptura i actitud humanistica en el ‘Liber Creaturarum’ de Ra -
món Sabunde”, in: Revista Catalana de Teologia 3 (1978): 127–151; idem, Les sources de la penseé 
philo sophique de Raimond Sebond (Ramon Sibiuda), Études montaignistes 17, Paris 1994; idem, 
La filosofia de Ramon Sibiuda, Barcelona 1997.
59 See the evidence in Feiereis, Die Umprägung der natürlichen Theologie, pp. 6–10; esp. p. 7 nn. 9–13.
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Lüthy, Christoph “Verspätete Wende: Wie Kopernikus im sechzehnten Jahrhundert 
gelesen wurde”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 150 (July 2, 2003): p. N 3.
Maier, Hans, An der Grenze der Philosophie: Me lanch thon, Lavater, David Friedrich Strauss, 
Tübingen 1909.
Markschies, Christoph, “Gottebenbildlichkeit. II. Christentum”, in: Religion in Ge -
schich te und Gegenwart, vol. 3, 4th ed., Tübingen 2000, pp. 1160–1163.
Matzke, David, Die natürliche Theologie des Raymundus von Sabunde: Ein Beitrag zur Dog-
mengeschichte des 15. Jahrhunderts, Breslau 1846.
Maurer, Wilhelm, Me lanch thon-Studien, Gütersloh 1964.
Merton, Robert King, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 
New York 1970; orig. pub. Osiris 4, no. 2 (1938), pp. 360–632.
Picht, Georg, “Die Entwicklung des Naturbegriffs”, in: idem, Der Begriff der Natur und 
seine Geschichte, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1990, pp. 79–95.
Puig, Jaume de, “Escriptura i actitud humanistica en el ‘Liber Creaturarum’ de Ramón 
Sabunde”, in: Revista Catalana de Teologia 3 (1978), pp. 127–151.
—,  La filosofia de Ramon Sibiuda, Barcelona 1997.
—,  Les sources de la penseé philosophique de Raimond Sebond (Ramon Sibiuda) (Études 
montaignistes 17), Paris 1994. 
Reinhard, Wolfgang, “Gegenreformation als Modernisierung? Prolegomena einer 
Theo rie des konfessionellen Zeitalters”, in: Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 68 
(1977), pp. 226–251. 
—, “Sozialdisziplinierung, Konfessionalisie rung, Modernisierung: Ein historiogra-
phischer Diskurs”, in: Nada Boskovka Leim gruber, ed., Die Frühe Neuzeit in der 
Geschichtswissenschaft: Forschungstendenzen und Forschungserträge, Paderborn 1997, 
pp. 39–55.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
46 Günter Frank
Rublack, Hans-Christoph ed., Die Lutherische Konfessionalisierung: Wissenschaftliches 
Sym posion des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 1988, Gütersloh 1992.
Scheffczyk, Leo, “Gottebenbildlichkeit. III. Theologie- und dogmengeschichtlich”, in: 
Le xi kon für Theologie und Kirche, vol. 4, 3 rd ed., Freiburg im Breisgau 1995, pp. 874–
876.
Scheible, Heinz, “Me lanch thon, Philipp”, TRE 22 (1992), p. 371. 
—, Philipp Me lanch thon: Vermittler der Reformation; Eine Biographie, Munich 1997. 
Schenderlein, Johannes, Die philosophischen Anschauungen R. von Sabunde, Leipzig 1898.
Schilling, Heinz, ed., Die Reformierte Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland: Das Problem 
der ‘Zweiten Reformation’, Wissenschaftliches Symposium des Vereins für Reforma -
tions geschichte 1985, Gütersloh 1986.
Stegmüller, Wolfgang, Glauben, Wissen und Erkennen. Das Universalienproblem einst und 
jetzt, 3 rd ed., Darmstadt 1974. 
—,  (ed.), Das Universalien-Problem (Wege der Forschung 83), Darmstadt 1978.
Strawson, Peter Frederick, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London 1971. 
Thüringer, Walter, “Paul Eber (1511–1569): Me lanch thons Physik und seine Stellung 
zu Copernicus”, in: Heinz Scheible, ed., Me lanch thon in seinen Schülern (Wolfenbüt-
teler Forschungen 73), Wiesbaden 1997, pp. 285–320.
Wiedenhofer, Siegfried, Formalstrukturen humanistischer und reformatorischer Theologie 
bei Philipp Me lanch thon (Regensburger Studien zur Theologie 2), 2 vols., Berlin 1976.
Zeeden, Ernst Walter, Konfessionsbildung: Studien zur Reformation, Gegenreformation und 
ka tholischen Reform, Stuttgart 1985.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
God in Time and Space
Socinian Physics and Its Opponents 
Sascha Salatowsky
1 Introduction
In the course of the 17th century, substantial changes took place both in physics 
and theology that encompassed also their mutual relationship. The old scholastic 
unity of philosophy and theology disintegrated. Philosophy was no longer the 
handmaid of theology (ancilla theologiae), but fought instead for its autonomy and 
freedom to philosophise (libertas philosophandi) independently from theological 
requirements. At the same time, theology lost its status as a leading science and 
came under increasing pressure to justify its doctrines, to demonstrate the truth 
of the Scripture and to accept the independence of philosophy and the scienc-
es. Physico-theology at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century 
was only an interlude which could not prevent the fundamental separation of 
these disciplines.1 Moreover, the foundation of philosophy in general and phys-
ics in particular in the Aristotelian framework and tradition was abandoned. The 
mathematization of physics was the result of this new understanding of sciences 
characterised significantly by experiments. 
A very striking example of this kind of change is astronomy which became 
the new leading science in the 16th century. The Copernican revolution of the 
heliocentric world-view lead to a new understanding of the universe that opened 
up the “boundaries” of heaven into infinity, as Alexandre Koyré has shown in his 
famous book From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (1957).2 What happened 
here had immense impact on the concept of space as well, which was therefore 
in the centre of scientific interests at that time, encompassing different theories 
such as atomism (Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), Daniel Sennert (1572–1637) etc.), 
extensive debates about the possibility of void space or vacuums3 and the idea of 
absolute space postulated by Isaac Newton (1643–1727).4 As a result, the old astro-
1 Cf. Anne-Charlott Trepp, Von der Glückseligkeit alles zu wissen. Die Erforschung der Natur als 
religiöse Praxis in der Frühen Neuzeit, Frankfurt/Main 2009.
2 Cf. Alexander Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, Baltimore 1957. 
3 Cf. especially Edward Grant, Much Ado About Nothing. Theories of Space and Vacuum from the 
Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution, Cambridge 1981; for a short overview Fritz Krafft: 
“Horror vacui”, in: HWPh 3 (1974), pp. 1206–1212. 
4 For the concept of space in the medieval and early modern period cf. Alexander Gosztonyi, 
Der Raum. Geschichte seiner Probleme in Philosophie und Wissenschaften, 2 vols, Freiburg et al. 
1976, here vol. 1, pp. 202–374.
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nomical convictions concerning nature, creation, matter, earth, universe, space, 
the order of up and down as an ontological structure of the geocentric model 
were either changed or totally abandoned. 
Of course, these debates did not remain without effects on important doctrines 
of theology because they called into question a certain understanding of the Bi-
ble. Space as a scope of creation, as “place” of divine actions was always a central 
category of theological thinking. The descriptions of the Bible about heaven and 
earth are numerous, beginning with the history of creation that describes the di-
vision between light and dark, the Firmament and the waters, heaven and earth 
and so forth (Gen. 1:1–17) and ends with the revelation of the Last Judgement, 
i. e. with the destruction of this “old” earth and the creation of a “new” heaven, a 
“new” earth and a “new” Jerusalem (Rev. 21:1), together with the resurrection of 
the true believers in a “new” spiritual body (1 Cor. 15:44). Numerous, too, are the 
biblical descriptions of God as the creator of the world who acts in the world, who 
shows himself “corporeally” in a place (Ex. 3:4; 19:20 etc.), who lives in heaven 
(1 Kings 8:27; Isa. 66:1 etc.) and who is not far from every human being (Jer. 23:23; 
Acts 17:27). But in what sense should we understand all these references—literal-
ly, metaphorically or spiritually? “Where” is God, where is the “space” of God? 
What does it mean that He is ubiqui tous in view of the debates about both the 
infinite and void space which was so difficult to believe for many Christians? 
What does space and place mean? What is a (mathematical) point in this context? 
What does ‘heaven’ mean, what ‘earth’ as a heavenly body? One of the main tasks 
of theology in the Early Modern Period was to find an answer to these questions 
in order to reconcile once again scientific and theological doctrines concerning 
space and the relation of God to it. 
The new scientific problems concerned, however, not only the concept of space 
but also the concept of time. “Here” (hic) as one principle of living beings is always 
accompanied by “now” (nunc) that gives—as a measure of motion—all here and 
there temporal direction. And it was again astronomy which was responsible for 
large-scale debates about the understanding of time. Hans Blumenberg has right-
ly concluded in his famous work Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt (1975, The 
Genesis of the Copernican World) that “the intensification of the problematic of time, 
which is characteristic of the modern age, can also not be understood apart from 
the alteration that Copernicus had set about making in the model of the world”.5 
With the daily rotation of the Earth on its own axis, the sun or rather the whole 
heaven was no longer the basis for reading off time in the course of the year. This 
function was from then on an attribute of this earthly planet that had previously 
been considered dormant. For Blumenberg, the problem of time clearly illustrates 
“why the Earth not only could become a star among stars but had to become one”.6 
5 Hans Blumenberg, The Genesis of the Copernican World. Transl. by Robert M. Wallace. Cam-
bridge, Mass. et al. 2000, p. 433.
6 Ibid., p. 435. (Italics in original)
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The predominant position of the Earth in the geocentric model as the centre of the 
universe—embedded in the eternity of the immovable highest spheres, where God 
was supposed to live—was dramatically reversed: The Earth became a star among 
stars, incorporated into universal generation and corruption, into time that is itself 
a creation of God, who outside of it rules in eternity. However, in the same way as 
the universe became infinite with dramatic consequences for the question “Where 
is God?”, time—as measure of infinite motions—became infinite (or eternal) with 
equally dramatic consequences for the old conviction that there is a difference be-
tween eternity (as an attribute of God) and time (as an attribute of the living things).
From a biblical point of view, God is not only the creator of the universe, i. e. the 
whole space in which all things are happening, but also the creator of time which 
is the beginning of all motions (Gen. 1:14–18). His “pre-temporality” extends out 
of time (Ps. 90:2), his “post-temporality” returns to eternity (Ps. 102:25–28), his 
“over-temporality” reaches into time (Ex. 3:14), and his “inner-temporality” final-
ly rises above time (Isa. 41:4). All times are to Him like a moment (Ps. 90:4) and a 
day like thousand years (2 Pet. 3:8). But what is the relation between eternity and 
time? How can the eternal act on the temporal, the infinite on the finite? How can 
one understand the temporal action of the eternal God? What is time and eterni-
ty? At this point, the relation between space and time is evident, as Johann Peter 
Lange puts it: “As the space is consistently the cosmos of appearances so is time 
their rhythm.”7 The Christian God as the creator of both of them must find his 
determination beyond space and time without disappearing into the infinite, i. e. 
into indeterminable everywhere and nowhere or forever and never. This task has 
already been at stage before the Copernican revolution began but became now 
more urgent. Theology was forced to prove once again the compatibility between 
the new physics of space and time and the view of God in the Bible.
It might be surprising that the classical understanding of space and time, as 
it was described for the first time by Aris totle and found its way into the philo-
sophical and theological tradition of Western Europe, did not change much in the 
aftermath of Copernicus.8 It is significant that Dirk Evers in his study Raum—Ma-
terie—Zeit (2000, Space—Matter—Time) comes to a very critical judgement when 
viewing orthodox Protestantism as a whole: “Despite all the closeness of content 
and the connection with the new [i. e. heliocentric] model of the world manifest-
ed in outstanding individuals like Kepler one does not arrive in the questions 
regarding the doctrine of God and creation and of cosmology, despite impres-
sive systematizing permeation and modifications in detail, at an understanding 
7 Johann Peter Lange, Christliche Dogmatik, Vol. 2, Heidelberg 1851, p. 74: “So wie der Raum 
durchweg der Kosmos der Erscheinungen ist, so die Zeit ihr Rhythmus.” Unless otherwise 
noted, all translations are my own.
8 There were, of course, some changes and revisions of the Aristotelian understanding of 
space already in the medieval period and later in the Renaissance. Cf. Max Jammer, Das 
Problem des Raumes. Die Entwicklung der Raumtheorien, Darmstadt 1980, pp. 55–101; Gosztonyi, 
Der Raum, vol. 1, pp. 164–229.
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that would be capable of a constructive engagement with modern science.”9 Even 
stronger was the judgement of Werner Elert in his famous book Morphologie des 
Luthertums (1932, The Structure of Lutheranism). According to him, Lutheranism 
was hopelessly entangled in a last-lying and convulsively struggling world-view, 
namely in an apology of the simple biblical world-view without realising that 
Copernicanism with the possibility of a plurality of worlds and the infinity of the 
universe requires totally different answers than a mere reference to the Bible.10 
However, the Lutherans were here in “good harmony” with the Catholics and 
the Reformed, who responded only passively and very slowly to the Copernican 
change of the world-view, too.11 
I find it remarkable that the classical concept of God, especially His attri-
butes of immensity, ubiquity, and eternity, have been questioned long before the 
Copernican revolution would lead to very similar questions, although against 
a totally different scientific background. It seems to me that the Catholics and 
Protestants were more interested in fighting the “old” enemies of the orthodox 
dogmatics than in fighting the “new” enemies of the natural sciences. Of course, 
what was at stage, was very important for the whole structure of theology: Is 
God omnipresent without having a specific place in the whole universe and is 
He eternal without having a beginning and/or an end in time? And if this is the 
case, how is it possible that the ubiqui tous and eternal God acts at specific places 
and in different times without actually being there? What kind of being beyond 
space and time is God? The answers to these questions were not controversial 
between the three orthodox denominations, but between them and different dis-
sident movements. The most prominent dissidents of the 16th and 17th centuries 
were the Socinians, who called themselves “Polish Brethren” or “Unitarians”.12 
The Socinians will therefore be the focus of this study. 
 9 Dirk Evers, Raum—Materie—Zeit. Schöpfungstheologie im Dialog mit naturwissenschaftlicher 
Kosmologie, Tübingen 2000, p. 120: “Trotz aller inhaltlichen Nähe und der sich in einzelnen 
herausragenden Gestalten wie Kepler manifestierenden Verbindung mit dem neuen [i. e. he-
liozentrischen] Weltbild stößt man in den Fragen der Gottes- und Schöpfungslehre und der 
Kosmologie trotz eindrucksvoller systematisierender Durchdringung und Modifikationen 
im einzelnen nicht zu einem Verständnis durch, das zur konstruktiven Auseinandersetzung 
mit der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft fähig wäre.”
10 Cf. Werner Elert, Morphologie des Luthertums. Erster Band. Theologie und Weltanschauung des 
Lu thertums hauptsächlich im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, Munich 21958, p. 356. 
11 There were, of course, some Lutheran, Catholic and Calvinist Copernicans. Cf. Rienk Ver-
mij, The Calvinist Copernicans. The Reception of the New Astronomy in the Dutch Republic, 1575–
1750, Amsterdam 2002; Pietro Omodeo, Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance: 
Reception, Legacy, Transformation, Leiden 2014.
12 For the history, theology and philosophy of the Socinians cf. Otto Fock, Der Socinianismus 
nach seiner Stellung in der Gesamtentwicklung des christlichen Geistes, nach seinem historischen 
Ver lauf und nach seinem Lehrbegriff, Kiel 1847, Reprint Aalen 1970; Earl Morse Wilbur, A His-
tory of Unitarianism: Socinianism and its Antecedents, Vol. 1, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1946; 
idem, A History of Unitarianism: In Transsylvania, England, and America, Vol. 2, Cambridge 
(Massachusetts) 1952; Herbert John McLachlan, Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England, 
Ox ford 1951; Sarah Mortimer, Reason and Religion in the English Revolution. The Challenge of 
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With their particular method of philosophizing—I call this the ratio philosophan-
di Sociniana—as part of the Aristotelian heterodox tradition and with their specif-
ic manner of exercising theology, i. e. the conviction that libertas prophetandi had a 
basis in the prophetic writings of the Bible, the Socinians can be accredited with 
ground-breaking work for the later Enlightenment. This concerns not only the 
radical rejection of the core Christian tenets, such as the doctrine of the trinity, 
of the incarnation of Christ, of justification etc., a new understanding of the rela-
tionship between reason and faith, a historical-critical method of reading and in-
terpreting the Bible, but also a philosophical and theological materialism unique 
to the time.13 This “metaphysical” materialism was also responsible for the devel-
opment of new “Socinian” physics which will be the main subject of this paper. 
At this point, I can address a question that has been discussed several times in 
recent years: Was there something like confessional physics in the Early Modern 
Period? Cees Leijenhorst has replied in the affirmative, by dealing with “Calvin-
ist Physics”14 or even more generally in a second article, published together with 
Christoph Lüthy, with “Confessional Physics”.15 In his study, Marcus Hellyer de-
scribes at length the “Catholics Physics” of the Jesuits in Early Modern Germany.16 
The topic of all these studies is especially the description of the philosophical and 
theological positions of the different orthodox denominations regarding the Eu-
charist and the Lord’s Supper.17 The issues at stake here were very intriguing: How 
Soci nianism, Cambridge 2010; Sascha Salatowsky, Die Philosophie der Sozinianer. Transformatio -
nen zwischen Renaissance-Aristotelismus und Frühaufklärung, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2015. 
Kęstutis Daugirdas, Die Anfänge des Sozinianismus. Genese und Eindringen des historisch-ethi -
schen Religionsmodells in den universitären Diskurs der Evangelischen in Europa, Göttingen 2016.
13 Cf. Salatowsky, “Unknown relations: Materialism and the concept of the soul. Christoph 
Stegmann—John Locke—Joseph Priestley” (in preparation).
14 Cees Leijenhorst, “Place, Space and Matter in Calvinist Physics”, in: The Monist 84,4 (2001), 
pp. 520–541.
15 Cees Leijenhorst and Christoph Lüthy, “The Erosion of Aristotelianism. Confessional Phys-
ics in Early Modern Germany and the Dutch Republic”, in: The Dynamics of Aristotelian Nat-
ural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, ed. c. Leijenhorst. Leiden et al. 2002, 
pp. 375–411.
16 Marcus Hellyer, Catholic Physics. Jesuit Natural Philosophy in Early Modern Germany, Notre 
Dame (Indiana) 2005.
17 Cf. Leijenhorst, “Calvinist Physics”, p. 521: “What has not been taken into account at all is the 
effect of the very heart of confessional strife, viz. sacramental theology, most notably the doc-
trine of the Eucharist. It is the explanation of Christ’s real presence in the consecrated bread 
and wine that most divided the various confessions and hence constitutes the best criterion 
to distinguish between Roman Catholics, Calvinists and Lutherans, certainly from the end 
of the sixteenth century onwards.” Leijenhorst/Lüthy, “Confessional Physics”, p. 376: “The 
confessional battles between Protestants and Catholics, but also among Protestants them-
selves soon created a new demand for Aristotelian philosophy. Especially the controversies 
in Eucharistic theology made precise definitions of such key terms as ,substance‘, ,place‘ and 
,person‘ more necessary than ever.” Hellyer, Catholic Physics, p. 7: “Perhaps the best example 
of how theological concerns could limit what natural philosophers were able to say was the 
question of how the transubstantiation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of 
Christ could be explained physically—what we can term the physics of the Eucharist.” For 
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can one justify the specific understanding of the Lord’s Supper with passages from 
the Bible and support it with philosophical principles? Important philosophical 
concepts such as matter, body, substance, person, place, space etc. had to corre-
spond to the respective denominational understanding. This has led to character-
istic transformations of the Aristotelian philosophy in the Early Modern Period. 
In this paper, I would like to show that the Socinians have developed their 
own confessional physics which is characterised by a materialistic understanding 
of the Aristotelian philosophy combined with a rational reading of the Bible. Ac-
cording to the Socinians, reason is the most fundamental category of both philos-
ophy and theology that excludes everything which is contrary to or even above 
reason.18 For them, mysteries are not the main focus of Christianity. This radical 
“demystification” applies also to God who does not break the rules of the world at 
discretion but is linked to them. He is, to give only one example, the creator of the 
world. However, the creation did not arise out of nothing but from the unformed 
prime matter.19 God is bound to the physical principles, especially to the principle 
of contradiction formulated by Aris totle in his Metaphysics: “It is, that the same 
attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the 
same respect.”20 What does this mean for the concept of God? Are the mysteries 
necessarily part of the concept of God? I want to focus here on the following 
question taking into account the present topic: Are God’s “heavenly” attributes of 
ubiquity and eternity for the Socinians attributes of its own class without having 
any connection to the “earthly” attributes of space and time? My thesis is that the 
Socinians developed a new rational understanding of God that ties Him back to 
the physical laws of space and time which He Himself created.
I have illustrated in my earlier study “Die Entlastung Gottes” (2015, “The Dis-
charge of God”) the change of the concept of God in the works of Fausto Sozzini 
(1539–1604), the leader of the Polish Brethren, and Conrad Vorstius (1569–1622), 
a Reformed theologian, however, with strong Socinian tendencies.21 I addressed 
the question of the omnipotence and omniscience of God (potestas et praescientia 
Dei) and also those of His simplicity (simplicitas) and eternity (aeternitas). The study 
demonstrated that Sozzini and Vorstius created an anti-speculative and even an-
ti-metaphysical concept of God, who was divested by and by of His most important 
orthodox attributes. For this reason, the German Lutheran Johann Gerhard (1582–
1637) accused Vorstius and the Socinians in several sections of his work Loci theo-
Hellyer, the sacrament of the Eucharist “was one of the most bitterly contested battlefields of 
the Confessional Age” (ibid., p. 90).
18 Cf. Salatowsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, pp. 130–186.
19 Cf. ibid., pp. 292–297; 321–324.
20 Aris totle, Met. IV 3, 1005b19–20. Quoted from: The Complete Works of Aris totle, ed. and transl. 
Jonathan Barnes, Vol. 2, Princeton 1984, here p. 1588. 
21 Cf. Sascha Salatowsky, “Die Entlastung Gottes. Sozzini, Vorstius und die Folgen ihrer Theo -
lo gie”, in: Ideengeschichte um 1600. Konstellationen zwischen Schulmetaphysik, Konfessionalisie -
rung und hermetischer Spekulation, eds. Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann and Friedrich Voll-
hardt, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2017, pp. 231–265.
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logici (1610–1625) of undermining the divine attributes in many ways.22 The Dutch 
Reformed Samuel Maresius (1599–1673) noted very similarly in his treatise Systema 
theologicum (1673) that Vorstius, the Arminians and Socinians “nibble away” the 
attributes of God, especially His omnipresence and immensity.23 The Jesuit Martin 
Becanus (1563–1624) too claimed in his Tituli Calvinistarum (1614) that Vorstius was 
the leading representative of the atheistic tendencies of the Reformed theologians 
who rejected among other things the infinity of God.24 These different statements 
illustrate that the pressure on the classical concept of God around 1600 was already 
wide spread, especially in regard to His metaphysical and physical properties. 
It is worth mentioning that the concept of God at that time was not a subject 
only of dogmatics, but also of metaphysics and even of physics. In dogmatics, the 
concept of God usually formed the first part of the treatise, describing God in His 
essence and with His attributes, especially in relation with the doctrine of the 
trinity. In metaphysics, God was the most important subject of the Metaphysica 
specialis, the second part, which describes the three main substances, i. e. God, the 
angels and the separated soul (anima separata). In physics, the description of the 
concept of space or place and time was connected with the question of how God 
relates to them. This threefold access also applies to the Socinian concept of God. 
However, due to the absence of a Socinian treatise on physics,25 I will describe 
here only one metaphysical and one theological treatise. Consequently, it is just 
possible to compare the philosophical and theological arguments.
The Metaphysica repurgata (1635) of Christoph Stegmann (ca. 1597–1646), who 
worked officially as a Lutheran pastor in Brandenburg, but was secretly a rad-
ical Socinian, is one of the most radical philosophical attempts at revaluating the 
concept of God.26 In the brief foreword to the reader he makes no secret of his 
intention: Metaphysics was to be purged of the opinions of the Scholastics, even if 
22 Cf. Johann Gerhard, Loci theologici cum pro adstruenda veritate tum pro destruenda quorumvis 
con tradicentium falsitate per theses nervose solide et copiose explicati (Jena 1610–1622), 9 vols, ed. 
Eduard Preuss, Berlin 1863–1875, here t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, s. III, § 131, p. 305b: “Simplicita tem 
Dei labefactat Vorstius tract. de Deo […].” Ibid., s. IV, § 141, p. 308b–309a: “Opponenda haec 
sunt […] 4. Vorstio, qui multis modis doctrinam de aeternitate Dei labefactat.” In the follo-
wing, references are given both to the Preuss edition and in brackets to the new English 
translation, cf. Gerhard: On the Nature of God and on the most Holy mystery of the Trinity, transl. 
Richard J. Dinda, St. Louis 2007, here p. 135 and 141.
23 Cf. Samuel Maresius, Systema Theologicum: Hactenus saepius recusum, nunc verò locupletatum 
prolixis annotationibus, ad illius explicationem & defensionem facientibus, Groningen 1673, lc. II, 
§ XXXII, p. 76a: “Ubi similiter, vel Ubietas, Deo non convenit, sed absoluta Ubiquietas, sive 
per fecta Immensitas: quam frustra admordent juxta Vorstium, Arminiani ac Sociniani […].”
24 Cf. Martin Becanus, Tituli Calvistarum, Mainz 1614, tit. IV, p. 289.
25 The manuscript Physicae problemata of Andrzej Wiszowaty jun. (1608–1678) was never print-
ed and is today presumed lost.
26 Cf. Christoph Stegmann, [Ms] Metaphysica repurgata, Lögnitz 1635. Gottfried Wilhelm Leib-
niz Bibliothek, Niedersächische Landesbibliothek, LH IV I 9, pp. 1–57. Only this copy in the 
Leibniz archive has survived. For a description of Stegmann’s life and philosophy cf. Sala-
towsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, pp. 41f.; 310–327; 419–427.
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this was considered more difficult than cleaning the Augean stables.27 The aim is 
to liberate the concepts and content of metaphysics from all scholastic trappings. 
What makes this treatise so important for the history of philosophy is the fact 
that Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) wrote in 1708 a reply to this treatise 
as an antidote. Leibniz was convinced that the Socinians created “a philosophy 
of their own”,28 a philosophy, which he recognised because of its allegedly de-
structive character as a great danger for the convictions and beliefs of the people. 
The “best” paradigm for this danger was exactly Stegmann’s Metaphysics, which 
Leibniz called a “peculiar little book”. He criticized in particular that Stegmann 
almost completely reduced God to the status of creatures and debased our minds 
to the level of matter.29 Purging metaphysics from all scholastic trappings as the 
aim of Stegmann’s treatise leads to a radical revaluation of the concept of God. I 
will expound his concept in the fifth section of this paper.
The Tractatus theologicus de Deo (1610) of Vorstius, who was, I repeat here the 
common view, a Reformed theologian with Socinian tendencies, is one of the 
most radical theological attempts of revaluating the concept of God.30 In the fore-
word of his treatise, he emphasises that the subject of this treatise, the concept 
of God, is for the human senses and for natural reason according to its essence 
and to its attributes alike so difficult and sublime to perceive, recognise and to 
understand, that a lot of different opinions of the old and the new interpreters 
exist.31 He accuses in particular the Scholastics of expanding the human curiosity 
beyond the divine word and of mixing philosophical and theological doctrines 
by using Aristotelian concepts in theological matters.32 The Scholastics, for exam-
ple, would ascribe to God such an eternity, which coexist integer with any time, 
including also the smallest one, and which introduce in this way an admirable 
existence of all things in eternity. The Scholastics would further impose on us 
such an immensity of God which excludes him totally from every empty space, 
but let him be on the other side integer at every other, even discontinuous, plac-
27 Cf. Stegmann, Metaphysica, p. 1 r: “Augiae stabulum citius purges, candide lector, quam om-
nia Scholasticorum de rebus Metaphysicis placita sub examinis incudem revoces.”
28 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Ad Christophori Stegmanni Metaphysicam Unitariorum”, in: 
Nicholas Jolley, “An Unpublished Leibniz MS in Metaphysics”, in: Studia Leibnitiana, vol. VII/2 
(1975), pp. 161–189, here p. 176, l. 1–10: “Constat eos qui Fausti Socini et similium Theologiam 
pro bant, et pleraque christianae fidei mysteria, sed maxime Trinitatem in Unitate di vi na, et 
in carnationem di vi nae naturae in Christo impugnant, propriam sibi Philosophiam condi-
disse; ei oppositam qua Scholae utebantur, et nunc quoque pro magna parte utuntur, non 
tan tum eae quae Romam venerantur, sed etiam quae frequentantur apud Protestantes.” 
29 Cf. ibid., p. 177, l. 16–22: “Stegmanni opusculum titulo Metaphysicae repurgatae conscriptum 
nac tus olim juvenis discusseram, stricturis quibusdam additis, ut ostenderem viros doc tos et 
acutos, abuti passim acumine suo nec Theologiam tantum, sed et philosophiam quan dam ex-
te nuatam, nobis dare, in qua vix quicquam egregium et sublime supersit, Deo ipso propemo-
dum in ordinem creaturarum redacto. Mente etiam nostra in materiae naturam degenerante.”
30 Cf. Conrad Vorstius, Tractatus theologicus de Deo, sive de natura & attributis Dei, Steinfurt 1610. 
31 Ibid., praef., p. *2 r–v.
32 Ibid., p. *3 r.
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es.33 Vorstius draws from this a radical conclusion which reveals his Socinian ten-
dencies: “Finally, I add that I will deviate here sometimes freely not only from the 
Catholics, such as Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suárez, but also from some of 
us [i. e. Reformed theologians], and that solely out of love for the truth.”34 Vorstius 
refers here to the free church of Christ, in which everyone has the right to speak 
freely. In section three of this paper, I will explain his concept of God, in partic-
ular his understanding of the infinity, omnipresence (omnipraesentia & ubiquitas) 
and eternity (aeternitas) of God. My aim is here to show that Vorstius was in these 
matters without restrictions indeed a Socinian. 
I would like to contrast these two Socinian writings, Stegmann’s Metaphysica 
re pur gata and Vorstius’s Tractatus theologicus, with two treatises from the opposing 
ortho dox denominations, namely by Catholics and Protestants: the Disputationes 
Me ta physicae (1597) of Suárez (1548–1617) and the Loci theologici of Gerhard. Both 
of these systematic tracts were essential parts of the discussions on the concept of 
God in general, and both of them were deeply involved in the Socinian debates 
in particular.
The Disputationes metaphysicae of Suárez, the leading Jesuit metaphysician of 
his time, are one of the most important philosophical attempts to reconfirm once 
again the essential unity of philosophy and theology from a Catholic perspective, 
a unity that manifests itself in the common processing of the concept of God as 
the nucleus of all Christian thinking.35 As we just have seen, Vorstius mentioned 
Suárez as a negative example for the typical Scholastic manner of mixing philos-
ophy and theology together. It is therefore appropriate to examine the judgement 
of Vorstius by describing the position of Suárez. With his Disputationes metaphysi-
cae, he wrote the most comprehensive work of this discipline in the Early Modern 
Period, which became the standard work for all orthodox denominations.36 The 
significance of his systematic work for the subject of this paper, the concept of 
God, is evident. What Edward Grant has described for the problem of God and 
space, applies universally: “Among scholastic authors who concerned themselves 
with the problem of God and space, few if any ever reached the high level of 
lucid and intelligent analysis attained by Francisco Suarez.”37 In section 2, I will 
33 Ibid., p. *3 v: “[…] dumque talem Aeternitatem ei [sc. Dei] adscribunt [sc. Scholastici], quae 
cuilibet tempori, etiam minimo, integra coexistat, ac perinde mirificam rerum omnium in 
aeternitate existentiam inducat; dum praeterea talem nobis Dei immensitatem obtrudunt, 
quae ipsum a vacuis quidem spaciis penitus excludat, in aliis autem omnibus, licet disconti-
nuis, locis integrum praesentem sistat […].”
34 Ibid., p. *4 v: “Tandem hoc adjicio: non tantum a Pontificiis, ut Th. Aquinate, Fr. Suarez, & 
sed a quibusdam etiam Nostrorum, interdum hic libere me dissentiere: idque solius amore 
ve ritatis.” Vorstius mentions here by name Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590).
35 Cf. Francisco Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae [=DM]. Tomus prior & posterior, Mainz 1630. 
36 Cf. Ernst Lewalter, Spanisch-jesuitische und deutsch-lutherische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts. 
Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der iberisch-deutschen Kulturbeziehungen und zur Vorgeschichte des 
Deutschen Idealismus, Hamburg 1935, Reprint Darmstadt 1967.
37 Grant, Much Ado About Nothing, p. 153. In this fascinating study, Grant is primarily con-
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expound Suárez’s philosophical arguments for God’s ubiquity and eternity, which 
can serve as the starting point for all subsequent debates of that time.
The Loci theologici of Gerhard, the leading Lutheran theologian of his time, 
are one of the most comprehensive theological attempts to secure the fundamen-
tal harmony between philosophy and theology from a Lutheran perspective.38 As 
mentioned above, Gerhard was one of the most prominent opponents of Vors-
tius’s concept of God. His importance for the theological debates of the early 
modern period is indisputable. In the early 17th century, he was “the greatest 
representative of Lutheran orthodoxy”. In his Loci, he “broke new ground in the 
development of theological method”.39 In section 4, I will explain Gerhard’s theo-
logical position and analyse his criticism of Vorstius.
In section 6, I will summarize the results of this paper.
2 Franciso Suárez: Manifesting God’s ubiquity and eternity
The concept of God reveals the close unity of Aristotelian philosophy and Chris-
tian theology in the Early Modern Period. On the one hand, God is the most 
important subject of the Metaphysica specialis, the second part of metaphysics. In 
this manner the Lutheran Christoph Scheibler (1589–1653) explains in detail in 
the second book of his Opus Metaphysicum (1617) the three main substances God, 
the angels and the separated soul.40 According to him and other philosophers, it is 
primarily due to the description of God as a “hyperousia” or “super-substantia” 
and “super-ens” (esse super omne ens) that required this special metaphysics.41 As 
an ens simplicissimum He is in fact part of the existence of all beings. However, as 
the creator He is at the same time no part of this “chain of being”.42 It was there-
fore a common opinion that there is no relation between the finite and the infinite 
(finitum non est capax infiniti). 
cerned with the concept of separate space understood as a vacuum. He deals not with the 
concept of space in general.
38 Cf. Gerhard, Loci.
39 A documentary history of Lutheranism, Vol. 1. From the Reformation to Pietism, ed. Eric Lund, 
Minneapolis 2017, p. 170a (for both quotations).
40 Vgl. Christoph Scheibler, Metaphysica specialis sive Metaphysicorum liber II. Continens tractatio-
nem de substantiis (adeoque de Deo, Angeliis, & Anima separata) & singulis accidentium generibus, 
Gießen 1617, c. II, art. II, p. 69–76. Scheibler defines God strictly speaking as “spiritus infini-
tus” (c. III, p. 76). Because of our imperfect mode of thinking, which is not able to recognise 
God in a direct way, we are forced to describe God in a more negative way as “infinitum, 
incorporeum, invisibilem, incircumscriptum etc.” (ibid., 88).
41 Cf. Jacob Martini, Exercitationum metaphysicarum libri duo, Wittenberg 1608, l. II, ex. IV, th. II, 
p. 647: “Ergone Deus negatur esse substantia? non negatur substantia: sed negatur substan-
tia, quae in praedicamentis locatur, atque adeo perfecte sub rationem & naturam genericam 
cadit. Est alioquin DEUS supersubstantialiter substantia: quippe, qui omnia supereminenter 
superat Entia, quae ab ipso sunt. Quid autem hoc? genusne Logicum; ut quidam somniant? 
Non Logicum, non Physicum, non Metaphysicum; sed hypermetaphysicum, hoc est, non 
genus. Terminus igitur (supersubstantialiter substantia) hoc vult, quod a nobis dictum est, in-
telligere nos Deum & esse, & esse super omne ens.”
42 Cf. Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. A Study of a History of Idea, Cambridge (Mass.) 1936.
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On the other hand, God was the starting point in the dogmatics. The Systema 
theologicae of the Reformed Bartholomäus Kecker mann (1572–1608) offers an ex-
ample for this. Very similar to Scheibler, he defines God as a “spiritus primus infini-
tus” and “supersubstantia”.43 Only the way of eminence (via eminentiae) allows us 
to ascribe to God in the most eminent manner the relative perfections we discov-
er in humans. However, these are only approaches to God, whom—as the most 
perfect being and creator of the universe—we can describe in finite terms and pic-
tures alone, not in His real immensity. Philosophy in general and metaphysics in 
particular are only tools for theology, providing the concepts and methods with 
which theology is able to develop the concept of God according to revelation. This 
double description of God in philosophy and theology encompasses necessarily 
the concept of space and time. What is the relation of God to these basic categories 
of living and non-living things? To lay a foundation for this discussion, it will be 
useful to summarize briefly Aris totle’s concepts of place44 and time. 
In his Physics, Aris totle defines place (τόπος) as “boundary of the containing 
body at which it is in contact with the contained body” or rather some lines later 
as a “the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it”.45 Place is neither 
matter nor form or extension but the boundary of a body, the immediate compre-
hensive of it, however, no part of it. To be more precise, place is thought to be a 
kind of surface (ἐπίπεδον), and a vessel (ἀγγεῖον), i. e. a container (περιέχον) of a 
thing (cf. Phys. IV 3, 212a28–29). Since the place determines the ratio of the bodies 
to another, there is no empty space for Aris totle. The doctrine that nature abhors 
a vacuum—which became proverbial as horror vacui in the Scholastics—can be 
explained in such a way that in an empty space on the one side a once moved 
thing is unable to become tranquil because of the lack of resistance and on the 
other side neither a forced nor a natural movement without medium can arise or 
be maintained. That means, an empty space does not enable motion, but prevents 
it.46 The motion of the fixed stars requires a first mover that is not itself moved by 
anything else (cf. Phys. VII 5, 256a13–16 and Met. XII 6, 1072a10–18). If movement 
ever exists because it is impossible that it should either come into being or cease 
to be (cf. Met. XII 6, 1071b7f.), the first mover must have always been and must still 
be. Its essence is pure actuality (ἐνέργεια), and it must be without matter for it 
must be eternal (cf. Met. XII 6, 1071b19–21). 
43 Bartholomäus Kecker mann, Systema S.S. Theologiae, tribus libris adornatum, Hanau 1602, l. I, 
c. II, p. 6.
44 Strictly speaking, Aris totle did not develop a theory of space (χώρα), “jedenfalls nicht in 
dem Sinne, dass der Raum Prinzip für Eigenschaften und Verhältnisse von Gegenständen 
im Raum wäre”. (Hellmut Flashar, “Aristoteles”, in: Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. 
Die Philosophie der Antike. Bd. 3. Ältere Akademie, Aristoteles, Peripatos, ed. Hellmut Flashar, 
Basel 2004, pp. 167–492, here p. 347. 
45 Aris totle, Physics IV 4, 212a5–6 and 212a20. Quoted from: Complete Works of Aris totle, vol 1, 
p. 360 and 361.
46 Cf. Grant, Much Ado About Nothing. 
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Aris totle defines time (χρόνος) in his Physics then as a „number of motion in 
respect of before and after.“47 Only in relation to motion it is possible to speak of 
time, insofar as time is something “in” the movement, namely the measure of the 
change of the movement between the before and the after. The time itself is no 
part of the movement: It is the measure of motion, by which one measures, not 
the measured itself. Circular motion is the most original, simple and complete 
movement because it alone is characterised by continuity. That means that mo-
tion which achieves the endpoint is identical with the motion that starts anew 
from it. Due to the retrograde motion of the circular motion in itself, it experi-
ences no interruption and makes it possible to maintain a coherent movement. If 
circular motion is the most perfect motion, then the fixed star sphere is the first 
and most original movement and it always gives all time its cosmic measure. Like 
movement, time does not arise or pass, for there could not be a before and an after 
if time did not exist (cf. Met. XII 6, 1071b7), although that what is in time necessar-
ily is subject to perishing and becoming (cf. Phys. IV 12, 221b28–30). Vice versa, it 
is also true that things which are always are not, as such, in time; for they are not 
contained by time, nor is their being measured by time (cf. Phys. IV 12, 221b3–5).
In what way does Suárez follow this Aristotelian concept of place and time in 
his Disputationes Metaphysicae? He begins the second volume of his Metaphysica 
specialis in Disputation 28 with the basic subdivision of all beings in an infinite 
being (ens infinitum et increatum) and a finite being (ens finitum et creatum).48 In Dis-
putation 29, Suárez comes up with some metaphysical and scientific reasons for 
the existence of God. In Disputation 30, he deals in great detail with the essence of 
the very first being (primum ens), which is God alone. Starting from the assertion 
that God is firstly a simply necessary being (ens simpliciter necessarium)—because 
it is not from another thing (ab alio) or depends on it but is alone out of Himself 
(ex se)—and that He is secondly a completely perfect being (ens omnino perfectum) 
that needs nothing, is lacking nothing, but is complete in itself,49 Suárez asserts 
the thesis that God is infinite.50 Infinite means here on the one side the infinitas 
durationis, i. e. the infinity as eternity, as perpetual being without beginning and 
end, and on the other side the infinitas virtutis, i. e. die infinite power of the first 
mover. The “ontological” infinity belongs to God because He is by Himself in His 
essence, independent from any other being, never become, but out of Himself 
that is what He is, and this for ever, so that He always exists. The “ontic” perfec-
tion is most suitable to Him because He is the first cause of every thing, quasi 
the whole being (totum ens) that releases all things out of themselves, nothing 
absorbing, never exhausted, always active, always moving, always in the being of 
the powerful movement. 
47 Aris totle, Physics IV 11, 219b1f. Quoted from: Complete Works of Aris totle, vol 1, p. 372. 
48 Cf. Suárez, DM XXVIII, sec. I, §§ I–III, p. 5a–b. 
49 Cf. ibid., DM XXX, sec. I, §§ I–II, p. 42b.
50 Cf. ibid., DM XXX, sec. II, § I, p. 44b: “nam evidentissimum est Deum esse aeternum, & con-
se quenter duratione infinitum.”
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This results in the following description of God as a pure act and completely 
simple being (actus purus & ens omnino simplex), as this perpetual being that ex-
cludes every potentiality and passivity, is instead always active in itself, pure, un-
mixed, indivisible, free from every composition and participation.51 God is there-
fore not a composition of form and matter. He is in fact completely immaterial and 
unextended, as Suárez emphasizes with references to Aris totle, Plato and Hermes 
Trismegistus.52 For such a substance of form and matter is subject to quantity, i. e. it 
is extended in its bodily parts. This corresponds, however, to a very imperfect be-
ing, such as plants, animals, and the humans. Hence, such a compositio substantialis 
cannot be attributed to the first being (ens primum) since there is an infinite differ-
ence between it and the beings dependent on it. “Anyone who invents a corporal 
God must therefore at least assume (so as not to make things completely absurd) 
that God has an immaterial and spiritual part, connected with a very noble and 
incorruptible body. However, one cannot conceive of God physically without a 
composition of form with corporal matter because God must be at least thought 
more perfect than man: But He would not be more perfect if He did not have at 
least an immaterial and spiritual form.”53 At this point, one can already recog-
nise the classical conception of God as a completely immaterial being—a substantia 
spiritualis immaterialis according to the common definition—which stands with the 
created world in space and time only in an external, top-down relationship. This 
follows also from the further descriptions of the attributes of God. 
In resuming the concept of infinity, Suárez equates it with immensity (immen-
sitas). As mentioned above, the concept of infinity encompasses omnipresence 
as a “non-spatial” category of the “everywhere” (in contrast to where) as well as 
eternity as a “non-temporal” category of the “forever” and “all the time” (in con-
trast to when). Infinity is therefore the attribute of God which keeps Him away 
from every model of the world, be it geocentric or heliocentric, no less than from 
time, which in its flow cannot hold the “static” eternal. Space and time are there-
fore no categories for Suárez to describe God’s essence. Only with the idea of an 
infinity of space and time does this model falter, since God then loses Himself in 
“infinite” Nothingness. As long as God enclosed a limited space and a limited 
time, he still had a relation to both of them. With the Copernican revolution, this 
relation loses ground in the long run.
51 Cf. ibid., DM XXX, sec. III, §§ II–III, p. 50a–b.
52 Cf. ibid., DM XXX, sec. IV, § XV, p. 53b.
53 Ibid., DM XXX, sec. IV, § XV, p. 54a: “Quare, qui Deum fingere corporeum, saltem existimare 
deberet (ne omnino esset irrationalis) habere Deum partem immaterialem, & intellectualem, 
coniunctam alicui corpori nobilissimo, & incorruptibili: atque ita non potest Deus cogitari 
corporeus sine compositione alicuius formae cum materia corporali, quia saltem cogitari 
debet Deus perfectior quam homo: non esset autem perfectior, nisi forma saltem haberet 
immaterialem, & intellectualem.”
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Suárez understands immensity strictly speaking as a “disposition toward a 
place, or the presence of God in all things”.54 In this respect, it is possible to say 
that God is everywhere. Suárez emphasizes here the novelty of the Christian reli-
gion and its distance to the ancient world of the heathens: Many ancient philoso-
phers have located God in a particular place—either in the centre of the universe 
or at the highest place.55 However, one can prove with natural reason that He is 
(incorporeal) everywhere: Since He is the universal efficient agent for all things 
(as the first mover of all beings), and in all things, He is intimately present in all 
things.56 For Suárez, this is also in accordance with the Bible, especially with Acts 
17:2f. and Ps. 139:8f., where the presence of God in this world and at all places is 
described. This, of course, does not refer to an anthropocentrism in the sense that 
God would act only in the world. Rather, one must say that God is present in His 
immensity also out of this world (extra hunc mundum). For He cannot be limited 
by any space, but is everywhere, i. e. even in these very large locations outside the 
world we know. Who would dare limit God to this tiny place where our world is 
located?57 The consequence is clear: “Because God can act outside the world with-
54 Ibid., DM XXX, sec. VII, § I, p. 64a: “Immensitas ergo stricte sumpta dicit habitudinem ad ubi 
seu praesentiam Dei in rebus omnibus.”
55 Cf. Aris totle, Physics VIII 10, 267b6f. In De Coel. I 3, 270b5–10 Aris totle mentioned the as-
sumption of the barbarians or Greeks who agree in allotting the highest place to the deity.
56 Cf. Suárez, DM XXX, sec. VII, § III, p. 64b: “Nam omne agens debet esse coniunctum passo in 
quod operatur. Sed Deus est universale agens efficiens omnia, & in omnibus quae sunt: ergo 
est intime praesens in rebus omnibus.” For the same position of the Reformed, cf. Clemens 
Timp ler, Metaphysicae systema methodicum libris quinque, Hanau 1608, Reprint Hildesheim et 
al. 2018, l. II, c. V, probl. II–III, p. 108–114.—Once again, the old pre-Copernican model of the 
world becomes visible, according to which there is no remote action of forces, but only the 
immediate action of something on something in the sense of pushing or pulling. However, 
there is, so Grant, “the powerful Scotist tradition against any attribution of spatial immen -
sity to God”. (Grant, Much Ado about Noting, p. 153) According to this position, it is not neces-
sary that God is present everywhere in order to be able to act since He acts with His infinite 
power. He rather resides in the highest place knowing everything beforehand. Suárez ex-
plicitly rejects this view: Like a finite form requires unity and closeness to matter in order to 
be able to act the active power, even if it is infinite, needs the closeness and immediacy with 
the passive and effected things in order to be able to act. Even if the active power could act 
over an infinite distance, it would be much better if it were active without a great distance 
from the effected thing. Only in that case does it achieve the highest perfection in action and 
the highest reign in the effected thing not only through its power, but also through its dis-
position and proximity to the effected thing. Cf. Suárez, DM XXX, sec. VII, § XIII, p. 66b. For 
a critical description of Suárez’s position cf. aza Goudriaan, Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis 
bei Suárez und Descartes im Zusammenhang mit der niederländischen reformierten Theologie und 
Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, Leiden et al. 1999, pp. 87–92.
57 Cf. Suárez, DM XXX, sec. VII, § XXX, p. 70a. With a reference to Augustine, De civitate Dei 
XI 5: “They [sc. the Platonists] of God, neither enclosing the divine substance in any place, 
nor setting any limits to it, nor giving it any extension in space, but rather acknowledging 
that it is everywhere incorporeally present in its entirety. Are they then going to say that 
it is absent from the vast expanses of space beyond the world and occupies only the once 
place where the world is located, which is no more than a tiny place in comparison with 
that infinite expanse of space? My own opinion is that they will not go so far as this kind of 
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out any change in His nature, He is really outside the world.”58 Both aspects be-
long together: Firstly, God acts in the world, but He is not embraced by it because 
of His immensity, and secondly, God is outside the world, but He is neither in a 
particular place nor in an infinite imaginary space (spatium imaginarium).59 On the 
contrary, He is where He acts freely, and is truly present.60 In conclusion, Suárez 
answers the question “Where is God?” with His ubiquity: God is too immeasur-
able and immense to be located even in the (limited) heaven. The relationship 
between ubiquity and place is therefore mediated over the omnipotence of God.
But what is place exactly? For an answer, we have to look at Disputation 51, 
where Suárez deals with the “where” (ubi) as one of the ten Aristotelian categories 
(cf. Cat. 4, 1b25–27). He defines it as an intrinsic modus, by which a body is corpore-
al really present where it is.61 This “where”, this modus praesentiae, does not depend 
on the exterior enclosure of a place (locus), but is part of the interior capacities of an 
extended body. In this context, Suárez refers to the ultima sphaera coe lestis, which as 
a body has a real presence where it is but still has no place since it is not in another, 
even more comprehensive heaven.62 That means that we have to distinguish be-
tween the spatial extension of a body, which is the capacity within its surface, and 
its location in space.63 In other words: The intrinsic where (intrin secum ubi) of an 
extended body, i. e. the being of a body, and the extrinsic place (extrinsecum locus), 
i. e. the relation of a body in a place to another body,64 are not congruent.
empty nonsense.” Quoted from The works of Saint Augustine (part 1, book 7: The city of God, 
XI–XXII), ed. Boniface Ramsey, tr. William Babcock, New York 2013, p. 7.
58 Suárez, DM XXX, sec. VII, § XXXII, p. 70b: “Ratio vero sumitur ex dictis, quia Deus potest 
operari extra mundum sine mutatione sui: ergo iam actu est extra mundum.”
59 Suárez does not deny the necessity of a imaginary space. With this concept, he introduces an 
absolute space which is mandatory since otherwise the last sphere of heaven which is not a 
physical place, would be inconceivable. Cf. Suárez, DM XXX, sec. VII, § XXVIII, p. 69b: “Ad-
dunt [sc. theologi] etiam argumentum supra tactum, quia nulla res est in nihilo: extra hunc 
autem mundum nihil est, nam spatium imaginarium non est, sed imaginatione fingitur.” 
The imaginary space, as it were, closes the heaven, which would otherwise be endless, sets 
the sky a dormant, i. e. immovable point. Suárez emphasizes that according to our way of 
thinking, we are forced to resort to this imaginary space in which we conceive of expansion, 
as well as geometric points, lines and surfaces. Cf. ibid., DM LI, sec. II, § vI, p. 623b. For a de-
tailed description of Suárez’s spatium imaginarium and the reaction of some Dutch Cartesians 
cf. Goudriaan, Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis, pp. 93–108.
60 Cf. Suárez, DM XXX, sec. VII, § XXXVI, p. 71b. 
61 Cf. Suárez, DM LI, sec. I, § XIV, p. 620a: “Dico ergo primo, esse in quolibet corpore propri-
um quendam modum intrinsecum ex natura rei distinctum a substantia, quantitate, & aliis 
accidentibus corporibus, a quo modo essendi formaliter habet unumquodque corpus esse 
praesens localiter alicubi, seu ibi, ubi esse dicitur.”
62 Cf. ibid., DM LI, sec. I, § XXI, p. 621b.
63 Cf. Ulrich Beuttler, Gott und Raum—Theologie der Weltgegenwart Gottes, Göttingen 2010, p. 43.
64 Place, or more precisely, the extrinsic place describes the relative position of the bodies to 
each other. Cf. Timpler, Metaphysicae systema, l. II, c. V, probl. VII, p. 118: “Locus non est ens 
absolutum, sed relatum.” Place is, according to his respective nature, nothing but the vessel 
of a body located there: “Hinc igitur patet locum secundum essentiam suam respectivam in 
genere nihil aliud esse, quam receptaculum locati.” (ibid., p. 118f.)
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Further, this ubi is not simply equated with space (spatium), as if it were a ves-
sel filled with another body; rather, it is an intrinsic space (spatium intrinsecum), 
which is to be determined as a being of reason (ens rationis): “To me, this space 
seems to be a being of reason, which is not, like impossible beings, fashioned gra-
tuitously; it rather has a foundation in the bodies themselves inasmuch as they 
are apt to constitute real space not only where they now are but also to infinity 
outside the last heavenly sphere.”65 Suárez refers here to the immensity of God 
described above in order to show that the difference between the real space on 
the one side and the intrinsic or imaginary space on the other side is essential 
for an appropriate understanding of God’s relation to place and space. His con-
cept is the background against which the description of place and space is made. 
God, who is outside of heaven but includes at the same time all things in heaven, 
“needs” an immeasurable “(every-)where”, which as a real “place” must be able to 
relate to all things and places. From the very beginning, this real “place” must be 
understood therefore in a way that it “holds” or “encompasses” God’s immensity. 
The same tension that characterises Suárez’s description of the relation of ubiq-
uity and place can be found in his explanation of the relation of eternity and time 
in his Disputation 51, which is now the subject of our consideration. It is not time 
as the duration of movement (duratio motus) which is of particular interest here.66 
It is duration in the strict sense of the word that clarifys the relation between 
eternity and time. The most prominent difference between time and duration is 
that the latter is not measured by movement. Duration means for Suárez: A thing 
lasts that persists in its existence. Duration is, therefore, the same as permanence 
in being.67 Specifically, Suárez speaks here about the inner duration, which is in-
dependent of external circumstances. God lasted by virtue of his eternity, even 
if there was nothing outside of Him. Duration as persistence in existence is thus 
firstly something real, secondly distinguished from imaginary or absolute time, 
the merely imaginary successio continua, and thirdly is not to be confused with 
relative time, i. e. the measured duration, which has a foundation in things.
65 Suárez, DM LI, sec. I, § XXIV, p. 622b: “Itaque quatenus hoc spatium apprehenditur per 
modum entis positivi distincti a corporibus, mihi videtur esse ens rationis, non tamen gratis 
fictum opere intellectus sicut entia impossibilia, sed sumpto fundamento ex ipsis corpori-
bus, quatenus sua extensione apta sunt constituere spatia realia, non solum quae nunc sunt 
sed in infinitum extra coelum, prout supra etiam in disp. 31 dictum est, tractando de Deo 
immensitate.” For the problem of the being in reason see John P. Doyle, Collected studies on 
Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617), ed. Victor M. Salas, Leuven 2010, pp. 161–208.
66 Cf. Suárez, DM XVI, sec. IX, § XI, p. 374b. More specifically, Suárez distinguishes between a 
tempus extrinsecum as the duration of movement of the heaven with respect to the duration of 
the other movements and a tempus intrinsecum as the real and intrinsic duration determined 
in a continuous motion.
67 Cf. ibid., DM L, sec. I, § I, p. 580a: “Deinde supponimus durationem non attribui, vere ac pro-
prie, nisi rebus actu existentibus. Dicitur enim durare res, quae in suae existentia perseverat: 
unde duratio idem esse censetur, quod permanentia in esse.”
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The uncreated duration is the eternity, which belongs to God alone.68 This is 
the infinity of time, which in a certain sense is only the other side of the infinity 
of space, the omnipresence of God. He always really exists so that there is no 
beginning and no end of being in Him; His being always takes and will always 
last. Suárez follows here the view of Boethius and Thomas Aquinas, according 
to which eternity is “the total, simultaneous and perfect possession of unending 
life”,69 i. e. the immutable and endless presence of God in itself. Tota simul denotes 
the absence of any progress of time in God, the perfect present without before 
and after; interminabilis vitae marks the absence of any possible change in His 
being because there is no difference whatsoever between being and life; perfecta 
possessio describes finally the necessary and perfect stability of God’s being and 
actions without any change. Eternity has no numerical value for Suárez at all: It is 
not measurable and it has no relation to the measurable, which is time. Nor can it 
be described as immutability because it is too much related to the changeability 
of time. Eternity is more appropriately described as a positive perfection that 
excludes everything negative from itself.70 
It is solely due to the human imagination that we say that God has always 
been, is always and will always be because we imagine Him in our own way 
in the ongoing true or imaginary succession of time, rather than understand-
ing Him as He really is in His eternity. In this way, we comprehend the whole 
eternity, which has existed up to this moment, as a space or as a latitude flowing 
without beginning. “In reality, however, there is in the eternity of God Himself 
no flow, and consequently neither past nor future, but He is only by an extrin-
sic denomination regarding the coexistence of our time according to our way 
of thinking.”71 Suárez recalls here the limitations of human imagination which 
prevents us from knowing God in His eternal immensity. It is clear, however, that 
this eternal duration is to be distinguished from all other kinds of duration. The 
closest one is the so called aevum.72 Aevum does indeed describe a certain duration 
a parte post, but not an infinity a parte ante, for as a created duration (duratio creata) 
it is not in that way in and through itself that it is deprived of the capax successio-
nis. The created duration belongs to the angels as creatures created by God, who, 
68 Cf. ibid., DM L, sec. III, § II, p. 586b: “Primo quia Deus vere ac proprie dicitur ex aeternitate 
realiter durasse: ergo per durationem realem & non in alio existentem: ergo per durationem 
increatam existentem in ipso Deo. Item Deus semper realiter extitit, ita ut nunquam in eo 
signari potuerit initium existendi, & in eo esse realiter permansit ac permanet, ergo realiter 
duravit, & durat sua intrinseca duratione, quae non potest esse nisi increata.” See the similar 
position of Timpler, Metaphysicae systema, l. I, c. V, probl. IX, p. 59. 
69 Suárez, DM L, sec. III, § VI, p. 587b: “Et priorem indicavit satis Boetius in recepta illa defi-
nitione aeternitatis, quod sit interminabilis vitae tota simul, & perfecta possessio.” Referring to 
Thomas Aquinas, ST 1, q. 10, art. 1.
70 Cf. Suárez, DM L, sec. IV, § XV, p. 591a.
71 Ibid., DM L, sec. III, § XII, p. 588b: “Re tamen vera, in ipsa aeternitate Dei nullus est fluxus, & 
consequenter nec praeteritum aut futurum, sed per denominationem extrinsecam ex coex-
istentia nostri temporis, iuxta modum concipiendi nostrum.”
72 Cf. ibid., DM L, sec. V, § XXVI, p. 595b.
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in His perfect presence alone, surveys everything at the same time. Even greater 
is the difference between eternity and time, which as a continuum means real 
successive duration (realis duratio successiva) which manifests itself in movement.73 
The duration thus accompanies the time that remains bound to the former. Du-
ration that released time was first. Suárez concludes by emphasizing the primacy 
of God’s eternity before creating any time, in the same way, as he has previously 
demonstrated the primacy of God’s omnipresence over each place and space He 
has created. Metaphysics, that is the conclusion, sets God outside of space and 
time, as the orthodox dogmatics of the time demanded.
3 Conrad Vorstius: Questioning the immensity and eternity of God
The “case” of Conrad Vorstius has already been the subject of various research.74 
The dramatic ramifications of the publication of his Tractatus theologicus de Deo in 
the second edition of 1610 are apparent, both for his public career as a professor of 
theology in Leyden and for his reputation as a Reformed theologian. In discovering 
certain Socinian tendencies in his work, a heated debate arose about his “true” or-
thodox faith, which ended with his dismissal at the Synod of Dort in 1618 and with 
banishment by the Dutch states from their territories. In the most recent research on 
this case, Kęstutis Daugirdas called Vorstius a “Semi-Socinian Semi-Nikodemit”.75 
He explains “Semi-Socinianism” as follows: “Vorstius’s programmatic insistence 
of a Bible-relatedness and reason-conformity of the speech of God was accompa-
nied by a historicizing of the conception of God”.76 In the tradition of Sozzini, who 
denied the classical view of God’s eternity as a atemporal presence in favour of a 
divine knowledge which is determined by the three time modes, Vorstius went 
a step further in describing God as living in a place and acting in time. I want to 
describe this idea of “finitisation” of God here in detail, supplemented, however, 
by His “spatialization”, which characterises the second aspect of my interest here.
The third disputation of the Tractatus theologicus with the subtitle De Deo, 
nempe de natura Dei in genere does not reveal any remarkable dissonances with 
the classical concept of God. Vorstius and his respondent Heinrich Weingarten 
define the nature of God as simple, infinite, immutable, individual, eternal and 
73 Cf. ibid., DM L, sec. VIII, S. 603a–b. 
74 Cf. Wilhelmus Johannes Kühler, Het Socinianisme in Nederland. Leiden 1912. ND Leeuwarden 
1980, esp. 57–76; Willem van ’T Spijker, “Heidelberger Gutachten in Sachen Vorstius”, in: Spät -
humanismus und reformierte Konfession. Theologie, Jurisprudenz und Philosophie in Heidelberg an der 
Wende zum 17. Jahrhundert, ed. Christoph Strohm et al., Tübingen 2006, p. 207–225; Jan Rohls, 
“Der Fall Vorstius”, in: Religiöser Nonkonformismus und frühneuzeitliche Gelehrtenkultur, ed. 
Friedrich Vollhardt, Berlin 2013, p. 179–198; Daugirdas, Anfänge des Sozinianismus, p. 392–438.
75 Daugirdas, Anfänge des Sozinianismus, p. 392: “Vorstius: Ein semi-sozinianischer Semi-Niko-
demit […]. Die Vergeschichtlichung des Gottesgedankens.”
76 Ibid., p. 407: “Mit dem programmtischen Instistieren auf die Bibelbezogenheit und Vernunft -
konformität der Rede von Gott ging bei Vorstius die Vergeschichtlichung des Gottesgedan-
kens einher […].”
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immense.77 Only the extensive notes to the third disputation show the dramati-
cal shift in the understanding of God which takes place here. Vorstius describes 
God’s duplex infinity as both encompassing His eternity and His immensity, i. e. 
His omnipresence and ubiquity.
1. God’s eternity is, strictly speaking, “nothing more than infinite duration lack-
ing any beginning and end”.78 At first glance, this definition fits very well to the 
classical understanding of eternity, as just illustrated with Suárez. However, Vorsti-
us sets a first counter point in equating duration with time. He refers here to the Lu-
theran Nicolaus Taurellus (1547–1606) and the Reformed Petrus Ramus (1515–1572) 
in differentiating between a physical and metaphysical time. While the former one 
is solely an attribute of finite beings without existing ante mundum, so is the latter 
one an attribute of all beings, always existing ante & post mundum. In other words: 
There is a double time, a finite time and an infinite, i. e. eternal time.79 Time and 
eternity are equated here. This was postulated first by Sozzini in his Praelectiones 
theologicae (1609)80 and afterwards became common opinion within Socinianism.81 
77 Cf. Vorstius, Tractatus, disp. III, pp. 17–19. 
78 Ibid., notae III, p. 202: “Est [sc. aeternitas] autem, absolute loquendo, nihil autem, quam pe-
rennis duratio, principio & fine carens.” See ibid., p. 209: “In summa: Aeternitas in se spectata 
nihil est aliud, quam tempus aeternum, sive duratio infinita, h.e. principio & fine carens […].”
79 Cf. ibid., notae III, p. 204: “Ut igitur duplex ἀιών sive seculum in Scriptura traditur (unde & 
ἀιώνιον) sive seculare dupliciter dici potest) ita nihil vetat, duplex tempus ibidem describi, 
alterum finitum, alterum infinitum, sive aeternum.” Vorstius seems to follow Petrus Ramus 
(1515–1572) here. According to Ramus, everything is in time. In developing this idea, Ramus 
divides time into an infinite and eternal time, which related to God, and a finite time, which 
belonged to the created things. 
80 Cf. Fausto Sozzini, “Praelectiones theologicae”, in: idem, Opera omnia in duos tomos distincta. 
Quorum prior continet ejus Opera exegetica & didactica, posterior Opera ejusdem Polemica com-
prehendit, Irenopoli [=Amsterdam] 1656 [=1668], tomus primus, pp. 537–600, here p. 545a: 
“Praeterea dicimus, rationis confirmationem quam afferunt, nullius momenti esse. Tempus 
enim aeternum est, quidquid Theologi nostri contra disputent, semperque & fuit & futurum 
est, ut & praeteritum aliquid, & praesens, & futurum sit. Nec vero in mundi creatione, ut 
ipsi arbitrantur, tempus primum extiti, sed tantummodo temporis mensura quaedam.” For 
a detailed analysis of this treatise see Daugirdas, Anfänge des Sozinianismus, pp. 138–153.
81 Other important representatives of this opinion were Adam Goslav (1577–1642) and Jo-
hannes Crellius (1590–1633). In his dispute with the Reformed Bartholomew Kecker mann 
(1571/3–1609) on the concept of the Trinity, Goslav argues for the identity of time and eter-
nity: “Sed quaeret hic aliquis, Ergo tu tempus aeternum statuit, ut dicas, Deum in tempore 
esse? Ego vero non video, cur negem tempus aeternum. Platonis opinionem, quam magna 
pars Theologorum sequitur, refutavit Aristoteles: ut mirer, quid desiderent nostri, vel Theo-
logi, vel Philosophi; maxime cum nec ratio contrarium suadeat, nec scriptura sacra aliud in-
gerat.” (Goslav, Refutatio eorum, quae Bartholomaeus Kecker mannus in libro primo Systematis sui 
Theologici disputat, Raków 1613, p. II, c. VIII, p. 101) In his famous book De Deo et ejus attributis 
(1630), Crellius agrees with the common opinion that eternity is to be understood as everla-
sting duration of a thing and that the most perfect eternity belongs to God: “Est enim Deus 
aeternus, quia & semper fuit, & semper erit, & sic non minus initio caruit, quam fine caritu-
rus est.” (Crellius, “De Deo et ejus attributis”, in: idem, Operum tomus quartus scripta ejusdem 
didactica & polemica complectens, Irenopoli [=Amsterdam] 1656 [=1668], pp. 3–116 [separate pa-
gination], here c. XVIII, p. 41b) However, this understanding of eternity does not mean that 
God is outside of time: “Non potest autem nobis eorum probari subtilitas, qui aeternitatem 
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For Vorstius, God is really and strictly speaking eternal, i. e. His Life is free 
from every beginning and end. He is therefore uncreated, immortal, incorrupt-
ible, and everlasting. However, the Reformed theologian emphasizes God is not 
outside of time. Surprisingly, he does not mean here the metaphysical, infinite 
time, but the physical, finite time. Despite some biblical references, in which God 
is described in explicit terms as eternal (cf. Gen. 21:33; Ps. 90:2; Rom. 16:26 etc.), 
Vorstius refuses to acknowledge these passages as absolutely true: “However, on 
the basis of this, God’s absolute eternity is not proven solidly because whatever 
was before this world is not necessarily from eternity.”82 Vorstius refers here to 
the example of the angels who were created a long time before the world, but who 
do not exist from eternity. A further explanation is that it was not Moses’ aim to 
prove God’s absolute eternity but His long-held and constant affection for His 
people, or His paternal and eternal benevolence toward us. 
The consequences are overwhelming: Like the Socinians, Vorstius denies the 
common view that the whole eternity (of God) exists together (simul, “at the same 
time”) and that it coexists with all times. According to this view, there is no mo-
tion, no succession of the past or the future but only one present time which 
contains all times in itself like a point which encompasses all lines in itself. This 
view reflects the famous phrase of Ps. 90:4, according to which a thousand years 
in God’s sight are like a day that has just gone by. Vorstius, however, recognises 
here a serious contradiction of the twofold consequences: On the one hand, all 
times and things would be and would be not at the same, which is impossible. 
On the other hand, God, who is outside of time in eternity, could effect that the 
past were not really the past and the future not really the future. The absurdity of 
this would be that for one thing the past is no longer and the future is not already 
yet, while otherwise both of them are really present in God’s eternity.83 Therefore, 
the true understanding of God’s eternity is that He is in time like all beings with 
His own present, past and future (cf. Rev. 1:4). Against this background, the true 
meaning of Ps. 90:4 is that time does not seem so long to God as it does to us who 
Dei, omnia, quae unquam extiterunt, temporum spacia complectentem, in unius puncti sei 
angustias cogunt. Indivisibilem enim eam esse statuunt; nihilque in ea prius, nihil esse po-
sterius. Itaque quicquid Deus unquam egit, acturusve est, id eum simul agere. Omnia ipsi 
praesentia; nihil praeteritum, nihil futurum. Quae sententia & sacris literis repugnat, & sibi 
ipsi, omninoque contradictionem non unam involvit.” (ibid., p. 43b) A concise overview of 
the Socinian position offers Fock, Socinianismus, p. 427–431.
82 Vorstius, Tractatus, notae III, p. 205: “Sed hinc tamen non solide probatur absoluta aeternitas 
quum non continuo ab aeterno sit, quidquid ante hunc mundum fuit […].” Some years later, 
the Socinian Valentinus Smalcius (1572–1622) argues exactly in the same way in his con-
frontation with the Lutheran Wolfgang Franz (1564–1628). Cf. Smalcius: Refutatio thesium D. 
Wolfgangi Frantzii […] de praecipuis Christianae religionis capitibus anno 1609, & 1610 disputandas 
proposuit. Raków 1614, disp. 1, p. 12. 
83 Cf. Vorstius, Tractatus, notae III, p. 207: “Hinc porro sequetur, Deum ratione aeternitatis ef-
ficere posse, ut praeteritum non sit vere praeteritum, futurum non vere futurum. Nam illud 
jam non amplius est: hoc vero nondum est: & tamen utrumque revera praesens est in aeter-
nitate, si utrumque aeternitati coexistit.”
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do not live forever. This “in-the-time-fetching” of God is reinforced by the fact 
that Vorstius agreed to the Socinian view that the first matter is equal to God. 
Like God Himself, it is uncaused and immortal.84 
2. One can find the same type of rational arguing in Vorstius’s description of 
God’s immensity which is strongly connected with His alleged omnipresence or 
ubiquity. Vorstius enumerates three main attributes of God’s immensity, namely 1. 
His incomprehensible and immeasurable magnitude of His essence, 2. His ubiqui-
tous presence completing heaven and earth, holding all creatures quasi in His 
hands, and 3. His various grades and modes of presence in the created things, so 
that God is, for example, in heaven in another way than on earth.85 Not surprising-
ly, Vorstius does not agree with this common view. Right at the beginning of his 
argumentation, he stresses that “nowhere in Scripture is taught explicitly that God 
is substantially ubiqui tous and is therefore per se infinite.”86 Of course, Vorstius is 
very well familiar with all the biblical references such as Ps. 139:16 and 11, Jer. 23:23, 
and Acts 17:27 that orthodox opponents refer to in order to legitimise the ubiqui-
tous of God. For him, however, no solid proof of the immensity of God is possible 
with these references. From Jer. 23:23 one can only infer that the divine essence is 
simultaneously both at all locations and at every single place, but not that He is 
ubiqui tous at every place. On the contrary, from Isa. 66:1 Vorstius concludes that 
God is substantially in the highest heaven, however, in a way that He is with all of 
His power near to us (cf. 1. Kings 8:27, Acts 17:27). The conclusion is thus clear: “We 
therefore plainly believe that the Bible inculcates that God lives really according to 
His substance (which is extensive and great, in respect to our substance immense 
and at the same time most glorious) in the highest and most capacious heaven: On 
earth, however, He is to be present to us with His power and wisdom, with His 
effective operation and providence.”87 In locating God in heaven, Vorstius follows 
the Scotist tradition, as mentioned above. However, with his last step he leaves even 
this path and turns towards Socinianism in making God finite. 
With reference to Mt. 18:10, 1. John 3:2, and Rev. 22:4—“and they shall see his 
[i. d. God’s] face”—Vorstius concludes with regard to the substance of God: “Thus, 
it [sc. substantia] is not completely and simply infinite.”88 The explanation for this 
radical heterodox view is totally rational: If God’s substance would be infinite, it 
could not be apprehend with a (created) sense because there must be a relation 
84 Cf. ibid., notae III, p. 209. For the position of the Socinians cf. Salatowsky, Philosophie der Soz-
inianer, pp. 292–296 and 321–324.
85 Cf. ibid., notae III, p. 210.
86 Ibid., notae III, p. 212: “Ad primum illud genus excipi potest, nusquam diserte in Scriptura 
doceri, Deum substantialiter ubique praesentem, adeoque simpliciter infinitum esse.”
87 Cf. ibid., notae III, p. 216: “Simpliciter igitur credamus quod S. literae toties inculcant, Deum 
revera sua substantia (quae ut amplissima & maxima, nostrique respectu immensa, ita simul 
summe gloriosa est) in coelo altissimo, eodemque capacissimo, habitare: in terra vero ubique 
virtute & sapientia sua, sive efficati operatione & providentia sua nobis adesse.” 
88 Ibid., notae III, p. 216: “Substantia Dei videtur jam ab Angelis Matth. 18.10. & videbitur olim 
a nobis facie ad faciem. 1. Joh. 3.2. Apoc. 22.4. Ergo non est prorsus & simpliciter infinita.” 
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between the object, which has to apprehend, and the person, who apprehends it. 
According to Vorstius, nothing in all of nature can be really infinite since all of 
the beings have a certain definite essence by which they are what they are. How 
much Vorstius reckons God among the finite things becomes clear from the next 
syllogism: No matter can really be infinite because it cannot receive infinite forms. 
“No number, no magnitude is really infinite. So God too. For, to be really infinite 
and to be this or that in particular, contradicts each other.”89 The next step in his 
argumentation is that Vorstius declares that not only the substance of God is finite 
but also His power. The potentia Dei may be immense or infinite in regard to us and 
to all possible things; however, strictly speaking, it is not. The argument is once 
again plainly rational: God’s power does not extend over the impossible things, 
because even in God Himself natural qualities exist to which He is bound.90 Con-
sequently, He can not undo what happened, and He can not stop time.91 
In his concluding remarks to this topic, Vorstius finally abandons the idea of 
the infinity of God which culminates in his materialistic, i. e. Socinian view of a 
bodily God. For him, attempts to interpret the Bible in a specific way in order to 
avoid a literal reading are futile. “Who can deny that in the Scripture a magni-
tude and local presence is continuously attributed to God? And that it is clearly 
affirmed that this place is really in the highest heaven?”92 Vorstius agrees with 
the common opinion that God does not have a thick or sensible body such as the 
bodies of created things have. However, he emphasises furthermore, and that 
marks the crucial Socinian difference, that also a spirit, even God, has his spiri-
tual magnitude which is, of course, not sensible but intelligible.93 In securing this 
view, Vorstius is even willing to give up the classical Aristotelian opinion of place 
as a boundary of the containing body and to accept an empty area (vacua regio).94 
89 Ibid., notae III, p. 216f.: “Nec numerus ullus, nec magnitudo ulla actu infinita est &c. Ergo nec 
Deus. Nam actu infinitum esse & in specie hoc vel illud esse, contradictoria sunt […].”
90 Cf. ibid., notae III, p. 217: “Potentia Dei, etsi respectu nostri, & rerum possibilium, recte im-
mensa dicitur, non tamen prorsus infinita est: quia non extenditur ad impossibilia: immo in 
ipso Deo consistit intra naturales Dei qualitates: Ergo nec essentia infinita est […].”
91 It is striking that Vorstius does not mention in this chapter the key reference of Josh. 10:12f. 
which stands paradigmatic for the heavy debate about the question of the geocentric or he-
liocentric model of the world. It is well-known that Joshua spoke to the Lord “O sun, stand 
still over Gibeon, O moon, over the valley of Aijalon” and that indeed “the sun stood still in 
the midst of heaven”. While for the orthodox Christian Aristotelians, this reference was one 
of the most important proofs for the geocentric model, the Copernicans like Kepler and Gali-
lei denied this interpretation of the Bible as being in contradiction with the laws of physics. 
For a discussion of this topic cf. Omodeo, Copernicus, esp. pp. 271–318. It can be assumed that 
Vorstius was a Copernican.
92 Vorstius, Tractatus, notae III, p. 218: “Aut quis negare potest, & magnitudo, et localem prae-
sentiam, in S. Scriptura Deo passim attribui? Et, locum etiam revera in supremo coelo esse, 
perspicue affirmari?”
93 Ibid., notae III, p. 218: “Sed quid vetat, etiam spiritus, imo & Deum, suam habere spiritualem 
magnitudinem; non quidem sensilem, sed aliquo tamen modo intelligibilem?”
94 Vorstius refers here to the “Christian philosophers” Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540–1609) and 
Taurellus. Whether this reference is justified or not, can not be examined here. 
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Finally, in his concept of God Vorstius adopts the position of the Socinians 
to such a great degree that it is right to call him not only a “semi-Socinian” but 
a “full-fledged” Socinian. This will become clearer in section 5 which describes 
Christoph Stegmann’s very similar concept of God. This impression is also con-
firmed by the strong reaction of the orthodox theologians of all denominations, 
accusing Vorstius of being a Socinian. One of his most famous opponents was the 
Lutheran Johann Gerhard.95 
4	 Johann	Gerhard:	Saving	the	essence	and	attributes	of	God
In the dedication of the second volume of his Opus metaphysicum the Lutheran 
Scheibler described the dramatic shift which took place in his times: “It is sad that 
that what was considered and demonstrated in earlier centuries as common and 
correct in the doctrine of God in our time has been called into question by some 
people, with reasons often of little importance, or at least diminished and degraded 
from the truth to something suspect. I mean Conrad Vorstius and his adherents.”96 
According to Scheibler, Vorstius left almost nothing from the divine attributes un-
harmed. He mentioned the infinity and power of God, His simplicity and eternity 
etc. For Scheibler, it is one of the main tasks of the Metaphysica specialis to explain 
these attributes of God which can be recognized by the light of natural reason.
Some years later, in 1625, Gerhard published his Exegesis sive uberior explicatio 
articulorum de Scriptura Sacra, de Deo et de persona Christi which he understood as 
a supplement to the first volume of his Loci theologici from 1610.97 Actually, it is a 
revision of the first edition with which Gerhard reacted to the latest developments 
in philosophy and theology, especially to the rise of Socinianism as the most “dan-
gerous enemy” of the Christian faith. In his dedication in the first volume, Ger-
hard called the Photinians—the Neo-Arians, later known as the Socinians—suc-
cessively a “disease”, a “virus or epidemic of contagion”, a “pest” or a “cancer”.98 
95 A second example for these disputes, which end in the Vorstius affair, is offered by Albert 
Grawer: Centuria I. Illustrium Quaestionum Theologicarum: De 1. Deo Uno & Trino. 2. Christo, in 
specie. 3. Spiritu Sancto, in specie. 4. Creatione. 5. Bonis & Malis Angelis. 6. Prima causa & Natura 
Mali. Disputationibus decem propositarum & D. Conrado Vorstio & Photinianis maxima ex parte 
oppositarum. Jena 1614. Further editions were printed in 1617 and 1661. 
96 Scheibler, Opus Metaphysicum II, epist. ded., p. 2 r: “Dolendum est […] ea quae superioribus 
seculis, in Doctrina de Deo, communiter, idque recte credita & demonstrata fuerunt, hoc no-
stro tempore, per rationes saepe nullius ponderis, a nonullis in controversiam vocari, vel sal-
tem extenuari, & de veritate suspecta reddi. Conradum Vorstium intelligo, ejusque asseclas.”
97 Cf. Johann Gerhard, Exegesis sive uberior explicatio articulorum de Scriptura Sacra, de Deo et de 
persona Christi in tomo primo locorum theologicorum concisius pertractatorum, Jena 1625. Preuss 
included this work in his edition of the Loci, mixing therefore the first edition with the sup-
plement. Nevertheless, as the new English edition of Gerhard’s Loci I will follow the Preuss 
edition. 
98 Gerhard, Loci, t. I, epist. ded., p. IX [not included in the English edition]: “Verum enim vero 
idem ille morbus resurgit hodie, idem virus pestilens infernalis draco e suis hodieque exha-
lat faucibus. Ut enim silentiis nube involvam varias, eas tamen omnes erroneas opiniones, 
quibus plurimi ipsissimum Nestorianismum et Eutychianismum postliminio in ecclesiam 
reducere annituntur, an non ingentem minantur pestem recentiores illi sive Samosatenia
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However, while the edition of 1610 focused on the writings of Sozzini and Chris-
toph Ostorodt (ca. 1560–1611), in the edition of 1625 the new works of Smalcius and 
Vorstius dominated the agenda. In the following, I will limit myself to Gerhard’s 
dispute with Vorstius on the divine attributes of eternity99 and immensity. 
For a better understanding, it should be noted that Gerhard divides the attri-
butes of God into essential and relative attributes. This subdivision is, of course, 
only a conceptual one because the unity of the essence of God is before any dis-
tinction: God is of all beings maximally one (maxime unum), just as he is also the 
greatest being (summum ens).100 This in turn means that all divine attributes are 
really and most simply one with the divine essence.101 Gerhard justifies this with 
the absolute simplicity of the divine nature, free of all composition, mixture, and 
division, and, therefore, of all accidents.102 From this follows, first of all, the incor-
porality and thus the spirituality of God, as Gerhard, citing John of Damascus, 
proves with the following rational argument: “No body is utterly simple, and 
an utterly simple being cannot be corporeal because every body is compounded, 
is passively potential, and is divisible. God is an utterly simple being and is not 
passively potential. Therefore, he is not corporeal.”103 The simplicity of God thus 
prevents any kind of composition that belongs solely to the bodies.104 
Similar to Suárez, Gerhard defines God as “eternal with a true, properly spo-
ken, and infinite eternity”.105 He refers here not only to the definition of Boethi-
us, already mentioned by Suárez, but also to the specification of the Scholastics, 
according to which this eternity means an interminable, indivisible, and inde-
pendent duration with no beginning and end. This view is based on numerous 
biblical references (like Gen. 21:33, Ps. 55:20 and 90:5, Rm. 16:26, and 2 Pet. 3:8), on 
some quotations of the church fathers like Hilary and Augustine and finally on 
the following “evident” reason: “He who is the creator of all things and all times, 
before whom there is nothing, with whom there is neither past nor future, neither 
before nor after, who is utterly simple and immutable, who remains immovable 
  ni sive Photiniani, quos vulgos Neo-Arianos vocat, quibus tamen illi longe pejores sunt et 
pestilentiores! […] Sed enim ut apparet, quam omnino pestilens tabes et quam virulentum 
carcinoma sit Photinianorum istorum doctrina […].”
 99 For this section, I will refer to my study “Entlastung Gottes”, pp. 261–263.
100 Cf. Gerhard, Loci, t. I, lc. II, c. VI, § 95 & 96, p. 288a [99].
101  Cf. ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VII, § 104, p. 295b [114].
102 Cf. ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, s. III, § 129, p. 305b [133]: “Essentia di vi na est simplicissima expers 
omnis compositionis, admixtionis ac divinisionis adeoque omnium accidentium.”
103 Ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, s. I, § 114, p. 299a [122]: “Nullum corpus est simplicissimum, et ens 
simplicissimum non potest esse corporeum, quia omne corpus est compositum, est in po-
tentia passiva ac dividuum. Deus est ens simplicissimum, non est in potentia passiva. Ergo 
non est corporeus.”
104 Gerhard criticises Vorstius here for his confusion both of things and of words, because 
spirit and body are contradistinct species. Cf. Gerhard, Loci, t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, s. I, § 115, p. 300b 
[124].
105 Ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. IV, § 137, p. 307 [139]: “Deus est aeternus vera, proprie dicta et infinita 
aeternitate.” (Italics in original)
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outside of every succession and every movement, who lives and rules forever, He 
indeed is truly and properly eternal. But all these things belong to God.”106 This is 
a typical example for the Scholastic way of reasoning by presupposing that what 
would have to be proved or at least demonstrated first. It is significant for the 
Lutheran theology at that time that Gerhard here also refers to Thomas Aquinas.
Subsequently, Gerhard deals extensively with the objections of Vorstius which 
he refutes step by step. Thus, he emphasized Vorstius’s opinion that on the basis 
of Ps. 90:2, God’s absolute eternity is not proved solidly so that also a participated 
eternity is possible that this eternity is unknown to the Bible. Here, as in general, 
we must keep a distance from our own speculations or mere assertions of some 
of the fathers, but only follow the Scripture which alone called God in the strict 
sense of the word eternal.107 Gerhard criticises Vorstius no less for his opinion that 
in God’s eternity is a succession of past, present, and future so that not all things 
are simultaneously present to Him. According to Gerhard, eternity is not an ac-
cident but God’s essence which must therefore be understood absolutely without 
any limitations. In the form of a syllogism, Gerhard tries to demonstrate this eter-
nity: “God’s eternity is nothing else but the duration of God. The duration of God 
is nothing else but His enduring existence, and the existence of God is the very 
essence of God. Ergo, eternity is the essence of God Himself.”108 Instead of seeing 
that God’s eternity is described in the Scripture in human fashion with words 
that indicate the succession of time but that, nevertheless, must be understood 
in a manner fitting for God, Vorstius minimizes the greatness of God, thinking 
in a childish way of the creator of all things. For Gerhard, God’s eternity coexists 
very well with the segments of time taken separately and succeeding one another. 
Therefore, as the distinction of times in creatures does not take away God’s eterni-
ty, so God’s eternity does not take away the distinction of times in creatures. 
Gerhard presents the following comparison for this parallelism: As the heav-
enly machinery revolves around an immovable pole with an eternal motion, and 
the immovability of the pole is not disturbed by the motion of the heavenly ma-
chinery nor the movement of the machinery caused to stop by the immovability 
of the pole, so also eternity coexists with the segments of time that follow each 
other, and neither is the fixed immovability of eternity disturbed by the contin-
106 Ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. IV, § 139, p. 308b [140]: “Qui est omnium rerum ac temporum 
creator, ante quem nihil est, apud quem nihil praeteritum aut futurum, nihil prius aut 
posterius, qui est simplicissimus et immutabilis, qui extra omnem temporis successionem 
et extra omnem motum immobilis permanet, qui in aeternum vibit et regnat, is etiam vere 
et proprie est aeternus. Sed haec omnia Deo competunt. Ergo.”
107 Cf. ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. IV, § 142, p. 309b [142]: “Respondemus 1. non nostris hic indul-
gendum speculationibus nec nudis patrum quorundam assertionibus. […] sed Scriptura 
unice audienda est, quae τὸ esse ante conditum mundum, antequam essent terra et montes, 
proponit, ut propriam aeternitatis descriptionem et ut attributum Deo unice conveniens.”
108 Ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. IV, § 143, p. 309b [143]: “Aeternitas Dei nihil aliud est quam du-
ratio Dei. Duratio Dei nihil aliud quam durans exsistentia, exsistentia Dei est ipsa Dei 
essentia. Ergo aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia.”
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uous successions of flowing times nor is the succession of time destroyed by the 
fixed immovability of eternity.109 In a way, one can find here a confirmation of the 
old idea that God is what creation is not. He is, as already mentioned, the very 
Other who can only be described by the way of negation (via negationis), in the 
reversal of all that what man is, thinks and acts. Gerhard does not conceal in this 
context the great difficulties that arise in the chapter De natura Dei which are 
strongly connected with the blindness of our mind: Because all the works of God 
are marvellous and mystic, filled with mysteries, how much more marvellous 
and sublime will be the creator of these works, God Himself?110 
According to Gerhard, from God’s eternity follows His immortality111 and in-
finity112 which only indicate in other words that God is incorruptible that He can 
neither be limited by time nor place, but that He is infinite in His own nature and 
essence, infinite, however, not in the sense of corporeal quantity or extension, but 
of (incorporeal) essence and perfection.113 In some ways, immensity, in turn, is 
the same in all ways as infinity, signifying that God is of Himself not limited or 
measured by any place or time nor any other thing. However, strictly speaking, 
immensity is the kind of property of God that signifies that He “is measured and 
circumscribed to no place but penetrates and fills each and every place without 
the multiplication, extension, inclusion, and division of His own essence.”114 This 
presence (adessentia) at all places at all times ultimately means the omnipresence 
or ubiquity of God (omnipraesentia, ubiquitas) which Gerhard describes as follow: 
109 Cf. ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. IV, § 143, p. 310b [144].
110 Cf. ibid., t. I, lc. II, prooem., § 4, p. 242a [5]: “Cum enim omnia Dei opera sint mirabilia et 
μυστηριώδη, mysteriis plena, quanto mirabilior et sublimior erit operum illorum effector 
ipse Deus?” It is clear from this statement that the orthodox Christianity was essentially 
a religion of mysteries which were seen as impenetrable for the human mind because of 
his weakness. However, scholars like Vorstius and the Socinians were no longer willing 
to accept such mysteries which stand in an obvious contradiction to the human reason. It 
should be noticed that this criticism took place long before John Toland published in 1696 
his Christianity not mysterious, the destruction of Christianity as the great mystery. That 
this was, of course, not the opinion of the clergies, is clear from the answer of the Puritan 
Thomas Beverley, Christianity the great mystery. In answer to a late treatise, Christianity not 
mysterious: That is not above, not contrary to reason. In opposition to which is asserted , Chris-
tianity is above created reason, in its pure estate. And contrary to humane reason, as fallen and 
corrupted: and therefore in proper sense, mystery, London 1696.
111 Cf. Gerhard, Loci, t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. VI, § 159, p. 316a [156]: “Deus est immortalis et incor-
ruptibilis.” (Italics in original)
112 Cf. ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. VII, § 162, p. 317b [158]: “Deus vere est infinitus.” (Italics in original)
113 Gerhard emphasises, of course, the “incorporeal essence” of God right from the beginning, 
defining God as “a spirit without a body” (Gerhard, Loci, t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. I, § 114, p. 299a 
[121]) and accusing Vorstius of disseminating fictions and fabrications about God (ibid., 
p. 300b [124]). 
114 Cf. ibid., t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. VIII, § 171, p. 320a–b [164]: “Immensitas est talis Dei proprie-
tas, per quam nullo loco mensurari ac circumscribi, sed omnia et singula loca citra essen-
tiae suae multiplicationem, extensionem, inclusionem ad divisionem penetrare ac replere 
significatur.” For a more detailed description of this topic in Lutheranism see Beuttler, Gott 
und Raum, p. 38–42.
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“This immensity and essential omnipresence of God must be understood in this 
way that God is present with all things not only by His might and efficacy nor 
only by His sight and knowledge but also in His total indivisible essence, for He 
is also immense and infinite not only in His power and wisdom but also in His 
essence.”115 God is at all places, but He can not be located; God is in all things, 
but He is not included; God is out of all things, but he is not excluded, and so 
forth.116 The reason is: He creates space, He possesses space in Himself, and His 
“spatiality” is identical with His being. He is free from any kind of limitation in 
the sense of His immensitas, adessentia and omnipraesentia, from which arises the 
threefold omnipresence through His essence, presence, and power (per essentiam, 
praesentiam et potentiam, in accordance with Thomas Aquinas). In describing this 
all outstanding property of God, Gerhard quotes the old sentence of the Scholas-
tics: “In being, presence, and power, God is here and everywhere.”117 
Gerhard uses also in his more detailed description of this ubiquity the conven-
tional Scholastic terminology. According to that, God is everywhere but neither 
locally (localiter) or in circumscribed fashion (circumscriptive)—i. e. in the way a body 
is in a place, a body that is circumscribed by its own corporeal place—nor definite-
ly (definitive)—i. e. at a specific place or “where” (ubi) as intelligent forms like the 
immaterial angels or the human soul are in a place, who are not locally circum-
scribed, but in their nature finite, so that they are “somewhere”—but “repletively, 
which must be understood not in a gross, corporeal manner—as if God filled 
all places like a body that fills its own place in such a way that it keeps another 
body from being put in the place it occupies—but in a divine way, because God, 
closed up in no place, contains all things because of the immensity of His own es-
sence.”118 The repletive omnipresence of God is all-pervading,—fulfilling, and—
containing, though He is and still remains separated from all places and things. 
God as the creator, as can be seen from this Lutheran description—and there 
is not much difference to the Catholic position of Suárez—, exists completely out-
115 Gerhard, Loci, t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. VIII, § 172, p. 320b [164]: “Haec immensitas et essentialis 
Dei omnipraesentia ita intelligenda est, quod Deus non tantum virtute et efficacia, nec tan-
tum visione et scientia, sed etiam tota et individua sua essentia sit omnibus rebus praes-
ens, neque enim tantum potentia et scientia, sed etiam essentia est immensus et infinitus.” 
116 With these paradoxical descriptions the danger of a pantheistic (or Spinozistic) identity of 
God and nature should be blighted. Cf. Beuttler, Gott und Raum, p. 40. 
117 Gerhard, Loci, t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. VIII, § 172, p. 320b [164]: “Enter praesenter Deus hic et ubique 
potenter.” (Italics in original) This hexameter is handed down from the early Middle Ages.
118 Gerhard, Loci, t. I, lc. II, c. VIII, sec. VIII, § 172, p. 320b [164]: “Scholastici dicunt Deum esse 
ubique non localiter seu circumscriptive, quo modo corpus est in loco, quod a loco suo corpo-
reo per partes quantas divisibili capitur ac circumscribitur, nec definitive, quo modo formae 
intelligentis, angeli scilicet et animae sunt in loco vel potius in certo ποῦ, quia sunt essen-
tiae finitae definitae, sed repletive, quod tamen non intelligendum est crasso et corporeo 
modo, quod Deus ita repleat omnia loca, sicut corpus, quod locum suum eo modo replet, 
ut impediat ne in loco, quem occupat, aliud corpus locetur, sed modo divino, quod Deus 
nullo modo conclusus omnia loca propter essentiae suae immensitatem contineat.” (Italics 
in original) 
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side of space and time. In His immensity, He can only be described in His omni-
presence and eternity without the possibility to say “where” God exactly exists 
and “when” He acts. In this understanding of God as the supersubstantia, the new 
heliocentric model which opened up the possibility of the infinity of space initial-
ly changed little.119 God remained outside of time and place, deprived of human 
access in thought, but close in faith in everyday life. 
5	 Christoph	Stegmann:	Introducing	the	finite	God	in	time	and	place
In contrast to Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae, Stegmann’s Metaphysica repurga-
ta does not contain a metaphysica specialis: There is no particular doctrine of God, 
of the angels and the separated soul. This corresponds to the view that there is 
only being that has its basis in matter, but no transcendent being that is in some 
way or other immaterial. Everything that applies to being as being, also applies 
to God, to the angels, and to the human soul. Assuming that there are only two 
constitutive principles of being, namely form and matter, and that both of them 
are equally involved in the “forming” of being—matter takes on the form, form 
informs matter –, Stegmann draws three profound conclusions from this: (1) We 
can not accept the idea that form gives complete being to the thing. Complete and 
specific being is given neither by matter nor form alone, but results from the in-
teraction of both of them. (2) “There is no existing thing that is pure form without 
matter. (3) Also God, the angels, the accidents, the beings of reason, in short, all 
existing things consist of form and matter.”120 
We would be mistaken to think that this materialism of all things was a wide-
spread view within Socinianism—on the contrary. Crellius, for example, defines 
God in the classical way as a spirit, by which he understands a substance that 
lacks the thickness and materiality that we observe in bodies.121 Following Au-
gustine, he refers to God as a spiritual substance. We find this description in Steg-
mann too,122 but used with a different meaning. Whereas for Crell, it is evident 
that the anthropomorphic description of God in the Bible must not be understood 
literally,123 Stegmann sees things exactly the other way around. “The Holy Scrip-
ture describes God to us, but never states that he is immaterial and unformed, but 
rather that he has matter and form.”124 Quoting 1 Cor. 15:40 and following Ter-
119 Cf. Omodeo, Copernicus, p. 158–196. 
120 Stegmann, Metaphysica, p. I, c. II, p. 9 r: II. “Nullum dari Ens quod sit pura forma absque 
materia. III. Etiam Deum, Angelos, accidentia, entia rationis, summatim omnia Entia ma-
teria & forma constare.” 
121 Crell, De Deo, c. XV, p. 37a: “Posterior definitio constitui potest hujusmodi, ut Deum dicamus 
esse Spiritum aeternum. […] Spiritum cum nominamus, substantiam intelligimus ab omni 
crassitie, qualem in corporibus oculorum arbitrio subjectis cernimus, alienam.”
122 Cf. Stegmann, Metaphysica, p I, c. II, p. 9 v.
123 Cf. Crell, De Deo, p. I, c. XV, p. 37b.
124 Stegmann, Metaphysica, p I, c. II, p. 9 v: “Scriptura autem nobis talem ubique describit 
Deum, non quod sit ἄυλος et ἄμορφος, sed qui materiam & formam habeat.” Stegmann 
follows here the opinion of Vorstius.
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tullian, he emphasises that there are no non-physical substances. Consequently, 
even spiritual substances such as God and the angels are physical: “It is said that 
God is a spiritual thing. A spiritual thing, however, is without flesh and bones. I 
answer: What is correct is that every spiritual thing is substantial and physical, 
even if it is without flesh and bones.”125 There are many different kinds of bodies, 
not only those that consist of flesh and bones. 
A first intermediate result shows that Leibniz was not totally wrong with his 
criticism that Stegmann had reduced God almost completely to the status of crea-
tures. Up to now, we have seen that Stegmann defines God as a spiritual, but no 
less material substance, and that he therefore denies any transcendental ontolog-
ical status of God. However, a second step reveals further revaluations of the 
concept of God concerning His attributes of ubiquity and eternity. I would like to 
show this with reference to Stegmann’s chapter De tempore et loco.
For Stegmann, time and space are part of metaphysics, even if they are ex-
trinsic characteristics of being which have to be dealt with—together with the 
intrinsic characteristics of unity and composition, within the same discipline. 
Although—unlike the intrinsic characteristics—they do not flow from the princi-
ples of existing things themselves, they nevertheless necessarily accompany the 
latter. According to Stegmann, time and space are therefore no transcendental 
categories, but affections of the real being (affectiones entis).126 This description, 
too, confirms that Stegmann does not make any distinction between the different 
kinds of beings. The Scholastics criticize such an approach because it undermines 
the differences between eternity and time, ubiquity and place and so forth. The 
Carmelite Francisco Gabriel, for example, emphasises that “not all beings are in a 
place, but only the corporeal one”.127 Once again, metaphysics and physics are here 
deeply involved in theological requirements which Stegmann wants to purge.
Stegmann differentiates between a mathematical (i. e. physical) and metaphys-
ical consideration of time. That considers time as dependent on the movement 
of heaven and stars. According to him, this describes time only in an improper 
sense, which is not the essence, but the measure of time alone. This considers time 
under the aspect of eternity, that is, insofar as it has been before there were heav-
en and stars, nay, insofar as it has existed from eternity.128 For Stegmann, time is 
125 Ibid., p. I, c. VII, p. 48 r: “Pergis: Deus est Spiritus, Spiritus autem carnem et ossa non habt. 
Respondeo. Recte est omnis Spiritus substantialis & corporeum licet carnem et ossa non 
habeant.”
126 Ibid., p. I, c. IV, p. 23 r and 25 r.
127 Francisco Gabrieli, Physica, continens etiam materiam de Mundo, de Caelo, & de Meteoris, Rome 
1670, disp. V, p. 231b: “Resp. quod non omnia entia sunt in loco, sed tantum corporea; ac 
proinde locus non est affectio entis in communi, sed tantum entis mobilis, quod est obiec-
tum philosophiae.”
128 Stegmann, Metaphysica, p I, c. IV, p. 22 v: “Tempus consideratur vel Mathematicè, quatenus 
nimirum à motu coeli et syderum dependet. Et hoc non est Metaphysicae considerationis, 
neque propriè tempus est, sed potius mensura temporis. Vel Metaphysicè quod fuit ante-
quam coelum et sidera essent, imò quod ab aeterno extitit.” 
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the general term (genus) of eternity, not the other way around. In other words: 
Eternity is part of time (pars temporis): “Eternity is the perpetual past, present and 
future duration of being. Eternity is therefore time.”129 Stegmann follows here the 
position of Socinus, Crellius, and Vorstius. Time as the perfect eternity, namely a 
parte ante and a parte post, without beginning and end belongs only to God. In this 
way, He differs essentially from the angels and the chosen who at the end of the 
days will receive “only” an aeternitas a parte post. In this view, Stegmann and the 
other Socinians agree with the orthodox understanding of God’s eternity. 
The crucial difference, however, lies in the fact that for the latter, as shown 
above, eternity is not part of time, but is totally different from it. For Suárez, Ger-
hard, and many other scholars, God is not temporal, but is rather the only thing 
that is eternal in the actual sense of the word, that means, without beginning and 
end. As such, he is that which time is not. Stegmann sees this exactly the other 
way around: “Also God is in time, and all spirits, nay, everything that is.”130 In 
other words, God’s eternity, the semi-eternity (aevitas) of the angels, and the time 
of the sublunary things—everything is time. For this reason God’s eternity, His 
being without beginning and end, means that He has been at all times, is now, 
and will always be, as is clear from Rev. 1:4 and 8. A temporal difference is also 
ascribed to Him in Ps. 90:2 and 102:27, i. e. a being marked by the past, present, 
and future which, although it may be eternal and pass through all times, none-
theless has a before and after.
Stegmann rejects the view according to which God’s eternity does not permit 
temporal differences, but instead exists in an indivisible moment in which every-
thing is always in the present. As mentioned above, this view was often defended 
by refering to Ps. 90:4 and 2. Peter 3:8, according to which a thousand years to 
God are like a day, and a day like a thousand years. For Stegmann, by contrast, 
it is clear from these words that the temporal difference is as nothing to God, 
as the infinity of the years remains a mere number to him. This does not mean, 
however, that there is no progress in God, or that there is no difference between 
before and after.131 
129 Ibid., p I, c. IV, p. 23 r: “Aeternitas est duratio Entis perpetua praeterita, praesens, et futura. 
Est itaque aeternitas tempus.” 
130 Ibid., p. I, c. IV, p. 23 v: “Respondeo. Etiam Deus in tempore est, et omnes spiritus, imo om-
nia quae sunt.” Cf. ibid., p. 24 r–24 v: “[…] cum Deum in tempore esse diximus, Deus vero 
ab aeterno fuerit, unde et aeternitatem partem temporis fecimus, necessario sequi tempus 
ab aeterno fuisse. Et ita est.” If time were not eternal, then it would start sometimes in 
time. But when time begins in time, then there is time before it begins, which is absurd. 
Stegmann refers here to Aris totle’s law of noncontradiction.
131 Ibid., p. I, c. IV, p. 30 v: “Deinde verba illa Psalmi et Petri nihil quoque ad hanc rem faciunt. 
Nihil enim aliud volunt, quam discrimen illud temporum, quod nos maximi merito facimus, 
apud Deum nihili fieri, cum illi infinitas annorum, et qui nunquam definirent, numerus 
restet, ita ut mille annos non pluris quam unum diem facere possit, secus ac nobis fit, qui 
crastinum nobis polliceri non audemus: at interim non dicitur in mille illis annis, ut et in uno 
illo die apud Deim nullam esse successionem, nullam prioris et posterioris differentiam.”
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As an affection of the living being, place is the “somewhere”, the space in which 
something is. In other words: “Place is the space of a located thing.”132 This sounds 
ordinary, but Stegmann sets immediately the counterpoint. He rejects the classi-
cal Aristotelian definition of place as “the innermost motionless boundary of what 
contains it”. The first argument for his rejection is typical for Stegmann’s way of 
thinking: Place belongs to every being, as well to the outermost heaven as to math-
ematical or incorporeal things. According to him, it is not justified to exclude some 
things arbitrary from this understanding of place. A further argument concerns 
the difference between place and surface: The former is immobile, the latter is mo-
bile. Place cannot therefore be moved by a moved body. Instead, a moved body will 
acquire a new place. Place is in this way equal with the located thing, but only as 
long as no movement takes places. Surface, however, is not equal with the located 
thing because it has only longitude and latitude, but in contrast to place no altitude.
Most important for the right understanding of the consequences of Stegmann’s 
definition of place is, however, his following conviction: “But as we have talked 
about time, so we must also say this about space, namely that it is eternal.”133 
Stegmann supports this view by arguing that God, because He is eternal, must be 
somewhere, i. e. in some place. Consequently, place must be eternal in the same 
way as God is eternal. If it were not eternal, it would then have been made, that 
is, it would have been made somewhere, i. e. in a place. Thus, it would have been 
before it had been made which is absurd. Stegmann makes reference here (similar 
to Crellius134), for example, to Ps. 2:4 and Mt. 5:16, in which heaven is ascribed to 
God as the place of His being. For Stegmann, the localization of God in heaven 
is accompanied by the idea that He is, according to His essence, not present ev-
erywhere, that is to say, He is not ubiqui tous, which clearly follows from Acts 
17:24 and Jer. 23:23. The reason is: “For if God is everywhere, in what way has He 
revealed Himself more in heaven than elsewhere? And what would it take to lead 
us from the earthly things to the heavenly, if God is by His nature present every-
where by that time?”135 Further, if God were ubiqui tous, he would either be in the 
same place as another object at the same time, or everything else outside of the 
132 Ibid., p. I, c. IV, p. 25 r: “Locus est spatium rei locatae.” Stegmann emphasises here his 
agreement with the Platonists who define “place” exactly in that way.
133 Cf. ibid., p. I, c. IV, p. 26 r: “Ut autem de tempore diximus, ita etiam de loco hoc asserimus, 
illum aeternum esse.”
134 Cf. Crellius, De Deo, c. XXVII, p. 92b.
135 Stegmann, Metaphysica, p. I, c. IV, p. 27 r: “Nam si Deus est ubique, quomodo se magis pate-
fecit in cœlis, quam alibi? Et quid opus nos à terrenis ad coelestia abduci, si ubique essentiâ 
praesentem hactenus Deum?” Crellius emphasises that in the case of ubiquity God should 
be indeed everywhere: “Ejus [sc. Dei] autem essentiam in quovis pulvisculo atque atomo 
totam latere, ac in locis quibusvis spurcissimis non minus, quam in angustissimo coelo-
rum domicilio extare, & porro obscoenissimis etiam atque impurissimis actionibus plane 
mediam intervenire, & cum iis rebús intime jungi, a quibus vel cogitatio abhorret; id de 
Deo sanctissimo atque augustissimo omnino sentiendum esse, & sine certissima jactura 
ignorari non posse, nondum ex sacris literis discere potuimus.” (De Deo, c. XXVII, p. 92b) 
He expresses understanding for those who do not dare to set God in lower places because 
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divine essence would be nowhere. Indeed, Stegmann goes so far in stressing the 
necessity of having to be in a place as to claim that “God is not infinite, much less 
absolutely and simply, but finite. God is not immense.”136 Insofar that ‘being in a 
place’ means being restricted by a place, God cannot be in an unbounded place, 
and therefore cannot be Himself infinite, immense and ubiqui tous, may He not 
be locked in a place like a bird in a cage. 
Stegmann’s two “bombshells” concerning the existence of God in space and 
time were the radical end of the Socinian concept of God. It does not come as a 
surprise that certainly not all of the Socinians agreed with this position. In his 
letter to Leibniz from the year 1707, in which he announced him the early submis-
sion of Stegmann’s Metaphysica repurgata, Samuel Crellius (1660–1747), grandson 
of Johannes Crellius, expressed his profound dismay about this position: “Fur-
thermore, I do not like everything about this metaphysics. The physical God is 
philosophized very roughly.”137 As we have seen, this assessment agrees with that 
which Leibniz should then give later in his refutation. God’s eternity as bound-
less time on both sides means a “necessary existence” in contrast to the creatures 
who are affected by the flux of time and do not exist necessarily.138 Leibniz also 
accused Stegmann of abusing passages of the Bible in order to confine God to a 
particular place which is ridiculous. If that would be the case, how can He know 
distant things or act on them? To maintain that God is finite proves only the crass 
ideas of Stegmann which are very remote from the true divine nature. In short, 
Stegmann’s “attenuated philosophy” is a bad example for a way of philosophiz-
ing in which “scarcely anything outstanding and sublime survives”.139 God as 
the creator of the world has to separate ontologically from it in order to save the 
transcendental hierarchy of all beings just like the transcendental structure of 
the whole universe. According to Leibniz, space and time are the inner-worldly 
conditions of an “imperfect” universe whose “outer-worldly” God is pure and 
stripped of all imperfections. However, this concept of God were not rewarded 
by success in the view of an Enlightenment which adopted more and more the 
Socinians ideas of theology and philosophy.
of His highest majesty, but place him in heaven. In this context, Crell mentions Vorstius 
who rejects rightly the usual view of the diffusion of the divine essence through all things. 
136 Ibid., p. I, c. IV, p. 30 v: “Deus non est infinitus, nedum absolute et simpliciter, sed finitus. 
Deus non immensus.”
137 Samuel Crellius, Letter to Leibniz, December 1, 1707. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek, 
Niedersächische Landesbibliothek, Lbr 182, p. 1 r: “Caeterum non per omnia mihi placet 
ista Metaphysica. De corpore Deo crasse satis philosophatur.”
138 Leibniz, “Ad Christophori Stegmanni Metaphysicam Unitariorum”, p. 184, l. 225–230: 
“Aeter nitatem autor ait esse Tempus utrinque interminatum seu durationem omnimodo 
in fi ni tam. Hoc excusari potest, modo observetur interim aeternitatem quando de Deo dici -
tur, plus aliquid notare, nempe Existendi necessitatem. Ita Deus fluxu temporis non affici-
tur, ut creaturae, quae existendi necessitate carent, et aliunde semper pendent.”
139 See footnote 29. 
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6 Conclusion
It is astonishing to see that the change of the Copernican model in astronomy in 
the 16 and 17th century did not lead to a revaluation of the concept of God, neither 
in the case of the Socinians nor in the case of the Catholics or Protestants. In my 
opinion, the most possible explanation for this is that even for most Coperni-
cans—with the notable exceptions of Digges and Bruno—the new heliocentric 
model continues to describe only a finite universe so that the old opposition be-
tween infinity and finity, heaven and earth, eternity and time did not experi-
ence any change. That the finite is incapable of the infinite remained for most of 
the theologians, philosophers and mathematicians a seldom contradicted belief. 
Even the Socinians, who were the “rationalisers” of Christian religion, did not 
change their concept of God, although at least some of them were defenders of 
the Copernican system.140 As long as heaven did not become infinite, there was no 
need to question the place of God in the outermost heaven.
The juxtaposition of Stegmann and Vorstius on the one hand and Suárez and 
Gerhard on the other has led to astonishing constellations concerning the concept 
of God. Contrary to the usual antithesis of Catholicism and Protestantism, in the 
matter of God no big differences could be determined. On the contrary, the simi-
larities were so great that Gerhard constantly used the terms or arguments of the 
Scholastics for his own argumentation. This does, of course, not mean that they 
were no differences in the concept of God between the Catholics and Protestants. 
But in the case of the question of the relation of God to time and space discussed 
here, that did not matter much. God is understood as an immaterial spirit, exist-
ing from eternity to eternity, without a beginning or end, ubiqui tously present in 
the whole universe, crossing all times and spaces with no difference, being in the 
outermost heaven as well as being near to you.
Stegmann and Vorstius did not accept this paradoxical description of God, 
which let Him be there and nowhere, which let Him act eternally in time. Both of 
them were defenders of a rational religion that deny not only in abstracto but also 
in concreto any contradiction between philosophy and theology. Both disciplines 
relate to each other on an equal footing, both being based on reason—their highest 
common principle. God’s action has therefore been a part of the events of nature 
from the very beginning. Indeed, God Himself is not outside of this world but is 
rather situated in the world in the heavens, where, in an eternity that is to be un-
derstood in temporal terms, He shapes the course of events in time. Revelation is 
thus not a transcendental event, but can be integrated in the natural metaphysics 
of being, which maintains itself in one way or another in constant change through 
matter. In my opinion, a radical and worldly point of view of this kind could have 
140 Martin Ruar (1588/90–1657), Johannes Ludwig von Wolzogen (1600–1661), and Andreas 
Wis sowatius (1608–1678) were defenders of the Copernican model. Cf. Kęstutis Daugirdas, 
“Re zep tion der chronologischen und astronomischen Schriften Keplers in Johannes Lud-
wig von Wolzogens Evangelienkommentaren”, in: Barok. Historia—Literatura—Sztuka 31 
(2009), pp. 169–190.
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arisen only outside universities and represents a further example of what Martin 
Mulsow has described as “Moderne aus dem Untergrund”, i. e. a modernity that 
first found expression in the realm of the forbidden and the subterranean.141 Steg-
mann and Vorstius are excellent representatives of this modernity.
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The Wittenberg Reception of Copernicus:  
At the Origin of a Scholarly Tradition*
Pietro Daniel Omodeo & Jonathan Regier 
The paradoxes of the Wittenberg reception of Nicolaus Copernicus’s astronomy 
constitute one of the most debated issues in the cultural history of Renaissance 
science. The relevance of the main theological and academic center of the Lu-
theran Reformation for the early dissemination of Copernicus’s De revolutioni-
bus orbium coelestium [On the revolutions of the celestial spheres] (1543) is beyond 
question. The two professors of mathematics whom Philipp Me lanch thon ap-
pointed in 1537, Georg Joachim Rheticus (lower mathematics) and Erasmus Rein-
hold (higher mathematics), made the relevance of Copernicus’s planetary theory, 
his application of geometrical devices and his parameters appreciable to a wide 
scholarly public.1 Rheticus learned the details of the new astronomy from Co-
pernicus himself and announced his teacher’s novel views through the Narratio 
prima [First report] (1540), a clear and non-technical introduction. Moreover, he 
mediated between Copernicus and the Nuremberg printer Johannes Petreius, 
to whom he consigned the precious manuscript of De revolutionibus. As far as 
the other Wittenberg mathematician is concerned, Reinhold computed the first 
tables based on Copernican values, the extremely successful Prutenicae tabulae 
[Prutenic tables] (1551). In the short run, Rheinhold’s practice-oriented work was 
much more effective in disseminating Copernicus than Rheticus’s enthusiastic 
defense of the most radical theses, that is to say, the centrality and immobility of 
the Sun and the motions of the Earth.2 At Wittenberg, Reinhold and his pupils 
were reformed humanists with strong mathematical training. Despite the general 
rejection of scholastic theology in the Lutheran intellectual community, and de-
spite hostility toward the Aristotelian tradition from certain quarters, they were 
well grounded in Aristotelian natural philosophy. All these factors impacted on 
their influential dissemination of De revolutionibus. Their efficacy in promoting 
*  This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and 
Innovation Programme, GA n. 725883. 
1 See Robert S. Westman, “The Me lanch thon circle, Rheticus and the Wittenberg interpreta-
tion of the Copernican theory,” in: Isis 66 (1975), pp. 163–193 and Claudia Brosseder, Im Bann 
der Sterne: Caspar Peucer, Philipp Me lanch thon und andere Wittenberger Astrologen, Berlin 2004.
2 Cf. Owen Gingerich, “Reinhold, Erasmus”, in: Dictionary of Scientific Biography 11 (1975), 
pp. 365–367. On the reception of his tables, see Gingerich, “Erasmus Reinhold and the Disse -
mi nation of Copernican Theory,” in: Gingerich, The Eye of Heaven: Ptolemy, Copernicus, Kepler, 
New York 1993, pp. 221–251. 
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these new astronomical results was selective, since they generally rejected the 
cosmological theses at the center of the new system (terrestrial motion alongside 
solar centrality and immobility). In their mitigated reception of Copernicus, they 
followed the most charismatic Wittenberg intellectuals, Martin Luther and Me -
lanch thon. In what follows, we will discuss Me lanch thon’s role in shaping this 
reception. In this context, Rheticus was exceptional in his realist defense of the 
Copernican system. However, he left Wittenberg in 1542, when Copernicus’ ma-
jor work was still in press, in order to take up a position as professor of higher 
mathematics at the University of Leipzig.3 After fleeing Leipzig and his subse-
quent banishment from that city due to a sex scandal, he eventually settled in 
Cracow, Poland, where he continued his mathematical research and supported 
himself as a physician. Reinhold, for his part, strengthened the selective recep-
tion of Copernicus by carefully avoiding geokinetic, heliostatic, or heliocentric 
doctrines and even reinforcing the traditional order of the heavens. In this essay 
we will recapitulate and assess the cultural context in which the Wittenberg in-
terpretation was born and its institutionalization took place.
The reception of Copernicus rested on various epistemological, natural, and 
scriptural presuppositions. In turn, historians of astronomy have interpreted it in 
different ways. Robert Westman labeled the two-sided appropriation-cum-rejec-
tion of De revolutionibus “the Wittenberg Interpretation” and considered it to be fun-
damentally “mathematical” as opposed to “physical” (or natural philosophical). In 
other words, Wittenberg mathematicians were especially attracted to Coper nicus’s 
use of minor epicycles to replace the Ptolemaic equant, reducing variation in speed 
to a composition of uniform circular motions. As Westman reports, Reinhold 
wrote the following inscription in his own personal copy of De revolutionibus, 
“Axioma Astronomicum: Motus coelestis aequalis est et circularis vel ex aequali-
bus et circularibus compositus”, that is, “Axiom of astronomy: Heavenly motions 
are either uniform and circular or composed of uniform and circular [motions].”4 
The Wittenberg astronomers were also interested in the possibility of developing 
improved sets of tables for astronomical computation. However, they did not ac-
cept the most daring cosmological hypotheses.
The question then arises: How could such a bipolar reception take place? How 
could Wittenberg mathematicians get along with such a reading of Copernicus? 
How could they ignore the first and the fifth book of De revolutionibus on the 
3 On Rheticus, bio-bibliography, see Karl Heinz Burmeister, Georg Joachim Rhetikus (1514–
1574): Eine Bio-Bibliographie, 2 vols, Wiesbaden 1967–1968. Also, see Jarosław Włodarczyk, 
In tro duction to Georg Joachim Rheticus, Narratio prima or First Account of the Books On the 
Rev o lu tions by Nicolaus Copernicus, Warsaw 2015, pp. 9–70. For a recent intellectual biogra-
phy in English, see Dennis Danielson, The First Copernican: Georg Joachim Rheticus and the Rise 
of the Copernican Revolution, New York 2006.
4 Westman, “The Me lanch thon Circle”, p. 176. See also in Owen Gingerich, An Annotated Cen-
sus of Copernicus’ ‘De revolutionibus’ (Nuremberg, 1543 and Basel, 1566), Leiden-Boston-Köln 
2002, the description of Reinhold’s copy of De revolutionibus 1543, pp. 268–278, with the re-
production on p. 269 of Reinhold’s motto on the “Axioma Astronomicum”. 
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general hypotheses and on planetary motions of longitude, respectively? Did 
they perhaps disentangle mathematical astronomy from a natural-philosophi-
cal treatment of celestial motions? Or did they search for a different synthesis? 
The Wittenberg program has constituted a puzzle for historians of Renaissance 
astronomy who read it in various ways, particularly as a conventionalist or in-
strumentalist enterprise (following Pierre Duhem’s interpretation), as a revival 
of physical Aristotelianism, or as a consequence of Scriptural literalism.5 In this 
essay we will first recapitulate the main lines of the historiographical debate, 
then reconsider the sources—manuscript and printed—on which an informed 
assessment of Wittenberg astronomy is grounded. We will pay close attention 
to its institutional settings and address the question of the possible confessional 
dimension of astronomy developed there. Additionally, we offer a translation of 
Me lanch thon’s most relevant pages on Copernicus and terrestrial motion.
1	 On	Me	lanch	thon’s	Changing	Attitudes	towards	Copernicus
In our view, the most suitable point of departure for a historiographical sum-
mary of our present topic is an article by the historian of Renaissance science 
Emil Wohlwill, “Me lanch thon und Copernicus,” which appeared in the German 
journal for the history of medicine and natural science, Mitteilungen zur Geschichte 
der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaft in 1904. Wohlwill focused on Me lanch thon’s 
rejection of terrestrial motion in the astronomical section of the latter’s Initia doc-
trinae physicae (1549), which can be freely translated as Introduction to Physics. His 
rejection was clearly directed against the Copernican theory and even Coper-
nicus in person. The tone of Me lanch thon’s criticism was harsh. In the section 
“Quis est motus mundi?” [What is the motion of the world?], one reads the fol-
lowing critique:
But here there are some who either by love of novelty or to show off their 
cleverness have argued that the Earth is moved and reject the movement 
of the eighth sphere and the Sun, whereas they assign motion to other ce-
lestial spheres. They moreover put the Earth among the stars.6
And a few lines later:
Although subtle specialists inquire into many things in order to exercise 
their wits, it is not right to openly affirm such absurdities, and it sets a 
damaging example. It is right for the mind to reverentially embrace the 
truth shown by God, to be at peace therein, to thank God for kindling and 
5 See the discussion in Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein, “Realism and Instrumental-
ism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal,” in: Perspectives on Science 6/3 (1998), 
pp. 232–258.
6 Philipp Me lanch thon (and Paul Eber), Initia doctrinae physicae, Wittenberg 1549, book I, f. 47 v: 
“Sed hic aliqui vel amore novitatis vel ut ostentarent ingenia, disputarunt moveri Terram, 
et contendunt nec octavam Sphaeram, nec Solem moveri, cum quidem caeteris coelestibus 
orbibus motum tribuant, Terram etiam inter Sidera collocant.”
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preserving some light in the minds of men, and to consider how to be led 
toward God by this light and in what way life should be guided and aided 
by the knowledge of truth.7
Me lanch thon believes that Copernicus’s theses are absurd from both a physical 
viewpoint and a theological. It bears recalling that physics and theology should 
not contradict one another, since Creation reveals the wisdom of its Creator in the 
eyes of the pious astronomer. The pious framework of Me lanch thon’s physics is 
stated clearly from the beginning. The heavens, the most noble part of creation, 
reveal God’s glory and, accordingly, constitute the most important field of phys-
ical contemplation:
After consideration of man’s nature, it is beneficial to look at the heavens 
and consider what the affinity between the heavenly bodies and the inferior 
ones is, especially in relation to man. In fact, it is not likely that those most 
beautiful bodies in the heavens were created in vain, especially since they 
remain the same and have motions that were ordained with great wisdom. 
It is something great to know what they are and what forces they have.8
In the section “Quid est finis et usus physics?”, that is, “What is the aim and the 
utility of physics,” Me lanch thon affirms that all of nature is like a theatre that 
God created for the human mind to contemplate.9 In line with these presupposi-
tions, Me lanch thon’s physics descends from the heavens to Earth. The first topics 
(loci praecipui) he deals with and their order is telling:
De Deo (On God),
De providentia  (On Providence),
De contingentia  (On contingency),
De Mundo  (On the world).10
This is the background against which one has to understand Me lanch thon’s indig-
nation vis-à-vis the heliocentric revolution and his harsh words against Co per ni -
cus. Still, as Wohlwill pointed out, he later tamed his judgement. He removed the 
harshest attacks on Copernicus’s ideas and person from the 1550 Witten berg edi-
 7 Ibid., f. 48 r: “Etsi autem artifices acuti multa exercendorum ingeniorum causa quaerunt, 
 ta men adseverare palam absurdas sententias non est honestum, et nocet exemplo. Bonae men -
tis est veritatem a Deo monstratam reverenter amplecti et in ea acquiescere, et Deo gratias 
agree, aliquam accedenti lucem, et servant in hominum mentibus, ac deinde considerare, quis 
ad Deum aditus sit per eam lucem, et quomodo vita regenda et iuvanda sit agnitione veritatis.”
 8 Ibid., chap. “Quid est physica doctrina?”, f. 9 v: “Deinde considerata hominis natura, suspice-
re in coelum iuvaret, et considerare, quae sit cognatio coelestium corporum cum inferioribus, 
ac praesertim cum homine. Non est enim verisimile haec pulcherrima corpora in coelo, fru-
stra condita esse, praesertim cum et maneant eadem, et leges habeant motuum magno con -
silio ordinatas. Haec quid sint, et quam vim habeant, penitus scire magnum quiddam esset.”
 9 Ibid., f. 19 v: “Tota natura velut theatrum est humani ingenii, quod Deus vult aspici.”
10 Ibid., f. 26 r.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
87The Wittenberg Reception of Copernicus
tion of the Initia. Whereas he had called the Copernican theses “absurd statements” 
(absurdas sententias) in 1549, he replaced these words with a neutral pronoun, “talia” 
[such issues], in 1550. The beginning of the aforementioned passage “Sed hic aliqui 
vel amore novitatis vel ut ostentarent ingenia, disputarunt moveri Terram” was rewritten 
as “Sed hic aliqui disputarunt moveri Terram”.11 Another criticism was erased:12
1549 1550
His divinis testimoniis confirmati, 
ve ri ta tem amplectamur, nec praesti giis 
eorum, qui decus in genii esse pu tant, 
conturbare artes, abduci nos ab ea 
sinamus.
His divinis testimoniis confirmati, ve -
ritate amplectamur.
Encouraged by these divine testimo-
nies, we should embrace the truth. Let 
us not be led astray by the deceptions 
of those who think it the glory of 
their cleverness to throw the arts into 
confusion.
Encouraged by these divine testimo-
nies, we should embrace the truth.
A new passage was inserted. The following one:
Although subtle specialists [artifices] inquire into many things [different 
theories] in order to exercise their wits, nonetheless the youth should 
know that they ought not dare to affirm such theories. In their first ed-
ucation, [students] shall appreciate theories [sententias] transmitted with 
the shared consensus of the specialists, which are minimally absurd. If 
[students] grasp that truth is manifested by God, they will embrace [this 
truth] with reverence and be satisfied with it.13
These words bear witness to the fact that Me lanch thon, “the teacher of Germa-
ny” (praeceptor Germaniae), did not eventually restrict the study of Copernicus’s 
paradoxes to specialists, but only teaching them to the students (iuniores). It seems 
that by 1550 Me lanch thon’s concern relative to the geokinetic doctrine shifted to 
pedagogy. He admitted specialists’ discussions of Aristarchus’s theory—that is to 
say, the Copernican planetary theses attributed to the ancient astronomer who, 
according to Archimedes’s Sand reckoner, first envisaged heliocentrism14—but be-
11 Emil Wohlwill, “Me lanch thon und Copernicus,” in: Mitteilungen zur Geschichte der Medizin 
und der Naturwissenschaft 3 (1904), 260–267, p. 261.
12 Ibid., p. 262.
13 Me lanch thon, Initia (Wittenberg 1550), f. 40: “Etsi autem artifices acuti multa exercendorum 
ingeniorum caussa quaerunt, tamen sciant iuniores, non velle eos talia adseverare. Ament 
autem in prima institutione sententias receptas communi arificum consensu, quae minime 
sunt absurdae, et ubi intelligunt veritatem a Deo monstratam esse, reverenter eam amplec-
tantur, acquiescant in ea.”
14 Eduard J. Dijksterhuis, Archimedes, Copenhagen 1956, pp. 360–373, Chap. XII, “The Sand 
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lieved that they should refrain from teaching it in their university classes. As 
Wohlwill also noticed, Me lanch thon expunged all references to De revolutionibus 
in later editions of the Initia (e. g. positive remarks concerning the theory of Mer-
cury and Venus). The teaching of Copernican hypotheses, alongside Ptolemaic 
astronomy and Tycho Brahe’s geo-heliocentric hypotheses, would be introduced 
in Me lanch thonian universities much later at the turn of the 1590s.15 
The most important point raised by Wohlwill in 1904 is that a correct apprecia-
tion of Me lanch thon’s views should not be exclusively based on the editio princeps 
of his textbook on physics but should also consider textual differences between 
the first and the second editions. Since the only recent edition of the Initia avail-
able is that of the Corpus Reformatorum, which was solely based on the version of 
1549, Wohlwill’s warning is still precious for Me lanch thon studies and the history 
of Renaissance astronomy.
2 On the Composition of Me lanch thon’s Initia 
More recently, Walter Thüringer has contributed to our understanding of Me lanch -
thon’s evolving position on Copernican astronomy by examining the manuscript 
version of the Initia and pointing out neglected textual differences relative to the 
printed versions of the book. The manuscript is still extant, preserved in the city 
library of Nuremberg (Stadtbibliothek Nürnberg, coll. Cent. V App. 21). The man-
uscript shows that Me lanch thon did not write the book alone. In fact, it was the 
result of a shared enterprise, which mainly consisted of a co-authorship with the 
Wittenberg professor of natural philosophy, Paul Eber. The different handwriting 
permitted Thüringer to establish the respective contributions of the two scholars. 
Eber authored the last part of book one, which is the part of utmost interest here. 
It is the book on the most general principles of nature, their link to the power and 
wisdom of God, the order of the cosmos and astronomy.16 Me lanch thon is the au-
thor of the more relevant part as far as the Copernican question is concerned. He 
also penned the refutation of terrestrial motion. Handwriting also shows that the 
professor of mathematics, Reinhold, read through the manuscript and inserted an-
Reckoner.” See also Edward Rosen, “Aristarchus of Samos and Copernicus”, now in Rosen, 
Co pernicus and His Successors, London and Rio Grande 1995, pp. 1–9.
15 This is witnessed by the Scot mathematician Liddel’s astronomical classes in Rostock and 
Helmstedt, which became the issue of a contention with Brahe, who suspected Liddel of pla-
giarizing his system with the planets encircling a Sun that encircles the Earth at the center of 
the world. Cf. “The European Career of a Scottish Mathematician and Physician,” in: Duncan 
Liddel (1561–1613): Networks of Polymathy and the Northern European Renaissance, ed. Omodeo 
with Karin Friedrich, 2016, pp. 35–92, pp. 65 and ff. Another testimony is afforded by Michael 
Maestlin’s teaching at Tübingen and Kepler’s scholarly defense of the motion of the Earth in 
1593. On this, see Nicholas Jardine, “Kepler’s ‘lightly woven cosmography’: on the sources, 
identity and significance of Kepler-Ms 18, 238 v-241 r, Russian Academy of Sciences, St Peters-
burg” in Caroline Noirot and Nuccio Ordine, Omnia in uno: Hommage à Alain-Philippe Segonds, 
pp. 453–465 and Charlotte Methuen, “Maestlin’s Teaching of Copernicus: The Evidence of His 
University Textbook and Disputations”, in: Isis 87 (1996), pp. 230–246.
16 Eber wrote from the section on lunar theory onwards.
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notations and small corrections on mathematical and astronomical details, as well 
as some computations and technical terms in Greek. One of Reinhold’s insertions is 
particularly significant. It has so far escaped the attention of historians of astronomy 
that the mathematical astronomer who computed the first Copernican tables also 
commented on a passage arguing that terrestrial motion would be excessively rapid. 
Reinhold calculated the exact speed in a marginal note: “In one hour every point of 
the Earth would cover 225 [German] miles; in a minute 3,75 [German] miles.”17
In the manuscript of the Initia, the refutation of terrestrial motion is full of 
corrections. Evidently, Me lanch thon rewrote these pages several times, changed 
words, erased passages, and reconsidered his arguments and their order.18 The 
Copernican challenge kept him very busy. It is interesting to remark that his ini-
tial tone was even cruder than that of the first printed edition concerning Co-
pernicus’s persona. For instance, the passage “Nec recens hi ludi conficti sunt” 
(These games have not been invented recently) first read “Nec sunt his furores 
recentes” (This insanity is not recent).19 Another erased passage is reminiscent of 
Luther’s reported objection, in 1539, “Der Narr will die gantze kunst Astronomiae 
umkehren” (That fool wants to turn the whole art of astronomy upside down).20 
Here Me lanch thon’s original words follow (left):
Manuscript of the Initia Printed version of Initia (Wittenberg 1549)
[Sed hic ingeniorum petulantia 
fingit conturb/ quae amat contra[-
dictiones]/ quae dedicatur conturba-
tione artium, finxit moveri Terram, 
et ad [… contendit Solem nam non 
moveri] Sed hic aliqui vel amori 
novitatis vel [propter alias causas] 
ut ostentarent ingenia disputarunt 
moveri Terram, […]
Sed hic aliqui vel amori novitatis vel ut 
ostentarent ingenia disputarunt moveri 
Terram, […]
17 Philipp Me lanch thon and Paul Eber, manuscript of Initia doctrinae physicae, Nürnberg, Stadt-
bibliothek, coll. Cent. V App. 21, f. 191 v: “In una hora 225 milliaria efficeret terrae quodlibet 
punctum. In minuto horae 3 ¾ milliaria.”
18 Walter Thüringer, “Paul Eber (1511–1569): Me lanch thons Physik und seine Stellung zu Co per -
nicus,” in: Me lanch thon in seinen Schülern, ed. Heinz Scheible, Wiesbaden 1997, pp. 285–321.
19 Me lanch thon, Initia (1549), book I, f. 47 v and Me lanch thon and Eber, manuscript of Initia, 
f. 179 r.
20 Martin Luther, Werke vol. II 1 Tischreden, Weimar 1912, p. 419. Cf. Michel-Pierre Lerner, “‘Der 
Narr will die gantze kunst Astronomiae umkehren’: sur un célèbre Propos de table de Lu-
ther,” in Nouveau ciel nouvelle terre: La révolution copernicienne dans l’Allemagne de la Réforme 
(1530–1630), ed. Miguel Ángel Granada and Edouard Mehl, Paris 2009, pp. 41–65.
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Manuscript of the Initia Printed version of Initia (Wittenberg 1549)
[But here the petulance of clev-
er minds has fabricated con-
fusion / which loves contradic-
tions / which delights in upending 
the arts, has fabricated that the 
earth is moved, and [argued that 
the sun is not moved]. But here 
there are some who either by love of 
novelty or [because of other reasons] 
to show off their cleverness, have 
argued that the Earth is moved […]
But here there are some who either 
by love of novelty or to show off their 
cleverness, have argued that the Earth is 
moved […]
In spite of the piece of evidence he uncovered, Thüringer argued that Melanch-
thon’s lengthy examination of the Copernican question and the revision of his 
position bear witness to his keen interest in De revolutionibus. Thüringer believes 
that the most important exponent of academic culture of the early reformation 
rejected the Copernican theory only for scriptural reasons21 but was open to con-
ventionalist readings of De revolutionibus. 
All these natural-scientific criticisms against the heliocentric system were 
not decisive for Me lanch thon, although he brought forward a great num-
ber of such arguments in his Phys ics. The main reason for the rejection was 
only the contrast with biblical as ser tions. Still, he did not reject the system 
as such, but rather Copernicus’s claim about its physical reality. Other-
wise, how could he have sent off Erasmus Reinhold’s Prutenic Tables with 
the remark that they are computed ac cording to Copernicus’s theory […] 
with out criticizing them?22
However, the manuscript, just like the published editions, does not support such 
an assessment, because it shows that Me lanch thon examined the physical argu-
ments and, to some extent, the mathematical ones as well (as witnessed by Rhe-
inhold’s intervention, among others) (see figure 1). Me lanch thon was a staunch 
opponent of terrestrial motion and the new planetary system, although his judge-
ment on the person of Copernicus softened with time. Also, he believed that 
mathematics and physics should be in agreement.
21 Cf. Me lanch thon, Initia (1549), book I, f. 48 r-v.
22 Thüringer, “Paul Eber”, p. 315: “Für Me lanch thon waren alle diese naturwissenschaftlichen 
Ein wände gegen das heliozentrische System nicht entscheidend, obwohl er selbst in seiner 
Phy sik eine große Zahl derartiger Argumente vorbrachte. Den Ausschlag zur Ablehnung 
gab allein der Gegensatz zu den Aussagen der Bibel. Er lehnte jedoch nicht das System als 
sol ches ab, sondern nur den von Copernicus erhobenen Anspruch auf physikalische Realität. 
Wie sonst hätte er die Preußischen Tafeln des Erasmus Reinhold verschicken können mit der 
Be merkung, sie seien nach der Lehre des Copernicus anfertigt […] ohne Kritik zu üben.”
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3	 Dispelling	Conventionalist	Interpretations	of	the	Wittenberg	Interpretation
The interpretation of the first mathematical reception of Copernicus in con-
ventionalist (fictionalist, or instrumentalist) terms can be traced back to Pierre 
Duhem’s epistemological history of astronomy. Over the last century his Sōzein 
ta phainomena: essai sur la notion de théorie physique de Platon a Galilée [To save 
the phenomena: An essay on the idea of physical theory from Plato to Galileo] 
(1908) has played an important role, either as hero or foil, in the question of how 
pre-Copernican astronomers considered their own work in relation to nature. 
For Duhem, most sixteenth-century astronomers were, quite rightly in his opin-
ion, skeptical about the real motions. What mattered for them was computational 
accuracy. Duhem devotes several pages to the “École de Wittemberg.” Recog-
nizing Me lanch thon and Reinhold as its founders, he characterizes Reinhold’s 
position on astronomical hypotheses as thoroughly instrumentalist.23 Hence, 
23 Duhem, Sauver les apparences, Paris 1908, pp. 83–84. 
Fig. 1: Reinhold’s marginal note to the manuscript of Melanchthon and Eber,  
Initia doctrinae physicae, Stadtbibliothek Nürnberg, coll. Cent. V App. 21, f. 191v.
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according to Duhem, when Reinhold adopts Copernican techniques and cele-
brates Copernicus as a restorer of astronomy, this signifies that Reinhold does not 
believe astronomical hypotheses represent the actual celestial nature or move-
ments. On this count, Duhem underestimates the importance of uniform motion 
for Reinhold. Uniform motion, whether for physical or metaphysical reasons, 
was for Reinhold the initial and principle attraction of Copernican astronomy. 
During the last three decades, historians of astronomy have largely supplant-
ed Duhem’s view of sixteenth-century astronomers with another view, wherein 
most were moderate or “perpetually frustrated realists” (Reinhold included).24 As 
for Me lanch thon, Duhem views him as a theologian rather than a philosopher,25 
a characterization that Me lanch thon would have disputed.26 Duhem believes 
that mid-sixteenth-century theologians agreed with astronomers on an instru-
mentalist view of astronomical statements, meaning that he must explain why 
Me lanch thon was so set against terrestrial motion, this opinion appeared in the 
harsher 1549 edition of the Initia. According to Duhem, the Wittenbergians could 
be at once instrumentalists regarding astronomy and yet convinced geocentrists 
because they believed true knowledge of terrestrial things was achievable (e. g., 
the immobility of the Earth), as opposed to true knowledge of celestial things.27 
Hence, Me lanch thon could perfectly well argue in the Initia for the immobility of 
the Earth, while elsewhere saying that astronomy could do no better than repro-
duce the celestial positions. Yet Duhem’s reading is inaccurate, as an examination 
of the Initia shows. Me lanch thon’s rejection of terrestrial movement is not only 
“au nom de la Physique et de l’Écriture,” as Duhem believes. After administering 
his theological arguments, Me lanch thon writes:
And while physical arguments that show the Earth to be immobile can 
be shunned, let us nevertheless discuss some [such arguments] readily at 
hand that satisfy those who judge with moderation and love truth.28
24 Barker and Goldstein, “Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy”, 
p. 253. Also see, Robert Westman, “The Astronomer’s Role in the Sixteenth Century: A Pre-
liminary Survey,” in: History of Science 18 (1980), pp. 105–47, p. 107; and Omodeo, Copernicus in 
the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance: Reception, Legacy, Transformation, Leiden 2014, pp. 66–71.
25 Duhem, Sauver les apparences, pp. 104–105.
26 See Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Me lanch -
thon, Cambridge/New York 1995, pp. 51–58.
27 Duhem, Sauver les apparences, pp. 91–92. Duhem makes this argument while discussing the 
planetary hypotheses of Me lanch thon’s son-in-law and Reinhold’s follower, Caspar Peucer. 
Peucer was the author of a work on planetary hypotheses in which he tried to adapt Co-
pernican models to a geocentric framework, thus paving the way for subsequent geo-he-
liocentric hybrid models. Cf. Peter Barker, “The Hypotyposes orbium coelestium (Strasbourg, 
1568),” in: Nouveau ciel nouvelle terre: La révolution copernicienne dans l’Allemagne de la Réforme 
(1530–1630), ed. Miguel Á. Granada and Edouard Mehl, Paris 2009, pp. 85–108.
28 Me lanch thon, Initia doctrinae physicae (1549), book I, f. 48 v: “Et quamvis eluduntur physica 
argumenta, quae ostendunt terram non moveri, tamen aliqua in promptu teneamus, quae 
moderate iudicantibus, et veritatem amantibus satisfaciunt.”
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What then follows, before the strictly physical arguments, is a list of basic astro-
nomical inequalities that would be observed if the Earth were not at the center 
of the world (e. g., inequalities concerning equinoxes, solstices, the zodiac, and 
the length of days and nights). This list, in sequence and content, is a summary 
of book one, chapter four of the Almagest. Not incidentally, these Ptolemaic ar-
guments were elucidated with diagrams by Reinhold in his 1549 commentary of 
the Almagest.29 Me lanch thon clearly believes that the centrality of the Earth can 
be established on astronomical grounds. Only then does he turn to Aris totle and 
actual physical arguments (e. g., the nature of simple bodies). 
It should also be noted that Me lanch thon’s theological arguments are not a 
matter of scriptural authority tout court. Thanks to scholarship on Me lanch thon’s 
epistemology, we have a much clearer idea of how he viewed the strengths—and 
essential post-lapsarian weakness—of the human intellect.30 In its outlines, he 
held a natural-light epistemology close to Augustine’s. He believed that the basic 
intellectual capacities of Adam remained, thanks to the grace of God, but that 
these capacities were deeply clouded because of sin. In Me lanch thon’s view, phi-
losophy and the arts were indispensable in remedying the intellectual and moral 
situation of humanity. But the arts were not perfect—or rather, the human mind 
remained fundamentally imperfect. Hence, Me lanch thon believed that the natu-
ral philosopher could and should turn to Scripture: 
Although some people mock the natural philosopher who cites divine 
testimony, we judge it correct that, wherever possible, philosophy consult 
with heavenly gospel and examine divine authority from within the deep 
fog of the human mind.31
Me lanch thon’s position is rooted in a respect for the disciplinary boundaries and 
hierarchies typical of Renaissance universities, where theology remained dom-
inant. To respect these boundaries was to preserve the methods and objectives 
that they fostered. It was in this sense that he defended the importance of philos-
ophy and rhetoric for theology, because without correctly structured demonstra-
tions, there could be no discussion, theological or otherwise. And it was in this 
sense that he elsewhere defended astronomers against a too strict imposition of 
physical constraint: the goals of astronomers were not the same as those of phys-
29 See Omodeo and Irina Tupikova, “Post-Copernican Reception of Ptolemy: Erasmus Rein-
hold’s Commented Edition of the Almagest, Book One (Wittenberg, 1549)”, in: Journal for the 
History of Astronomy 44 (2013), pp. 235–256.
30 See Günter Frank, “The Reason of Acting: Me lanch thon’s Concept of Practical Philosophy 
and the Question of the Unity and Consistency of His Philosophy,” in: Moral Philosophy on 
the Threshold of Modernity, ed. Jill Kraye and Risto Saarinen, Dordrecht 2005, pp. 217–33; Peter 
Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science, Cambridge 2007, pp. 93–103.
31 Me lanch thon, Initia doctrinae physicae, book I, f. 48 r: “Quanquam autem rident aliqui phy-
sicum testimonia di vi na citantem, tamen nos honestum esse censemus philosophiam con-
ferre ad coelestia dicta, et in tanta caligine humanae mentis autoritatem di vi nam consulere, 
ubicumque possumus.” 
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icists.32 Me lanch thon sums up the theological portion of his attack on Copernicus 
as follows:
Encouraged by these divine testimonies, we should embrace the truth. Let 
us not be lead astray by the deceptions of those who think it the glory of 
their cleverness to throw the arts into confusion.33
In other words, Copernicus’s physical hypothesis is a threat to the order and dig-
nity of the liberal arts, and so a threat to the university itself, an institution that 
had one of its greatest champions in Me lanch thon.
4 On the Circle of Me lanch thon
Robert Westman is perhaps the scholar who most prominently emphasized the 
institutional setting of the Wittenberg debate over Copernicus. Back in the late 
1970s he provided an important account of the Me lanch thon circle as a case study 
of theory reception within a scientific community. Lynn Thorndike had already 
argued for the relevance of the Wittenberg community in the history of astrology 
and introduced the expression “the circle of Me lanch thon” to characterize the 
astrology-centred attitude of his group.34 Westman, for his part, worked out the 
details of the Copernican reception with a view toward criticizing Kuhn’s notion 
of paradigm shifts. The Kuhnian theory, at least in its naïve form, assumes an 
immediate cleavage between practitioners who understand a new paradigm and 
those who do not; Westman argued that the Wittenberg reception shows us in-
stead how new theories can be taken as multi-layered. Communities can accept, 
adopt, and assimilate certain features of a theory, while ignoring or criticizing 
other features:
Indeed, certain parts of the new theory were to be adopted and preferred 
as consistent with the foundations of astronomy if interpreted in a frame-
work where the earth was at rest, while other aspects were rejected or ig-
nored as irrelevant or as possessing low truth content.35
Westman also emphasizes how Me lanch thon and the mathematicians in his orbit 
were able to frame Copernican astronomy for subsequent generations. These gen-
erations would not be confronted with any paradigm choice or clash—instead, 
advanced students would learn about Copernican astronomy as a kind of techni-
cal innovation in planetary theory rather than a wildly new interpretation of the 
32 Duhem, Sauver les apparences, pp. 106–107.
33 Me lanch thon, Initia doctrinae physicae, book I, f. 48 v: “His divinis testimoniis confirmati, ve-
ritatem amplectamur, nec praestigiis eorum, qui decus ingenii esse putant, conturbare artes, 
abduci nos ab ea finamus.” 
34 Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, 8 vols, London/New York 1923–
1941, vol. 5, p. 378. Cf. Claudia Brosseder, “The Writing in the Wittenberg Sky: Astrology in 
Sixteenth-Century Germany,” in: Journal of the History of Ideas 66/4 (2005), pp. 557–576.
35 Westman, “The Me lanch thon Circle,” p. 167.
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universe’s structure. In Westman’s description, Me lanch thon emerges both as a 
savvy institutionalist and a fatherly figure to his students and colleagues. West-
man stresses that Me lanch thon set a tone where professional mathematicians 
were allowed “considerable freedom to explore new pathways.”36
In his more recent work on The Copernican Question, Westman has emphasized 
the astrological commitment by Me lanch thon and his pupils.37 Rheinhold’s Co-
pernican tables could be read against the background of a shared commitment 
36 Ibid., 174.
37 Richard Westman, The Copernican Question: Prognostication, Skepticism, and Celestial Order, 
Berke ley/ Los Angeles/London, 2011, pp. 160–164.
Fig. 2: Frontispiece of the 1550 Frankfurt edition of Me lanch thon and 
Eber’s Initia doctrinae physicae with scenes of the fall of Adam and Eve.
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to astrology as the science of God’s Providence. In addition, his theoretical work 
on planetary theory, as well as that of Caspar Peucer, who succeeded him as a 
professor of mathematics in Wittenberg, was motivated by Me lanch thon’s pro-
gram to decipher the divine project inscribed in the heavens. The endeavour had 
clear eschatological tones, since astronomy and the related science of chronology 
aimed to determine the epoch corresponding to apocalyptical prophecies.38
It would be interesting to stress the continuity with Rheticus’s work here, 
which manifests an effort to understand history, especially political history, 
through improved astronomy. Rheticus’s dispute pro gradu for his Master’s de-
gree in 1536 dealt with the legitimacy of astrology. He answered negatively the 
quaestio “whether the laws prohibit astrological predictions” (an leges damnent 
praedictiones astrologicas?). To the contrary, he argued with the Republic (546 A-D) 
that “Plato states that the republic changes due to some celestial causes which 
impel cyclical changes of cities and empires.”39 Such a commitment to astrology 
clearly earned him Me lanch thon’s approval, as he was soon appointed professor 
of lower mathematics. The astrological-political theme would figure prominently 
in the Narratio prima, where Rheticus argued that the variations of the Earth’s 
eccentricity produce changes of rulers, this in the section “Ad motum centri ec-
centrici Monarchias mundi mutari” (The Kingdoms of the World Change with 
the Motion of the Centre of the Eccentric). Rheticus thus established a lasting 
connection between Copernican astronomy and astrology by asserting that Co-
pernicus’s model of terrestrial eccentricity relates to the wheel of fortune.40 In his 
late years in Poland, Rheticus would apply his political astrology to compose a 
prediction concerning the seven next kings of Poland (Vaticinium ex parte Regum 
Septe post decessum Sigismundi Augusti per Rheticum Doctorem et Astrologum Medi-
cum illustrem editum, 1572).41
5 Additional Elements to Assess the Initia, Its Circulation, and Its Goals
Further elements for an assessment of the impact, circulation, and setting of the 
Initia can be derived from a closer look at the manuscript and the first printed 
editions. In the same year in which Me lanch thon had the revised version of the 
Initia printed in Wittenberg with his softened judgment on Copernicus, two other 
editions were printed, one in Basel and one in Frankfurt/Main. Neither of them 
incorporated the author’s revisions, therefore they further circulated the highly 
critical statements (e. g., the words “adseverare palam absurdas sententias”) of 
38 Miguel Ángel Granada, “La ‘tradición de la casa de Elías’: Astronomía, cronología, historia,” 
in Res Publica: Revista de Historia de las Ideas Politicas 18/2 (2015), pp. 315–338, p. 328.
39 Georg Joachim Rheticus, “Quaestio: an leges damnent praedictiones astrologicas? recita-
ta […] d. 17. April. 1636”, in: Corpus reformatorum, vol. 10, Halle 1842, col. 712–715, col. 713. Cf. 
Włodarczyk, Introduction to Rheticus, Narratio prima, p. 13.
40 See Edward Rosen, Three Copernican Treatises, New York 1939, pp. 121–127. Omodeo, Coperni-
cus in the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance, pp. 34–35.
41 Ludwik A. Birkenmajer, Mikołaj Kopernik, Cracow 1900, pp. 613–614.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
97The Wittenberg Reception of Copernicus
the 1549 editio princeps. Later Wittenberg editions (1553 and 1555) reproduced the 
tamed edition (talia asseverare) from 1550, followed by a Leipzig edition (1559).42 
The parallel circulation of the two versions shows that Me lanch thon’s more mod-
erate approach to Copernicus needed time to be appreciated among his readers. 
If one considers that the version included in the Corpus Reformatorum is the one 
from 1549, one clearly sees that the shift could pass unobserved for a long time.
Does not Me lanch thon’s correspondence also include a very harsh institution-
al attack against Copernicus? In 1541 he wrote to his correspondent, the physician 
Burchard Mithoff, about “that Sarmatian astronomer, who sets the Earth in mo-
tion and fixes the Sun” (ille Sarmaticus Astronomus, qui movet Terram et figit Solem) 
calling for extreme measures against such extravagances: “Without question—he 
wrote—wise rulers should suppress intellectual immodesty” (profecto sapientes 
gubernatores deberent ingeniorum petulantiam cohercere).43 The political dimension 
of Me lanch thon’s engagement with physics is witnessed in the first version of 
the introduction to the book, which remains in the Nuremberg manuscript. The 
relevant pages are a section, from f. 14 r to the beginning of f. 19 r, that was not 
printed, as indicated in the manuscript with the following words in a different 
hand than Me lanch thon’s (possibly that of the typesetter): “All these [words] are 
omitted in the printed exemplar, which goes on with that which follows after five 
pages.”44 The erased passage addressed rulers, inviting them to foster letters rath-
er than military projects. Also, it opposed the theological obscurantism of those 
who would ban the study of physics from a pious education. Here Me lanch thon’s 
words follow, in our translation:
According to our judgment regarding the Church and the fatherland, the 
greatest leaders would deserve merit if they took care that this part of phi-
losophy be well presented by the designated masters, and that the other 
arts be wisely taught, rather than try to imitate Babylonian walls by con-
structing ramparts and fortifications. Physics [doctrina physica] does not 
relate negligibly to the Church, nor does the knowledge of physics contrib-
ute little to the judgements to be shaped and, in the process of education, 
to the quality to be fostered. Frequently [saepe] the comparison of physics 
can add some light [or something of clarity] to the explanation of celestial 
teachings [dogmatum celestium]. Whenever the parts of the human body are 
to be taught, when there is a demonstration of how many forces [in the 
body] may be rendered inactive, [it is also taught that] these parts can be 
governed through discipline. Thus the wise natural philosopher is pious: 
he discerns many traces of God in this variety of nature, by whose consid-
42 We could not yet check the Leipzig 1560 and the Lyon 1552 editions.
43 Me lanch thon to Mithobius (16 October 1541), in: Philipp Me lanch thon, Me lanch thons Brief-
wechsel. Kritische und kommentierte Gesamtausgabe, vol. 10, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2009, 
nr. 2830, pp. 542–543, p. 543.
44 Me lanch thon, original preface to the Initia, manuscript f. 14 r: “Omnia haec in exemplari 
excuso omissa sunt, et quae post paginarum quinque sequuntur adiecta.”
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eration a verification of providence is formed. In whatever manner God, 
in his design, exhibited so much art in nature, to remind us of himself, 
why would this study be either prohibited or neglected, as some in the 
Church wish. It is doubtless that Adam, Seth, and others have first joined 
most studiously this wisdom, this consideration of nature, the parts [of 
this discipline], with the teaching conveyed by God, and […] [when] they 
experienced that force to be marveled at [in nature], have given grace to 
God, have honored and invoked him. It is a great virtue to imitate their 
piety and zeal.
Wittenberg, 1 September 154945
6	 Considerations	on	the	institutional	settings	of	Wittenberg	astronomy
The rejection of geocentrism for natural and theological reasons is not the salient 
element of the Wittenberg reception of Copernicus. Rather, we would like to stress 
the reconfiguration and the transformative reception that took place in the spe-
cific institutional framework of Wittenberg. Me lanch thon’s “middle way” aimed 
to connect many cultural strands and perspectives. In fact, it brought together 
humanism and reformation, theological anti-scholasticism and methodological 
Aristotelianism, mathematics and physics, education in the natural sciences and 
religion. He and most of his mathematical and philosophical collaborators con-
sidered the Copernican hypotheses to be too radical to be accepted and dissem-
inated to students. Nonetheless, their commitment to astronomy and astrology, 
which they saw as the science of God’s Providence, fueled their keen interest in 
Copernicus’s work, so far as parameters, methods, and technical solutions were 
concerned. De revolutionibus offered a new basis for their mathematical-astronom-
ical work: it constituted a new synthesis of Ptolemaic and post-Ptolemaic science 
(especially Islamicate). Still, De revolutionibus had to be domesticated. It had to 
be made usable for practice and teaching. The Wittenberg approach was multi-
pronged. Rheinhold’s Prutenic Tables (1551) offered astronomical and astrological 
45 Ibid., ff. 14 r–16 v: “Nostro iudicio melius de Ecclesia et de patria mererentur summi princi-
pes si curarent a delectis artificibus ad hanc philosophiam partem recte conscribi, et alias 
artes sapienter tradi, quam cum aggeribus et moenibus instruendis Babylonicos muros imi-
tari conantur. Non si nihil ad Ecclesiam pertinet doctrina physica, nec nihil ad formanda iu-
dicia et ad proprietatem in docendo tuendam, cognitio physices. Sepe collatio physices aliq-
uid lucis addit dogmatum celestium explicationi. Quoties de partibus humanis docendum 
est, cum ostendendum est quot vires languefactae sint, quae partes regi disciplina possint. 
Denique pius est sapiens physicus multa dei vestigia cernit in hac varietate naturae, quorum 
consideratione adsensio de providentia valde conformatur. Cumque deus hoc ipso consilio 
tantam in condenda natura artem adhibuerit, ut nos de seipse commonefaceret, cur haec 
studia vel prohiberi vel negligi in Ecclesia nonnulli volunt. Non dubium est hanc sapien-
tiam, hoc est naturae considerationem, primos illas partes Adam, Seth, et ceteros studiosis-
sime cum doctrina a deo tradita coniunxisse, et […] sepe eum mirandum vim experiventur 
[experiverunt], deo gratias egisse eum celebrasse, et invocasse. Horum et pietatem et studia 
imitari excellens virtus est. Witebergae Calendis Spetemb. Anno 1549”
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practitioners a useful instrument of heavenly computation, while Me lanch thon 
prevented the circulation of heliocentrism and geokinetic theory among stu-
dents. In Me lanch thon’s view, the centrality and immobility of the Earth had to 
be maintained as it was in accordance with fundamental principles of physics 
and basic astronomy, and with established literal interpretations of Biblical pas-
sages on the order of the heavens. Therefore, he was not willing to admit any 
form of conventionalism in the modern sense of the term. On this point, he had a 
different epistemological agenda than the theologian Andreas Osiander, author 
of the anonymous introduction to De revolutionibus. Osiander attempted to protect 
Copernicus from criticism by erecting disciplinary and methodological walls, 
stressing the distance between theological truths, which are revealed, physical 
explanations based on causes, and mathematics, which are hypothetical. He in-
tended to secure a relative autonomy for scholars in various fields of inquiry by 
downplaying the physical import of Copernicus’s challenge, while also insulat-
ing mathematical practice from theological and physical interventions. Me lanch -
thon and his circle deeply disagreed with such a disaggregated epistemology. 
Rather, they were committed to an integration of the various levels of ontological 
and natural knowledge. In this sense, Rheticus, the author of the Narratio prima 
and keen supporter of heliocentrism as the real world system was no less real-
ist than his anti-heliocentric colleagues, Me lanch thon, Eber, and Reinhold. Yet, 
his program of “radical Copernicanism” did not prevail and the Wittenberg core 
group chose to stay geocentric and geostatic.
In the same year in which Me lanch thon and Eber had the Initia printed in 
Wittenberg, Reinhold printed a bilingual edition of the first book of the Almagest 
in which he commented on Ptolemy’s cosmological premises and reinforced the 
anti-heliocentric arguments of the ancient authority on mathematical astrono-
my. Reinhold added several scholia and diagrams aimed to make Ptolemy’s ar-
guments clear. They permitted the reader to consider details that had been left 
implicit in the original work. The aim was pedagogical, since Reinhold’s intended 
readership were students of the liberal arts:
For the advantage and happiness of the public schools, I began an edi-
tion of Ptolemy’s excellent work, in which the universal theory of heavenly 
motions is raised on its first foundations. The present edition of the first 
book is aimed at making students familiar with the basics [of astronomy], 
which are preliminary to [a correct understanding of] the other books [of 
the Almagest]. Without any doubt, it is very useful to present to young peo-
ple these sources of the discipline. Still, since the beginners are not yet 
conversant with the Greek language, I have added a Latin translation, for 
whose inaccuracy I beg the pardon of the specialists. I also hope that some-
body will eventually accomplish a complete and clear translation of Ptol-
emy for public interest. Moreover, to help the students, I have commented 
and explained some difficult passages. I hope that all these efforts will be 
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pleasing to God and be approved by all experts. My intention is, in fact, 
that the youth not strive merely for the void shadow of the art [doctrina], 
but that they be made familiar with mathematics and with this art useful 
for human life and peace.46 
Reinhold’s edition of Ptolemy is patently embedded in Me lanch thon’s educational 
and cultural program.47 This new edition of Ptolemy reinforced the geocentric 
and geostatic convictions of the Wittenberg circle and could serve as a reference 
for Me lanch thon’s anti-Copernican arguments in the Initia. As a matter of fact, 
Reinhold checked those pages in the Initia on astronomical subjects, as is docu-
mented in the manuscript marginalia and corrections as well in the pages that 
entail the refutation of Copernicus. In those years, between 1543 and 1549, Rein-
hold was preparing a commentary on De revolutionibus and Ptolemy, which also 
included comments on the astronomical passages concerning planetary theory 
in Pliny’s Natural History. In 1549 Reinhold also gave classes on Ptolemy.48 The 
comments on Copernicus entail some hints that point toward the possibility of a 
geocentric translation of the planetary models of De revolutionibus. They emerge 
in the commentary on Jupiter’s theory.49
The Wittenberg follower of Reinhold as professor of mathematics, Caspar Peu-
cer (who was Me lanch thon’s son-in-law) followed in his footsteps and envisaged 
a geocentric transformation of Copernicus’s theory of the precession of the equi-
noxes and the motion of the eighth sphere in the ‘Ptolemaic-Copernican’ work 
Hypotheses astronomicae, seu theoriae planetarum ex Ptolemaei et aliorum veterum 
46 Claudius Ptolemaeus, Mathematicae constructionis Liber primus graece et latine editus. Additae 
explications aliquot locorum ab Erasmo Rheinholt Salveldensi, Wittenberg 1549, f. a8 r–v: “Itaque 
quod faustum et felix sit studiis publicis, incohavi editionem optimi operis Ptolemaei, in quo 
doctrina de motibus coelestibus universa ex primis fundamentis extructa est. Ac nunc edidi 
primum librum, ut haec initia fiant familiaria discentibus, quae aditum ad reliquos libros 
faciunt. Utilissimum autem esse deduci iuventutem ad hos doctrinae fontes, non dubium 
est. Et quia iuniores nondum adsuefacti sunt ad graecam lectionem, addidi et latinam inter-
preationem qualemcunque, de qua veniam ab eruditis peto; ac opto, ut aliqui publice utili-
tatis causa integram aliquando et luculentam interpretationem Ptolemaei edant. Illustravi et 
scholiis aliquot obscura membra, ut discentes adiuvarem. Totum hunc laborem spero et Deo 
gratum esse, et probaturos esse omnes sapientes. Nam hanc ob causam praecipue susceptus 
est, ut iuventus non inanem doctrinae umbram tantum appetat, sed ad mathemata et ad hanc 
doctrinam vitae hominum utilem et pacis nutricem adsuefiat.” Here and in the following 
quotations from Latin, we have standardized the expressions and revised the punctuation 
and capital letters only where we deemed it useful for an easier reading of the passages.
47 Cf. Omodeo and Tupikova, “Post-Copernican Reception of Ptolemy” and “Visual and Ver-
bal Commentaries in the European Renaissance: Erasmus Reinhold’s Treatment of Classical 
Sources on Astronomy,” in: Philological Encounters 3 (2018), pp. 1–43.
48 Copernicus Gesamtausgabe VIII/1, Receptio Copernicana, Berlin 2002, p. 590. 
49 [Erasmus Reinhold], Commentarius in opus Revolutionum Copernici, Staatsbibliothek zu Ber-
lin, collocation Ms. lat. fol. 391, f. 233 r. Cf. Aleksander Birkenmajer, “Le Commentaire Inédit 
d’Erasme Reinhold sur le De revolutionibus de Nicolas Copernic,” in: La Science au seizième 
siècle, Paris 1960, pp. 171–177.
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doctrina ad observationes Nicolai Copernici, et canones motuum ab eo conditos accomo-
datae [Astronomical hypotheses, or planetary theory derived from Ptolemy and 
other ancient doctrines and accorded to Nicolaus Copernicus’s observations and 
the canons of motions he composed] (Wittenberg 1571).50 We could call Reinhold 
and Peucer’s appropriation of Copernicus ‘instrumental’ only in the very limit-
ed sense that they aimed at using its methodology and models while inserting 
them in a familiar geocentric and geostatic framework. No confusion should be 
engendered though: they were by no means instrumental in the sense that they 
were conventionalists, if by “conventionalist” we want to say that they separated 
mathematics from physics. Quite the contrary, they searched for the harmoniza-
tion of geometrical representation and causal explanation.
A scholarly tradition emerged from this institutional context due to the in-
fluence that Wittenberg had on other reformed universities in Germany and be-
yond. When Tycho Brahe devised his geoheliocentric system (with the Earth at 
the center of fixed stars, solar and lunar circles, and the Sun at the center of plan-
etary circles) scholars who learned astronomy along the Me lanch thon-Reinhold-
Peucer line were not caught by surprise by Brahe’s theory. To them it looked like a 
rather obvious post-Copernican geometrical transposition. Therefore, they could 
not understand Brahe’s bold claim that he had discovered a new system of the 
world nor the battles he engaged in against ‘plagiarizers’ of his geo-heliocentric 
hypotheses. The immediate reaction of the court mathematician of Kassel Chris-
toph Rothmann to Brahe’s De mundi aetherei recentioribus phaenomenis [On the Most 
Recent Phenomena in the Ethereal World] (Uraniborg 1588) is telling:
I did not consider this [geo-heliocentric theory] to be a new approach but 
precisely Copernicus’s, apart from the fact that I could treat the matter in 
the reverse manner by bringing Copernicus’s hypotheses back to the solar 
motion. Moreover, I assumed that Rheticus and Reinhold also took that 
same approach into consideration.51
In light of this dismissal of Brahe’s originality, geo-heliocentric astronomy consti-
tutes a development of the Wittenberg project to find a middle way between Pto-
lemy and Copernicus, as well as between Aristotelian physics and Copernican 
astronomy. This was a theology-led educational project which, however, was not 
yet ‘confessional’ in the sense that it intentionally marked a Protestant approach 
to astronomy as opposite to a Catholic one. The natural sciences and astronomy 
were not yet part of the confessional dispute. However, during the ongoing pro-
50 Caspar Peucer, Hypotheses astronomicae, Wittenberg 1571, pp. 592–593.
51 Tycho Brahe, Opera Omnia, ed. J.L.E. Dreyer, Amsterdam 1972, vol. 6, pp. 156–157. On Brahe 
and Rothmann, see Miguel Á. Granada, “Astronomy and Cosmology in Kassel: The Con-
tribution of Christoph Rothmann and His Relationship to Tycho Brahe and Jean Pena,” in: 
Science in Contact at the Beginnig of the Scientific Revolution, ed. J. Zamrzlová, Prague 2004, 
pp. 237–248 and idem, “Did Tycho Eliminate the Celestial Spheres before 1586?,”in: Journal for 
the History of Astronomy 37 (2006), pp. 125–145.
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cess of Konfessionalisierung the school of astronomical mathematics initiated by 
Me lanch thon’s circle became an important component of Protestant institution-
al (academic) culture.52 Wittenberg scholars perceived astronomy as a strategic 
field of cultural politics, as Me lanch thon’s active support of the natural sciences 
testifies. Still, in his years, the political struggles over the status of astronomy re-
mained enclosed within the evangelical camp. Given the humanistic background 
of Me lanch thon’s project, astronomical issues were still intra-confessional or su-
per-confessional. The humanistic-cum-astrological approach, as opposed to the 
Scholastic one, had not yet become overloaded with confessional implications.
7 Conclusion
The paradoxes of the Wittenberg reception of Copernicus can be seen as linked 
to a limitedly instrumental but not necessarily conventionalist reading of De 
revolutionibus, if by “conventionalist” one implies the sharp separation between 
astronomical modeling and physical causality. Wittenberg realists rejected the 
motion of the Earth and the heliocentric system but did not reject Copernicus’s 
work. Rather, they engaged with a transformation of its theories and a practical 
appropriation of its numerical results and geometrical devices. Their goal was to 
integrate, not to separate, modeling and causality (as well as revelation).
Me lanch thon’s attitude towards Copernicus changed during the time. He must 
have been influenced by discussions with his collaborators, in particular Rein-
hold. Conversely, he shaped Wittenberg scientific programs. We can imagine that 
for the passionate pupil of Copernicus, Rheticus, it must have been hard to wit-
ness the staunch opposition (and the insults at a personal level) that Me lanch thon 
directed against his astronomical praeceptor. Me lanch thon, who had supported 
Rheticus’s career in Wittenberg, arguing that the latter was born for mathematics, 
did not trust his Copernican revision of physics. Eber and especially Reinhold—
later Peucer and the geo-heliocentrists—wholeheartedly embraced Me lanch thon’s 
philosophical viewpoints and sought to inscribe the new astronomy in an Aristo-
telian natural philosophy. Their project meant to find a balance between, on the 
one hand, a defense against theological skepsis of the teaching of mathematical 
astronomy, and, on the other hand, a rejection of radical philosophical innovation.
Planetary hypotheses at the University of Wittenberg developed in accordance 
with its institutional and pedagogical constraints. They account for the specifici-
ty of the Wittenberg reception of Copernicus and the success of its developments. 
The Wirkungsgeschichte of the geocentric assimilation of Copernicus’s planetary 
theory, as implemented in the Wittenberg research program, went far beyond 
the Protestant camp, as evidenced by the broad reception of Brahe’s astronomy 
among Protestants as well as Catholics during the seventeenth century.
52 Pietro D. Omodeo, “Institutionalized Metaphysics of Astronomy at Early-Modern Me lanch -
thonian Universities,” in: Wissen in Bewegung. Institution—Iteration—Transfer, ed. Eva Cancik- -
Kirsch baum and Anita Traninger, Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 51–78.
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Appendix:
Philipp Me lanch thon, “What is the motion of the world?”
Translation of “Quis est motus mundi” section from the 1549 edition of the Initia doct-
rinae physicae (book I, ff. 47 v–51 v). Reprinted in Corpus Reformatorum, vol. 13, pp. 216–
220.53 In Me lanch thon’s handwritten manuscript, this section runs from 178 v—194 r.
The parts of the world will be discussed in their place. The heavens will be discussed 
first. The heavens are moved according to circular motion, which is confirmed by the 
same arguments that were given conerning its shape. For circular motion is appropri-
ate to spherical bodies. And the eyes are witness that the heavens are wheeled around 
in twenty-four hours.
But here there are some who either by love of novelty or to show off their cleverness 
have argued that the Earth is moved and reject the movement of the eighth sphere 
and the Sun, whereas they assign motion to other celestial spheres. They moreover 
put the Earth among the stars. Nor were these games recently devised. Archimedes’ 
book on the Counting of Sand [The Sand Reckoner] exists to this day. In it he reports that 
Aristarchus of Samos taught this paradox, where the Sun stands immobile and the 
Earth revolves around the Sun. 
Although subtle specialists inquire into many things in order to exercise their 
wits, it is not right to openly affirm such absurdities, and it sets a damaging example. 
It is right for the mind to reverentially embrace the truth shown by God, to be at peace 
therein, to thank God for kindling and preserving some light in the minds of men, 
and to consider how to be led toward God by this light and in what way life should be 
guided and aided by the knowledge of truth.
53 A partial translation in French of this chapter has been done by Michel-Pierre Lerner, in 
“Aux origines de la polémique anticopernicienne (II): Martin Luther, Andreas Osiander et 
Philipp Me lanch thon,” in: Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques (2006), pp. 409–452, 
pp. 437–440. 
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Although some people mock the natural philosopher who cites divine testimony, 
we judge it correct that, wherever possible, philosophy consult with heavenly gospel 
and examine divine authority from within the deep fog of the human mind. Psalms 
most clearly affirms the Sun to be moved. [God] put the tabernacle in the Sun itself, 
and the bridegroom advancing through his nuptial bedchamber exults like the strong 
man running his course.54 He sets out from one extreme of the heavens and revolves 
to the other extreme. Let us be satisfied with this clear testimony about the Sun.
Another Psalm speaks about the Earth. God established the Earth upon its stabili-
ty [stabilitatem]. It will never be moved, always and eternally. And the first chapter of 
Ecclesiastes says: The Earth stands eternally; the Sun rises and sets, and returns to 
the place where it rises.55 And it is considered a miracle among miracles, when God 
wished to make the Sun stop and even move back.56 Encouraged by these divine tes-
timonies, we should embrace the truth. Let us not be led astray by the deceptions of 
those who think it the glory of their cleverness to throw the arts into confusion. 
And while physical arguments that show the Earth to be immobile can be shunned, 
let us nevertheless discuss some [such arguments] readily at hand that satisfy those 
who judge with moderation and love truth.
First, in the revolution of a circle, the center remains immobile. But the Earth is in the 
middle of the world and is, as it were, the center of the world. It is therefore immobile. 
Macrobius also brought forward this argument [the above] taken from Cicero.57 
Moreover, there are many demonstrations of the minor premise [of the syllogism, i. e., 
the centrality of Earth] drawn from appearances, that is, from everyday observation 
of the stars, from the equinoxes, from the increments and decrements of days and 
nights, and from eclipses. 
For if the Earth is not in the middle of the universe, it will necessarily occupy one 
of the following locations:
[I]  First, it is located outside the axis of the world but is equidistant from both poles, 
such that it is in the equinoctial plane. 
[II] Secondly, it is situated on the axis of the word but outside the equinoctial plane, 
that is, closer to one of the two poles.
[III] Thirdly, it is neither on the axis of the world nor in the equinoctial plane.
[I. Case] In this first [decentered] positioning [of the Earth], these absurdities would 
follow depending on the different positions of the Earth in one place or another of the 
equatorial plane:
54 Psalms 19:4–6 (KJV): “Their line is gone out through all the Earth, and their words to the end 
of the world. In them hath he set a tabernacle for the Sun, which is as a bridegroom coming out 
of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race. His going forth is from the end of 
the heaven, and his circuit unto the ends of it: and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof.”
55 Ecclesiastes 1:4–5.
56 Joshua 10:12–14.
57 From I.22 of Macrobius’s Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, in Macrobius, Commentary on the 
Dream of Scipio, trans. William Harris Stahl, New York 1990, p. 181.
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[I.1]  First. Equinox would never occur at “sphaera recta,”58 because the horizon 
would never cut the Earth into two equal halves. 
[I.2]  Second. At “sphaera obliqua,”59 at some places [on the Earth’s surface] there 
would be no equinox while at others there would be, but not on the parallel 
at the mid-point between the Tropics, that is, not on the equinoctial circle, 
but on another minor parallel closer to one of the Tropical points.
[I.3]  Third. The time from sunrise to midday would not equal the time from 
midday to sunset.
[I.4]  Fourth. The stars’ magnitudes and intervals in the east and west would not 
appear equal.
[II. Case] These absurdities would result from the second positioning, if the Earth 
were on the axis of the world but not in the middle:
[II.1]  First. In every latitude [clima], the plane of an [observer’s] horizon would 
cut the heavens into two unequal parts, except the places at “sphaera recta.” 
Therefore, the zodiac would be divided into two unequal arcs, and thus 
at some places more and at other places fewer than six signs of the Zodiac 
would be seen above the horizon. This is contrary to all experience. 
[II.2]  Second. The shadows of the Sun’s rising and setting at equinoxes would 
not agree such that they make one perfectly matching, straight line [in una 
recta linea ἑῶ εὐθείας]. Nor on the day of the summer solstice would the 
shadow of the rising Sun make a matching line with the shadow of the 
setting Sun at winter solstice, and vice versa. 
[III. Case] In the third positioning, that is, neither on the axis of the world nor on the 
equinoctial plane, the same absurdities would follow as in the two cases above. [III.1] 
Generally, wherever the Earth might be placed outside the center, the equal ratio of 
increment and decrement, of days and of nights, would be thrown off. [III.2] Nor 
would lunar eclipses always take place when the Moon is diametrically opposite the 
Sun, because the Earth would not in be in the middle of the world and would not cast 
its shadow on the Moon. 
These eight absurdities [I.1–III.2] prove clearly that the Earth cannot be in any other 
place except the center of the universe.
From this confirmation of the thesis, that the Earth is in the center of the world, it 
follows first that since it is at the center it does not move. From here arise several dis-
tinctions of motion. For circular motion is revolution about the center. And rectilinear 
motion is rectilinear insofar as it is carried from the center or middle, or to the center 
or middle. These distinctions would not exist if there were no established center or 
middle. From here, then, arise several arguments.
 A simple body possesses only one motion.
 The Earth is a simple body.
Therefore, only one unique motion applies to it. Downward, rectilinear motion, 
that is, motion toward the center, therefore applies to the parts of the Earth. Once at 
58 This is the position of an observer at the equator.
59 This is the position of an observer at a latitude between the equator and one of the poles.
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the center, the parts are motionless. Therefore, circular motion does not apply to the 
Earth. 
Secondly. Every heavy body strives downward to the center, and then would be 
necessarily motionless when it has arrived at the real center, because it is appropriate 
that the center be immobile. Therefore, when the parts of the Earth are fallen to that 
part which is the real center, they will necessarily be at rest on its surface. It follows 
that the universal mass [of the Earth] is at rest. 
Thirdly. Nature is likewise composed of parts and wholes. All parts of the Earth, 
and every mixture in which earth is dominant, are carried downward to the surface 
of the Earth and are there at rest. Therefore the Earth as a whole is at rest.
The fourth argument is a physical conjecture. Extremely quick motion impedes ag-
glomeration, which is necessary for every being that is generated. However, the Earth 
is like the womb for the birth of so many things. If everyday it were carried around 
with such great speed, which would be the case if it were moved, it would not be able 
to foster anything but would scatter its assembled parts. Thus, one should embrace 
and defend the argument that the Earth is in the center of the world and at rest.
It should also be known that, because of the Earth’s smallness compared to the 
heavens, it is like a point, that is, it has no notable magnitude, as much clear evidence 
shows, because the horizon divides the heavens everywhere into two equal parts. 
And observed at the same time from any part of the Earth, the stars are always seen 
to hold the same relative distances. Gnomons and armillary spheres set at whatever 
place on the Earth behave as if they were all located at the actual center of the Earth. 
And equinoctial shadows of the rising and setting Sun make a single straight line, just 
as if they were cast into a plane cutting through the center of the Earth.
The reader is invited to observe a globe and [observe] that earth and water are 
joined [forming a unique sphere]. And although many distinguish between the cen-
ter of magnitude [i. e., the center of the sphere] and of gravity, nevertheless there is 
in fact one center. The center of gravity and magnitude is the same,60 as the recently 
discovered land [America] shows, and the earth is not as the ancients believed totally 
surrounded by ocean. That the globe of water is ten times greater than that of earth, 
because ten handfuls of water were thought to come from one handful of earth, this 
picture is not true. For spheres are in a triple ratio relative to their diameters. 
60 Strangely, this clause is left out of the reprinting of the 1549 Initia in the Corpus Reformatorum, 
in Corpus Reformatorum, vol. XIII, ed. Carolus Gottlieb Bretschneider, Halle 1846, p. 219.
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Cosmology and Scholarship  
in Seventeenth-Century Helmstedt:  
The Baltic Mathematician and Scientific Mediator 
Nicolaus Andreae Granius (c. 1569–1631)*
Stefano Gulizia
This paper deals with the scientific culture of the University of Helmstedt at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century through a close consideration of the life, 
work, and cosmological views of the Swedish professor of physics Nicolaus An-
dreae Granius (c. 1569—1631). It focusses, in particular, on the documented im-
pact he had on his cultural milieu. It also aims to account for the fact that the 
circulation of Peripatetic learning in Protestant schools—such as the Academia 
Julia—helps to reconstruct a mutual influence, both theoretical and curricular, 
of logic and natural philosophy at the close of the Renaissance. I believe that the 
current history of early modern natural philosophy has yet to fully appreciate 
this issue. My methodology combines the reception of Aris totle with a renewed 
study of academic mobility, including teachers, students, and their personal ob-
jects of knowledge. In this context, I suggest that Granius’s iter Germanicum was 
akin to the peregrinations of British scholars on the continent like John Craig 
of Edinburgh and Duncan Liddel of Aberdeen,1 and I further point out that the 
strong evidence left behind by these learned travelers invites a comprehensive 
reassessment of the interaction—via correspondence, oral exchange, and textual 
cross-checking—between individuals and their collective institutions, be they cir-
cles, households, or academies. Granius was one of those Renaissance mediators 
who had the ability to travel between movable peripheries.2 And while Granius 
was not a protagonist or an innovative theoretician, his lifetime was marked by 
the lasting and profound upheavals that shook Me lanch thonian education and 
*  I would like to thank the editors of this volume for their comments and suggestions, and 
Pietro Daniel Omodeo for inviting me to present in his “Early Modern Cosmology” network, 
as well as Mihnea Dobre, Eric MacPhail, and Camilla Russo for their precious support. I 
acknowledge the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel for sustaining a grant on scribal 
technologies and Aristotelianism, which constitutes the framework of this research. 
1 Pietro Daniel Omodeo (ed.), in collaboration with Karen Friedrich, Duncan Liddel (1561–
1613): Networks of Polymathy and the Northern European Renaissance, Leiden 2016.
2 Howard Hotson has written about spontaneous pedagogical phenomena at the frontier, 
Commonplace Learning: Ramism and its German Ramifications, 1543–1630, Oxford 2007, pp. 3–37; 
in Hotson’s explanation, after the destruction of the German Reformed academic tradition 
in the 1620s, the model becomes one of center and periphery turned on its head.
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post-Keplerian science. The main primary source for this reconstruction are Gra-
nius’ annotations and marginalia in the books he owned that are still preserved 
in the Herzog August Library. These constitute an important document of early 
modern note-taking practices in scholarly milieus as well as knowledge circula-
tion at a Protestant university marked by Lutheran theology, late humanism, and 
methodological Aristotelianism.
1 From Prague to Northern Europe
In 1610, at the age of 42, the Baltic mathematician Nicolaus Andreae Granius was 
in Prague and spent twenty creutzers purchasing a logical treatise by the Domin-
ican Chrysostomus Javellus, which was published in Lyon in 1579.3 At this junc-
ture, Granius was an itinerant fellow. In the Czech lands he was received as a 
Papal Scholar at the Collegium Nordicum in Olomouc;4 previously, he had taught 
both publicly and privately in Rostock at the same university where he defended 
his doctorate, and at the Academia Julia in Helmstedt. Indeed, the Duke Heinrich 
Julius of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel was pushing to arrange a professorship for 
him, which would materialize in 1613 with Granius’ appointment in physics.5 In 
point of fact, throughout the entire life and career of this cultural traveler from 
Sweden the pedagogical and the geopolitical continued to play out like two sides 
of the same coin. And while Javellus, among other things, stood at one end of a 
theoretical rift with Zabarella concerning the role of experiential proofs and the 
role of merely probable premises in the construction of science,6 Granius’ inter-
ests were by no means confined to the epistemology of truth. Rather, as with 
many natural philosophers of his time who defended a larger jurisdiction of their 
philosophical pursuits, these interests encompassed logic, ethics,7 computational 
astronomy, as well as political and cosmological debates. Granius approached his 
private library as something always in progress and requiring continual note-tak-
3 Granius registers a specific day, September 10, in his possession note. The copy is now housed 
at the Herzog August Bibliothek (hereafter HAB), with the shelf mark H: O 54.8° Helmst.
4 The Jesuits organized two collegia—one in Olomouc (Moravia) and another in Braunsberg 
(Royal Prussia)—specifically in order to educate future defenders of the Catholic faith in 
Scandinavia; although technically a lecturer, Granius was part of the second largest student 
body in that school: cf. Jaroslav Miller, Urban Societies in East-Central Europe, 1500–1700, Al-
dershot 2007, p. 64.
5 This is a post that Granius never abandoned, even after the King of Sweden, Gustav II Adolf, 
and the powerful Axel Oxenstierna tried to lure him back to Uppsala; for an overview of 
student mobility and intellectual exchanges between Sweden and the Helmstedt milieu, see 
Daniel Riches, Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture: Brandenburg-Swedish Relations 
in the Seventeenth Century, Leiden 2013, pp. 197–202, who reconstructs the courtly co-opting of 
academic Philippism in Germany as part of an anti-Catholic strategy based in high intellectual 
circles such as those of Georg Calixtus and Hermann Conring, to whom I return below.
6 Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter, “Scientific Knowledge and the Metaphysics of Experience: The 
Debate in Early Modern Aristotelianism,” in: Studia Neoaristotelica 10 (2013), pp. 134–154.
7 On this aspect, see my article “Ethics in the Cultural Debates of Seventeenth-Century Ros-
tock and Helmstedt: The Case of Nicolaus Andreae Granius (1608–1617),” in: History of Uni-
versities 32 (2019), forthcoming.
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ing. As I argue in this essay, it was not the habit of collecting per se that played a 
significant role, but the owner’s insistence on extending certain scribal methods 
of early modern scholarship (and readership), even to mathematical works.8
As for Prague, his return to the city was more than a mere backdrop to Gra-
nius’ peregrinatio academica. First, it was the center of an empire. Second, it also 
set the stage for Granius’ own confrontation with Kepler and Galileo, which he, 
as we will see, actually co-orchestrated.9 And finally, as a courtly space within 
the international book trade, it also became the theater of accidental and uneasy 
negotiations around new scientific monographs, which seriously challenge the 
ethereal or unmovable characteristics of “print culture” seen as a technology that 
possesses key features of fixity and standardization.10
Take the example of Tycho Brahe. He clearly decided to use a specific book, 
the Astronomiae instauratae mechanica, in an attempt to secure imperial patron-
age. So he moved the book out of the domestic presses of Hven and successfully 
marketed it in Prague,11 where it circulated, essentially, as a catalogue of prized 
astronomical instruments. But once there, the book suffered piracy and uneven 
standards due to commercial pressure. Rudolf II had to issue dire caveats against 
fraudulent imitations, which in turn prove two points: that Brahe’s mechanics 
were read, simultaneously, by different readers with different goals, and that ac-
creditation became more and more insecure as it moved outside the courtly ma-
trix and the author’s personal control.
One of these diverse readers was Granius himself, whose extended annotations 
of his books is a document of early modern reading and learning techniques. As 
if by design, he did not emphasize the artisanal aspects of knowledge-making in 
his private collection, even if he tirelessly recalculated astronomical tables and 
rehearsed the empirical data contained in the diagrams appended to the text.12 
 8 Cf. Elizabeth Yale, “Marginalia, Commonplaces, and Correspondence: Scribal Exchange in 
Early Modern Science,” in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 
(2011), pp. 193–202, and Renée Raphael, Reading Galileo: Scribal Technologies and the Two New Sci-
ences, Baltimore 2017, which makes the point that, for all the manufacturing of Galileo’s fame, it 
is still useful to look at him as “entrenched in the world of the early modern scholar” (p. 62).
 9 Otto Walde, “Nicolaus Granius, Gali lei och Kepler,” in: Lychnos 7 (1942), pp. 279–280.
10 Although ‘classic’ in their own right, the warnings of Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book: 
Print and Knowledge in the Making, Chicago 1998, pp. 17–19, still have a valid purchase for early 
modern science; see also Matthew McLean and Sara Barker (eds.), International Exchange in 
the Early Modern Book World, Leiden 2016, esp. pp. 31–58, and 171–238.
11 I am relying here on the much more detailed account of John Robert Christianson, On Tycho’s 
Island: Tycho Brahe and His Assistants, 1570–1601, Cambridge 2000, pp. 218–236, though my 
limited purpose is to sketch out the cultural context in which Granius functioned as a reader, 
sometimes responding to solicitations as a patron and sometimes as a fellow mathematician.
12 There are numerous examples of this scribal behavior. Some relevant instances of Granius’ 
diagrammatic thinking are: 1) in his edition of Erasmus Reinhold’s Prutenicae Tabulae (Tübin-
gen 1562), marked as H: N 104.40 Helmst., in which he summarizes the causes that produce 
uniform circular motion or aequatio (f. 14 r), he worries about synchronizing chronologies 
(ff. 21 v—22 r), and he transforms the recipes for calculating the latitude into a diagram 
(ff. 40 r—v); 2) his copy of Reinhold’s commented edition of the Almagest, printed in 1549 at 
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He privileged the task of summarizing and extracting key opinions,13 often by 
imposing extended headings on the superior margin of his printed editions,14 
including consolidated segments of the Aristotelian corpus, and overall he read 
books like accomplished humanists did,15 that is, by giving the appearance of 
moving within the tenets of established scientiae.16
Indeed, while a growing number of scholars have shown interest in marginalia 
not only as a record of engagement with one text, but also as a trading zone where 
different traditions of scholarly practices came together,17 it remains peculiar of a 
reader such as Granius—and, by extension, his entourage within the community 
at Helmstedt—that he preferred discipline-specific ways, treating the text he was 
working on as belonging to recognizable scientific genres, be they geometry and 
mixed mathematics, or something else.18 It is arguable that Granius possessed a 
refined understanding of different levels of readership, for instance that of court-
Wittenberg, marked as H: N 7.80 Helmst. (1), in which he concentrates on the Danube arc-
chord problem (f. 52 v), writing Danubius over the AB chord of the diagram and underlin-
ing “altitudo convexitatis,” but without correcting the calculation that is wrong. Cf. Pietro 
Daniel Omodeo and Irina Tupikova, “The Post-Copernican Reception of Ptolemy: Erasmus 
Reinhold’s Commented Edition of the Almagest, Book One (Wittenberg, 1549),” in: Journal for 
the History of Astronomy 44 (2013), p. 242.
13 We need more research into the methods of the Collegium Nordicum at Olomouc to ap-
preciate the similarities between Granius’ acquired techniques and Scholastic adversarial 
activity.
14 Here, as well, examples are abundant: cf. “Caelum est globosum” in the Reinhold set of 1549, 
cited in note 10 (ff. 49 v—50 r), and “Sol est in centro mundi” in Granius’ copy of Kepler’s 
Epitome astronomiae Copernicanae, marked as H: N 89.80 Helmst. (1) and printed at Linz in 1622 
(cc. 446–447).
15 As an annotator, and albeit on a lower level of philological achievement, Granius’ reading 
and note-taking methods resemble Casaubon’s style, that is, a complex rather than cursory 
system, which relies on marginal and loose-leaf memoranda instead of copying passages 
out in a notebook: see Anthony Grafton and Joanna Weinberg, “I have always loved the Holy 
Tongue:” Isaac Casaubon, the Jews, and a Forgotten Chapter in Renaissance Scholarship, Cambridge 
2011, and Id., “Kepler as a Reader,” in: Journal of the History of Ideas 53 (1992), pp. 561–572.
16 Granius’ interest in the disciplinary discourse is documented in the extensive set of notes 
added to H: Q 140.8o Helmst. (1), which contains a 1532 edition of Juan Luis Vives’ De Dis-
ciplinis, and in his attention for the Aristotelian debate on the subordination of sciences in 
the margins of Pietro Catena’s Universa loca in logicam Aristotelis, published by Francesco 
Marcolini (Venice 1556) and now housed as H: N 25.4o Helmst. (5).
17 While the precise intellectual benefit of the term ‘trading zone’ as a scholarly tool is often 
vague, at least in my opinion and because not every negotiation is a trade, a more innovative 
application of this strategy is tied to the study of genres in scientific knowledge, as shown by 
Richard L. Kremer, “Incunable Almanacs and Practica as Practical Knowledge Produced in 
Trading Zones,” in: Matteo Valleriani (ed.), The Structures of Practical Knowledge, Berlin 2017, 
pp. 333–369.
18 This is how Raphael, Reading Galileo, p. 74, characterizes Viviani’s strategy; she also follows an 
interesting procedure in the decades subsequent to Galileo according to which a quantitative, 
experimental finding is cited and discussed as a piece of bookish or textual evidence (p. 177). 
A good illustration of this point is found in Granius’ annotated copy of William Gilbert’s De 
magnete (Rostock 1628; M: Nc 4o 46); cf. Nick Wilding, Galileo’s Idol: Gianfrancesco Sagredo and 
the Politics of Knowledge, Chicago 2014, pp. 33–35, for magnetism in the Galilean milieu.
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iers and craftsmen, and that in his early Czech years, in dialogue with Kepler, he 
came to grips with the “theorica” as a Renaissance genre with its audiences and 
technical challenges;19 that said, he also read and copiously annotated the works 
of his fellow mathematician at Rostock, Heinrich Brucaeus,20 who complained to 
Tycho Brahe that he could not get his head around the Copernican hypothesis 
using a diagram alone.21 Within this context, it is therefore highly significant that 
in his copy of Brahe’s Astronomiae instauratae mechanica Granius found absolutely 
nothing to say about the instruments, but instead annotated the letters of Giovan-
ni Antonio Magini comprised in the edition: perhaps, the way in which Granius 
could capitalize on just what he wanted to find in a printed edition parallels what 
has been described as Magini’s highly focused reception of Keplerian astronomy.22
2 A plurality of cosmological approaches
The historiographical literature on Helmstedt emphasizes the apex of three ex-
emplary types—regional university, Lutheran theology and late humanism. This 
seems largely beyond question for the post-1620 period. Nevertheless, it tends to 
disregard a distinctiveness of earlier approaches to Aristotelian cosmology by 
Helmstedt professors that is perceived most acutely, perhaps, in those historical 
actors who were involved in academic mobility and came through key European 
intellectual crossroads, such as Breslau or Rostock itself. There is evidence—to 
which I briefly return below—that in the circle of Granius’ friends and colleagues, 
Hermann Conring, the distinguished scholar of Aris totle’s Politics and reader of 
Machiavelli, owned a copy of the 1615 edition of Giuseppe Biancani’s Aristote-
lis loca mathematica.23 And within this crucial Jesuit treatise, published in quarto, 
Conring annotated the sections pertaining to the fluidity of the heavens and the 
celestial locations of the comets. Conversely, Granius himself, who remained a 
true Peripatetic throughout his life, became interested in the work of the Venetian 
19 Adam Mosley, “Objects of Knowledge: Mathematics and Models in Sixteenth-Century Cos-
mology and Astronomy,” in Sachiko Kusukawa and Ian MacLean (eds.), Transmitting Knowl-
edge: Words, Images, and Instruments in Early Modern Europe, Oxford 2006, pp. 193–216.
20 e. g. Brucaeus’ De motu primo (Rostock 1585; H: N 84.8o Helmst.).
21 TBOO vii. 85: “Ob id desiderabam organum, quod mihi ob oculos obiiceret totam illam Co-
pernici imaginationem, quam ego, ut verum fateat, ex simplici illa delineation nunquam 
plane assequi potui.” The functioning of such instrumental machina mundi calls into ques-
tion the thesis advanced by Pierre Duhem who labelled many early modern astronomers 
as entirely indifferent to the reality of the hypotheses utilized to describe the heavenly mo-
tions; cf. Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein, “Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth 
Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal,” in: Perspectives on Science 6 (1998), pp. 232–258, who 
reformulated this issue in terms of indetermination rather than irrelevance, and from the 
point of view of the Aristotelian proof, and especially the ample discussion of Pietro Daniel 
Omodeo and Jonathan Regier in this volume.
22 James R. Voelkel and Owen Gingerich, “Giovanni Antonio Magini’s “Keplerian” Tables of 
1614 and Their Implications for the Reception of Keplerian Astronomy in the Seventeenth 
Century,” in: Journal for the History of Astronomy 32 (2001), pp. 237–262.
23 It is H: N 6.40 Helmst.; cf. Paul Raabe, “Die Bibliotheca Conringiana,” in Michael Stolleis (ed.), 
Hermann Conring (1606–1681), Berlin 1983, pp. 413–434.
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mathematician Giovanni Battista Benedetti, who was active at the Court of Savoy 
in Turin and combined an anti-conventionalist opinion with adherence to the 
Coper nican system.24 Indeed, one could further argue that in this context, and to 
the eyes of many Aristotelians, Tycho Brahe’s geo-heliocentrism would have been 
understood as a singular culmination of the cosmological style of Wittenberg, 
with its emphasis on tabular calculation and geometric modelling. Certainly, reli-
gious motives played a role in the decision to be cautious. But it was because of its 
peculiar connection with the Aristotelian background that the well-established 
Protestant school of Helmstedt could avert a rupture with tradition, even if it 
was intrinsically able to criticize the Aristotelian cosmos based on its own short-
comings. This being the case, there is room for a fresh examination of Granius’ 
copious marginal annotations as a gateway into how a Baltic polymath could 
maintain an anti-dogmatic stance, and occasionally even an anti-Aristotelian 
one, while still remaining within the Peripatetic system.25
Yet, being a Peripatetic natural philosopher at the beginning of the seven-
teenth century did not mean being a defender of all the points endorsed by Aris-
totle himself. There were some features in the Aristotelian formulation that were 
problematic to maintain, such as the forced symmetry between rivers and winds. 
In addition to these kind of difficulties, the Helmstedt professors who extensively 
annotated the printed editions of Biancani, Benedetti, Brahe, Reinhold or  Kepler26 
had to deal with new issues. Granius remained a stable associate within the 
larger orbit of the Caseliani of Helmstedt, and this was a formidable intellectual 
group as well as one unafraid of moving in territories where support for Aris totle 
was difficult to find. What is typical of this knowledge community is the way 
they historicized the Aristotelian debates of sixteenth-century Italy. Just as their 
Paduan or Venetian predecessors relied on the unprecedented materials being 
published and pertaining to the Greek commentators, so, too, but by a curious 
inversion, Helmstedt natural philosophy often appears as a strategy to reframe 
early modern disciplines of knowledge by placing Nifo or Boccadiferro exactly 
in the position in which their previous generation would have put Simplicius or 
Philoponus.27 Thus, for instance, we see Zabarella occupy one of the treatises of 
De rebus naturalibus with an extensive defense of Averroes and his notion of formae 
fractae, that is, the existence of intermediate passages between substantial and ac-
24 See below note 32.
25 Apart from the intellectual debate, there is a further dimension, both geopolitical and bi-
ographical, in which Granius defies the expectations one could have about his allegiances. 
During the tragic trial of Nicolaus Campanius, Granius is repeatedly scrutinized for his 
alleged sympathies for Roman Catholicism; see Oskar Garstein, Rome and the Counter-Refor-
mation in Scandinavia: The Age of Gustavus Adolphus and Queen Christina of Sweden, 1622–1656, 
Leiden 1992, pp. 259–265.
26 Cf. the copy of Astronomia nova marked as H: N 29.20 Helmst. (2) at the HAB.
27 Charles Schmitt, “Philoponus’ Commentary on Aris totle’s Physics in the Sixteenth Centu-
ry,” in: Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, Ithaca 1987, 
pp. 210–227.
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cidental phenomena such as colors, and on the other side of the transalpine book 
trade we have a physical dissertation about the natural elements presided over by 
Adam Luchten and printed at Helmstedt in 1605, which remains almost entirely 
unimpressive except for the last corollary where the author confronts Zabarella’s 
idea of a cold region in the process of rain falling.
Granius’ intellectual output is perfectly integrated within this habit of ex-
pounding public theses resulting from ongoing conversation and marginal an-
notations. The chosen topics might seem consciously traditional, but often their 
arrangement is inconsistent with the received theory, as I will soon show. Aware-
ness of inner weaknesses in the Aristotelian cosmos generated an underappre-
ciated sense of epistemic freedom. No one—as far as I am aware—dealt with 
the shocking discovery of Caselius writing in the margins of his own edition of 
Zabar ella’s Opera logica, printed by the Venetian Meietti in 1578, “telos ou gnosis 
alla praxis” (the goal is not knowledge but practice), which takes the opposite 
stance of what Zabarella argued in the chapter 1:2.28 It is because of evidence 
such as this that we cannot take the risk of “black boxing” the plurality of the 
cosmological debates in Helmstedt, or of subscribing to the false teleology of the 
Galilean dialogue according to which there are only two chief planetary systems. 
Likewise, the friction inside this Aristotelian stronghold was made invisible, par-
adoxically, by its own success.
3	 First	notes	on	Granius’	scientific	problem-solving
As one of the Scandinavian itinerant faculty members at Helmstedt, Granius 
played a part in the construction of a ‘cognitive ecology’ of knowledge which 
had fundamental underpinnings of biological naturalism. This was on behalf of 
Caselius’ close circle, with whom Granius also shared polemical targets (Ramus 
and his cohort of novatores, described as the ancient sophists), stylistic preferences 
(the georgic imagery of ‘floreant paululum’ or ‘reviviscunt’), and, most important-
ly, the idea that only a theoretical account of differentiae (e. g. cartilage and bone 
being analogical or differing by more or less) could underwrite the correct ‘start-
ing point’ of a scientific inquiry. Granius is acknowledged by his contemporaries 
Arnisaeus and Conring as one of the first Helmstedt Aristotelians to conclude 
publicly that virtues are acquired by habituation and teaching, and that they are 
states rather than natural capacities, a parallel that suggests how all aspects of 
cleverness—including the zoon politikon—emerge from natural roots shared with 
the beasts. In this exchange about political science, Granius also makes important 
reflections about a nest-building swallow who acts according to dianoias akribeian, 
or ‘intelligent design’.29 Granius was regularly engaged in presiding over public 
28 Cf. Riccardo Pozzo, “Philosophy, Medicine and Aris totle’s De Anima in Helmstedt at the 
Close of the Renaissance,” in: Barbara Bauer (ed.), Scientiae et artes: Die Vermittlung alten und 
neuen Wissens in Literatur, Kunst und Musik, Wiesbaden 2004, pp. 831–841.
29 Aris totle’s reference (from Historia animalium, 612b18–32; cf. 614b31–33) is part of numerous ex-
amples of the intentional activity of animals which reveal ‘the precision of their intelligence’. 
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debates, at least in the period between 1604 and 1608. His reputation as a biblio-
phile, however, must have accompanied him as well, and it is symptomatic that 
a Rostock treatise De meteoris, written in 1596 prior to his appointment in Helm-
stedt, was subsequently acquired by the Duke Heinrich Julius of Braun schweig 
and systematically annotated in its new library location. Apart from these ritu-
alistic or academic sources, comparatively little is known about Granius’ life.30
As we have seen, he was once a papal scholar at Olomouc, in the Czech lands, 
and he also wrote a letter to the Swedish archbishop of Uppsala on October 3, 1610, 
in which he expresses marvel at the discovery of astral bodies orbiting around 
Jupiter and also pointedly conflates the telescopic practice of Kepler and Galileo.31 
This well-known episode is interesting in itself, and for two additional reasons. 
First, in so far as it testifies to the rarified exchange across the Alps that the taci-
turn Galileo attended to in his Paduan years—Gali lei being an anti-Hartlib type, 
the unresponsive kernel of a network of knowledge; and second, because it is not 
clear what Granius actually thought of Kepler’s aprioristic cosmology. On the one 
hand, he almost certainly believed that astronomy ought to be part of natural 
philosophy; and he spent time, as I mentioned earlier, annotating the books of an 
alleged student of Tartaglia, Giovanni Battista Benedetti, who sometimes alluded 
to a Pythagorean and Archimedean philosophical inspiration, whose methodol-
ogy was to approach practical as well as classical problems of natural philosophy 
using straight mathematical means, and who should be considered as engaged in 
While, in itself, the Greek term akribeia refers to an important task of the historian, such as 
it was understood by Thucydides, the problem of skill and wisdom is also taken up in the 
tradition of Aristotelian metaphysics and moral responsibility (compare, in the commentary 
tradition, the position of Alexander of Aphrodisias in Aristotelis Metaphysician Commentaria, 5, 
1–2); my thanks to Marco Sgarbi for alerting me to this point. For a discussion of this passage 
in light of Theophrastean and Peripatetic biological works see Georgia Tsouni, Antiochus and 
Peripatetic Ethics, Cambridge 2019, p. 190, and James G. Lennox, “Aris totle on the biological 
roots of virtue: the natural history of natural virtue,” in: D. Henry and K.M. Nielsen (eds.), 
Bridging the Gap between Aris totle’s Science and Ethics, Cambridge 2015, pp. 193–213.
30 The best study of Granius’ collection is still O. Walde, Bücher- und Bibliotheksgeschichtliche 
Forschungen in Ausländischen Bibliotheken (Uppsala 1930), esp. pp. 142–148, but we also have an 
extended comparison between him, Casaubon, and the anonymous annotator of Jean Bodin 
in the 1597 Latin edition now in the house of the French scholar Jean Ceard by Ann Blair 
(The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science, Princeton 1997, pp. 195–198). Among 
other useful observations, Blair calls Granius “more Ramist than Ramus himself,” refer-
ring to a scheme appended to the printed edition despite a complaint that Bodin “unjustly 
carps against Aris totle.” Blair’s general argument that Renaissance natural philosophy was 
a bookish enterprise shaped by Scholastic and humanist practices does not apply to the 
Helmstedt entourage without some adjustment and limitations, but it is fitting for Granius’ 
miscellaneous education, and it reinforces the necessity of looking at ordinary scholars and 
their working methods; see also her “The Rise of Note-Taking in Early Modern Europe,” 
Intellectual History Review 20 (2010), pp. 303–316.
31 Massimo Bucciantini, Galileo e Keplero: Filosofia, cosmologia e teologia nell’Età della Controrifor-
ma, Turin 2000, p. 189.
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a program to mathematize physics.32 On the other hand, Granius appears to have 
remained committed to the sort of conventionalism ante litteram that is tradition-
ally, if anachronistically, ascribed to the Wittenberg tradition.33
There is a greater irony in the paradoxical behavior of this Aristotelian scholar 
as a note-taker. The case of Ramus, once again, is instructive beyond Granius’ 
case. In the milieu of the Swedish mathematician it was customary to treat Ramus 
as a dangerous homo novus with slim philological understanding, or as a boast-
ful theoretician. As Omodeo writes, the margins of Duncan Liddel’s own copy 
of the Scholae Mathematicae leave no doubt about Liddel’s negative opinions on 
Ramus’ attempted reduction of astronomy to computational purity: “He mocks 
hypotheses,” one annotation goes.34 And this pattern has a larger epistemic force. 
Granius would have subscribed to the impossibility of an astronomy without 
hypotheses, and in his own margins he took sarcastic distance from Ramus on 
several occasions, except he also spent most of his energy as a commentator in 
drawing tables—some of which might be taken as a simple diagrammatic tool, 
but some of which are clearly following a dichotomous logic until its extreme 
end. I suggest that this anomalous, seemingly contradictory behavior is actually 
quite productive as a tool to study the historical context of Helmstedt Aristote-
lians. To give a concrete example, there is a fascinating paper insert between 29v 
and 30r of Granius’ copy of Regiomontanus’ Tabulae Directionum, which works 
essentially as a computational aid for calculations.35 However, in the remaining, 
miscellaneous notes most of Granius’ energy—as elsewhere36—is taken up with 
the question of where mathematics derives its certainty and evidence, or, to put it 
differently, whether or not it falls short of the rigor demanded by an ‘Aristotelian 
science’, such as it is described in the Posterior Analytics. This set of preoccupa-
tions is often referred to as the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum. Giacobbe 
and Jardine have differently shown that the debate crossed its Italian boundaries 
and reached France, Portugal, and England; it can be demonstrated that there 
were also readers of the quaestio in seventeenth-century Helmstedt, one of whom 
was Granius himself. There is a scheme on the subordination of sciences in the 
32 Cf. Pietro Daniel Omodeo, “La cosmologia infinitistica di Giovanni Battista Benedetti,” Bruni-
ana et Campanelliana 15 (2009), pp. 181–190, and Id., Efemeridi e critica all’astrologia tra filosofia 
naturale ed etica: La contesa tra Benedetti e Altavilla nel tardo Rinascimento torinese, Berlin 2014.
33 Take, for instance, the intense textual activity of Granius in Reinhold’s 1549 edition of the 
Al magest (cited in note 12), which concentrates on the diagrams and includes (at f. 72 v) the 
longest mathematical annotation in this set. Given the large quantity of new evidence at the 
HAB, I am taking a fresh look at the post-Copernican reception in Helmstedt in another essay.
34 Omodeo, Duncan Liddel (1561–1613): Networks of Polymathy (as in note 1), p. 63; for the German 
observatory of Kassel as a good example for an astronomy that developed without hypothe-
ses see Karsten Gaulke, “Perfect in Every Sense: Scientific Iconography on an Equation Clock 
by Jost Bürgi and the Self-Understanding of the Astronomers at the Kassel Court in the late 
1580s,” in: Nuncius 30 (2015), pp. 37–74.
35 This is the H: N 131.4o Helmst. copy.
36 Nicolaus Reimarus Ursus, Fundamentum Astronomicum (Strasbourg 1588); the annotated 
copy of Granius at the HAB is H: N 70.4o Helmst. (1).
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
118 Stefano Gulizia
1556 copy of Catena, who was one of the main interlocutors in the mathematical 
debate, along with Barozzi, Piccolomini, and Pereyra.37 Then again, one must be 
careful to respect the paradoxes of this annotator. On the one hand, given the Me -
lanch thonian environment where he worked, Granius certainly sought to restore 
the higher epistemological status of mathematics, but this did not prevent him 
from scolding Paduan Aristotelians in the margins, or from adding nuggets of 
information and elliptical arguments that seem to come, by way of digression, 
from the opposite theoretical standpoint.
To properly switch from Granius’ cosmological interest to his natural philos-
ophy it is useful to take stock of his scholarly habitus as an adversarial reader. 
The Bodin volume at the HAB offers a good point of departure.38 One can see 
how the meticulous clarifications far exceed Granius’ contractual obligation to 
teach his students a course on Me lanch thon’s introductory manual in the field, 
the Initia doctrinae physicae. To Bodin Granius adds systematic, numbered outlines 
to explain the text, and dichotomous diagrams, for instance on the motions of 
the earth proposed by Copernicus, the laws of optics, the modes of generation 
in plants, or kinds of agent intellect. On a few occasions, he offers vernacular 
Swedish translations for technical terms. And Bodin’s description of the birth of 
worms from excrement elicits this note from Granius, which exhibits an aware-
ness of autoptic ideals: “worms that are born from rotten cheese similarly degen-
erate into flies. I myself have seen this in cheese placed in hot weather and in a 
hot and dry place.” Granius was deeply committed to the study of natural phe-
nomena, but there is more to this picture: he is one of the early modern scholars 
who have become increasingly interested in the relationship between Aris totle’s 
“geometric style” of scientific demonstration and its practice in territories covered 
by Aristotelian physics. As Jim Lennox recently argued, the order and method 
for the investigation of nature that Aris totle presents in his Physics are governed 
by an understanding of “local” norms, that is, protocols for inquiry that are quite 
specific to an individual domain.39 The situation is therefore twofold. Granius 
responds to the professional program traced by Cornelius Martini in his 1612 
inaugural oration, now part of the HAB miscellanea Yx 31, in which he constructs 
the student of natural history as a spectator who marvels at the world (inventum 
obstupescat) and also wants deeply penetrate its mysteries (naturae adyta penetra-
re). At the same time, Granius also wants to capitalize on Aris totle’s rhetorical 
advantage of dismissing his predecessors’ best efforts by presenting them with 
mounting empirical data that they cannot face or account for; in short, Granius 
sees science as a cumulative group endeavor, but it is typical of him and his in-
tellectual circle that one arrives at the complexity of physical and cosmological 
37 See Guy Claessens, “Platonic Reminiscence or Aristotelian remembering? Pietro Catena’s 
Philosophy of Mathematics,” in: Physics 49 (2013), pp. 21–36.
38 I am referring to the Wechel edition of Bodin’s Universae Naturae Theatrum (Frankfurt 1597), 
annotated by Granius, and now shelved as H: M 237.80 Helmst.
39 James G. Lennox, “Aris totle on Norms of Inquiry,” in: Hopos 1 (2011), pp. 23–46.
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inquiries not through a survey of endoxa but by reflecting—via marginalia—on a 
picture of problem-solving activity.40
Here I would like to briefly apply these findings to the study of a collection of 
four meteorological dissertations, which Granius printed in Rostock and brought 
with him to Helmstedt: the 1596 volume De meteoris. The first and the third are the 
most interesting, and they systematically pair a nominal definition with previous 
treatments in the School of Padua, for instance the theory of aereum unctuosum with 
Nifo, and the idea that vapor est materia meteororum with Boccadiferro. As it stands, 
Granius’ way of proceeding may be Peripatetic, but certainly not quite Aristotelian 
in the strict sense, even if he sticks to Aris totle’s guns throughout and avoids men-
tioning that the altitude of cometary activity, along with the parallax of Mars, have 
been the two most important reasons for geo-heliocentrism. If we look at Meteorol-
ogy 1.6, a discussion of previous accounts of comets, we notice that Aris totle first 
sketches the views he deems worthy of notice—Democritus says comets are con-
junctions of planets, and so on—and then proceeds to criticize the endoxon by way 
of empirical data. Granius, on the contrary, accepts an initial definition received by 
the commentary tradition (often, as I said before, by taking sixteenth-century Ital-
ian Aristotelians as avatars of the Alexandrian tradition), and then systematically 
breaks off the exposition with a pattern of short, puzzling questions that derive 
from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems. Sometimes, in the course of De meteoris, the 
very questions are the same, such as the saltiness of the sea, or the visual trick in 
which the sea looks more transparent than fresh water, when in point of fact it is 
denser. Other times, it is the argumentative key which is borrowed, and the way 
Granius is able to do this is in itself a study in Peripatetic flexibility. The situation 
is quite clear in the case of his treatment of the winds, which responds to the state-
ment ventus non est naturalis motus (wind is not a natural motion) and follows the 
exposition of Problems 26, and whatever of Theophrastus is preserved in there, 
rather than other doxographical materials of the Aristotelian corpus. In a manner 
of speaking, it is as if Granius utilizes a problem-style epistemology to bypass a 
vexed notion that derives from a singular aporetic moment in Aris totle’s works, 
for, as Malcolm Wilson recently clarified, once Aris totle commits himself strongly 
to his systematic analogy between the rivers and the winds, he must spend vast 
amounts of energy to introduce an elaborate, radial apparatus in order to support it.
4 Interim conclusion and future research
It would be a mistake to use this abbreviated and, in some ways, preliminary 
survey of Granius’ massive evidence preserved in Wolfenbüttel as a key to assess 
the originality of his project in the reception of Aristotelian natural philosophy in 
40 The topic is too complex to be properly tackled here, but on this aspect of Aristotelian meth-
od cf. Cynthia A. Freeland, “Scientific Explanation and Empirical Data in Aris totle’s Mete-
orology,” in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1990), pp. 67–102, and Joseph Karbowski, 
“Endoxa, facts, and the starting points of the Nicomachean Ethics,” in: Bridging the Gap (cited at 
note 29), pp. 113–129.
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early modern Germany, although it is equally clear that Granius was a humanist 
of high caliber, and recognized as such within the community of Helmstedt. He 
had interests in many Peripatetic disciplines and discourses, and was in constant 
dialogue with colleagues operating in the fields of logic, ethic, and politics; he also 
read about rhetoric and religion, and was conversant with the humanist tradition 
of Vives and Erasmus.41 That said, Granius did not lean on administrative tools like 
bookkeeping nor did he draw on commonplace books, despite his strong interest 
in Renaissance naturalists;42 mostly what he left behind was a series of tests on pa-
per or instructions, and what he did for the most part was to recombine different 
scribal techniques so as to arrive at the most fitting for his purposes. In this paper, 
I tried to reveal the ambition and complexity of Granius’ scientific mediation by 
historicizing the epistemology and manipulability of the manuscript culture that 
he applied to his printed collection. Therefore, a first point that is most urgent to 
stress here is the multifaceted character of the scientific and philosophical debate 
that developed in a late-humanistic, Protestant university such as Helmstedt. As 
a field, cosmology is particularly well-suited to dispute a number of preconceived 
notions, chief among them the idea of the Academia Julia as an unfaltering bastion 
of Aristotelian doctrine. Moreover, the majority of Granius’ books were annotated 
prior to his appointment as a professor of physics in 1613, so one could correctly 
say that adversaria and polycentric networks of learning are mutually reinforc-
ing and that Granius’ legacy simultaneously reflects certain trends of the Jesuit 
teaching he was nurtured by and anticipates a large, antiquarian tendency that 
characterizes the gradual shift from the Republic of Letters to the Enlightenment.43
Second, the recognizable impact of note-taking as a specific epistemic practice 
in early modern academia, documented by scores of adaptable folding, writing, 
and drawing techniques, partakes in a revisionist historiography which under-
stands excerpting not as outdated and bookish, but as one of the main prototypes 
of the empirical method.44 It is within this reconstruction that Granius provides 
41 Despite Granius’ interest for Erasmus, it would be wrong to see his marginal notes as 
aligned to the methods of amplification recommended in De Copia; they are often ‘copious’, 
but not to facilitate abundant style, nor are they overwhelmingly anxious about managing 
information either.
42 For the system of loci and the history of reading see Fabian Krämer, “Ulisse Aldrovandi’s 
Pandechion Epistemonicon and the Use of Paper Technology in Renaissance Natural History,” 
in: Early Science and Medicine 19 (2014), pp. 398–423.
43 Paul Nelles, “Historia Litteraria at Helmstedt: Books, professors and students in the early 
Enlightenment university,” in: H. Zedelmaier and M. Mulsow (eds.), Die Pratiken der Gelehr-
samkeit in der Frühen Neuzeit, Tübingen 2001, pp. 147–176, invokes a “quixotic” blend of tradi-
tions, didactic environments, and sociability to explain how a qualified register of historical 
Pyrrhonism crept into the teaching curriculum.
44 The bibliography on this theme is expanding rapidly: cf. Richard Yeo, Notebooks, English Vir-
tuosi, and Early Modern Science, Chicago 2014, together with Dana Jalobeanu, “The Toolbox of 
the Early Modern Natural Historian: Note-Books, Commonplace-Books, and the Emergence 
of Laboratory Records,” in: JEMS 4 (2015), pp. 107–123, Fabian Krämer, Ein Zentaur in London. 
Lektüre und Beobachtung in der frühneuzeitlichen Naturforschung, Affalterbach 2014, Helmut 
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some exceptional clues, all of which must be reinforced by further research. In 
this essay, the most notable features that have emerged concern the eclectic recep-
tion in Helmstedt of Paduan Aristotelian sources from the south, often organized 
as a new cluster of veteri superseded by novi, the anti-dogmatic spirit that led to a 
careful assessment of innovative key texts (like Benedetti, Galileo, Kepler), even 
when they were at odds with traded conceptions, and finally an accentuation of 
conflicting opinions analyzed and resolved through scholarly cross-checking. A 
closer examination of Granius’ Nachlass at the HAB is a desideratum of further 
research. This investigation should take into account the different philosophical 
foundations provided or underlined for natural inquiries, and explain what led 
Granius to his confrontation with encyclopedic systematizers such as Goclenius 
and Kecker mann; it should also make sense of how Granius used the margins to 
transition in and out (topically) pre-structured books. It is very likely that intense 
scribal activity will continue to express and bolster a pluralistic attitude, and 
that once the polyphony of voices around Granius and his entourage is restored, 
we will see that even in a consolidated, Me lanch thonian outpost like Helmstedt 
there was no standard Copernicanism and no simplified image of natural science.
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Attacks on Judicial Astrology,  
Religious Dissent and the Rise of Skepticism
Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer
The topic of my paper is astrological prediction based on comets. The question 
will be raised whether and how the improvement of mathematical and observa-
tional astronomy had an impact on astrological practice with regard to comets. My 
main questions concern negotiations between men of science (physicians, math-
ematicians, diplomats and theologians) about the validity of cosmological and 
genethlialogical, or general and individual astrology. My objective is to find out 
the intellectual roots of skepticism against astrological prognostications and to 
explain which arguments contributed to the decline of astrology. In the first part 
of my paper (chapters 1–5) my sources are calendars with forecasts of astronom-
ical events (eclipses, conjunctions) and astrological prognostications, pamphlets 
on the occasion of comets as well as humanist editions of ancient astrological texts 
and textbooks. In the later part of this article (chapters 6–8) my answer focuses 
on a hitherto neglected aspect in the history of science: the impact of religious 
dissenters, mainly Anti-Trinitarians (also called Socinians after Fausto Sozzini), 
on the emergence of astronomy as a science and the decline of astrology. From the 
corpus of pamphlets in Latin and German dealing with the comets of 1577, 1618, 
1663–1665 and 1680–1683 I will single out tracts by Andreas Dudith (1533–1589) 
and his circle of physicians,1 whose severe critiques of astrology on the occasion of 
the comet of 1577 were reprinted, commented upon and quoted during the follow-
ing century—long before cometary theory reached a new scientific level, thanks 
to Edmond Halley’s findings and Newtonian theory. On one hand, Dudith’s skep-
ticism was associated with Epicureanism and atheism by defenders of astrology 
and in particular by authors of comet sermons (Kometenpredigten). On the other 
hand, followers of the new astronomy welcomed these amateur observers, with 
their bizarre religious ideas, as their allies. Moreover, their arguments against as-
1 Pierre Costil, André Dudith, humaniste hongrois. Sa vie, son oeuvre et ses manuscrits grecs, Pa ris 
1935, première partie, ch. IV; deuxième partie, Ch. II; Cesare Vasoli, I miti e gli astri, Na po li 
1977, pp. 351–387; Domenico Caccamo, Eretici italiani in Moravia, Polonia, Transilvania (1548–
1611). Studi e documenti, Florence/ Chicago 1970, pp. 109–151; Gábor Amási, The uses of human-
ism. Johannes Sambucus (1531–1584), Andreas Dudith (1533–1589) and the Republic of letters in 
East Central Europe, Leiden 2009, pp. 239–327, here pp. 203–224; Luka Ilic, “Andreas Dudith 
und sein reformiertes Netzwerk in Breslau am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts”, in: Joachim Bahl-
cke/ Irene Dingel (eds.), Die Reformierten in Schlesien vom 16. Jahrhundert bis zur Alt preußischen 
Union von 1817, Göttingen 2016, pp. 53–64.
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trological superstition, which conditioned fear and terror among the uneducated, 
were shared by political reformers in the early Enlightenment.
The number of pamphlets and illustrated broadsheets showing and describing 
the comets of 1577, 1618/19, 1652–1654, 1664/65 and 1680–1682 increased during 
the century of scientific revolution.2 The appearance of the comet of 1577 was de-
scribed and analyzed in more than 200 tracts. Tycho de Brahe’s description was 
the most famous, but it was not published before 1588. Three bright comets ap-
peared after the Bohemian war had erupted.3 The comets of 1664/65 and 1680/81 
attracted even more of the attention of professional and lay observers.4 Even in the 
second half of the 17th century, calendar writers admitted that due to their read-
ers’ expectations, they still felt obliged to add an astrological chapter about the 
significance of eclipses, major conjunctions or comets, which were supposed to 
be engendered by the vapors of planets. This supplementary chapter was entire-
ly based on cosmological and judicial astrology, which was at that time already 
considered a dubious art. 
Calendar writers and pamphlet authors were theologians, physicians or teach-
ers of mathematics or medicine. There can be no doubt that pamphlets about 
comets introduced non-academic readers to new results and methods of phys-
ics and astronomy, since the names of Copernicus, Erasmus Reinhold, Brahe, Jo-
hannes Kepler and Johannes Hevelius were often cited in them as authorities. 
The main scientific issues of cometary theory were linked with the topics of the 
new astronomy and, like these, they were debated from a theological viewpoint 
in the pamphlets. If comets were objects above the moon and their orbits formed 
straight or slightly curved lines, their nature and origin could be described just 
2 Philipp Carl, Repertorium der Cometen-Astronomie, Munich/Paris/London 1864; Volker Fritz 
Brü ning, Bibliographie der Kometenliteratur, Stuttgart 2000; with respect to the medieval tradi-
tion of astrology cf. Sara Schechner Genuth, Comets, Popular Culture and the Birth of Modern 
Cos mology, Princeton 1997; Christoph Meinel (ed.), Grenzgänger zwischen Himmel und Erde. Ko -
meten in der Frühen Neuzeit, Regensburg 2008; idem, “Kometenschriften des 17. Jahrhunderts 
in der Marienbibliothek zu Halle”, in: Jutta Eckle (ed.), Auf einer anderen Erde und unter einem 
anderen Himmel. Zu den Kalendern, Praktiken, Prognostiken und Kometenschriften aus der Frühen 
Neuzeit in der Marienbibliothek zu Halle an der Saale, Halle (Saale) 2016, pp. 65–84; Ros ma rie 
Zeller, “Wunderzeichen und Endzeitvorstellungen in der Frühen Neuzeit. Kometenschrif-
ten als Instrumente von Warnung und Prophezeiung”, in: Morgen-Glantz 10 (2000), pp. 95–
132, here 103–125. Also cf. my commentary to a series of illustrated broadsheets depicting co-
mets in Wolfgang Harms/Michael Schilling/ Barbara Bauer/ Cornelia Kemp (eds.), Illustrier te 
Flugblätter des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts. Die Sammlung der Herzog August Bibliothek Wol fen büttel, 
vol. I, Tübingen 1985, nrs. 195–210; also nr. 194 with the comment by Hans Unter reitmeier.
3 C/1618 Q1 could be observed from August until September 1618, C/1618 V1 from November 
until the beginning of December, C/1618 W1 from the end of November 1618 until January 
1619. Cf. Meinel, Grenzgänger (n. 2), p. 38.
4 C1/1664 W1 was detected in November and was visible until January 1665. C/1665 F1 ap-
peared in April 1665. More than 100 pamphlets were devoted to both comets. C/1680 V1 was 
discovered by the astronomer Gottfried Kirch on November 14 and was visible until February 
1681. More than 230 titles are manifests of the comet’s publicity. Cf. Meinel, Grenzgänger (n. 2), 
p. 78 and 91; James Howard Robinson, The great comet of 1680, Northfield Minnesota 1916.
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like that of planets, although they passed the ecliptic at oblique angles, vanished 
from sight and finally disappeared in space.5 In 1665 most of the pamphleteers 
had abandoned the Aristotelian doctrine of comets as meteora. In the way the 
pamphlet authors made their readers familiar with Aristotelian physics and cos-
mology, comparing the peripatetic theories with new astronomical knowledge, 
they also explained the planetary system and the constellations of the celestial 
globe, while their astrological prognostications stressed their theological pur-
pose and stirred up fears of God’s resentment. Astrological predictions based on 
major conjunctions of the three upper planets or on eclipses were usually con-
firmed by reference to Arabic astrologers, mainly Albumasar (Abu-Ma’shar).6 
It is well known that Philipp Apian, Galileo Gali lei, Johannes Kepler and Isaac 
Newton were readers of the Bible who made proper suggestions for how to inter-
pret Holy Scripture and who refused to accept doctrines of the church that they 
found incompatible with their scientific method and their own discoveries. The 
traditional view of astrology was debated in pamphlets about comets in relation to 
Biblical prophecies until the end of the 17th century. Some Protestant theologians 
were concerned about the lack of orthodoxy in their congregations. They were 
convinced that their interpretation of comets in analogy with the celestial signs 
listed in Matthew 24 and Luke 21 as messengers of the Last Judgment would deter 
their flocks from dangerous libertinage. They looked at comets as signs in the 
book of nature, which were to be interpreted analogically with Holy Scripture. 
It was well-known that Andreas Dudith and his protégé Marcellus Squar cia lu -
pus (1538– after 1592) were Anti-Trinitarians.7 In the history of astrology, the par-
ticular role played by religious non-conformists, sympathizing with Anti-Trini-
tarian ideas and therefore facing the risk of prosecution, deserves our attention 
not less than the famous claims by Gali lei and Kepler concerning how to interpret 
Scripture wherever it deals with the motion of the heaven and the central posi-
5 The interdependence between pamphlets about comets and the rise of empirical astronomy 
is evident, but will here only be incidentally considered; cf. Schechner Genuth, Comets (n. 2) 
and Meinel, Grenzgänger (n. 2); Robert S. Westman, The Copernican Question. Prognostication, 
Skepticism and Celestial Order, Berkeley/ Los Angeles/ London 2011, pp. 250–257.
6 Besides his treatise on major conjunctions and nativities, edited by Keji Yamamoto et al. 
cf. abu-Ma’shar, The great introduction to the science of astrology, Facsimile, Frankfurt am Main 
1985; an example for an edition from the 16th century: Albumasar, De magnis coniunctioni-
bus […] octo continens tractatus, Venice 1515.
7 This is the leitmotif of Stieff’s biography of Andreas Dudith: Carl Benjamin Stieff, Versuch 
einer ausführlichen und zuverläßigen Geschichte von Leben und Glaubens-Meynungen Andreas 
Du diths Gewesenen Bischofs, wie auch dreier Kaiser Raths und Gesandten in Polen […], Breslau 
1757; Christoph Sandius, Bibliotheca Anti-trinitariorum, Freistadt 1684, pp. 61–64 and 81n. 
Clau dio Madonia, “Marcello Squar cia lu pus”, in: Gordon Kindler/Claudio Madonia (eds.), 
Adum brados of the Kingdom of Toledo, Jacob Acontius and Marcellus Squar cia lu pus, Baden-Baden 
1994, pp. 119–126; Martin Bundi, Flüchtlingsschicksale am Alpensüdfuss im 16. Jahrhundert. Le -
bens bilder italienischer Glaubensflüchtlinge im Veltlin und in den Bündner Südtälern, Chur 2015, 
pp. 46–48; idem, “Marcellus Squar cia lu pus, Flüchtling und Kosmopolit des 16. Jahrhun-
derts”, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 56 (2006), pp. 435–445.
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tion of the Earth. Unorthodox approaches to the tradition of the Biblical text and 
the formation of Christian doctrine opened a new approach to cosmology and 
astrology as complex systems that, throughout Arabic transmission, scholastic 
learning and the revival of ancient texts and science by humanists, included a 
proper understanding of the Creator and his creation as natura naturans and natu-
ra naturata.8 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) had already raised the is-
sue of terrifying and intimidating the ignorant crowd by astrological di vi nation, 
which he found irresponsible and treacherous.9 Andreas Dudith and Marcellus 
Squar cia lu pus derived their anti-astrological arguments from Pico’s repertory. 
They fervently refuted the suspicion of impiety and turned this reproach back 
upon their enemies, who in their turn abused theology. The controversy about 
the validity of astrology interfered with the question of what true piety was and 
how truth in religion could be detected. Since Dudith and Squar cia lu pus were 
allies of famous Antitrinitarians (Giorgio Biandrata [1516–1588] was Squar cia lu -
pus’ colleague, while Dudith supported Jacobus Palaeologus [1520–1585]), and 
both were correspondents of Fausto Sozzini (1539–1604), it seems worthwhile to 
investigate whether and how Antitrinitarianism paved the way to ‘new science’ 
100 years before Isaac Newton.
Before I turn to the religious dissenters and their critique of astrology (in 
chapter 6), some preliminary remarks about the relationship between mathe-
matical as tron omy and astrology in early modern textbooks as well as about the 
ancient authorities might be useful: Aris totle, Ptolemy, Pliny and Seneca (chap-
ters 1 and 2). Chapter 3 will explain who was authorized to predict the future—
prophets in the Bible, trustworthy interpreters of the sacred text and astrologers 
confirming Biblical prognostications. Me lanch thon tried to justify astrology with 
reference to God’s attributes and human responsibility and thus was more open-
minded than the Church of Rome and Calvin (Chapter 4). In order to understand 
the role of religious dissenters or Nicodemites in the controversy about the va-
lidity of astrological predictions, it has to be kept in mind that the doctrines of 
the three Christian denominations provided distinct frames for the acceptance of 
astrology (Chapter 5). 
8 For the history of astrology as such a system of ideas which reconciled Neoplatonism with 
Aristotelianism, which formerly had been made compatible with the tenets of creational 
theology, cf. Thomas Leinkauf, Grundriß Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance 
(1350–1600), vol. 2, Hamburg 2016, pp. 1481–1498 and the chapter on Pietro Pomponazzi and 
his school pp. 1609–1630.
9 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Disputationes adversus astrologiam di vi natricem (Bologna 
11496), ed. by Eugenio Garin, Florence 1946–1952, vol. 1, pp. 126–128, 180–188 and 443–458; 
Tho mas Leinkauf, Grundriß (n. 8), vol. 2, p. 1482. 
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1 Astronomy and astrology—an intimate relationship  
from an tiqui ty to early modern times 
New discoveries and results of mathematical calculations and measurements by 
astronomers, the controversy about Copernicus’ cosmology, Kepler’s laws and 
a more precise description of both anomalies of planetary movements did not 
discredit cosmological and judicial astrology in early modern Europe. On the 
contrary: Cosmological and judicial astrology were by no means condemned as 
pure superstition, neither by Lutheran reformers nor by mathematicians in the 
century of the scientific revolution and before. 
The respect for general (geographical and meteorological) or individual pre-
dictions from planetary aspects on entire regions as well as on individual com-
plexion was widespread.10 Iatromathematics is the doctrine dealing with the 
planetary influences at different positions within the zodiacal circle at a certain 
time on the human body. Parts of the body were linked with the planets, which 
were considered as determining the balance of the humores.11 The reputation of 
astrology as a system with rules which linked celestial constellations to individ-
ual maintenance motivated early modern almanac writers to look for the most 
precise ephemerides in order to make their predictions more accurate. In the 16th 
century some almanac writers were already arguing that, thanks to Copernicus’ 
exact calculations of the planetary orbs and a more precise calendar that was 
based on new ephemerides, astrological prognostics would be more reliable. In 
elementary text books used during the arts course at universities, the study of 
mathematical astronomy was recommended because it served as a secure base 
for judicial astrology, the casting of individual nativities and iatromathematics. 
One had to know the data of a major conjunction of the upper planets in order 
to measure their influxus physicus on places, regions and countries, as well as on 
men living there (general or cosmic astrology). Exact determination of daytime 
and precise localization of the planetary orbits in the annual course were crucial 
for plotting an individual horoscope. The twelve houses corresponded to twelve 
parts of heaven, measuring 30° each, at the time of the horoscope, that is, the 
stars rising above the horizon at one particular moment. Following Me lanch thon 
Johannes Garcaeus (1530–1574), the reformer’s younger colleague at the universi-
ty of Wittenberg, considered planetary astronomy as fundamental for valid as-
trological prognostications.12 Moreover, Garcaeus considered di vi nation by the 
planets and the stars a legitimate means to become familiar with God’s plans and 
10 John D. North, “Celestial Influence—the Major Premiss of Astrology”, in: Paola Zambelli 
(Ed.), ‘Astrologi hallucinati’. Stars and the End of the World in Luther’s Time, Berlin/ New York 
1986, pp. 45–100.
11 Wolf-Dieter Müller-Jahncke, Astrologisch-magische Theorie und Praxis in der Heilkunde der 
frühen Neuzeit, Wiesbaden 1985 (= Sudhoff’s Archiv 25).
12 Johannes Garcaeus, Astrologiae methodus, Basel in qua secundum doctrinam Ptolemaei, exactissi-
ma facillimaque Genituras qualescunue iudicandi ratio traditur, Basel 1576. In his Iudicium Astro-
logicum of the Saxonian Duke (Kurfürst) Augustus Garcaeus proudly states: “Haec loca 
planetarum desumpta sunt ex calculo Copernici” (fol. 3 r).
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to praise his wisdom and majesty as creator of the cosmos, thus following Me -
lanch thon’s doctrine (see below, chapter 4). 
With his Practica (1541), the calendar writer and physician Andreas Aurifaber 
(1514–1559) was one of the first promoters of Copernican theory, which he learned 
from Joachim Rheticus’ Narratio prima13 Like Aurifaber, Erasmus Reinhold and 
Victorinus Schönfeld, both Me lanch thon’s colleagues, praised the solidity of their 
annual almanacs by referring to the latest calculations by Copernicus. In fact, the 
latter provided the data for foretelling the effects of comets, eclipses and plane-
tary conjunctions better than ever before.14 
We may generalize: In the centuries of the scientific revolution, the reform of 
astronomy as a mathematical and physical science received major incentives from 
the needs of general and genethlialogical astrology. Therefore, the persistence 
of astrology until the 18th century is a good argument against a teleological con-
struction of the history of natural science. The simultaneity of fairly heteroge-
neous ideas from multifarious traditions blurs the simple picture of the gradual 
progress of science by the abandonment of astrological superstition. 
Ptolemy was regarded as an authority for both astronomy and astrology by hu-
manists. Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos is a compendium about general and genethlialogical 
astrology. It starts from “the idea that the influences of the heavenly bodies are en-
tirely physical”, but ends up with rules for astrological prediction that were largely 
inherited from Babylonian predecessors.15 Book II spells out cosmic influences on 
geography and the weather. Books III and IV present rules for how to predict mat-
ters of individual human life from the state of the heavens, without teaching the 
mathematics of casting a horoscope. The Tetrabiblos was commented upon by Ara-
bic mathematicians and thus “acquired much extra astrological baggage on its voy-
age” through the centuries.16 Ptolemy’s astrological rules were still widely quoted 
by almanac writers in the 16th and 17th centuries. Among these Arab authorities Al-
bumasar (Abu Ma’shar 786–886) was the most influential, because he used obser-
vational data from the ephemerides concerning major conjunctions of the superior 
planets as a base for rules that gave to astrological predictions a scientific ring.17 The 
elements used for forecasting were eclipses of the sun and moon, as well as transits 
13 Jonathan Green, “The first Copernican Astrologer, Aurifaber”, in: Journal for the History 
of Astronomy 41 (2010), nr. 2, pp. 157–165; Richard L. Kremer, “Calculating with Andreas 
Aurifaber. A new source for Copernican astronomy in 1540”, in: Journal for the History of 
Astronomy 122 (2010), pp. 484–502.
14 Barbara Bauer (Hg.), Philipp Me lanch thon und die Marburger Professoren, Marburg 22000, Eras-
mus Reinhold pp. 370–376 and Victorinus Schönfeld 417–424; eadem, “Sprüche in Prog nos -
ti ken des 16. Jahrhunderts“, in: Walter Haug/ Burghart Wachinger (eds.), Kleinstformen der 
Li teratur, Tübingen 1994, 165–203, here 169.
15 John D. North, Cosmos. An illustrated history of astronomy and cosmology, London 2008, pp. 120–
121, the quotation is from p. 121.
16 Ibid., p. 120.
17 Abu Ma’sar, On Historical Astrology. The Book of Religions and Dynasties (On the Great Conjunc-
tions), edited and translated by Keji Yamamoto and Charles Burnett, 2 vols. Leiden 2000.
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of the planets at their rising and stationary periods. These phenomena were ana-
lyzed to answer the following questions: Where will an event happen? When will 
it take place? What is its general nature? What is its specific nature?18 Genethlialogy 
was established as a doctrine in Books III and IV of the Tetrabiblos. It is concerned 
with the history of an individual from his nativity, that is, the horoscope drawn 
up for the moment of his birth. Ptolemy regarded the configuration of the heavens 
at the time of an eclipse as analogous to that of drawing up a nativity (Tetrabiblos, 
II,6).19 Parallels between general astrology and genethlialogical astrology served 
as a bridge between both halves of the Tetrabiblos. Early modern astrologers still 
were familiar with Ptolemy’s rules and the Arabic tradition in casting horoscopes 
of extraordinary celestial events at the moment of their first appearances. Also the 
observation of a comet or the detection of a new star could give rise to horoscopes 
that referred to specific moments of their heavenly career. 
Albumasar was particularly concerned with the lives of kings and rulers and 
major political events during their reigns. The doctrine of general astrology that 
was established in an tiqui ty distinguished the houses of the planets, their exalta-
tions, terms, domains and years. The zodiacal signs were divided in twelve parts 
and grouped into four triplicities (trigones). General astrology drew attention not 
only to the period of one year, distinguishing between sidereal and tropical year, 
but also to the rhythm and periodicity of the planets, as well as to their passages 
through the twelve zodiacal signs. According to Albumasar, it was significant for 
astrological prediction to note from the ephemerides when Saturn, which needed 
29,5 years for a revolution of the Sun, and Jupiter, which accomplished the same 
revolution in 11,9 years, would meet again, approximately every 20 years. This 
event is called a major conjunction. Since each conjunction covered only two-thirds 
of the ecliptic circle in relation with the previous conjunction, four successive con-
junctions usually were in the same triplicity. After twelve or 13 conjunctions, the 
meeting of the both upper planets would return to their points of departure in 
the first of the four triplicities.20 Albumasar’s impact on early modern almanac 
writers was enormous, for his “idea was that human institutions […] rise and fall 
according to a timetable set by certain types of conjunction of the planets Saturn, 
Jupiter and Mars.”21 Astrologers looked for correspondences between these plan-
etary meetings, their horoscopes, their rhythms and terrestrial events such as the 
accession to the throne, the decline of reigns or the death of a king. In early mod-
ern almanacs and annual prognostics, frequent references to the Tetrabiblos and to 
the Arabs were intended to give weight to particular predictions. 
Texts by Ptolemy, Pliny and Aratus dealing with astrology were edited and 
commented upon by humanists, e. g. by Philipp Me lanch thon, Joachim Camer-
18 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 574.
19 Ibid., 1, p. 576.
20 Ibid., p. 582–584.
21 North, Cosmos (n. 15) p. 196.
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arius and Jacob Milichius.22 The early modern doctrine of comets and their influ-
ence was based on Aris totle’s meteorology, which was combined with the astro-
logical doctrine in Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos. Almanacs with astrological prognostics 
of bad weather, warfare and epidemics were widespread until the end of the 17th 
century. As soon as a comet or an unknown celestial object like a nova appeared, 
astronomers tried to determine its position in relation to planets and stars that 
were under the same zodiacal sign. As soon as it was identified above the horizon 
in the sky, a horoscope was drawn up, where the position of the new star or the 
path of the comet was plotted at one particular moment before the background 
of the circle with the 12 houses. Speculations about the astrological significance 
of comets, their physical influence and their supposed divine origin terrified un-
educated people in early modern Europe, no matter how the scientific knowledge 
about planetary movements and comets increased. 
The critique of astrology, although it was not as old as the doctrine about the 
influences of the stars, has a honorable tradition in the Renaissance. It was mainly 
stimulated by theological arguments. Although the tenets of Babylonian ‘Chalda-
ic’ astrology, the planets as representatives of gods, were incompatible with Chris-
tian doctrine and the assumption of sidereal necessity threatened God’s omnipo-
tence and providence, as well as human freedom of action, it must be noted (and 
needs to be explained) that astrological interpretations of extraordinary celestial 
events like comets remained the domain of Protestant preachers until the end of 
the 17th century. Since the Renaissance, astrology as a doctrine of physical influxus 
transmitted by the stars, had been a part of natural philosophy. Astrologers were 
eager to make it compatible with Aristotelian cosmology and physics, as well as 
with creational theology.23 Cosmic astrology, as part of natural philosophy and 
as a tool for medical therapy, was taught together with astronomy and mathe-
matics in the liberal arts course, whereas judicial astrology served the purposes 
of everyday life and provided orientation and security, apart from the Christian 
doctrine of salvation and outside the university. The churches were hostile to 
judicial astrology (astrologia di vi natrix) because in the Old Testament, prophecies 
other than those authorized by the Prophets themselves were condemned. The 
arguments against judicial astrology were summarized by Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola and Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498). Early modern intellectuals like 
Thomas Erastus (1524–1583), who ridiculed astrology and condemned it as a dan-
gerous superstition that was mixed up with false theology, usually quoted Pico 
and Savonarola as their predecessors.
22 Claudij Ptolemaei, de praedictionibus Astronomicis, cui titulum fecerunt Quadripartitum [i. e. Te -
tra biblios], Graecè & Latinè, Libri IV. Philippo Me lanch thone interprete, Basel 1553, pp. 104–
106 and 119; Liber II Caii Plinii [secundi] de mundi historia, cum commentariis Iacobi Milichii, 
diligenter conscriptis & recognitis, Frankfurt 1543 (Wittenberg 11535), chapter 25.
23 Leinkauf, Grundriß (n. 8), vol. 2, pp. 1481–1498.
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2 Aris totle’s cosmology and meteorology 
Ancient writers regarded comets as omens heralding natural disasters. Only 
Aris totle envisaged a physical explanation for their apparition and for subse-
quent misfortune.24 In the liberal arts courses at Protestant universities and Je-
suit colleges alike, Aristotelian cosmology and meteorology provided a familiar 
frame for understanding heavenly phenomena and their movements. In 1277, Ar-
istotelian physics and cosmology had been brought into harmony with creation-
al theology.25 According to Aris totle, only circular movements where no change 
could be remarked were appropriate for the superlunary spheres.. The regular 
planetary orbs in their crystalline spheres and the diurnal motion of the entire 
heaven served as examples to all observers. Meteorological phenomena belonged 
to the sublunary world, which was formed by the four elements and their mix-
tures. Water and earth tended by gravitational force downward to the center of 
the earth, while air and fire had the tendency to rise in a rectilinear line. Earthy 
phenomena were subject to decay, while in superlunary regions, planets and 
stars circulated in everlasting, eternal orbs. Only 300 years later, the principal 
distinction between sublunary atmosphere and superlunary spheres was called 
into question, due to Brahe’s measurements of the supernova that appeared in 
the northern circumference in August 1572, as well as of the comet which he 
observed in 1577.26 
In combination with the phenomena described in the second book of Caius 
Plinius Secundus’ (23–79) Naturalis Historia, as well as with Book II of Tetrabiblos, 
Aris totle’s Meteorologica provided the framework for conjectures about effects of 
comets and other prodigia such as northern lights, halos and parhelia.27 While 
Aris totle explained comets as dry exhalations from the earth, and hence con-
sidered them as matter which therefore had physical effects, Pliny interpreted 
comets as prodigies and saw in their particular shape a clue to their significance, 
and these portentous meteors indicated civic disorders.28 
It is noteworthy that only critiques of astrological predictions from comets 
favored Seneca’s conjectures about their nature, origin and orbs. Seneca figured 
24 Schechner, Comets (n. 2), pp. 17–26; Jane L. Jervis, Cometary Theory in Fifteenth Century Europe, 
Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster 1974, pp.11–21.
25 Jan A. Aertsen/ Kent Emery Jr./ Andreas Speer (eds.), After the Condemnation of 1277. Philoso-
phy and Theology at the University of Paris in the last Quarter of the 13th Century. Studies and Texts, 
Berlin/ New York 2001.
26 John L.E. Dreyer, Tycho Brahe. Ein Bild wissenschaftlichen Lebens und Arbeitens im 16. Jahrhun-
dert, translated by M. Bruhns, with a preface by W. Valentiner, Karlsruhe 1894, Reprint 2005, 
pp. 165–174.
27 Aris totle, Meteorologica, with English translation ed. H.D.P. Lee, Cambridge/Mass 1977; Hans 
Strohm’s introduction to his edition and German translation to Aristotele’s Meteorologica 
and De Mundo, Darmstadt 1970, pp. 121–129. Quotations here are from Lee’s translations;the 
pages are indicated in brackets.
28 Schechner, Comets (n. 2), p. 21n; Rudolf Wolf, Handbuch der Astronomie, ihrer Geschichte und 
Litteratur, Zurich 1890, Reprint Amsterdam 1970, p. 573n.
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that comets shared many properties with planets.29 They belonged to “the eternal 
works of nature”. Nobody ever observed that a comet would descend all the way 
down to the ground and vanish. Studying their paths might enable us to learn 
more about the universe. Seneca admitted that we would not even know why the 
planets do not transcend the ecliptic, whereas comets are not confined to the zo-
diac circle. But since comets were so rare, a single lifetime would not be enough to 
investigate their nature. Seneca is optimistic that their nature as celestial bodies 
will be explored sometime in the future.
In contrast, followers of Aris totle’s Meteorologica were inclined to view comets 
as fiery meteors heralding winds, drought, storms, tidal waves and earthquakes. 
At the same time, they were interpreted as messengers of God’s wrath. Although 
they were not mentioned in the Bible, they were supposed to be included in the 
class of signs announcing the end of time and the Last Judgment. Due to their 
shape, comets were interpreted as parts of a divine language written in the heav-
enly book of nature that announced God’s resentment at incorrigible, corrupted 
sinners, all of them victims of the primordial Fall. 
Meteora are phenomena consisting of elements and are generated by the cir-
culation of the four elements below the surface or in the air. But for Aris totle, the 
space filled by the stars was immaterial and therefore free from change and decay, 
which are only characteristic of matter. While Plato considered all celestial bodies 
as divine, Aris totle distinguished between stars and planets moving in enormous 
distances above the earth in eternal, regular circles and irregular shooting stars, 
comets and galaxies. Quinta essentia, a subtle fluid substance, filled the enormous 
celestial space, instead of celestial fire, whereas material bodies were subject to 
decay and came into being from mixtures of elementary matter that was supposed 
to rise from the earth or fall down to it in rectilinear motions. Changes produced 
by the motion of matter, like weather phenomena, followed natural laws. 
Shooting stars, so called torches and goats, are “due to the same cause […]. 
Their origin […] is as follows. The exhalations that arise from the earth when it is 
heated by the sun must be not, as some think, of a single kind, but of two kinds; 
one is more vaporous in character, the other more windy, the vapor arising from 
the water within and upon the earth, while the exhalations from the earth itself, 
which is dry, are more like smoke. The windy exhalation being hot rises to the 
top, the more watery exhalation being heavy sinks below it.” (Meteor. I,4, 341b 
5–13) The region underneath the circular celestial motion is seen as being filled 
with a warm, dry substance called fire which is subtler than air. The subsequent 
layer is air. The fiery substance surrounded the outside of the terrestrial sphere 
like a belt of inflammable material which would need only a little motion in or-
der to burst into flames. Flames are produced by the boiling up of dry currents 
of air. Also celestial revolution is seen as setting this inflammable material into 
29 L. Annaeus Seneca, Naturales Quaestiones, VII, c. 2 and 23–27, cf. the edition in 2 volumes by 
Thomas H. Corcoran, Cambridge/ Mass. 1971–1972 and Jervis, Cometary theory (n. 24), pp. 13–17.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
133Attacks on Judicial Astrology, Religious Dissent and the Rise of Skepticism 
motion. The flames thus produced by frictional heat would differ according to 
position and quantity of the inflammable material. They appear as torches, goats 
and shooting stars (341b 15–36). 
When therefore formation takes place in the upper part of this region, the 
phenomenon is produced by combustion of the exhalation; when in the 
lower, by ejection consequent upon the condensation and cooling of the 
more humid exhalation which inclines downwards when it condenses and 
as it contracts propels the heat and cause it to be shot downwards. 
(I,4, 342a17–22) 
Cold and humid exhalations thrust downward, causing the hot material to shoot 
down. The direction of the motion depends on the position of warm vapors. 
The material cause then of all these phenomena is the exhalation, the mov-
ing cause in some cases the celestial motion, in others the condensation of 
the air as it contracts. And all of them take place below the moon. 
(342a 28–31)
Here the ingredients of meteorological cometary theory are already clear: inflam-
mable material, frictional heat and exhalations which can be dry or wet, cold or 
warm. Some early modern intellectuals (among them, Squar cia lu pus and Pierre 
Gassendi) found Aris totle’s ideas about dry exhalations and wet vapors inconsis-
tent. How can they rise at all, they asked, although this is contrary to the nature 
of the watery element? Aris totle figured that wet exhalations would not rise as 
high as dry vapors, which would then burst into flames (Meteor. I,6). 
In Meteor. I.7, Aris totle explains how the earth is wrapped into an atmosphere 
which is formed by elementary matter, mostly air. Layers of dry and warm exha-
lations form the upper region of the atmosphere. They are set into motion by the 
revolution of the superlunary sphere directly above. If a dry exhalation rises to 
the upper layer underneath the rotation of the first superlunary sphere, frictional 
heat is produced which causes the dry matter to burst into flames. Thus a comet is 
produced (I,7, 344a 16–22). Its shape depends on the direction of the inflammable 
exhalation. The movement of a comet or a shooting star is explained by analogy 
with a flame of torch running across a string of chaff. In contrast, a dense heap of 
matter will burn out when it is inflamed, and the flame will be stationary. A com-
et can be formed by dry exhalation in the lower region (344a 34–35). According 
to Aris totle, a comet in the superlunary region can only be produced if the dry 
exhalation approaches the sphere in which a planet or a star is moving. In that 
case the motion of the planet will have an impact on the shape, color and path 
of the comet in its neighborhood. Aris totle explains the comet’s tail as a kind of 
stellar halo, analogous to haloes of the sun and the moon produced by the air 
during their course. 
It can be easily seen that Aris totle had no clear conception of the position and 
the path of a comet, nor is there any suggestion in his work of how to determine 
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it by the help of instruments or by calculation. But comets had their place in his 
cosmology as meteora. They were not produced by planets or as a byproduct of 
their conjunctions. Neither were their head, coma and tail only reflections of light 
from other sources (the sun or stars). Their matter consisted of dry vapors rising 
from the earth and being warmed up on their way. Their material was inflamed 
as the comet hit the fringe where the sublunary world meets with the lowest su-
perlunary sphere.
Aris totle assumed that comets were signs of coming wind and drought, for 
plentiful exhalation would make the air drier. The force of the wind depends on 
the quantity of warm evaporation (I,7, 344b 20–23). Although comets in his view 
mostly belong to sublunary phenomena, they can be subject to the influence of 
the planets, despite the enormous distance separating the sublunary sphere from 
the planetary orbs. The mixture out of which comets are formed is dissolved in 
the zodiac circle, due to the motion of the sun and the planets. Therefore, the 
majority of comets occur outside the tropics (I,8, 346a 12–14). Aris totle believed 
that the Milky Way with its multitude of bright and thick stars, was produced 
in the same way as comets. When the air, which is like fire, is disintegrated by 
motion, a mixture is produced which bursts into a fiery star surrounded by a halo 
( Meteor  I,8, 345b-346a). 
3 Eschatological fears
Fears that the Last Judgment was imminent and that heaven was full of signs an-
nouncing the end of the world pervaded the century following the Reformation.30 
Luther and Me lanch thon identified the Pope with Antichrist, who in St. John’s 
vision was to anticipate the arrival of the Savior and Judge at the end of time. 
In his sermon on the occasion of the Second Advent Sunday in 1522, Luther was 
looking for events and phenomena which could be interpreted as antecedents 
of the Last Judgment, as it is described by Luke 21:25–30. Only believers would 
be sensitive enough to adjust their lives to the terrible signs which the gospel 
announced (also Mark 13:24). In particular, Luther identified eclipses of the sun 
and the moon as well as shooting stars as fulfillments of Luke’s prognostication. 
With regard to Johannes Lichtenberger’s prophecy of a global deluge in 1524 and 
other pamphlets interpreting the major conjunction of the superior planets in the 
watery sign of Pisces beginning in February 1524, Luther moreover foretold that 
this forthcoming event, which astrologers had been predicting since 1488, would 
correspond with Luke’s foretelling. He explicitly referred to doomsday forecast 
30 Volker Leppin, Antichrist und Jüngster Tag. Das Profil apokalyptischer Flugschriftenpublizistik 
im deutschen Luthertum 1548–1618, Gütersloh 1999; Heike Talkenberger, “Prophetie und 
Zeit ge schehen. Texte und Holzschnitte astrologischer Flugschriften zur ‚Sintflutdebatte’ 
1520–1524”, in: Reformation und Revolution. Beiträge zum politischen Wandel und zu den sozialen 
Kräf ten. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Rainer Wohlfeil, Stuttgart 1989, pp. 93–123; eadem, 
Sint flut. Prophetie und Zeitgeschehen in Texten und Holzschnitten astrologischer Flugschriften 
1488–1528, Tübingen 1990.
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of astrologers with respect to “die grosse constellation der planeten, die ietzt 
eyntretten wirt ubir tzwey iar, denn die planeten sind gewißlich von der hymel 
krefften und scharen wol das furnemmist, und yhre wunderliche verrsamlung 
ist eyn groß gewiß tzeychen ubir die wellt. […] Darumb ich darauf stehe, das 
der hymlische scharen bewegung sey gewißlich die zukunfftige constellation der 
planeten, daruber die sternmeyster sagen es solle eyne syndflut bedeutten. Got 
gebe, das der iungst tag sey, wilchen sie gewißlich bedeuttet.“31 
This great conjunction could not be natural; however ”es ist dennoch eyn tzey-
chen von Christo genennet.“ Earthquakes, epidemics, famines and wars were 
also interpreted as apocalyptic signs of the end.32
Five years later, Luther edited Lichtenberger’s Prognosticatio with a preface em-
phasizing that extraordinary celestial events certainly are signs produced by God 
and his angels. Their message is to warn those who are less affected by the gospel 
than by irregular phenomena in nature and who are more easily intimidated by 
astrological predictions.
Den grund der sternkunst halt ich fur recht/ aber die kunst vngewis/ das 
ist/ Die zeichen am hymel vnd auff erden feylen gewislich nicht/ Es sind 
Gotts vnd der Engel werck/ warnen vnd drewen den gottlosen herren vnd 
lendern/ bedeutten auch ettwas/ Aber kunst darauff zu machen ist nichts/ 
vnd ynn die sterne solchs zu fassen. […]33 
According to Luther, astrological vaticinia were not reliable because it is difficult 
to distinguish between God’s markers and the interference of Satan.34 Luther’s 
skeptical view of astrological predictions from horoscopes is well known: Astrol-
ogers diminished the authority of the Bible and threatened God’s majesty and 
omnipotence. Our sins may not be excused by reference to the stars or sidereal 
necessity.35 To these theological reservations we may add what Aby Warburg has 
observed. Luca Gaurico cast Luther’s nativity in 1524 by manipulating his factual 
birth date in order to demonize him. Thus astrology was instrumental in anti-Lu-
theran polemics.36 
31 Martin Luther, “Predigten des Jahres 1522“, in: Martin Luthers Werke, Weimarer Ausgabe, 
vol. X/2, Weimar 1925, pp. 93–120, here 107–108.
32 Luther, “Predigten des Jahres 1522“, p. 108.
33 Luther, “Vorrede auff die weissagung des Johannis Lichtenbergers”, Wittenberg 1527, in: 
Aby Warburg, Heidnisch-antike Weissagung in Bild und Text zu Luthers Zeiten, Heidelberg 1920, 
ed. by Dieter Wuttke, 1978, pp. 81–86.
34 Ibid., p. 85.
35 Ingetraut Ludolphy, “Luther und die Astrologie”, in: Zambelli (ed.), ‘Astrologi hallucinati‘ 
(n. 10), pp. 101–107.
36 Anselm Schubert, “Luther töten. Der jüdische Mordanschlag auf Martin Luther 1525“, in: Lu-
ther-Jahrbuch 82 (2015), pp. 44–65, here 57; Zambelli, “Many Ends oft he World. Luca Gaurico 
instigator of the debate in Italy and Germany”, in: eadem (ed.), ‘Astrologi hallucinati’ (n. 10), 
pp. 239–263; Anthony Grafton, Cardanos Kosmos. Die Welten und Werke eines Renaissance-As-
trologen, translated from the American by Peter Knecht, Berlin 1999, pp. 144–147.
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Lutheran interpreters of the Bible, historians and almanac writers pointed to 
Daniel’s prophecies in Daniel 2 and 7. The fourth monarchy was identified with 
the Roman Empire, whose days were approaching with the end of time. Philipp 
Me lanch thon interpreted the political events (e. g. the Diet of Worms in 1529 and 
political disorders in Cologne in 1543) in the light of Daniel’s prophecies in his 
commentaries from 1529 and 1543.37 
Philipp Me lanch thon frequently quoted the vaticinium domus Eliae from the 
Talmud which enabled historians and astrologers to interpret their present time 
within a larger scale and in correspondence with biblical chronology. God’s cre-
ation would not last longer than 6000 years. 4000 years had passed before Jesus 
was born. The remaining 2000 years would probably not be fully come to pass, but 
rather the end of the world would occur earlier due to increasing chaos, turmoil 
and man-made disasters, manifesting moral corruption. Me lanch thon placed this 
vaticinium in front of his edition of Chronicon Carionis.38 Almanac writers at the 
end of the 16th century speculated whether the cycles of great conjunctions of the 
upper planets within the four trigons, which periodically followed one another 
would correspond with the three periods of the 6000 years vaticinium. 
The end of the aforementioned period of apocalyptic fears is indicated by Jo-
hannes Kepler’s Discurs von der grossen Conjunction (1623), where the mathemati-
cian defied speculations about the end of the world that had been provoked by the 
entrance of the conjunction of the upper planets into the fiery trigon after they had 
passed the three watery signs of the zodiac during the previous 200 years.39 Kepler 
argued against astrological prognostications based on the great conjunction by 
recommending an examination of particular causes for ongoing warfare as man-
made disaster, instead of a search for the most general and most remote causes 
in the sky. He certainly was not the first mathematician to protest against abuse 
of astrology, that is against false methods and practices, but he used the genre of 
almanacs and annual prognostics himself to enhance a better understanding of 
natural and social laws above and below the moon. For Kepler, astrology was a 
mathematical art which had to be restored. The influences of planets depended on 
the geometry of their motions in relation with the earth.40 Kepler tried to calculate 
the distance and paths of the comets on the basis of heliocentric cosmology.
37 Cf. Bauer (Ed.), Me lanch thon und die Marburger Professoren (n. 14), pp. 830–840
38 Leppin, Antichrist (n. 30), pp. 130–136; Bauer, Me lanch thon und die Marburger Professoren (n. 14), 
pp. 206–228; the Chronicon Carionis is analyzed within its historical context in eadem, “Die 
Chronica Carionis von 1532, Me lanch thons und Peucers Bearbeitung und ihre Wirkungsge-
schichte”, in: Himmelszeichen und Erdenwege. Johannes Carion (1499–1537) und Sebastian Horn-
mold (1500–1581) in ihrer Zeit, ed. by Kultur- und Sportamt der Stadt Bietigheim-Bissingen. 
Stadtmuseum Hornmoldhaus, Ubstadt-Weiher 1999, pp. 203–246.
39 Johannes Kepler, Discurs von der grossen Conjunction […] des 1623. Jahrs (1623), in: Johannes 
Kepler, Opera omnia, ed. by Max Frisch, 1867, vol. vII, pp. 678–713.
40 Johannes Kepler, Warnung an die Gegner der Astrologie—Tertius Interveniens, with introduction 
and commentary ed. by Fritz Kraft, München 1971; Fritz Kraft, “Tertius interveniens: Keplers 
Be mü hun gen um eine Reform der Astrologie”, in: August Buck (ed.), Okkulte Wissen schaf ten in 
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4 Philipp Me lanch thon’s authority and astrological eclecticism
General and judicial astrology in almanacs and annual prognostications flourished 
in territories where Luther’s reformation was adopted and Me lanch thon’s disciples 
held university chairs or worked as court physicians and calendar writers.41
Philipp Me lanch thon and his younger colleagues Jacob Milichius (1501–1559), 
Caspar Peucer (1525–1602) and Johannes Garcaeus adopted Aris totle’s meteorolo-
gy and his doctrine of the four elements in order to explain the nature and physi-
cal effects of comets.42 In contrast they assumed that these irregular meteora that 
had other properties than stars and planets were prodigia that surpassed the order 
of nature. Their allegorical meaning could be revealed by the help of judicial as-
trology. It was the task of Christian scien tists to search for their causae efficientes 
as well as their causae finales. The Wittenberg professors turned to two other au-
thorities whose texts they commented on for their students, Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos 
and the second book of Pliny’s Naturalis historia.43 It was a challenge to integrate 
the ancient ‘pagan’ theories into creational theology and justify astrological pre-
diction by the help of Ptolemaic rules, but within a Christian frame. The result 
is highly speculative, and they allowed for the possibility that a forecast on this 
basis might fail. Whenever the origin and matter of a comet cannot be explained, 
in their work, its character as a divine prodigy is emphasized. In case a prognosis 
is falsified, it is not the astrologer who is blamed, but rather the inescapable imbe-
cillitas mentis after the fall. 
Me lanch thon deals with comets in his Initia doctrinae physicae.44 Here and else-
where in his prefaces to school manuals, Me lanch thon justifies the practice of 
der Re nais sance, Wiesbaden 1992, pp. 197–225; idem, Was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält. Ant -
wor ten aus den Schriften von Johannes Kepler (Mysterium cosmographicum, Tertius interve niens, har-
mo ni ces mundi) in deutscher Übersetzung mit Einleitung, Erläuterungen und Glossar, Wies ba den 2005, 
pp. 179–329; Barbara Bauer, “Die Rolle des Hofastrologen und Hofmathemati cus als fürst licher 
Be ra ter”, in: Höfischer Humanismus, ed. August Buck (Beiträge zur Huma nis mus for schung, hg. 
von der Kommission für Humanismusforschung der DFG) Weinheim 1989, pp. 93–117.
41 Stefano Caroti, “Me lanch thon’s Astrology”, in: Zambelli (ed.), ‘Astrologi hallucinati’ (n. 10), 
pp. 109–121; Barbara Bauer, “Gott, Welt, Mensch und Sterne in Me lanch thons Initia doctrinae 
physicae”, in: Jürgen Leonhardt (ed.), Philipp Me lanch thon und das Lehrbuch des 16. Jahrhun-
derts, Rostock 1997, pp. 149–174; Bauer (ed.), Me lanch thon und die Marburger Professoren (n. 14), 
pp. 366–369 and 382–388.
42 Doctrinae physicae elementa, sive initia, dictata in Academia Vuitebergensi: per Philippvm Melan-
thonem, ex postrema autoris recognitione, Basel 1550 (second enlarged edition, first edition 
1549); Caspar Peucer, De praecipuis di vi nationum generibus […] recognitus et auctus […], Frank-
furt 1594 [first edition: 1553]; Johannes Garcaeus, Meteorologica, Wittenberg 1568. 
43 Liber II Caii Plinii [secundi] de mundi historia, cum commentariis Iacobi Milichii, diligenter con-
scriptis & recognitis, Frankfurt 1543 (Wittenberg 11535), here chapter 25; Claudij Ptolemaei, 
de praedictionibus Astronomicis, cui titulum fecerunt Quadripartitum, Graecè & Latinè, Libri IV. 
Philippo Me lanch thone interprete, Basel 1553, here book II, pp. 104–106 and 119.
44 I here quote from the edition by Carolus Bretschneider: Philipp Me lanch thon, Initia doctrinae 
physicae, Wittenberg 1549, in: Corpus Reformatorum vol. XIII, ed. by Carolus Bretschneider, 
Halle 1846, col. 350–354. See the German translation by Walther Ludwig: Philipp Me lanch -
thon, Initia Doctrinae Physicae—Die Anfänge der physikalischen Lehre, Rahden 2008, pp. 195–199; 
Melanthone, I libri di fisica, ed. and commented by Dino Bellucci, Torino 2009.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
138 Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer
judicial astrology within the scope of Christian doctrine as an acceptable middle 
course which avoided two equally dangerous pitfalls: the assumption of Democri-
tus and Epicure that the world and all phenomena, regular as well as irregular, 
are the products of accidental compositions and mixtures; and the worldview of 
the Stoa that natural events are eternally determined, leaving no room for human 
liberty.45 According to Me lanch thon, extraordinary meteora such as comets are 
testimonies that the world is ruled by divine providence. We are invited to study 
these phenomena in order to admire God’s design as opifex mundi. In his Initia doc-
trinae physicae, Me lanch thon defines prodigia as extraordinary phenomena which 
cannot be explained by laws of nature alone, but carry with them a secret mes-
sage: “plerunque aliquid de humanis eventibus significant” (p. 351). Nature tends 
to uniformity and dislikes monstra, which are accidents, but have a supernatural 
meaning. Comets and shooting stars consist of matter which can be analyzed by 
the help of physics. Comets and other fiery meteora therefore have physical causes, 
since they are formed of venomous matter which is inflamed and combusted by the 
sun or by one of the planets (Saturn, Mars or Mercury) in the highest region of the 
terrestrial atmosphere. Comets have an influence on terrestrial climate and can do 
harm to the humoral system. Moreover, they have a significance as divine messen-
gers, warning us to repent in time, for the Last Judgment may be close. Comets may 
be interpreted on the same level as major conjunctions, which can be mathemati-
cally determined, but they have an allegorical meaning as “similes operibus artifi-
cum”, announcing natural disasters as well as political upheavals (pp. 351 and 353). 
Me lanch thon and his followers emphasized that there is good evidence for a 
causal connection between the appearance of a comet, its proximity or affinity to 
a planet or a planetary conjunction and terrestrial disasters, natural catastrophes 
or political turmoil and revolutions. In his prefaces and poems, Me lanch thon 
preached that God wanted his believers to investigate the cosmic order, where 
his traces are manifest, and to study irregular celestial events as signs of a divine 
language.46 Astrological prognostications from comets and other celestial events, 
however, are not reliable, because God’s hidden plans cannot be fully recognized 
since the fall of our first parents. Also, demons may intervene, trying to hamper 
God’s plans, disturb his creation and lead his believers astray. 
Garcaeus and Peucer combined Aris totle’s doctrine of comets as fiery meteo-
ra and Ptolemaic astrology, with its tenets of Christian doctrine, namely divine 
providence, the order of salvation and the expectation of the Last Judgment. 
Moreover, the impact of Arabic iatromathematics and astrology—how major 
conjunctions affect the weather and human temper, and why kings are partic-
ularly subject to cometary influence—is manifest in Peucer’s classification of di-
45 Me lanch thon, Initia doctrinae physicae, lib. I, “Quid est physica doctrina?”, p. 180–181.
46 Barbara Bauer, “Philipp Me lanch thons Gedichte astronomischen Inhalts im Kontext der na-
tur- und himmelskundlichen Lehrbücher”, in: Stefan Rhein/Heinz Scheible (eds.): Me lanch -
thon und die Naturwissenschaften seiner Zeit, Sigmaringen 1998 (= Me lanch thon-Schrif ten der 
Stadt Bretten 4), pp. 137–181.
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vi nations and in Garcaeus’ systematic efforts, but is never explicitly admitted. 
Aris totle contributed an explanation for why comets could have meteorological 
effects and produce anomalies of nature; Ptolemy provided astrological rules for 
analyzing the significance of a comet in relation to planetary positions and the 
Zodiac. Arabic theory of major conjunctions and their astrological rhythm helped 
to relate political upheavals and dynastic changes with extraordinary celestial 
signs. Thus “seditiones, bella, mutationes imperiorum, Regum & Heroum inter-
itus, vastitates” are listed among the consequences of a comet, engendered by a 
major conjunction.47 This eclectic mixture of doctrines was bolstered by verses 
of ancient poets such as Claudianus that were quoted over and over again: Et 
caelo nunquam spectatum impune Cometen (p. 351).48 Catalogues of apparitions and 
ensuing misfortunes in the realms of nature and politics were published to verify 
astrological predictions.49 
In order to determine the effects and significance of a comet one has to (1) ana-
lyze its nature; (2) find its place in the Zodiac and its position in relation with the 
planetary orbits; (3) describe where its tail or its coma point to; (4) consider how 
long it could be observed; and (5) interpret its color in relation to those character-
istics of the known planets.50 
The growth and enormous rise of a comet are described by Garcaeus like a 
spectacle. Near the Earth the comet is tiny, then grows in size, accumulating more 
and more matter on its way up until it is struck by the fiery substance in the 
neighborhood of the planetary spheres, which sets it afire. The flames burn until 
the matter is consumed and then the comet vanishes.51 The following causal ex-
planation manifests the eclectic combination of ancient and medieval traditions: 
Causa specialis efficiens est, tetra aliqua siderum maleficorum coniunctio, 
vel eorundem atroces aspectus, vel etiam Eclipsis aliqua in signis infaus-
tis. Maleficae enim stellae Saturninae cum Saturno, sua vi lumine motu, 
occulta quaedam virtute retentiua, constringunt poros terrae, ac colligunt 
47 Garcaeus, Meteorologica (n. 42), fol. 24 v.
48 Claudius Claudianus, De bello Getico, v. 243. Garcaeus refers to verses by Aratos, Jovianus 
Pontanus and Joachim Camerarius in his Meteorologica (n. 42), fol. 24 r-25 v.
49 Ibid., fol. 25 v-26 r. To give an example I here translate the title page of the catalogue by 
Georg Caesius, calendar writer of the Markgrave of Baden: “Catalogue of all comets never 
seen before, in chronological order, beginning with the year of the deluge [1656 a.Chr.] until 
the present comet in 1579, together with wonders or annotations of events and the effects of 
the comets in each sign of the Zodiac, whereby a smart reader can easily make up his mind 
about every Comet, etc., from writings by philosophers, astronomers whose names are men-
tioned in the preface, to be kept in mind, and with regard to other multifarious uses, most 
eagerly collected thanks to most careful research, with a judgment about the recent comet 
the past year.” (Nürnberg 1579) 
50 Garcaeus, Meteorologica (n. 42), fol. 28 r. 
51 Ibid., fol. 19 r-v.
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in ea noxios ac superfluos vapores, qui cum non habent exitum in terra, 
conclusi putrescunt.52 
Their theological purpose is to induce the reader to pray to God, begging Him to 
prevent the evil announced by the celestial messenger and promising Him to live 
righteously according to His commandments. God’s wrath may be mitigated by 
acts of piety. Therefore the misfortune announced by a comet is not an inevitable 
fate, as the Stoics thought. Comets may be interpreted as indications of grace for 
those who are able to decipher them as signs of a divine language. 
5 Astrology viewed by three main churches
To fully appreciate the role played by Anti-Trinitarians in the demystification of 
astrology, one has to keep in mind that the teaching of astronomy and astrology 
varied with respect to the confession and church doctrine in post-Reformation 
Europe. In schools where Me lanch thon’s influence was dominant, astrological di-
vi nation was a branch of natural philosophy, just like cosmology, and justified as a 
means to admire the cosmic order and thereby apprehend the Creator’s evidence. 
The Pope and Jean Calvin were equally hostile towards genethlialogic astrol-
ogy. The Church carefully defended the monopoly of spending sacraments and 
saving souls. Genethlialogic astrology and particular therapies based on iatro-
mathematics were not tolerated, but were rather discriminated against as errone-
ous doctrines by false prophets leading believers astray.53 One of the first decrees 
issued by Pope Sixtus V was his 1585 Bull “contra exercentes artem astrologiae 
iudiciariae”, which drew from the anti-astrological tradition of Pico and Savona-
rola, and which Thomas Erastus also recommended to his superstitious patients 
in Protestant Germany.54 Manuals of astrology and other occult arts were placed 
on the Roman Index librorum prohibitorum beginning in 1559. The Bull forbid the 
teaching of astrology, but did not specify criteria for how to distinguish between 
fair predictions based on natural laws and false or demonic prognostics that 
conjured occult forces. Authors of books dealing with natural magic, as well as 
with astrology, such as Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486–1535), Pietro Pomponaz-
zi (1462–1525), Girolamo Cardano and Giambattista della Porta (1535–1615) were, 
however, not explicity condemned by the Papal Bull. The policy of putting books 
52 Ibid., fol. 19 v.
53 Ugo Baldini, “The Roman Inquisition’s condemnation of astrology in the 16th century; an-
tecedents, reasons and consequences”, in: Gigliola Fragnito (ed.), Church, Censorship and Cul-
ture in Early Modern Italy, Cambridge 2001, pp. 79–110.
54 Constitvtio S. D. N. D. Sixti Papae Qvinti contra Exercentes Astrologiae Iudiciariae Artem. 
Et alia quaecunque diuinationum genera, librosque de eis legentes, ac tenentes, Roma 1586; 
Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer, “Die Bulle contra astrologiam iudiciariam von Sixtus V., das 
astrologische Schrifttum protestantischer Autoren und die Astrologiekritik der Jesuiten. 
Thesen über einen vermuteten Zusammenhang”, in: Zukunftsvoraussagen in der Renaissance, 
ed. by Klaus Bergdolt and Walther Ludwig, Wiesbaden 2005 (Wolfenbütteler Abhandlungen 
zur Renaissanceforschung 23), pp. 143–222.
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on the Index librorum prohibitorum presupposed clear conceptions of orthodoxy 
in faith, but was rather vague in distinguishing between fair, sober science and 
false, treacherous and demonic arts.55 In Renaissance natural philosophy, astrolo-
gy—the doctrines of planetary influxus, cosmic irradiation and secret correspon-
dences between stars and parts of human body—was intimately tied up with 
natural magic. There was no agreement about where to draw distinctions be-
tween white magic (magia naturalis) and demonic black magic. Magia naturalis was 
widely tolerated in Padua, Naples and elsewhere on the Italian peninsula; com-
petent manipulation of natural forces for the benefit of kings was rewarded by 
nominations to university chairs and famous courts. Despite Sixtus’ Bull against 
judicial astrology, literature about magia naturalis continue to flourish, although 
magical practices included astrology. Controversies during the last decades of the 
16th century about how to distinguish between magia naturalis and demonic magic 
and discussions about witchcraft,56 however, did not affect debates about the na-
ture and origins of comets and the dangerous effects of astrological predictions 
based on comets. 
Calvin’s Advertissement contre l’astrologie qu’on appelle judiciare et autres curiosités 
qui règnent aujourd’hui au monde was a reply to an anonymous defense of judi-
cial astrology by Mellin Saint Gelais (Advertissement sur les jugements d’Astrologie, 
Lyon 1546). Calvin’s aim was to convince clients of astrologers that the Gospel 
alone promised the way to salvation.57 Calvin’s attack on judicial astrology was 
directed to the simple folk and was not meant as an erudite refutation on the 
level of Pico’s Disputationes. But his methodological advice for an appropriate in-
vestigation of nature is remarkable. His first argument against judicial astrology 
is that it is more reasonable to ask for causes naturelles ou inférieures than to head 
for the most general causes. Therefore, it would, for example, make more sense 
to ask what happens in the moment of conception, instead of casting a horoscope 
immediately after the birth. He argues that the disposition of a child is more 
dependent on the temper and character (complexion) of the parents than on side-
real influence.58 In addition, God has the power to effect his grace speciale, which 
nobody can ever calculate.59 Astrologers trying to predict individual fate from 
55 Ugo Baldini, “Die römischen Kongregationen der Inquisition und des Index und der wissen-
schaftliche Fortschritt im 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert. Anmerkungen zur Chronologie und zur 
Logik ihres Verhältnisses“, in: Hubert Wolf (ed.), Inquisition, Index, Zensur. Wissenskulturen 
der Neuzeit im Widerstreit, Paderborn/Munich et al. 22003, pp. 229–278
56 Leinkauf, Grundriß (n. 8), vol. 2, pp. 1498–1530; Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer, “Wagnerbuch”, in: 
Wilhelm Kühlmann/ Jan-Dirk Müller/ Michael Schilling/ Johann Anselm Steiger/ Friedrich 
Vollhardt (eds.), Frühe Neuzeit in Deutschland 1520–1620. Literaturwissenschaftliches Verfasser-
lexikon, vol. 6, Berlin/ Boston 2017, pp. 423–433; eadem, “Magie und neue Wissenschaften im 
Wag ner buch (1593)”, in: Kaspar von Greyerz et al. (eds.), Religion und Naturwissenschaften im 
15. und 17. Jahrhundert, Heidelberg 2010, pp. 141–185.
57 Jean Calvin, Advertissement contre l’astrologie judiciare (11549), ed. by Olivier Millet, Genève 
1985, Millet’s introduction on p. 52.
58 Ibid., pp. 58–60.
59 Ibid., p. 60. 
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the influence of the planets are suspected of interfering with theologians and of 
annihilating the doctrine of predestination, which is based on God’s inconceiv-
able council.60 The claims of astrologers to be able to foretell the future by study-
ing sidereal influ ences violated His majesty and were blasphemous. Zacharias 
Ursinus (1534–1583), one of the authors of the Heidelberg catechism, exclaimed: 
It is “vanitas vanitatum” to believe in Venus’ benevolent inclinations and to be 
afraid of Saturn’s maleficent influence. 61 Ursinus explains why God’s actions are 
incalculable and why his plans have to be accepted. Because of His omnipotence, 
God can prevent evil, but He is not willing to exempt His creatures from their 
responsibility. He may prevent us from committing evil, but it was not in accord 
with Providence to confuse or destroy what He created.62 Astrology would there-
fore annihilate the doctrine of twofold predestination. Magic, di vi nation and all 
kinds of conjuring demons are inspired by the Devil, who wants to seduce man 
to idolatry. The church is the only refuge of the elected. David Pareus (1584–1622) 
and Quirinus Reuter (1558–1613), one of Dudith’s pedagogical advisors and his bi-
ographer, edited Ursinus’ commentary to the Heidelberg Catechism and thus en-
sured that the condemnation of astrology remained a pre requi site in the defense 
of divine predestination.63 It must be noted, however, that meteorological astrol-
ogy—the doctrine of physical influxus from the planets, inherited from Aris totle 
and partly from Ptolemy and bolstered by Neoplatonism—was unanimously ac-
cepted by natural philosophers of the three main churches. Therefore, the attacks 
by Dudith and his circle were interpreted as an assault on ecclesiastical authority.
6 Reformed theology, antitrinitarianism and the decline of astrological di-
vi nation—the impact of Andreas Dudith’s circle
6.1 The comet of 1577
Thaddaeus Hagecius ab Hagek might have introduced his friend Andreas Dudith 
to Brahe’s research, thereby drawing the attention of his correspondent to his 
own astrological practice in Prague. Brahe mentioned, in a letter to Bartholomae-
us Scultetus of August 17, 1588, that he had sent Dudith a copy of his privately 
60 Ibid., p. 60–61.
61 Zacharius Ursinus, Paranaesis ad S. theologicae catecheticaeque doctrinae studium, ed. by Quirinus 
Reuter, Heidelberg 1602, to questions no. 27–27, 94–95; Zacharias Ursinus, “Loci theologici tra-
diti in Academia Heidelbergensis”, in: idem, Opera theological tributa in tomos tres, pp. 570–605.
62 Corpus Doctrinae Orthodoxae sive Catecheticarvm explicationum D. Zachariae Ursini. Opus abso lu -
tum D. Davidis Parei Opera extrema recognitum, Nunc autem emendatius & auctius […] Heidel-
berg 1592, p. 57.
63 An assault on astrological prediction is implicit in the widespread Heidelberg Catechism, 
Ursinus was one of its authors. Cf. Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer, “Astrologiekritik und refor-
mierte Theologie in Heidelberg”, in: Karla Apperloo-Boersma/ Herman J. Selderhuis (eds.): 
Macht des Glaubens. 450 Jahre Heidelberger Katechismus, Göttingen 2013, pp. 147–162; an English 
version may be consulted: Mahlmann-Bauer, “Reformed Theology and Criticism of Astrol-
ogy in Heidelberg”, in: Apperloo-Boersma/Selderhuis (eds.), 450 years Heidelberg Catechism, 
Göttingen 2013, pp. 179–187.
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published book De mundi aetherei recentioribus phenomenis and was eager to hear 
what Dudith thought of Brahe’s research about comets and his threefold classifi-
cation of pamphlets describing the comet of 1577.64
The comet which appeared five years after the supernova in Cassiopeia (Au-
gust 1572) could be seen from October 1577 until the end of January 1578. The 
white pale coma with a splendid curved tail covering 25° of a circle stimulated 
professional and lay observers to wonder about its origin, probable effects and di-
vine purpose. For the first time, letters were exchanged which enabled observers 
to compare what they saw and to examine their own measurements in relation 
to others. This lively communication by mathematical observers was crucial in 
abolishing Aristotelian cosmology. Brahe provided the most accurate data from 
10th November and communicated them to colleagues like Hagecius in Prague 
and Michael Maestlin in Tübingen, before he published his findings in a private 
publication in 1588. 65 Brahe had already located the nova far above the moon, 
namely in the (supposed) eighth sphere, for it lacked a parallax and therefore he 
assumed it must be a star. He applied the same method to measure the height 
of the comet in 1577 and concluded that it probably was a celestial object in the 
region of Venus. Observations by astronomers elsewhere convinced him that the 
comet was seen in the same position from any position on Earth. Brahe tried to 
plot its path, assuming that its speed was regular and its motion had the form 
of a partial parabola. The comet crossed the ecliptic in an oblique arc and its 
motion was independent of planetary orbs. Brahe assumed the existence of ce-
lestial bodies different from stars and planets that traveled through a permeable 
interstellar medium, thus falsifying Aristotelian cosmology, as well as Aris totle’s 
meteorological cometary theory. The direction of the tail, which (he thought) 
was lightened by the sun rays, was always opposed to the sun. It therefore was 
improbable that cometary matter was inflamed, for flames vanished when the 
inflammable matter was consumed, but the comet just disappeared from sight on 
its way through cosmic space. In his Latin publication, Brahe described what he 
had seen and measured. He also evaluated publications by other observers and 
classified them according to their mathematical exactness.66 
64 Lynn Thorndike, History of Magic and Experimental Science, vol. 6, New York 1941, pp. 183–187.
65 Tycho de Brahe, De Mundi aetherei recentioribus phaenomenis, liber secundus qui est de illustri 
stella caudata ab elapso fere triente Novembris anno 1577 usque in finem Januarii sequentis conspecta 
(Uraniborg 1588), Prag 1603, in: Tycho de Brahe, Opera omnia, vol. IV, Frankfurt a. Main 1648, 
Reprint Hildesheim 2001, pp. 5–377, a nice description of its appearance on p. 5; cf. Jürgen 
Mittelstrass (Ed.), Enzyklopädie Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Vol. 1, Berlin 2005, p. 524; Do-
ris Hellman, The Comet of 1577. Its place in the history of astronomy, New York 1944, pp. 118–137; 
Dreyer, Tycho Brahe, pp. 165–194; Westman, The Copernican Question (n. 5), pp. 250–257.
66 Brahe, De Mundi aetherei recentioribus phaenomenis (n. 65), caput X. The following pamphlet 
authors were critically examined: on p. 135: Michael Mästlin, p. 146: Cornelius Gemma Fri -
sius, p. 152: Elisaeus Roeslin; p. 156: Thaddaeus Hageccius [!], p. 175: Bartholomaeus Sculte-
tus; p. 196: Andreas Nolthius; pp. 102: Nicolaus Winckler; p. 206: Johannes Praetorius; p. 207: 
Marcellus Squaricalupus. As to Erastus’ judgment see below, note 103.
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Only in a German treatise that he never published did Brahe take pains to 
speculate about the astrological meaning of the comet. There he regarded comets 
as “a great wonderwork of God and a miracle of nature”.67 Brahe was not exempt 
from traditional belief in astrology: Although divine plans were hidden from 
men, he maintained that some clues about the significance of the comet could be 
gained from old astrological writings. 
Consensus among scientific experts and theologians gave way to disagree-
ment about the height and the path of the comet and its function as a divine mes-
senger. Generally, comets were supposed to announce God’s wrath at disobedient 
mankind, and it was thought that they would disappear as soon as this function 
had been fulfilled. Brahe suggested in his German tract that the significance of 
the comet was to be interpreted as the aftermath of the nova in 1572. The comet 
announced war in those regions over which it passed, according to Ptolemy’s 
doctrine, in particular to the Spaniards, the Italians, the French and Belgians. 
Brahe assumed that some celestial events forecast good as well as evil, depending 
on the faith of the observers. The pious would bow to their secret significance and 
commend themselves to God.68
Thaddaeus Hagecius, a professor of mathematics at the Collegium Carolinum 
and a physician, also published his observation of the comet above Prague, but 
due to incorrect measurements of a parallax of 5°, he still located it beneath the 
moon. In a later publication he corrected his error, which Brahe had pointed out 
to him.69 With regard to its divine significance, Brahe was more cautious than 
Hagecius. Since comets had been observed ever since the beginning of the world, 
the new comet could not be interpreted as a sign announcing the end of the world. 
Efforts to prevent epidemics and to develop therapies against the plague en-
couraged Dudith’s circle of non-conformist humanists to scrutinize the wide-
spread doctrine of comets as meteora that were supposed to infect human bodies 
by their noxious vapors and to endanger the life of princes and kings, persons 
with delicate constitutions. Andreas Dudith (1533–1589), counselor of the Em-
peror, Thomas Erastus (1524–1583), physician and theologian in Heidelberg and 
Basel, Marcellus Squar cia lu pus (1525– after 1592), a refugee from Piombino and 
for a few years court physician at Alba Julia (Transylvania) and Simon Grynaeus 
(1539–1583), a former student of Erastus, professor of medicine in Heidelberg and 
from 1580 professor of ethics at the University of Basel,70 initiated a debate about 
the Aristotelian meteora-theory in combination with the astrological doctrine of 
comets. Their anti-astrological arguments remained current until 1681, when a 
spectacular comet triggered the old debate about its nature and possible effects 
67 Hellman, The Comet of 1577 (n. 65), p. 132 and pp. 338n. Brahe’s German pamphlet hat a Latin 
title: De Cometa anni 1577, was written in 1578 and published for the first time in 1922.
68 Hellman, The Comet of 1577 (n. 65), p. 202–203.
69 Thaddaeus Hagecius ab Hayck, Descriptio Cometae qui apparuit Anno Domini 1577 […], Prague 
1578; Hellman, The Comet of 1577 (n. 65), pp. 188–203 and p. 369n.
70 Urs Leo Gantenbein, article “Grynaeus, Simon”, in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, online.
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anew. Pierre Bayle’s Pensées diverses sur la comète presented the old critique of as-
trologia judiciaria in a wider framework, as one outstanding example of supersti-
tion nurtured by the Church, by placing the arguments of the heterodox human-
ists in the context of anthropology, natural law and political theory.71
6.2 Andreas Dudith’s career
Andreas Dudith (1533–1589), a nobleman of Hungarian and Italian origin, a mem-
ber of the Catholic reform circle, Bishop of Pecz, later convert, ambassador and 
counselor of Maximilian II and of his successor Rudolph II, was interested in 
science and owned a humanist library.72 His alienation from the Church of Rome 
was a gradual process. As a member of the Padua circle of Cardinal Reginald 
Pole (1500–1558), he believed in the need for an adjustment of the Catholic Church 
to the new challenges of the Reformation. As a delegate at the Council of Trent 
representing Hungary, Dudith did not manage to gain support for the lay chalice 
and other reforms in 1562. In November 1563 he was named Bishop of Pecz and 
endowed with the title of Hungarian counselor to Ferdinand I. When he decided 
to marry a noblewoman in 1567, he justified this step in a letter to Maximilian II, 
pleading that the celibacy of the clergy was against divine and natural law. He 
moreover complained that his intervention at the Council was completely in vain, 
due to the plenipotentiary prerogative of the Pope.73 Domenico Caccamo suggest-
ed that Dudith remained a Nicodemite during his mature life, at Padua and Trent 
as well as in his later functions as counselor of Maximilian II and Rudolph II. On 
demand, Dudith generously offered good reasons for his dissimulation in his Let-
ter to the Polish nobleman Jan Lasicius (1534–1599), as will be seen later.74 Dudith’s 
early sympathies were with the reformed church. Dudith exchanged letters with 
Theodor Beza as well as with Fausto Sozzini. He maintained a good relationship 
with the Moravian brethren, while enjoying religious tolerance at Pascov (Mora-
via). The Jesuits were equally appreciated by him as good pedagogues. Not only 
his friends were aware that Dudith inclined towards Socinianism, for he did not 
hesitate to defend his Anti-Trinitarian ideas. He was used to make up his mind 
independently, but eager not to lose the favor of his patron, the Emperor. When 
71 Pierre Bayle, Pensées diverses sur la comète, 2 vols., ed. by A. Prat, nouvelle edition préparée par 
Pierre Rétat, Paris 1984; Caccano, Eretici (n. 1), p. 127.
72 Costil, Dudith (n. 1), pp. 170–195 (the years at Paskow and Wroclaw), pp. 195–221 (humanist 
circle in Wroclaw); Caccamo, Eretici (n. 1), pp. 109–151; Amási, The uses of humanism (n. 1), here 
pp. 203–224; Ilic, „Andreas Dudith und sein reformiertes Netzwerk” (n. 1), pp. 53–64; Vasoli, 
I miti e gli astri (n. 1), pp. 350–387; Lech Szscucki (ed.), Entre orthodoxie et nicodémisme. André 
Dudith au concile de Trente, Paris 1984.
73 Caccamo, Eretici (n.1), p. 115; Andreas Dudith, “Excusatio ad […] Maximilianum II. In qua 
ratione adfert, quamobrem episcopate Quinque ecclesiensi et aliis honoribus abdicates, uxo-
rem duxerit”, in: idem, Orationes in concilio Tridentino habitae, ed. by Quirinus Reuter, Offen-
bach 1610, pp. 32–51.
74 Epistola Andreae Dudithii Sac. Caes. M.[aiesta]tis consiliarii, ad Joannem Lasicium equitem Polo-
num, In qua de di vi na trinitate, [s. l.] 1590, here last page; Dudith, Letter to Maximilian, 9 April 
1568, quoted by Caccamo, Eretici (n. 1), p. 117, note 22.
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the comet appeared in the autumn of 1577, Dudith was living in Pascov, Moravia, 
was concerned about the health and education of his children and was always 
eager to learn from foreign visitors, physicians, historians and theologians. He 
had studied Aris totle’s meteorology; he had copied Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos and was 
familiar with ideas by Girolamo Cardano, Pietro Pomponazzi and his followers 
at the University of Padua. Dudith turned to his medical friends, Johannes Crato 
von Krafftheim (1519–1585) and Thomas Erastus, two experts in therapies against 
the plague and its prevention, for he was eager to know their judgment about the 
celestial phenomenon. 75 Erastus sent him in turn a detailed analysis of comets in 
general, according to peripatetic theory, and explained to him why any reason-
able man should only reckon with salubrious effects. Eight years before Tycho 
de Brahe’s most accurate description of the comet, which had not yet been pub-
lished, Dudith’s host, the historian Giovanni Michele Bruto (1517–1592), edited 
Erastus’ letter and Dudith’s Commentariolus about the comet addressed to Crato.76 
The three friends and Dudith’s host Brutus refuted in unisono astrological pre-
dictions. They considered them ill-founded and dangerous, because forecasts of 
catastrophes easily promoted panic among the common people.77 
After the anti-astrological preface by Bruto, which is dated at Cracow, Sep-
tember 1579, Dudith’s letter to Johannes Crato covers pages 13–50. It is followed 
by Erastus’s statement (pp. 51–68) which however had previously occasioned Du-
dith’s own considerations. 
 
Erastus edited Dudith’s letter to Crato a second time, again in Basel, suppressing 
Brutus’ preface, but with five additional texts.78 
The texts are arranged in the following order: 
1 Thomas Erastus, Judgment of comets (“De Cometarum significationibus iudi-
cium”, pp. 1–21),
2 Dudith’s Letter to Erastus demanding his comment with regard to Squar cia lu -
pus’ manuscript (Dudithius … Erasto, Kal. Februarij 1579, pp. 22–26),
3 Marcellus Squar cia lu pus, Reply to Erastus about comets (De cometa in uni ver -
sum, atque de illo qui anno 1577 visus est, opinio, Pascovii […] 1578, pp. 27–97),
75 Thorndike, History of magic and experimental science, vol. 6 (n. 64), pp. 183–187; Hellman, The 
Comet (n. 65), p. 192, 352n.; Costil, André Dudith (n. 1), pp. 371–395; Vasoli, I miti e gli astir 
(n. 1), pp. 350–387.
76 Andreas Dudith, De cometarum significatione commentariolus, in quo non minus eleganter quam 
docte et vere mathematicorum quorundam in ea re vanitas refutatur. Addidimus D. Thomae Erasti 
eadem de re sententiam, Basel: Petrus Perna 1579. 
77 In 1577/78 Erastus must have convinced Dudith that astrology, even though it was practiced 
by the ancients, was a treacherous art. During his first years at Paskov Dudith still had 
sympathies for astrology, because its tradition went back to an tiqui ty. He copied Ptolemaios’ 
Tetrabiblos and paraphrased an astrological text by Proclos; cf. Costil, Dudith, pp. 290–295. 
78 De cometis dissertationes novae clarissimorum virorum Thomas Erasti, Andreae Dudithii, Marcelli 
Squar cialupi, Symonis Grynaei, ed. Thomas Erastus, [s. l., i. e. Basel] 1580.
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4 Erastus, letter to Dudith about the nature of comets and refutation of Squar -
cia lu pus’ arguments and defense of the Aristotelian meteorology (De come-
tarum or tu, natura […], pp. 105–123; “Declaratio et probatio Sententiae Aristo-
telicae […] con tra D. Marcellum Squarcialupum”, pp. 124–166),
5 Dudith’s Letter about comets to Johannes Crato, which was formerly pub-
lished as Commentariolus (“Dudith Ioanni Cratoni s., Pascovia, Kal. Mart. 1578”, 
pp. 167–196),
6 Simon Grynaeus, Two treatises about fiery meteora and the causes of comets 
(“Com mentarii duo de ignitis meteoris unus: alter de cometarum causis atque 
sig nificationibus”, pp. 1–88).79 
The readers are informed that Dudith had asked Erastus to publish Squar cia lu -
pus’ text together with his former opinion, the Commentariolus. Erastus inserted 
Dudith’s original letter to Crato between his own “defensio” against Squar cia lu -
pus and the tract by Grynaeus. Squar cia lu pus’ text outweighs the others by its 
length and extravagance.
Apparently Brahe read the Dissertationes novae (Basel 1580). In his review of 
pamphlets about the comet in 1577 Erastus is listed among the authors whose 
speculations lacked an empirical basis: Erastus had just uncritically adopted Ar-
istotelian meteorology, in spite of his ambitious claim that comets are salubrious. 
Brahe treats Marcellus Squar cia lu pus with greater respect, because the Italian 
physician abandoned the Peripatetic meteora-theory and in consequence rejected 
astrological predictions based on the physical impact of comets. Andreas Du-
dith’s Commentariolus is not mentioned at all, for Dudith was not a scientific ob-
server equipped with astronomical instruments. His approach to the extraordi-
nary appearance was based on what others wrote about it and on the evaluation 
of cometary theories from an tiqui ty and Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos. Sober reasoning 
induced him to undermine the principles of astrology,80 and his protégé Marcel-
lus Squar cia lu pus added new ideas, confirming Dudith’s skepticism.
6.3 Junius Michael Brutus’ sympathies with the credulous victims of fraudulent 
astrologers
The first editor of Erastus’ treatise and Dudith’s Commentariolus, Giovanni Mi-
chele Brutus, a convert and religious refugee like Squar cia lu pus, 81 dedicated the 
booklet with Dudith’s and Erastus’ texts to Nicolaus Mielecki, governor (Woi-
79 Grynaeus does not contribute new arguments to the anti-astrological debate and was not 
mentioned in Tycho de Brahe’s review at all. Grynaeus’ prolix text will therefore be not fur-
ther considered.
80 Hellman, The Comet of 1577 (n. 65), p. 310.
81 Giovanni Michele Bruto’s career is summarized by Domenico Caccamo, Eretici (n.1), pp. 145–
1152. Ernst Gustav Vogel, Nachrichten von dem Leben und den Schriften des Geschichtsschreibers 
Johann Michael Brutus, Meißen 1864, in particular pp. 44n, and 50. Before travelling to Dudith 
Brutus had contacts with Mino Celsi and Celio Secondo Curione in Basel, like Squar cia lu -
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wode) of Podolia. Brutus agrees with Dudith’s rejection of astrological di vi nation 
and adds some critical remarks of his own, suggesting that astrologers ought to 
be punished as irresponsible agitators. He is the first to suggest their punishment 
for the sake of public order and peace, an argument which we will encounter 
again only in 1681. 82 The Italian historian takes advantage of his dedicatory let-
ter to look back at his peaceful stay in Dudith’s house. At the end of the preface, 
Brutus not only portrays Dudith as a vir doctus atque eloquens, but gives a lively 
impression of his entire way of thinking and living, his family and his household. 
He deserves such a eulogy because he perfectly matches the Horatian ideal of 
beatus ille procul negotiis, thanks to his Epicurean frugality and modesty (pp. 8–9).
In his preface, Brutus vituperates against presumptuous astrologers who un-
settle the illiterate people with bold conjectures about God’s threatening punish-
ments. Brutus is upset that astrologers frighten the ignorant crowd with threat-
ening predictions arising from the appearance of a comet, namely bad weather, 
famine, war, epidemics, political turmoil etc. These they interpret as divine 
punishment, an event that is reserved to the Last Judgment. Astrologers predict 
events, the occurrences of which are supposed necessary, and which therefore 
can by no means be prevented, unless they belong to the futura contingentia. Their 
warnings, he contends, that people would have to endure inevitable suffering 
with patience, are futile, because these poor people would not be able to protect 
themselves against contingent evil. There is no use investigating the stars in or-
der to foretell what must necessarily occur and what wise men can foresee from 
past experience. .Brutus argues, moreover, that it is useless to frighten the poor, 
who are not at all responsible for their misery and have no power to change it, 
by predicting bad crops, shortage of food, famine, etc. Once intimidated by as-
trologers, the poor live in anguish, as though they see a sword dangling above 
their heads without knowing whether or not they will be struck. This kind of 
fear paralyzes the poor and ignorant, but does not help them to protect them-
selves against mischief. a man who knows his individual birth horoscope lives 
in constant fear without being able to prevent the evil which the astrologer has 
predicted. His entire family suffers with him, especially if he suspects that the 
predicted evil might come from his siblings or friends. Brutus describes psychot-
ic fear as semper animorum crudelis carnifex (p. 5). This type of anguish cannot be 
extinguished by reasonable action, for there is no way to know how to prevent 
the presumably inevitable disasters one fears or how to protect oneself and one’s 
family against unknown dangers predicted by an astrologer. This is particularly 
distressing for uneducated people, but even the erudite (mediocriter prudens) do 
pus. Cf. Delio Cantimori, Italienische Häretiker der Spätrenaissance, translated from Italian by 
Wer ner Kaegi, Basel 1949, p. 289 and 322n.
82 Dudith, “Commentariolus” (n. 76), pp. 3–12, with the date at the end: X. Kalend. Sept. 1579 
Cracoviae. About Brutus’ stay in Dudith’s home at Paskov and his relationship to Niccolo 
Mielecki cf. Costil, Dudith (n. 1), p. 170n. and 175; Vasoli, I miti e gli astri, pp. 363–365. In the 
following the page numbers in brackets refer to Brutus’ edition of 1579.
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not know how to cope with revelations by an astrological soothsayer. A man who 
knows his nativity can no longer enjoy innocent pleasures, being appalled by a 
supposedly dreadful future which he has no power to avoid. Usually those who 
argue against the soothsayers and try to reassure the terrified souls are unjustly 
suspected of impiety and treachery, while the astrologers are honored as trust-
worthy authorities and pious men. In any case, astrologers who abuse theology 
should be accused of hypocrisy. 
Therefore, Brutus resumes, Dudith deserves reader’s gratitude for tackling 
the issue of astrology in combination with cometary theory. Brutus praises his 
way of reasoning, as well as his style. If there is anything in his speech which 
may wound it is the reproach that astrologers take advantage of illiterate people’s 
credulity and greedily look for their own profit (p. 7). It is difficult to convince 
those who have been imbued with judicial astrology since their childhood that 
di vi nation is pure superstition. Dudith does not offend his reader, but solicits his 
attention by suggesting how this futile superstition can be eradicated. 
6.4 Erastus, De cometarum significationibus iudicium83
Erastus’ anti-astrological treatise triggered the debate de cometarum significatione. 
It was not his first battle against astrologers. As a physician, he had come across 
colleagues and patients in Germany and in Italy as well who believed in astrolo-
gy.84 He was appalled by the credulity of illiterate and erudite people alike, who 
consulted astrologers as soon as they had to make up their minds before taking 
action. Erastus complained that the astrologers’ deliria were repugnant to Chris-
tian piety. Their “greuliche Gotslesterung” is the Devil’s work. Therefore, Eras-
tus reedited Girolamo Savonarola’s treatise against astrologers, a confirmation of 
Pico della Mirandola’s arguments, and translated it into German, for the benefit 
of those he considered the simple folk.85 In his earlier works, Erastus argued as a 
theologian and philosopher. His judgment in 1578 was not only occasioned by the 
new comet, but also influenced by what he had experienced in Italy and Germany 
as a physician who fought against the plague. Reason and experience , he writes, 
are our tools for the investigation of nature and for the management of our lives. 
We are able to construct theories or build models for the explanation of distant 
phenomena, and then put the theoretical assumptions to an empirical test.86 Eras-
tus implores his readers not to believe the forecasts of astrologers, who predict 
83 In: De cometis dissertationes novae (n. 78), pp. 1–21.
84 Thomas Erastus, De astrologia di vi natrice, ed. by Johann Jacob Grynaeus, Basel 1580, pref-
ace to the reader, dated: Heidelbergae 1564; Erastus’ edition and translation of Savonarola’s 
treatise has the title: ASTROLOGIA CONFVTATA. Ain warhafte Gegründte Vnwidersprechliche 
Confutation/ der falschen Astrologei oder abgottischen warsagung aus des himels vnd der gestirnen 
lauff/ der warheit zu steuer/ vnnd dem gemeinen man zur warnung/ aus welscher vnd Lateinischer 
sprach/ wie volgend zu sehen/ von neuen ins deutsch gebracht. […] Heidelberg 1557, cf. here „Der 
inhalt dieses Buches“ and the dedicatory letter to his patrons, Fürsten von Henneberg. 
85 Erastus, Astrologia confutata (n. 84), Der Inhalt; Vorred.
86 Erastus, “Ad candidum lectorem Epistola”, in: De cometis dissertationes novae (n. 78), before p. 1.
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all kinds of evil from the appearance of a comet, without solid reasons. Erastus 
still clings to Aris totle’s cometary theory, but he dissociates the analysis of exha-
lations and their effects from astrological di vi nation, for the latter is incompatible 
with the tenets of the meteora-theory. Since comets are formed by dry and hot 
exhalations which burst into flames in the upper atmosphere, they cannot carry 
with them germs that trigger epidemics, for putrefaction is a result of humidity. 
Therefore, according to Aris totle, comets are salubrious, for they purify the air. 
Hence they may serve as antidotes against the plague. 
6.5 Dudith’s Commentariolus 
Johannes Crato’s research concerns the prevention of the plague and its per-
ceived cause, putrefaction of the air.87 Dudith’s letter to Crato (28 February 1578) 
is a response to Erastus’ considerations.88 Actually, Dudith’s approach is ethical: 
by a sober investigation and rational arguments, he aims at the destruction of a 
fraudulent practice. A variety of opinions about comets is current at this time. 
Dissenters from the traditional opinion (Aris totle’s meteora-theory) and popular 
astrological di vi nation are viewed with the suspicion of impiety. This is what 
happened to Dudith, because some of his friends interpreted his skepticism as 
heterodoxy. Therefore Dudith at first thought it wiser to keep silent and ask Cra-
to, the expert, for his advice. But Dudith is worried by serious doubts about Aris-
totle’s meteora-doctrine. Johannes Praetorius, a former teacher of Dudith’s sons 
who was later nominated to the Altdorff academy to teach astronomy, believed 
that comets were dry exhalations from the earth, but he followed Peter Apian’s 
observation that the comet’s tail always pointed away from the sun. Therefore, it 
seemed probable that the recent comet’s coma was illuminated by the sun’s rays 
and that the comet approached the sun. Paulus Fabricius, Medicus Caesareus & 
Mathematicus (1529–1589), therefore preferred to adopt Seneca’s conjecture that 
comets are stars with an unknown divine mission.89 Cardanus also assumed that 
comets were celestial bodies, thereby concluding that heaven is not immutable. 
Dudith concludes: as long as we ignore the nature and matter of the comet, it does 
not make sense to predict from that phenomenon. But even if we knew more, it 
87 Johannes Crato von Krafftheim, Ordnung der Praeservation/ Wie man sich zu Zeit der Jnfec-
tion verwahren […] Bresslaw im Jar 1553 […] Jetzo aber […] new vbersehen vnd corrigiert, Frank-
furt a. M. 1585.
88 Dudith’s letter is here quoted from its first edition (1579), the page numbers are added in 
brackets within the text. The original version is also published in the critical edition of Du-
dith’s Epistulae, ed. by Lech Szczucki and Tiburtius Szepessy, vol. 6: 1577–1580, ed. Nicolaus 
Szymánski and commented by him and Lech Szczucki, Budapest 2002, Nr. 904, pp. 108–133. 
Additions and variants of Dudith’s letter will be analyzed later, following the 1580 reprint of 
De cometis dissertationes novae (n. 78).
89 The reference alludes to Fabricius, Dialexis de novae et privs incognitae stellae invsitatae magnitv-
dinis & splendidissimi luminis apparitione, & de eiusdem stellae vero loco constituendo. Adiuncta est 
ibidem ratio inuestigandae pa”rallaxeos cuiuscunque Phaenomeni […] nunc primum conscripta et edi-
ta, per Thaddaeum Hagecium ab Hayck, Aulae Caesareae Maiestatis Medicum. Accesserunt 
aliorum quoque doctissimorum virorum de eadem stella scripta […], Frankfurt am Main 1574. 
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would not be allowed to foretell evil or propitious events from the mere appari-
tion, which may be an illusion. Dudith knows the ancient verses about comets 
heralding all kinds of misfortune (p. 19). But there were many comets which were 
not followed by wars or epidemics and the death of princes. Dudith also lists the 
disasters of the present time, horrible wars, brutal invasions, slaughter and floods 
of blood. All these innumerable misfortunes beset mankind, although there had 
been no comets announcing them. According to Scaliger’s Exotericae exercitationes, 
it is ridiculous and irrational to predict the death of a prince or other mortalium 
pernicies from comets (p. 21).90 It is more realistic to look for proximas praesentesque 
causas of wars, epidemics and other natural or man-made disasters, instead of 
attributing them to the hair, the beard or the tail of a comet, hence to remotas illas 
coelestes, vniuersalesque… causas (p. 22). The list of dreadful events, like the civil 
wars in France and the Low Countries and the occupation and devastation of 
Hungary, cruelties committed by the intruders from Turkey, prisoners of war and 
crimes committed by soldiers who slaughtered innocent people, shows another as-
pect of Dudith’s Commentariolus. Apparently the Imperial Counselor was frustrat-
ed by the failure of politics—at home and abroad in foreign countries –, which was 
not able to prevent cruelties and miseries caused by wars and occupations. Who 
would be silly enough to declare that comets in the past, or the recent barbed star, 
were messengers of these terrible events, or causes of the death of two emperors 
well-known for their piety, e. g. Divus Ferdinandus Caesar and his son Divus Maxi-
milianus? Dudith remembers three Kings of France whose death followed within 
a few years: Henry II, France II and Charles IX (pp. 25–26). It would likewise be 
insane to connect accidents, illnesses and other misfortune with bad weather and 
thunderstorms that only happened to accompany them, claiming that these events 
acted as causes and were somehow concatenated with terrestrial affairs. In con-
trast, in times of peace and prosperity we would never welcome the appearance of 
a comet as a savior. Therefore astrological di vi nation is futile. This is manifest in 
the quarrels and controversies among astrologers who cast nativities with contra-
dictory and inconsistent predictions. Dudith blames a Venetian astrologer for his 
dreadful and false predictions (p. 29–30). Superstition and credulity based on the 
oracles, dreams and other deliramenta of poets, rather than historians, are threats 
to Christian piety and undermine common sense and sane reasoning. Belief in 
occult forces exerted by heavenly objects, spiritus in the air and water comes close 
to magic. Dudith likewise dismisses the meteora-theory and its supplement, Ptole-
maic astrology. The prognosis of dreadful terrestrial consequences of dry exhala-
tions inflamed in the upper regions is futile, for a natural connection of causes and 
effects according to well-known laws of nature cannot be established (p. 32). Thun-
derstorms can regularly be observed with frightening effects, but since people are 
90 Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exotericarum exercitationum liber quintus decimus, de subtilitate, ad Hie-
ronymum Cardanum, Frankfurt am Main 1582 [1st edition: Paris 1557], exercitatio LXXIX de 
comete, pp. 294–297.
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used to them, they are not seen as miracles. Many extraordinary celestial events, 
such as eclipses, halos or parhelia, can also be explained by natural laws and cal-
culated, like the rising and setting of the sun or the motions of stars and planets 
(p. 34). Nevertheless, major conjunctions of the three upper planets are interpreted 
as threatening spectacles mirroring the meeting of earthly rulers, which is ridic-
ulous. Only the rarity of such events and the ignorance of their origins give rise 
to superstition and scare the gullible (p. 35). Again and again Dudith emphasizes: 
These phenomena occur and will occur, as long as Nature, the most beau-
tiful architecture of the universe, will exist, by natural order and law […]. 
Therefore di vi nation has derived from superstition and childish fear, nei-
ther from nature herself nor by any discipline, whether sacred or profane, 
which however is based on firm and true principles.91
In the Bible, Dudith argues, di vi nation from the stars of evil or beneficial events 
is severely reprimanded. God alone is omniscient and omnipotent; who may 
boast of sitting in his council? Who was present as an eye-witness of His plans 
so that he is able to foresee long before the event takes place what is going to 
happen? (ibid.) Comets and other extraordinary celestial events are neither caus-
es nor even supernatural signs. If these objects can be naturally explained and 
foretold by the application of physical laws, then they are not prodigies (portenta, 
ostenta) to frighten us with occult forces, for prodigies are against the order of 
nature, sent by God for unknown reasons, and announced to mankind by His 
legitimate prophets or angels (p. 37). If there ever were prodigies in the sky, di-
vi nation by vaticinia based on them would be impossible, because these events 
were a priori exempt from the natural order. We must admit that we are ignorant 
of future events, “nam est nescia mens hominum fati, fortisque futurae”. Only if 
soothsayers working from comets were legitimated by God as prophets would 
Dudith believe them. Otherwise, they must justify their claims to know God’s 
wrath and the connection between divine considerations and the celestial event. 
If sins make God angry whenever would there be an occasion for him not to 
be angry? Dudith mocks the logic of cometomantices: “Non igitur Cometae, sed 
peccata Deum irasci significant. At irae Dei grauioris signa sunt Cometae: quia 
peccata etiam grauia sunt.” (p. 39) 
Not from comets as divine messengers, but from sacred revelation in the Bible, 
does man come to know moral laws and to learn about eternal punishments. In 
the version of the letter reprinted by Erastus in 1580, Dudith is even more explicit 
about the distinctions between science and theology, and between human intelli-
gence and the authority of Holy Scripture. 
91 “Fiunt autem ista, & dum natura, pulcherrimaque huius universitatis compages stabit, fient, 
suo quodam naturali ordine ac lege […]. Quocirca ex superstitione, puerilique metu profecta 
est omnis haec diuinatio, non ex rei ipsius natura, non disciplina vlla, vel sacra, vel prophana: 
quae quidem firmis ac veris nitatur fundamentis.” Cf. Dudith, “Commentariolus” (n. 76), p. 36.”
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Here somebody might raise an objection against me: you have to reason 
from the principles of each art [that is, from physics and astronomy]. I 
however do not worry about these distinctions, but have violated them by 
transgressing the borderlines, since I am fighting against astrologastros 
from the domain of theology92. But tell me: why do astrologers intrude into 
theology and try to confirm their fictions (commenta sua) by sacred prophe-
cies? They believe that they are entitled to the justification of their absurdi-
ties and vanities to abuse theology, and they will not allow us to go back to 
the source of truth in order to prove our assertions? […] Surely it is allowed 
to take refuge in a superior discipline, in cases where disciplines provide 
contradictory results, so that the quarrel may be settled. God’s word, which 
has come down to us by prophets and apostles, must be our norm, like a 
Lesbian rule (regula Lesbia), according to which truth should be examined.93 
In the later version of his letter, Dudith is alluding to the chapter about equity 
(epieikeia) in Aris totle’s Ethica Nicomachaea (V, 14, 1137b 30). Aris totle compares 
the challenge of applying a general law to a specific case that can only roughly 
be subsumed to it, because the legislators never thought of this particular case, to 
the Lesbians’ method of building a house with uneven, rough stones (Lésbia oiko-
domía). Since a straight measuring stick could not be applied to irregular stones, 
the Lesbians used as kanon a flexible piece of lead which could be applied to a wall 
with uneven stones so that it was possible for them to dress it straight.94 In his 
Adages Erasmus explains the regula Lesbia as follows: Whenever a rule is adjusted 
to the facts or a law is accommodated with the customs and not the other way 
around, we may say that we apply a regula Lesbia.95 The dogmata Christi would, 
however, be spoilt, if they were adjusted according to our corrupted habits in the 
way of a regula Lesbia.96 Among theologians, comparisons of Holy Scripture with 
a regula Lesbia proved to be extremely controversial. Therefore Dudith’s reference 
92 which according to the objection is not at all Dudith’s profession.
93 “Hinc mihi illud obijci posse uideo: ex proprijs cuiusque artis principijs agendum esse, me 
autem finibus uiolatis genus transcendere, cùm ex theologia contra astrologastros pugnem. 
Sed cur illi, quaeso, ex sua arte in alienam irruunt, & commenta sua sacris oraculis stabilire 
conantur? Sibine in re absurd & uana comprobanda licere Theologia abuti putabunt, nobis 
in ueritate asserenda ad ueritatis fontem recurrere non putabunt? Praeclaram sane legem & 
authoribus suis non indignam. Licet profecto licet, sicubi artes ac disciplinae inter se pug-
nant, ut lis omnis dirimatur, ad certiorem eamque superiorem confugere. Dei nimirum per 
Prophetas & Apostolos traditum uerbum norma nobis esse debet, ac quaedam quasi Lesbia 
regula ad quam ueritas omnis examinetur.” De cometis dissertationes novae, pp. 185–186. This 
passage of Dudith’s text is absent in the 1579 edition. 
94 E. Büchsel, “Regula Lesbia”, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 8, Darmstadt 1992, 
col. 489n.
95 Erasmus of Rotterdam, Adagia (Venice 1500), chilias I, 5, 93, quoted by Büchsel, Art. “Regula 
Lesbia” (n. 93), col. 489n.
96 Erasmus of Rotterdam, Ratio verae theologiae (1519), p. 89, quoted by Büchsel, “Regula Lesbia” 
(n. 93), col. 490.
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to the regula Lesbia has implications for his biblical hermeneutics. By comparing 
moral laws in the Holy Scripture with a measuring stick used in cases where 
uneven, rough stones were piled up to form a wall, Dudith indirectly admits that 
there are cases where the biblical text may be, or even must be, adjusted in order 
to serve as a proper regula vitae.97 Evidently the Bible does not offer appropriate 
advice for the solution of scientific problems; it only provides (by parables and 
exempla) clues for what is right or wrong, but not at all for astrological prediction. 
This kind of abuse woud have been considered blasphemous. Dudith’s warning, 
which is directed to hypocritical astrologastri, is not far from Gali lei’s recommen-
dation to abandon the literal meaning of the Bible where it is obviously contrary 
to celestial phenomena which can be scientifically explored. 
After this digression in the text of 1580, Dudith sums up his argument: Divi-
nation from comets and stars is vain superstition. Events following them are not 
linked to heavenly apparitions, neither by necessity nor even by the faintest prob-
ability (p. 40). False science and true religion are mutually exclusive.
The apparent terrestrial origin of comets of dry and hot exhalations can never 
be responsible for epidemics. Pestilence is engendered by putrefaction (putredo); 
decay is the consequence of corruption of matter by humidity. Therefore, Erastus 
was right in attributing to comets which originated from dry and hot exhalations 
(according to Aristotelian theory) rather salubrious effects, which he illustrated 
by the comets of 1556 and 1558 and events following their appearance (p. 41). Ex-
planations of how the delicate temper of kings and princes or their organs are 
more easily affected by the venomous air than their hardworking subjects are 
pseudoscience and deserve being ridiculed or even despised. Comets are neither 
causes nor signs of the birth and death of rulers: “Nihil coelo cum imperatoribus 
et regibus negotii est” (p. 48). Heaven is a universal cause, which thanks to mo-
tion and light is responsible for alteration, coming into being and corruption, but 
the heavenly region is indifferent to what happens on Earth as a result of natural 
effects (p. 49). Dudith’s epilogue is addressed to Crato, who he hopes will be a 
critical reader. Also Crato might be able to elucidate what Erastus wrote about pu-
trefaction and illness, because Crato treated this matter in one of his most recent 
books and it is to be hoped that he will write more, for the benefit of students of 
philosophy and medicine (p. 50). 
In his letter to Erastus, which was inserted in the Dissertationes novae, Dudith 
was no longer sure that the Aristotelian paradigm could be correctly applied to 
comets. He disagrees with Erastus’ praise of Aris totle, declaring that ancient au-
thorities are not exempt from error, not even ristotle, whose errors had already 
been listed by theologians in the 13th century. Dudith rather trusts his own senses 
and encourages his readers to investigate nature without prejudice:
97 The Lutheran Johann Jacob Müller comments that he could not believe his eyes when he hit 
upon Dudith’s comparison of Holy Scripture with a Lesbian rule. Cf. below, n. 136.
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Step down to the admirable, most beautiful theater of the universe: look at 
nature with your own, not with foreign eyes. Apply your senses [to prove] 
what others may pretend: listen however, but only trust words if they are 
in agreement with reason and nature. If, however, they report strange 
things, reject them, as frankly and easily as they were expressed by oth-
ers […] This is not the school of the Pythagoreans or theologians where 
authority instead of reason must be admitted. We only venerate theology 
in so far as we accept that what springs from sacred monuments as sacro-
sanct and unshakeable truth without any doubt.98
Therefore we may imitate Aris totle by superseding him, as Aris totle diverged 
from Plato’s doctrines and the Pre-Socratics, whose ideas he summarized in his 
doxographies. The search for truth, Dudith argues, is the only guide to progress. 
If our ancestors had blindly trusted the authority of their teachers, there would 
have been no progress in science. Knowledge in theology, physics, medicine and 
jurisprudence has increased; the sciences are reformed. Therefore Dudith feels 
Erastus deserves his particular praise, for Erastus dared to enlarge and correct 
accepted doctrines by new research and by his own investigations. Likewise, 
Erastus will certainly appreciate Squar cia lu pus’ treatise, which he will receive 
as a manuscript. Dudith admires Squar cia lu pus for having demonstrated the 
flaws of Aris totle’s meteorological theory about comets and having reached the 
conclusion that di vi nation from the stars is pure superstition. Dudith frankly ad-
mits that Squar cia lu pus’ investigation is more accurate and subtle than his own 
Commentariolus. Moreover, it is written in a beautiful, elegant style. Nevertheless, 
Dudith is proud of being Squar cia lu pus’ patron, for the latter’s ingenious treatise 
was written during his stay in Dudith’s house at Paskov, and therefore Dudith 
urges Erastus to get it published. As a sceptic, Squar cia lu pus will not obstinately 
insist his own opinion, especially when he feels insecure about his conjectures. 
6.6 Squar cia lu pus attacking astrologers and blaming theologians
In his letter to Crato Dudith on the occasion of the comet suggests that he was, 
like Erastus, but unlike Squar cia lu pus, not yet ready to abandon Aristotelian 
meteorology in 1579. Squar cia lu pus’ opinion “De Cometa” is more radical than 
Dudith’s treatise and it prompted the physician to a detailed refutation. Squar cia -
lu pus rejects the Aristotelian view of comets as meteora, produced by terrestrial 
exhalations, because he finds it inconsistent and puzzling. The Italian physician 
98 “[…] descende tu quoque in admirandum hoc est pulcherrimum quod dixi orbis theatrum: 
tuis oculis non alienis naturam intuere: tuos sensus adhibe, quid alij affirment: audi quidem, 
ita tamen verbis fidem adiunge, si rationi, si naturae consentanea loquantur. Sin autem aliena 
adferant, eadem libertate ac facilitate, qua ab illis dantur, tu reijce … Non haec Pythagoreorum 
est schola, non Theologorum, in quibus autoritas pro ratione admitti debeat. Soli hunc Theolo-
giae honorem habemus, ut quid ex sacris monumentis profert, id nos sine ulla dubitatione pro 
sacrosancta et firma veritate recipiamus.” Cf. De cometis dissertationes novae (n. 78), p. 23n.
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equally dismisses Ptolemaic astrology as unscientific, for it claimed that there is 
a connection between planetary conjunction, the emergence of a comet and the 
noxious effects supposedly transmitted to terrestrial beings through the atmo-
sphere. Squar cia lu pus bluntly denied causal connections between the appear-
ance of a comet and unfavorable climate (storms, rainfall, droughts) or an out-
break of epidemics. He favored the idea that comets may be celestial objects like 
planets.His treatise deserved mention by Brahe in the latter’s critical review of 
pamphlets about the comet of 1577. As Brahe emphasizes, Squar cia lu pus at least 
contributed valid arguments against Aris totle, although he might have done bet-
ter to demonstrate his conjectures by mathematical reasoning.99
Like the historian Bruto, Squarcialupi was a religious refugee from Piombino. 
He received his degree as doctor medicinae from Pisa in 1538 and published a tract 
about therapies against the plague in 1562. After his emigration, he came to know 
Theodor Zwinger in Basel and probably Crato von Krafftheim in Vienna. Before 
he met Dudith and enjoyed his hospitality in Dudith’s Moravian home, Squar -
cia lu pus became familiar with the Moravian brethren.100 Squar cia lu pus arrived 
at Paskov by the end of February 1578 and stayed until the beginning of May. 
After that, he returned to the Grisons and emigrated with his family to Poland. 
In August he visited Paskov again. From there he travelled to Breslau, hoping 
to meet Crato. In September 1578 Squar cia lu pus lived in Cracow. From there he 
sent his opinion de Cometa to Dudith. In Cracow, Squar cia lu pus also edited Pliny 
the Younger with a dedication to Rudolph II and planned an edition of Hippo-
crates. Thanks to recommendations by Giorgio Biandrata, Squar cia lu pus was 
named court physician by the new duke of Transylvania and moved to Alba Julia 
in December 1579. During the following years he wrote medical treatises that 
were published in Claudiopoli (Cluj). The following six years apparently were 
the happiest of his life. In Transylvania the parliament (Landtag) had granted free 
practice to five Christian denominations in 1568 and 1571. In a letter of 15th Sep-
tember 1581, Squar cia lu pus implored Sozzini to temper his controversies with 
religious adversaries, pleading for tolerance.101 In December 1585 he returned to 
the Grisons, where the religious situation had completely changed since the six-
ties in favor of orthodoxy and confessional control. In 1588 he moved again to 
Transylvania with his sons.102 
 99 Brahe, De mundi aetherei recentioribus et phaenomenis pars secunda (n. 65), De cometa anni 
1577, p. 207.
100 Madonia, “Marcello Squar cia lu pus“ (n. 7), pp. 119–126; Bundi, Flüchtlingsschicksale (n. 7), 
pp. 46–48; idem, Squar cia lu pus (2006, see n. 7), p. 435–438.
101 Fausti Socini Senensis ad amicos Epistolae […], De novo accesserunt quaedam A. Dudithii Epis-
tolae, ed. Fratres Polonici, Irenopoli 1656, p. 359n. and Fausto Sozzinis answer, Cracow, 
20 November 1581, pp. 361–368.
102 In his medical and balneological tracts Squar cia lu pus draws from his own experience. Cf. 
Bundi, Flüchtlingsschicksale (nr. 7), pp. 47n. For a summary of his ideas cf. Caccamo, Eretici 
(n. 1), pp. 128–131; Vasoli, I miti e gli astri, pp. 375–382.
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Squar cia lu pus was encouraged by Dudith and his friends to to attack Aris totle 
and the treacherous astrologers.103 Squar cia lu pus’ treatise is divided into three 
parts. First he assails “ineptos Astrologos”. Second, he launches his criticism 
against the Peripatetics and their inappropriate paradigm. In the third part, he 
mocks those pseudo-theologians who characterize comets as wonders of nature 
(monstra horrenda). Like Dudith, he admits that the nature of comets is totally 
unknown, and therefore vaticina based on their appearance are ill founded. As-
trologers, physicians and some theologians vainly claim that comets are accom-
panied by the plague, wars and death. But to be afraid without being able to say 
what makes one afraid is stupid. It is the task of enlightened men to investigate 
the comet’s nature, and this exactly is what Squar cia lu pus sees as his task. He 
states that Ptolemy’s rules about comets and ensuing misfortune are not based 
on observation. To judge from the color of a celestial appearance that it may be 
engendered by a planet with the same outlook is an illusion. Squar cia lu pus finds 
more flaws in Ptolemy’s reasoning, when he quotes Prolemy’s prediction that a 
comet appearing in the sign of Scorpio may cause heavy rains in the west, but 
elsewhere may foretell a drought. How can one and the same object have op-
posite effects? Ptolemy does not explain why comets in Capricorn are likely to 
stir up quarrels, whereas in Sagittarius they are supposed to endanger pregnant 
women. It is meaningless to predict certain types of evil, since all kinds of misfor-
tune affect individuals as well as nations, whether they be attributed to fate, phys-
ical laws or accidents (p. 33). Squar cia lu pus wonders why people are afraid of the 
new comet, for astrologers are cautious enough to give assurances that man is 
not subject to the stars and that God’s omnipotence is superior to sidereal neces-
sity. Ptolemy’s advice is contrary to Christian piety, when he recommends prayer 
to God as a preventative of evil consequences from a comet that appears close 
to a conjunction of Jupiter with the Moon (p. 34). It is ridiculous to choose days 
and hours for actions and enterprises according to planetary constellations, as 
though the planets and stars formed a senate analogous to Earthly committees of 
politicians. is It is contradictory to foretell that a comet will be harmful to certain 
regions and countries, but helpful to others because different parts of the Earth 
may be associated with particular signs of the zodiac, for how can one and the 
same object cause opposite effects in different regions where it is exactly seen in 
the same position? There are constant changes in the world and various weather 
phenomena which create different conditions for agriculture. Some countries suf-
fer from warfare, invasion and occupation by enemies. The conditions for making 
one’s living differ from country to country and from time to time. These changes 
cannot be reduced to universal causes. There is no sound basis for assuming that 
the appearance of a comet is linked with terrestrial misfortune. Since the arts and 
sciences have been restored and the original Christian faith has been reestablished 
103 Dissertationes novae (nr. 78), p. 38. In the following quotations from Squar cia lu pus’ text al-
ways are from this edition.
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by the reformers, Squar cia lu pus maintains, piety and erudition have enormously 
increased among European nations. There is no reason to be afraid of comets or 
to associate them with God’s wrath. In addition, the persistence of the dreadful 
effects of comets or planetary constellations cannot be predicted. Squar cia lu pus 
particularly ridicules Caspar Peucer’s De di vi nationum generibus because of the au-
thor’s astrological prejudices. Peucer’s conviction that not only comets, but also 
thunderstorms ,were prodigies sent by God is not acceptable for theological rea-
sons. Peucer assumes that, by analogy, floods are prodigies which warn people of 
warfare. But how can his argument stand,since there is no direct physical relation 
between a deluge or an earthquake, a comet and the outbreak of wars? Unusual 
phenomena frighten us, but Peucer does not explain why they threaten us, for 
how can inanimate events transmit threatening messages? He is not able to name 
criteria which would allow us to distinguish between evil announced by angels, 
demons or God (p. 39). Peucer confused fatal necessity and free will. He is unable 
to distinguish between the celestial realm and terrestrial mutability, between Dei 
decreta and fortunae mobilitas. Obscure prognostications produce a mixture of hope 
and fear. They threaten humans with God’s resentment because they suggest that 
it may be transmitted by a comet and that God will only mitigate his wrath if he is 
soothed by prayers. No matter how events things develop, these presumably pious 
writers always have, with respect to fairly vague di vi nations, an excuse for why 
their dire predictions may have failed (p. 40). There is a diversity of opinion among 
famous philosophers and mathematicians as to how long the effects of a comet or 
another extraordinary event will last. Since Peucer takes into account the shape of 
a celestial appearance which is reminiscent of an eagle or a dragon, he is inclined 
to interpret the celestial event as a product of a demon or of the Devil himself, who 
wants to frighten the pious. Peucer and his school (that is, Me lanch thon’s legacy) 
give no explanation for the particular force of a comet (p. 40–41). 
Comets and other celestial phenomena, whose height we cannot exactly deter-
mine, present themselves under various aspects, depending on the nature of the 
atmosphere and the weather. Therefore, Squar cia lu pus concludes, predictions 
from observation without closer examination and measurement are without val-
ue. How can we talk about future effects, if we have no idea about the origin and 
nature of a celestial phenomenon? There is no independent position on Earth 
which makes it possible to plot the entire orbit of a comet. Observations of the 
comet have to be corroborated to be reliable, because they vary depending on 
viewpoint and weather conditions. In addition, observers disagree about when 
a comet was seen for the first time and when it finally disappeared. Casting a 
horoscope at the precise moment of the birth of the comet is difficult, for the 
exact moment of stars rising above the horizon is relevant for determining the 
twelve houses, as everybody knows. Hence astrologers’ judgments about the im-
pact of the comet will be different, depending on when and where its position is 
analyzed, whether at the beginning of its course or when it reaches its peak and 
its utmost brilliance. It is futile to base forecasts of definite events on such shaky 
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ground, as there are different appearances of one and the same object and various 
observations never cover the entire course of it (p. 48). 
The second chapter is devoted to Aris totle’s doctrine. Once it is shattered, he 
argues, the doctrines and glory of astrologers will vanish completely (p. 49). Fol-
lowers of Aris totle differ from astrologers because the former predict only nat-
ural disasters, while the latter also foretell man-made disasters such as wars. 
Squar cia lu pus shows by common sense arguments why it is unlikely that comets 
are formed by terrestrial exhalations, which are supposed to be inflamed in the 
upper region of the sky; hence, their effects, namely droughts and storms, are im-
probable as well,. Dry exhalations rising from the earth cool down on their way 
up, until their original heat disappears and the matter vanishes in the air. The 
enormous motion of the upper spheres is not responsible for the inflammation of 
a comet, for what kind of fire can there be? It is not identical with fire on earth or 
fiery matter erupting from a volcano. The frictional heat caused by the motion of 
the upper sphere of the moon depends on the matter thus set in motion and its 
speed. After its long way up, there may only remain a tiny remainder of Earthly 
exhalations, condensed to a small globe. This will not be ignited by friction. The 
doctrine of cometary matter which is inflamed by frictional heat thus does not 
make sense, according to the physical nature of smoke and of the atmosphere. 
If comets consisted of smoky matter which burst into flames by friction, their 
appearance would be different: they would have the shape of a mountain of com-
bustible matter; they would immediately burst into flames; and the flames would 
absorb the matter entirely until it was consumed. Hence the appearance of a com-
et, its shape and path, are not consistent with Aris totle’s theory. Once the matter 
is consumed in the upper air, there must be a further supply of smoke that arises 
and nurtures the flames anew. How the earthy heat is preserved in the upper at-
mosphere cannot be explained. Flames are upright, like pyramids, and they have 
the shape of a torch, whereas comets stretch out in length. The brilliance of the 
coma does not resemble a flame; it is stainless and has no shadows. The comet’s 
head has the brightest shine. The brilliance diminishes from coma to tail. Appar-
ently the recent comet, Squar cia lu pus observes, is more like a star illuminated 
by the sun, for it receives its light from the sun nearby, like the moon. Its path 
is similar to a planetary orb, although it crosses the ecliptic at an oblique angle. 
Like all other comets, it participates in the first motion of the fixed stars. Why do 
we not sense the heat that is presumably fostered by the comet? After the comet 
had disappeared, the summer in 1578 was not particularly hot and dry. On the 
contrary, due to moderate temperatures, there was a plentiful harvest. Neither 
storms nor earthquakes were registered that might have produced a sufficiency 
of vapors necessary to produce a comet. 
Squar cia lu pus points to another inconsistency of Aristotelian doctrine: once the 
combustible matter is consumed, from whence can heavy winds be engendered? 
Squar cia lu pus assumes that a furnace served as a model for the Aristotelian the-
ory, but this model is not appropriate. In a furnace, the flames consist of smoke 
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burning down. Vapors and smoke burn down rapidly, if the fire is strong enough. 
But once the matter which was produced by exhalations is burnt down, storms 
and droughts can no longer develop (p. 56). If one assumes that some smoke re-
mains after the extinction of the comet, an explanation is needed for why winds 
are engendered by this smoke in the upper region, and how the heat in that re-
gion can be transmitted to the lower atmosphere? How can the smoke reach the 
lower spheres, by the help of light, rays or the rapid motion of the sphere, since it 
is the nature of the original exhalations from cavities in the Earth to rise quickly, 
especially when they are heated up in the upper region? The followers of Aris-
totle are unable to defend his theory. For if they pretend that, after the comet’s 
extinction, smoke remains and heat is produced, they must explain these effects 
by the help of physics. But the present comet produced no heat; on the contrary, it 
was extremely cold when Squar cia lu pus observed its course. 
If cometomantices take refuge in the influence of the planets and their aspects 
in order to explain the emergence of storms that would then be able to set free 
new exhalations, they only further undermine themselves by explaining the 
unknown by the even less familiar (p. 58). Unlike other material, the matter of 
the comet burning down is never transformed into ashes. Therefore the furnace 
model has to be dismissed. By another thought experiment, the physician from 
Piombino demonstrates the absurdity of the assumption that comets are formed 
from Earthly exhalations. If that were the case, they would be ready to engender 
a new comet after their extinction. Once the comet vanished and the matter was 
partly extinguished, hot smoke would remain, or some steamy vapor. Comets are 
formed by smoke rising upward. Smoke is engendered inside the Earth by aridity 
(and heat), but the burning comet makes the atmosphere dry again, engendering 
droughts and storms which will generate more dry, inflammable matter. There-
fore, it would be plausible to assume that a new comet is produced by the heat 
of a prior comet. The reductio ad absurdum is an indirect proof of the contrary as-
sumption that comets are celestial objects similar to planets. Erastus’ opinion that 
the heat is developed inside the Earth, and this causes the matter to rise rapidly, 
is refuted in the same way, by analogy with observations on Earth: The sun is the 
major source of life, sanity and growth. Animals are equipped with inborn heat 
which keeps them alive, but their residence, the Earth, is cold and dry. Erastus’ 
conjecture of heat inside the Earth that defeats the humidity and thus is respon-
sible for the purification of the air by rising cometary matter, cannot be verified. 
Squar cia lu pus concludes that phenomena on Earth and in the sky cannot be ex-
plained by the help of Aristotelian meteorology and cosmology.104 Squar cia lu pus 
suggests dropping Aris totle’s division between immutable heavenly spheres and 
the terrestrial realm, where generation and corruption take place, by relying sole-
104 Squar cia lu pus here mocks Antoine Mizauld, the author of a Cometographia crinitarum stel-
larum and a Meteorologia from 1540 and 1538 as “Mizaldus ineptus”; cf. Hellman, The Comet 
of 1577 (n. 65), p. 104–105.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
161Attacks on Judicial Astrology, Religious Dissent and the Rise of Skepticism 
ly on proper sense perception and arguing by analogy that the same natural laws 
are valid on Earth and in the sky (p. 63).
The third part deals with the assumptions shared by astrologers and some 
theologians (e. g. Me lanch thon’s followers). Astrologers enter the domain of theol-
ogy, claiming presumptuously that their predictions from the stars are in accord 
with God’s decrees. But God’s will is inaccessible. It can by no means be explored 
by assuming occult forces or secret knowledge. Squar cia lu pus ridicules theolo-
gians who take refuge in miracles whenever they meet phenomena that they can-
not explain in terms of nature. There are many phenomena whose origins and 
effects are unknown to us. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to conclude that 
they are supernatural or unnatural or that God uses them as vehicles for the ex-
pression of His wrath. Squar cia lu pus introduces a new thought experiment. An 
Egyptian who never saw heavy rainfalls would surely be surprised by masses of 
rain causing floods, and would be even more frightened by thunderstorms. They 
might make him believe that the beautiful machina mundi will collapse. An Italian 
farmer, however, would laugh at the foreigner, for he knows all this is natural and 
not at all unusual. 
The effects of all things we observe are caused either by the Creator, by nature, 
by man or by accident (a caeca fortuna). In contrast, creatio ex nihilo, the genesis of 
an individual soul, Christ’s incarnation and the resurrection of the dead are mira-
cles. Nature presents two classes of phenomena that are both admirable: the ordi-
nary, regular growth of plants and ripening of fruits, and the coming into being 
of animals. In addition, there are generis naturae peccata, namely hybrid species, 
monstra among plants and animals and even horribly immoral men, like Catilina 
and Nero. Man is responsible for what is produced by reason and judgment, and 
the virtuous can be distinguished from the vicious. Accidents may happen ex 
fortuito, but these do not contradict God’s providence. Still, one has to be cau-
tious not to declare something as a miracle prematurely, for “multa enim sunt a 
natura, et ab humanis etiam uiribus quae superant intelligentiam nostram.” If we 
assume that one and the same phenomenon acts as cause and as sign, we must 
admit that we are ignoring its nature, since nature acts from unknown causes. 
This is inconsistent (p. 66). Portenta and monstra have hidden natural causes, but 
we are not entitled to assign them divine messages, for what appears to us as 
their extraordinary character is only due to our ignorance. 
There are many events which either follow from natural laws, are the outcome 
of human decisions or happen as mere accidents. These events occur, even when 
no comet is seen. A philosopher who is not frightened by an extraordinary celes-
tial event or object will certainly investigate its nature, which does not prevent 
him from honoring the Creator and respecting His order of salvation. 
Me lanch thon stated that celestial objects were created in order to direct our 
attention to God, and that God wanted us to regard these objects as messengers 
which announced His will and temper. Squar cia lu pus wonders where the sacred 
text legitimates astrology or advises astrologers to speculate about future events. 
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God has nowhere encouraged astrologers to renounce the use of reason (p. 75–76). 
Soothsayers pretend to have a knowledge which nobody else has, which is be-
yond human capability. Mali vates—mali theologi: They ignore true wisdom and 
frighten the credulous people with their futile speculations. If comets really were 
divine threats, God’s benevolence and grace would be absent, but this would be 
contrary to what Holy Scripture tells us. If a comet were created as a messenger 
to warn us, the pious would pray to God to prevent the evil, but the comet would 
still be visible. In that case, it would apparently have been created in vain, and 
God would be amusing himself by scaring us with no purpose. 
Comets are surely created by God; they have natural causes which are still 
unknown to us. Nevertheless, we are not minimizing them if we assume they are 
just as natural as lightning and thunder. We admire the works of nature as parts 
of God’s creation and try to induce from our observations the laws of nature. As-
trologers, however, behave like false priests, who show their contempt for God’s 
omnipotence and omniscience and who cheat the uneducated. Irrational fear fos-
ters credulity and superstition. Disasters that occurred after a comet happens to 
have been observed may not be attributed to it. 
The epilogue presents a list of unbearable miseries and slaughters caused 
by warfare and other man-made disasters in the recent past. Death is a natural 
consequence of violence. The victims of violence and brutality deserve pity; the 
death of a king (unless he is killed) is not frightening at all, for there are laws 
which guarantee a legitimate successor and heir to the throne. Cometomantices 
may deplore the death of three kings in France, while elsewhere 30,000 people 
have just died of the plague and innocent citizens were victims of cruel warfare—
events which were surely not announced by a comet, but can be analyzed by the 
study of human behavior. 
Divine prophets never received their dreadful prognostics from heavenly 
signs. They never mentioned comets, but they pointed to divine justice. It is no of-
fence to religion to deny the authority of astrologers and defy their judgments as 
treacherous. Astrology is a pseudo-art that seduces the pious, leading them away 
from the Bible and God’s commandments. Only if this treacherous pseudo-art is 
unmasked, can piety, charity and justice be preserved (p. 97). 
6.7 Erastus’ vain attempts to save the meteora-theory
Although Erastus, Dudith and Squar cia lu pus all agree that astrology is a pseu-
do-science and interferes with theology, Erastus was not at all pleased with 
Squar cia lu pus’ arguments. Whereas Squar cia lu pus tried to show the inconsis-
tencies of peripatetic theory about comets, and noted the many questions that it 
left unsolved (such as the nature of the earthy exhalations), Erastus still believed 
that Aris totle’s theory accounted for the phenomena far better than Seneca, for 
example, when he wonders about comets in his Naturales quaestiones. Erastus con-
siders the problem of hot exhalations rising from the Earth, which presumably 
provide matter for the production of comets. He distinguishes vapors and exha-
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lations, assuming that other airy meteora are composed from humid vapors and 
dry exhalations in various mixtures. 
Erastus completely ignores what Squar cia lu pus had to say about the place 
of comets far above the moon, right next to the planetary spheres. Apparently, 
they both did not bother about measuring the distance of the comet and its place 
in comparison with the moon and other planets. The method of measuring the 
parallax of new celestial objects in relation to the moon and the planets was ob-
viously unknown to all three of them. Therefore Erastus’ ideas about the comet 
seemed of little or no value to Brahe, for the impact of Erastus’ critique of judicial 
astrology is hampered by his obstinate defense of Aris totle’s meteora theory.105
6.8 Dudith’s conception of science and scientific method according to his later 
correspondence
Dudith complained of hostile reactions by his friends Peter Monau (1551–1588), 
Court Physician of Rudolph II, Nicolaus Rhediger (1525–1587) and Thaddaeus 
Hagecius, only because he had tried to prove that astrological prognostics abused 
Christian doctrine. Dudith’s firm denial of any connection between a comet and 
disastrous events might have upset Hagecius, for this astronomer neatly distin-
guished between causes and signs, and defended Me lanch thon’s view that com-
ets were divine messengers communicating God’s wrath. This is evident from 
the title of Hagecius’ pamphlet, published in Görlitz in 1580: Epistula ad Martinum 
Mylium, in qua examinatur sententia Michaelis Maestlini et Helisaei Roeslini de cometa 
anni 1577 ac simul pie asseritur contra profanas et Epicureas quorundam opiniones, qui 
cometas nihil significare contendunt.106 Dudith protested against Hagecius’ suspicion 
that people like him and Squar cia lu pus belonged to the Epicureans, a class of 
hominum nimirum ethnicorum et in Deum contumeliosorum.107 At first Dudith mod-
estly recommended Hagecius to consider Erastus’ arguments, which he said were 
more convincing than what he, Dudith, had only written down in a hurry. His 
aim had been simply to provoke a discussion about scientific method, rather than 
to start a quarrel or to urge others to agree with his opinion. But when Hagecius 
insisted on his suspicions, Dudith revealed the source of his own anti-astrolog-
ical arguments in the Commentariolus, namely Julius Caesar Scaliger, Giovanni 
105 Brahe, De mundi aetherei recentioribus et phaenomenis pars secunda, De cometa anni 1577 
(n. 65), p. 207. Erastus must be blamed for his unconvincing, though rather sophisticated 
ma noeuv res to save peripatetic theory. “Unum saltem hoc loco libere dicam; si Erastus 
Astro lo giae & Paracelso obstrepens, non veriora in medium protulit, quam in hac Cometa -
rum materia, dum Aristotelis de Generatione eorum doctrinam non saltem probabilem 
esse sentit, sed certiorem, quam refelli veris rationibus ab aliquos possit […] equidem nul -
lum est periculum, ut vel Astrologi, vel Paracelsista suam professionem ab illo labefacta-
tum iri pertimescant.”
106 Dudith, Epistulae, vol. 6 (n. 88), p. 343; cf. Hellman, The Comet of 1577 (n. 65), p. 370, nr. 49.
107 Dudith to Hagecius, 11 December 1579, in: Dudith, Epistulae, vol. 6 (n. 88), nr. 981, pp. 274–
275; Dudith to Hagecius, 20 February 1580, ibid., nr. 993, p. 297–300; Dudith to Hagecius, 3 rd 
August 1580, ibid., Nr. 1013, p. 345–350.
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Pico della Mirandola and Girolamo Savonarola. Undoubtedly they were pious 
men. Astronomy is a science because eclipses can be mathematically predicted, 
whereas according to Dudith astrology “is a treacherous art, in opposition with 
God’s word and [natural] philosophy. […] [Astrology] is not ordained by God, 
but [is] a profanation and abuse of his commands. For the stars are not created 
by God as messengers of future events, the knowledge of which He has reserved 
to himself.”108 The sun and the planets operate as universal causes. They are pre-
requi sites for the growth of plants and guarantee that every species can develop 
its proper characteristics. But knowing a general precondition of life does not per-
mit one to predict particular effects.109 To know the character of a child, we must 
be aware of all the factors that determine it: heredity, environment, social condi-
tions, the nature of the mother’s milk, etc. Dudith learned from Erastus that di vi-
nation of contingentia futura is false and repugnant to God. Human knowledge is 
based only on sense perception: “Omnis nostra notitia, omnis cognitio a sensibus 
est. In sensus autem nostros non incurrunt adhuc res, quae nondum sunt aut ne 
esse quidem coeperunt.”110 Astrologers not only deliver erroneous prognostics 
from nativities, but they use a treacherous, fallacious method: “ostendo non posse 
eam non errare, cum de futuris contingentibus blaterat.”111
Dudith was familiar with the scientific tradition taught in Padua and Paris.112 
He distinguished among three orders. As an ambassador, he was involved in the 
order of human affairs, politics and warfare and knew about the responsibilities 
of rulers and their loyal servants. As a reader of the Bible who exchanged letters 
with Theodore de Bèze and other orthodox Calvinists, Dudith was aware of a 
divine order following the creator’s hidden plans, which were beyond our grasp 
and had to be humbly revered rather than understood. Religious controversies, 
wars and the prosecution of dissenters contradicted Jesus’ teaching and his com-
mandments. They were consequences of a gradual formation of Christian doc-
trine in the fourth century which transformed the teaching of the gospel by intro-
ducing unbiblical notions and scholastic subtleties that were beyond the grasp of 
the common people. Finally, the order of nature encompassed observable events 
on Earth as well as distant phenomena in the sky and followed rules which scien-
tists were able to explore, although many phenomena which seemed to be irreg-
ular still had to be explained by natural laws as yet unknown. By induction more 
general laws could be abstracted from observations of particular instances and 
108 “[Astrologiam […] fallaciam Dei verbo et philosophiae placitis adversariam esse conten-
do. […] Non igitur Dei ordinatio est, sed Dei ordinationis profanatio atque abusus. Non 
enim astra in hunc finem ordinata a Deo sunt, ut nobis futuros casus denuntient, quorum, 
ut saepe dixi, scientiam sibi soli Deus retinuit”. Cf. Dudith, Letter to Hageck, 26 September 
1580, in: Epistulae, vol. 6 (N. 88), p. 367; cf. Costil, Dudith (n. 1), p. 356.
109 Ibid., p. 369.
110  Ibid., p. 366.
111  Ibid., p. 371.
112 Ibid., pp. 60–96 and 366; Caccamo, Eretici (n. 1), p. 111 and 127; Vasoli, I miti e gli astri (n. 1), 
pp. 366–369.
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events. Human epistemology was restricted to realms accessible to sense percep-
tion and logical reasoning from given data. Dudith doubted whether there were 
miracles kata physin at all. Phenomena which were beyond understanding had to 
be patiently investigated until their secrets were unraveled. 
With regard to cometary theory as well as pharmacology, Dudith was depen-
dent on experts’ knowledge. He was not a scientific observer. After Hagecius had 
corrected his earlier measurement of the comet and admitted that the comet had 
a smaller parallax than the moon, which was in harmony with Brahe’s discover-
ies, Dudith was at once persuaded to abandon Aristotelian meteorology. Comets 
had to be celestial objects far above the moon, and therefore it was impossible 
that they derived from smoky exhalations, since these would never reach the 
planetary spheres. But if comets traverse the ecliptic above the moon, then the 
assumption about the immutability of the heavens must be abandoned.113 A gen-
eration before Kepler, Dudith believed that he could be a pious reader of the Bible, 
with due respect for God’s omnipotence and omniscience, by humbly restricting 
himself to exploring phenomena that were accessible to sense perception. He was 
skeptical, but contemporary research about the location of the comet of 1577 con-
vinced him that progress in scientific method was possible and that therefore 
more riddles of nature would be solved in the future. 
As a reader of the Bible, Dudith drew analogous conclusions. He preferred to 
trust his own reasoning and he frowned at ancient authorities when their doc-
trines disagreed with the literal meaning of the sacred text. He dared to publicly 
sympathize with the Moravian Brethren, when their pedagogy convinced him. 
He also backed Jacobus Palaeologus when the latter was charged with heresy, 
and he wrote to Fausto Sozzini that it was of no use to get involved in theological 
controversies and polemics.114 
Dudith’s letter of 1570 to the Polish nobleman and historian115 Jan Lasicki (La-
sicius, 1534–1602) concerning the Trinity has a similar structure similar to that 
of his Commentariolus. Since it spells out an original confession of antitrinitarian 
faith, it was published only after Dudith’s death. 
Dudith does not approach questions of religion as a diplomat, but addresses 
Lasicius as a friend whom he can trust. Religion and questions of faith require a 
deep personal commitment. Dudith’s efforts to reach a better understanding of 
God and the divine revelation that promised salvation to believers can be com-
pared with his search for certainty about extraordinary celestial events as parts 
of nature. In both cases, his motivation to deviate from accepted opinions is the 
113 Dudith, letter to Hagecius, 19th January 1581, cf. Costil, Dudith (n. 1), p. 358.
114  About Dudith’s sympathies with antitrinitarianism cf. Caccamo, Eretici (n. 1) pp. 119–125.
115 Karol Karski, Art. “Lasicki, Jan“, in: Traugott and Wilhelm Bautz (eds.), Bio-bibliographisches 
Kirchenlexikon, vol. 4, Herzberg 1992, p. 1191n. Lasicius’ Historia […] fratrum Bohemicorum 
was published as a fragment (book VIII with summaries of the other parts) in 1660. Lasi-
cius studied in Basel, Geneva, Zurich, Strasbourg and Heidelberg and was involved in 
polemics against antitrinitarians.
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same. Dudith is amazed by Lasicius’ lack of tolerance, as he is surprised seven 
years later that people are willing to accept Aris totle’s theories in combination 
with Ptolemaic astrology without serious examination. Who will prescribe what 
he, the ex-bishop, is to believe? Lasicius must accept that Dudith’s conversion 
from Roman Catholicism was a step which required serious investigation, for 
why else should Dudith have preferred to leave the splendor of courtly life? If it 
had been sufficient to conceal his personal convictions and simply feign an agree-
ment with the majority, it would not have been necessary to change his entire 
life. To behave like a sophist or a sceptic and to dispute about religion without 
personal commitment was not appropriate in serious matters of religion, when 
salvation was at stake. 
You must know, Lasicius, that if I had been willing or if I were still willing 
to listen with foreign ears or not to use my own eyes, to agree with the 
Pope, how easily I would have got all those things which, according to the 
simple folk, people are usually eagerly striving for, but which only a happy 
few can ever reach.116
Dudith was also not willing to accept astrological interpretations of a comet as a 
symbol of God’s particular communication with His church, for the astrologers 
thereby abused theology to intimidate the simple folk and to lead believers away 
from the Biblical text. 
Dudith’s captatio benevolentiae leaves no doubt to the reader that the issue of 
true belief and its justification are serious matters. Faith is not what remains when 
the faculties of reason and sense fail, but it is, like scientific certainty, the result 
and consequence of sober consideration and examination. Science and faith rely 
on the same tools. 
The narratio begins with a fundamental critique of church doctrine (fol. A 2 v). 
In Dudith’s eyes, it has degenerated to a vain ideology and consists of riddles 
which nobody is able understand, not even experts who had never come to a 
consensus about the definition of the di vi nae personae. The consequence of the 
tiresome effort throughout the history of Christianity to deduce a doctrine about 
God and his properties from the sacred text has been constant quarrel and mu-
tual suspicion of heresy. Dudith starts an analysis of central notions of the Atha-
nasian Symbolum by declaring his reservation about its authorship (fol. A 3 r). 
He refuses to accept Athanasius as a promulgator of a Christian doctrine which 
rather resembles a muddy pool, in comparison with a limpid source such as the 
sacred text itself. Dudith’s deconstruction of necessarily inadequate attempts to 
116 Epistola Andreae Dudithii Sac. Caes. M.[aiesta]tis consiliarii, ad Joannem Lasicium equitem Po-
lonum, In qua de di vi na trinitate, [s.l.] 1590, fol. A 3 r, the pages of the following quotations 
are given in brackets in the text. “Non nescis, Lasici, si alienis auribus audire, si non meis 
oculis cernere, si Papae assentari voluissem, aut nunc quoque vellem, quam iis rebus om-
nibus abundare potuissem, quas vulgo homines magno studio consectantur, nec tamen, 
nisi pauci, consequuntur.”
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
167Attacks on Judicial Astrology, Religious Dissent and the Rise of Skepticism 
define the divine personae might have offended pious ears because of his sublime 
satirical talent. The Trinity is a riddle, a bugbear without a basis in the Biblical 
text. The relationship among Father, Son and Holy Spirit is not at all clear, be-
cause the three personae who are supposed to be identical with only one and the 
same God form a fictitious entity, a pure abstraction. This verbal monstrum gives 
birth to others and comes close to blasphemy. For, from the identity of three di vi-
nae personae, it follows that if God is incarnated in Christ, the Father and the Holy 
Spirit must likewise be incarnations of the same nature, for the Deity cannot be 
divided or dissociated. Hence Trinity itself must be allowed the attribute of being 
incarnated—a monstrous idea (fol. B 3 r). Especially when one turns to the Virgin 
Mary, one would have to admit that the Theotokos gave birth to a hybrid, immane 
monstrum, namely to the Trinity and (allegorically) to the Church. The Missale of 
1538 that was used in Polish churches requires from believers an extraordinary 
veneration of the Holy Virgin, because the Trinity was born from her (fol. B4 r-v). 
Dudith’s exclamation, “O seclum insipiens & infacetum”, is similar to his com-
ments with regard to astrologers’ explanations of how a comet can bring forth 
misfortune and be responsible for bad weather, as well as for man-made disaster. 
Even Luther’s dissociation from the Church of Rome and his neglect of Patristic 
tradition were not radical enough, in Dudith’s view, since he asserted that Christ 
suffered secundum utramque naturam, which implies that together with Christ the 
Creator of the universe had also been slaughtered by the hands of wicked men. 
“Quid potest fingi magis portentosum?” (fol. Cv) 
Dudith’s analysis of notions without a clear denotation and of sentences where 
subject and predicate do not match and that therefore lack a truth value, ends 
with a demystification. After that, Dudith starts with the more edifying part of 
his letter. Christ has more weight than the church and church authorities, for in-
dividual salvation relies on Christ and His message (fol. C 2 r). If we try to follow 
Calvin, who declared that the Symbolum upon which the representatives at Nica-
ea agreed is a solid, trustworthy fundamentum fidei, we must admit that even the 
Symbolum Nicaeanum has lyrical expressions devoid of denotation which are more 
appropriate in a poem than in a confession of faith, where not a single syllable 
may be changed. 
’God from God, light from light, true God from true God’. What’s the use 
of this repetition? Does it give a special emphasis or is the expression more 
forcerful? Thus you realize, that it is a poem, more appropriate for being 
sung, than a confession of faith, in which it is absurd to change a single 
syllable.117 
117 “Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine, Deum verum de deo vero. Quorsum ista repetitio? An 
vel emphasim habet vllam, vel maiorem expressionem? Vides ergo, carmen esse magis 
cantillando aptum, quam formulam confessionis, in qua syllabam vnam abundare, absur-
dum est.” (fol. C 2 v)
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Neither Luther’s exegetical sermons nor the Symbolum Nicaeanum nor Calvin’s 
commentary provided solid norms for a true confession. Dudith thereafter forms 
his own confession by quoting from the New Testament and naming the exact 
source (fol. C 4 r-C 5 v). Jesus is a man, born by a woman and expressing his ideas 
by conversing with His disciples. He was sent as a mediator by his Father, who 
alone deserves full veneration as omnipotent Creator. The Holy Spirit belongs 
both to the Father and the Son and is transmitted by them to the believers, but He 
is neither a persona nor a deity, and therefore needs no adoration by prayers. Du-
dith’s advice to Lasicius to get rid of false doctrines, to free himself from prejudice 
and finally to become familiar with Christ by studying the sacred text, may be 
extended to the believers in astrology and the cometomantices. Whoever declares 
that Dudith is a dangerous heretic because of his unorthodox belief, and that his 
fellowbelievers have to be protected against this dangerous wolf, falls prey to nox-
ious prejudices by pseudo-theologians. “I am talking about different faiths. Keep 
your own opinion, leave my own to me. Nobody should explore the conscience of 
others with curiosity and impudence. Never assume the part of the judge.”118 
By analogy, nobody is entitled to read God’s will from the stars, as though by 
means of the stars He tried to warn his believers. Alluding to Matthew 13:24–30, 
Dudith concludes that it is up to Christ to judge who belongs to His flock. The dis-
tinction between divine omniscience and restricted human knowledge is justified 
with reference to Jesus’ famous parable of the tares. The same attitude is character-
istic of the sceptic, who has no reason to believe what astrologers predict. 
7 The reception of Dudith’s and Squar cia lu pus’ anti-astrological treatises
Elias Maior (1587–1669), director of the famous Gymnasium Elisabethanum in 
Wroclaw, reprinted Dudith’s and Erastus’ treatises when a series of three comets 
appeared at the beginning of the Bohemian War.119 Maior explains in his dedica-
tory preface to his patrons—members of the magistracy—why it is worthwhile 
to reprint Dudithi & Erasti de cometis Commentariolum.120 A group of intellectuals 
found that they had to address the mater of the comet which was observed in 
the winter of 1618 and therefore published their opinions about its significance. 
Maior is made desperate by astrological superstition, which can hardly be erad-
118 “De diuersa fide loquor. Vos vestram sententiam retinete, mihi meuam relinquite. Ne cu-
riose & impudenter alter in alterius conscientiam inquirat. Ne sumamus nobis Iudicis par-
tes.” Ibid., last page. Mino Celsi also added letters by Dudith to his pamphlet against the 
prosecution of heretics, because he appreciated him as his ally in pleading for religious 
tolerance. Cf. Mino Celsi, In haereticis coercendis quatenus progredi liceat; Poems and Corre-
spondences, ed. Peter G. Bietenholz, Napoli/ Chicago 1982, pp. 603–612.
119 De cometarum significatione cl. virorum Andreae Dudithii commentarius, & D. Thomae Erasti sen-
tentia, Elias Maior Vratislaviensis denuo edidit, & adjecit […]. Breslau: Baumann, David Müller 
1619. The booklet is dedicated to Christoph Hentscher, Pro-Chancellor of the Diocesis Bres-
lau; cf. Werner Taegert, “Major, Elias”, in: Killy Literaturlexikon, enlarged second edition, ed. 
by Wilhelm Kühlmann et al., vol. 7, Berlin/ New York 2010, p. 627n. 
120 Maior, De cometarum significatione (n. 119).
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icated once it has been disseminated. Following Scaliger’s reservation about as-
trological and physiological influxus from stars to parts of human bodies, Maior 
repeats Dudith’s arguments for why comets are not prodigies and hence their 
influence on the birth and death of rulers cannot be verified. Reference to experi-
ence does not render the view of a causal connection between heaven and human 
bodies more plausible. While the death of a king is a deplorable loss, the birth of 
a prince is a joyful gain. Maior cites passages from ancient chronicles indicating 
that frequently the birth of an heir to the throne was accompanied by the appear-
ance of a comet. Astrological nativities of princes of the Habsburg dynasty have 
always been presented as eulogies. Loyal authors often enhanced their glamor by 
reference to a comet in connection with the joyful event of the birth of a successor. 
When the death of a ruler whose birth had once been happily announced by a 
comet is equally connected with a later comet’s dire appearance, what then was 
the use of the previous comet, when its happy message would be annihilated by 
the later? Maior presents tiresome lists of kings and dukes who were born and 
who had died. He praises their efforts to negotiate peace treaties that proved to 
be crucial for the survival of Lutheran faith in Silesia, remarking that there were 
quite a few comets that had accompanied or preceded these political events. The 
same is true of the history of the church and the Lutheran faith, which Maior 
summarises. The chain of events that led Emperor Matthias to issue his Epistula 
maiestatis in 1609, which granted Protestants their religious liberties, is completely 
independent of the appearance of comets, no matter whether astrologers argued 
to the contrary. Apparently, the Silesian schoolman invokes agreements, treaties 
and imperial grants as pillars of peace, desperately wishing that their commem-
oration would turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy on the eve of the election 
of the Bohemian king. As Maior notes, Justus Lipsius, who once seemed to be im-
pressed by traditional soothsaying with comets, admitted that he was converted 
to a more reasonable opinion by Dudith’s Commentariolus. His epitaph which can 
still be seen inside the Elisabeth Church in Wroclaw today was donated by the 
widow and is quoted by Maior in full. The epitaph praises Dudith’s excellence, 
his humanist interest in science, his fluency in many languages, his loyalty to 
two emperors, his successful negotiations with foreign potencies and his role as 
pater familias and husband. The citation of the epitaph emphasizes the legacy of 
Dudith’s intellectual standing and his religious tolerance, without any mention 
of his heterodoxy. Maybe Maior hereby wanted to remind the Habsburg party of 
the outstanding qualities of their loyal Counsellor, despite his religious dissent. 
On the occasion of the comets in 1664 and 1665, Johann Andreas Bose (1626–
1674), professor of theology at Wittenberg, published a new edition of the letters by 
Erastus, Dudithius, Squar cia lu pus and Simon Grynaeus, adding a preface of his 
own and some more recent remarks by contemporary observers.121 Bose testifies 
121 Johann Andreas Bose (ed.), De significatv cometarvm dissertationes et ivdicia doctorvm homin-
vm: collecta, emendate, & cometomanticae nostri temporis opposita, Jena 1665. In his table of 
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that the two comets that appeared in 1664 and 1665 provoked terror and fright-
ened the vulgus […] ac simpliciores as well as docti prudentesque. He remembers 
(quoting from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Historiae sui temporis122) that the fright-
ening aspect of a comet in 1556 intimidated Charles V so much that he decided 
to retire. When the Wittenberg professor looked for an authority who would be 
able to stop cometary fears and refute astrological superstition, he came across 
the Dissertationes novae from 1580. He found it worthwhile to reprint the texts de 
significatione Cometarum, because the weight of their argument and the beautiful 
style were as convincing in 1665 as they had been more than 80 years earlier. 
Dudith and his allies once and for all vanquished astrological superstition. Since 
up to now, it was argued, the nature of comets and their origins are unknown, 
nobody is entitled to predict their effects or speculate on their significance (fol. ):( 
3 r). The Lutheran professor, is cautious enough, however, to emphasize that he 
does not want to interfere with theologians who still interpret comets as divine 
messengers. Bose’s biographical details do not conceal that Dudith started his 
career as a bishop and Hungarian representative at the Council of Trent. His Ora-
tiones were published by Quirinus Reuter, professor of theology in Heidelberg. 
Squar cia lu pus was a religious refugee from Italy who spent his later years in 
Poland. Although little is known about his career, he also deserves being remem-
bered, and therefore Bose quotes Dudith’s eulogy: “nihil in hoc genere eruditius, 
acutius, elegantius siue a nostris, siue a veteribus scriptum esse existimaret”.123 
The catalogue of more recent men of science (mostly astronomers), who all agree 
with Dudith and his circle in denouncing astrological superstition and defeat-
ing erroneous doctrines, names authorities who are affiliated with three different 
churches: Julius Caesar Scaliger, Benedictus Pererius SJ, Johann Baptista Riccioli 
SJ, Pierre Gassendi as well as Philipp Müller (1585–1659), professor of physics and 
mathematics at Leipzig, whose classes Bose had attended. 
8	 Stanislas	Lubienietzki’s	Theatrum Cometicum
Stanislaw Lubieniecki (1623–1675) acknowledges that the battle against astrolog-
ical soothsaying from comets, to which he contributed his Theatrum Cometicum, 
began with Erastus, Dudith and Squar cia lu pus. Lubienietzki, son of a Polish no-
bleman who had served as a Unitarian pastor in Rákow, studied law, accompa-
content he listed De significatu Cometarum JUDICIA […] Julii Caesaris Scaligeri p. 133, Bene-
dicti Pererii p. 134, Simonis Grynaei and Philippi Mulleri p. 154, Thomae Fieni p. 159, Johannis 
Baptistae Riccioli p. 173, Petri Gassendi p. 174 and Jacobi Primerosii p. 177. Cf. Christian Gott-
lieb Jöcher, Compendiöses Gelehrten-Lexicon, Leipzig 1733 (3 rd edition), art. “Bose, Johann 
Andreas” in column 493.
122 Jacobus Augustus Thuanus, Historiarum sui temporis opera, Offenbach 1609, ad annum 1556, 
p. 370 A: “Iam antea pridie Non. Mart. Ingens & lucidum sidus sinuoso flexu flammiferum 
crinem trahens in octauo Librae gradu per XII dies continuos arsit; quo viso Caesar mor-
tem sibi portendi ratus omnia ad profectionem necessaria comparari iusserat[…]. “
123 Dudith, Letter to Erastus, in: De cometis dissertationes novae, p. 29.
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nied a young Polish nobleman during his studies to Amsterdam, Orléans, Sau-
mur, Angers, Paris and Leiden, became a Unitarian pastor and tried to make his 
living by collecting political news which he offered to the Kings of Sweden, Den-
mark and Poland as a journalist. He had to flee from Poland during the war with 
Sweden, and he implored the King of Denmark for refuge. After short residenc-
es in Stettin, Copenhagen and Altona, Lubienietzki finally settled in Hamburg. 
Wherever he lived, he tried to negotiate religious tolerance for the members of the 
Unitarian congregation, for which he felt responsible, but he was persecuted and 
condemned by Lutheran theologians as soon as he began discussions about reli-
gious topics. He was convinced of the superiority of his faith, which he praised as 
truly and literally catholic. Queen Christina of Sweden was interested in debat-
ing with the versatile nobleman. He temporarily served as a secretary to the Dan-
ish and Polish Kings, collecting news from European courts and intellectuals, but 
was never their ambassador, as he seemed to pretend to be, in order to maintain 
his residence as a refugee.124 
He observed the comet of 1664 from his house in Hamburg and wrote down 
his observations, which he sent to other noblemen and mathematicians, no matter 
whether they were Roman Catholics, Lutherans or Calvinists, among them Isma-
el Bouilleau (1605–1694), who converted to Roman Catholicism in 1631, Athana-
sius Kircher SJ (1602–1680), Johannes Hevelius (1611–1687) and Henry Oldenburg 
(1618/19–1677). His letters were published and richly illustrated in the first volume 
of his Theatrum Cometicum.125 Five copies are preserved in the Royal Library at Co-
penhagen, three of them with handwritten dedications to King Frederic II, Duke 
of Gottorp, to Christian Albrecht and to Queen Christina of Sweden, whom he 
tried to win as his patrons.126 
In the second volume, Lubienietzki presented a catalogue of all the comets 
since the Biblical Deluge. He intended to present all the available sources about 
each comet and was particularly interested in exact descriptions of their posi-
tions and courses. He devotes three chapters to each comet, beginning with its 
description, then quoting eyewitnesses who drew their own conclusions as to its 
presumed significance, and ending with a summary of his own, listing political 
events which he thought might be associated with the appearance. Thanks to an 
124 Kai Eduard Jordt-Jörgensen, Stanislaw Lubieniecki—zum Weg des Unitarismus von Ost nach 
West im 17. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1968, pp. 21–102; Michal Choptiany, “The theater of cos-
mic and human history”, in: Chronologia Universalis. Research-project Calendars and chronology 
in the intellectual culture of Early Modern Europe, funded by the Polish National Excellence Center, 
January 2014, Web address: chronologiauniversalis. Wordpress.com/tag/theatrum-cometi-
cum (opened Dec. 18, 2018).
125 Stanislaus Lubienietzki, Theatrum cometicum in tres tomos distinctum, Amsterdam 1667. The 
three volumes have separate frontispieces. I: Communicationes de cometis a. 1664 & 1665 cum 
viris per Europam cl. habitas […], II: sive historia cometarum a diluvio ad a. 1665 […], III: Theatri 
Cometici Exitus, de significationibus cometarum […]; cf. Christoph Sandius, Bibliotheca Antitri-
nitariorum (n. 7), pp. 165–168.
126 Jordt-Jörgensen, Lubieniecki, (n. 121) pp. 92–94.
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increasing number of astronomical publications, the mathematical data provid-
ed by professional observers of the comets of 1606, 1618/1619, 1653 and 1661 are 
particularly rich and accurate. The enumeration of single, sometimes petty his-
torical events which were not presented as a coherent narrative, but supposedly 
preceded, accompanied or followed the appearance of a comet, is puzzling, if any 
conclusion can be drawn from this overwhelmingly ‘baroque’ list of heteroge-
neous news at all. Lubienietzki does not explicitly deny that heavenly appearanc-
es and terrestrial events—whether they were happy or unhappy—are linked, but 
tries hard to show how the mass of collected historical data can be related with 
the unusual celestial phenomenon. Four narrative principles can be recognized 
which, however, give no answer to the purposes of divine providence: a) fortu-
nate events may follow from unfortunate events and vice versa; b) the judgment 
of what is awful and what is comforting depends on the geographic position and 
the viewpoint of the eyewitness. Thus wars, for example, are always dreadful for 
victims, but promising for those who want to enlarge their territories. Likewise, 
the death of an emperor certainly afflicts his subjects, but also gives rise to prom-
ising new initiatives. c) Events which are dreadful for some who suffer from them 
are outweighed by events which promise a better future. Thus in 1618, the afflic-
tions caused by wars and other inconveniences is counterbalanced by hope elicit-
ed by weddings of kings and princes or the birth of a successor to the throne.127 d) 
A chain of unhappy events does not start as soon as a comet appears, but can also 
precede it. The merely superficial connection between heavenly appearance and 
events on earth suggests that guidelines for writing history cannot be gathered 
from astronomical observations or astrological speculations. Events which matter 
in politics and society have more to do with ethics and generally with anthropol-
ogy. The course of history has a complexity which cannot be simplified by tell-
ing the facts as a quasi-causal sequence of occurrences. Lubienietzki’s enormous 
effort to mirror the simultaneity of what happened in one single year in Europe 
under the more or less accidental impression of a comet makes it impossible to 
describe the single events according to any political logic or as a psychological 
sequence. In many cases, Lubienietzki’s arrangement of historical facts gives the 
impression that history is a mere chaos, whose sense can only be guessed subse-
quently when we know the outcome and may judge what is just or unjust, good 
or evil about it from a down-to-earth perspective. In any case, interpretations are 
avoided which could make the reader believe in a causal relationship between a 
comet and political history. Lubienietzki’s way of relating single events and tell-
ing history is meant to disprove traditional opinions about comets as messengers 
of evil. The enormous mass of historical evidence can be independently read as 
an annalistic chronicle.
127 Lubienietzki, Theatrum cometicum (n. 122), p. 436: “Non deerunt huic tempestati laeta hy-
menaeorum & natalium Principum solemnia, quae bellorum aliorumque incommodorum 
tristitiam dispungebant.”
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A third volume of the Theatrum cometicum dealt with the astrological signif-
icance of comets. In the “Exitus” of the work, the question of God’s purpose in 
creating comets is negotiated in a series of letters which were exchanged between 
Hamburg and Amsterdam. The arguments that we know from the Dudith circle 
are repeated; hence, skepticism is recommended as an appropriate attitude, given 
our present knowledge, for the nature of comets is still unknown. The tradition-
al opinion that comets are messengers of evil, announcing God’s punishments, 
is ridiculed as superstition. There is an emphasis on the ethical consequences of 
astrology, for as Lubienietzki suggests to his Dutch colleague Franciscus Cuperus 
(Kuypers), there is common agreement that neither God nor man is subject to side-
real influence, there is no necessary fate determining the course of human affairs, 
and the Creator’s plans are inaccessible to believers. The opinion that comets have 
a supernatural significance is not rejected directly, but receives an ethical turn. 
Apparently Nicodemism, a pragmatic assimilation to the religious customs 
of the majority of Lutherans in Hamburg and Denmark, was an attitude which 
Lubienietzki recommended in the case of scientific questions that had the tenden-
cy to interfere with theology. A kind of scientific Nicodemism is manifest in the 
dialogue between Lubienietzki and Cuperus. The catalogue of past comets and 
the history of nations and governments had the purpose of falsifying the ancient 
saying that there is no comet without ensuing evil. Given the experience of past 
comets, which shows that comets are accompanied and followed by as many pos-
itive as negative events, we must admit that a comet is a Janus-faced portentum: 
a threat to the wicked and a messenger of favorable events to the righteous and 
pious people. It can happen that one and the same event may be reduced to var-
ious causes and the other way around, that two diverse effects derive from one 
and the same cause. Therefore, a comet has different meanings, depending on 
who looks at it and where the observer is located. Whoever agrees with this opin-
ion ought to abandon altogether the traditional view of the conjunction between 
comets and terrestrial events, since no causal connection can be established be-
tween the celestial body and any one particular event. 
Whoever expresses fear of comets is admitting that he has reasons to be afraid 
of the future or of God’s Last Judgment. Superstitious fear because of the appari-
tion of a comet surely indicates an uneasy conscience. The question of astrologi-
cal relevance and the significance of extraordinary celestial objects vanishes, once 
Lubienietzki’s psychological analysis is accepted. Presumably the Nicodemite128 
ridicules—with due caution as a refugee who was viewed with suspicions—any 
effort to defend astrological predictions from comets by the intriguing claim that 
people who do not care about them have no religion. 
128 Christoph Sandius mentions a book written by Lubienietzki incognito with the following 
title: Paraenesis ad Nicodemitas, sub nomine Timothei Christiani (manuscript); cf. Christoph 
Sandius, Bibliotheca Antitrinitariorum, (n. 7), p. 168.
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In his correspondence with Cuperus, Lubienietzki remembers that the battle 
against cometomantices began with Erastus and Dudithius, to whom famous 
contemporary astronomers like Riccioli, Hevelius and Bullialdus can be added.129 
Meanwhile, peripatetic theory has been replaced by the conviction that comets 
are celestial bodies with paths similar to planetary orbs (although not parallel 
with them). Squar cia lu pus had already concluded that they are too distant to in-
fluence the atmosphere. In the manner of Dudith and Squar cia lu pus, Lubienietz-
ki abstains from irritating people who conjecture that comets transmit a dreadful 
message. He rather agrees with Squar cia lu pus, who suggested a wide sense of 
“portenta” as extraordinary, unusual phenomena which, however, follow from 
natural laws partly unknown. In this sense, comets may be named portenta just 
as halos or parhelia are. This may appear as a play on words. It is important to 
emphasize that the freedom of action is not hampered by any fatal necessity de-
termined by comets. The signs mentioned in the gospel that are to announce the 
end of the world do not refer to comets. This is why, he says, the Jews ignored 
them. Thus comets may signify propitious events to good people and evil to the 
wicked. In an Apotelesma Lubienietzki quotes Biblical verdicts against astrologi-
cal di vi nation, which was forbidden to the Jews in the Pentateuch. “Utinam verò 
omnes libero corde serviamus Domino, cujus in manu omnia nostra sit!”130 Com-
ets are a kind of joker, reminding the believers of an incomprehensible divine 
justice signaled by extraordinary celestial phenomena. Lubienietzki assures his 
readers that comets have at last a significatio ethica: comets, like other extraordi-
nary phenomena in nature, rather mirror the state of the observer’s conscience. 
9 The aftermath of cometary skepticism—Johann Jacob Müller’s defense  
of	the	traditional	view—a	lost	battle
In 1665 comets were regarded as objects the nature of which was still unknown. 
In any case, there was no more reason to be afraid of a comet’s physical effects. 
Squar cia lu pus’ conjecture that a comet was too far from the earth to exert phys-
ical influence on events was the accepted view by the middle of the 17th century. 
Since Kepler’s observations of the comet in 1607, observers had tried to find out 
whether its path was straight or curved. Its presumable orbit, which only pres-
ents itself in parts to observers at different places, became the dominant topic in 
cometary discourse. The association of its shape and color with the properties 
of a planet nearby was furthermore dismissed as pagan astrology, which had 
attributed to the planets the properties of the gods whose names they had.
In November 1680, a bright comet appeared with an impressive fan-like tail. It 
changed its direction abruptly, after it had passed its perihelion on the 18th of De-
cember. To scientific observers who had studied Kepler, Descartes, Gassendi and 
129 Lubienietzki, Theatrum cometicum (n. 122), pars III: Theatri Cometici Exitus, p. 9 (separate 
pagination).
130 Ibid., p. 11.
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Hevelius, it seemed more likely that the apparition in the winter sky was rather 
one celestial object that followed a steep elliptic or parabolic path than that two dif-
ferent comets had appeared which were heading in opposite directions.131 Johann 
Christoph Sturm (1635–1703), professor of physics and mathematics at Altdorf, 
described the celestial object in the light of Descartes’ vortex cosmology, exam-
ining thereby the theories of Hevelius and Pierre Petit as well, but he completely 
disregarded questions about its function as a divine messenger.132 Erhard Weigel 
(1625–1699), Professor of Mathematics at Jena and calendar writer, considered the 
comet with respect to the tradition as an extraordinary preacher sent by God.133 
Dudith and Squar cia lu pus had suggested that investigations of cometary theo-
ries and observations of a comet ought to be dissociated from the theological bias 
that astrological predictions usually encouraged. They see conjectures that God 
had sent a comet to warn his believers and announce his wrath, etc., as an assault 
on piety. Their furor anti-astrologicus suggests that religious non-conformists were 
more willing to surrender traditional views of nature than Lutheran theologians. 
But the claim of both Antitrinitarians, that only the Bible comprised God’s revela-
tion, was still regarded as an offense by some Protestant comet preachers in 1681. 
Sermons on the occasion of a comet (Kometenpredigten) were in 1680/81 still a 
popular genre in Protestant popular literature. Some Lutheran preachers were 
eager to make their readers familiar with the opinions of contemporary astron-
omers, thereby adding edifying observations about physico- or astrotheology.134 
The shape, color and course of a comet inspired them to interpret it as an allegor-
ical sign in the book of nature. More conservative theologians thought it expedi-
ent to draw the attention of their flock to what they saw as divine messengers, as 
a means of increasing their piety. On the occasion of the spectacular apparition, 
they thought it worthwhile to admonished their flock to keep their distance from 
epicureanism and atheism. From the viewpoint of more enlightened colleagues, 
131 Meinel, Grenzgänger (n. 2), pp. 92–101; idem, “Kometenflugschriften” (n. 2), pp. 78–80, 230 
brochures (most of them in German) were devoted to the comet. A summary of the contro-
versy about the winter comet in 1680 is presented in my commentaries on two illustrated 
broadsheets of this phenomenon. Cf. Harms et al. (eds.), Illustrierte Flugblätter, vol. I (n. 2), 
nrs. 209–210. 
132 Johann Christoph Sturm, Cometarum natura, motus et origo […], Altdorf 1681; cf. Meinel, 
Grenz gänger, pp. 92–94.
133 Erhard Weigel, Himmels-Zeiger der Bedeutung bey Erscheinung des ungemeinen Cometen, Anno 
1680 vom 5. November an beobachtet, Jena 1681; cf. Meinel, Grenzgänger, p. 97n.; idem, Kome-
tenflugschriften, p. 79.
134 A few examples: Gespräch zwischen einem Naturkündiger, Politico und Geistlichen, Nürnberg 
1681; Caspar Neumann, Des Noah Regenbogen/ Und der itzt Brennende Comet, Breslau 1681; 
Simon Bornmeister, Christlich/ Vernünfftige Cometen-Betrachtung, Nürnberg 1681; Georg Sa-
muel Dörffel, Astronomische Betrachtung des Grossen Cometen […] Nebenst etlichen sonderlichen 
sonderbahren Fragen und neuen Denckwürdigkeiten/ sonderlich von Verbesserung der Hevelischen 
Theoriae cometarum, Plauen 1681; Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer, article “Dörffel, Georg Samu-
el”, in Killy Literaturlexikon, second enlarged edition by Wilhelm Kühlmann et al, vol. 3, 
Berlin/ New York 2008, pp. 68–70; Meinel, „Kometenflugschriften“ (n. 2). 
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these preachers were continuing to propagate a childish superstition when they 
assumed that comets implicitly belonged to the Biblical signs announcing the 
Last Judgment and that they conveyed an allegorical meaning which—like the 
rainbow as a symbol of God’s peace after the Deluge (Genesis 9:16)—may be deci-
phered by simple folk and by men of science alike. 
Following Me lanch thon’s tradition, Lutheran preachers warned that Epicure-
an contempt for comets, as well as pre-Christian superstition, were pitfalls on 
both sides of a recommended middle road.135 Caspar Neumann (1648–1715), a 
Silesian preacher who was also well trained in astronomy, thought it worthwhile 
to introduce his readers and listeners to cometary theory, still emphasizing that 
comets function as extraordinary preachers to those who do not care for the Bib-
lical message.136 He argued that biblical revelation and reason cannot be contra-
dictory, since they rise from the same divine source. God entrusted the keys to 
His heavenly kingdom to the preachers of His word, who moreover had access to 
the keys of natural wisdom by studying astronomy. After his clear-cut demarca-
tion between the domains of astronomy and theology, Neumann explained that 
comets had a supernatural meaning, like the rainbow for Noah. Comets were 
like other extraordinary works of creation and wonders of nature in witnessing 
God’s omnipotence. Nevertheless, the conviction that comets have an allegorical 
meaning which served as a moral guideline apart from the Bible had nothing to 
do with astrological superstition. 
A few years before comets were finally identified by Dörffel, Edmond Halley 
and Isaac Newton as celestial objects with orbits that could be calculated, refer-
ences to Dudith, Squar cia lu pus and Brutus were still up to date in comet tracts, 
because they accused the boldness and insolence of comet preachers who abused 
theology to intimidate their believers. Alarming comet sermons were a case for 
magistrates, who were concerned to maintain public order and therefore were in-
terested in preventing panic due to frightening heavenly events like the appear-
ance of comets. Stirring horror from the apparition of a comet was deemed irre-
sponsible. Irrational fear raised by a childish superstition might promote panic 
reactions.137 Preachers who spread frightening messages should not be tolerated, 
135 Johann Mayer, Vorstellung Deß jüngst-erschienenen Cometen […], Ulm 1681.
136 Caspar Neumann, Des Noah Regenbogen und der itzt brennende Comet, Breslau 1681, pp. 7–9, 
19–24, 32n. and 35n; Barbara Bauer, Art. „Neumann, Caspar“, in: Killy Literaturlexikon, 
vol. 8, Gütersloh 1990, p. 364 and 373.
137 Here is a short list of titles which criticize comet sermons as using pia fraus: Anti-Scepti-
cus. Verwerffung des Cometen-Gespötts, [s.l.] 1681; Unmaßgebliches Bedencken/ Ob die Kometen 
zukünfftige Unglücks-Fälle […] verkündigen. Aus Veranlassung des jüngsthin neu-erschienenen 
Cometen, [s.l.] 1681; Wiederholtes vnd vertheidigtes ohnmaßgebliches Bedencken von der Cometen-
Bedeutung/ wider die bey einer vnter dem Namen Zettel-Schreyer/ vor wenig Tagen außgegangenen 
Cometen-Predigt, [s.l.] 1681; Fax mira non dira: Das ist/ Strobel-Schwantz-Stern/ Bart-Cometen/ 
Seynd nicht böse Straf-Propheten. Oder Auß der H Schrifft/ der Natur und Erfahrung gezogener 
Bericht und Beweißthum/ daß die Cometen Nach gemeinen und irrigen Wahn keine Unglücks-Ster-
ne seyen [s.l.] 1681; Simon Bornmeister, Christlich-vernünfftige Cometen-Betrachtung, Nürn-
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but reprimanded as mischief makers. When they discredited themselves and 
abused the Gospel by their unbiblical interpretation of celestial phenomena that 
astronomers hoped to explain naturally, the magistrate should be entitled to sus-
pend them from their ministry. Thus the misconduct of theologians who used 
comets as a means to increase piety by intimidation was a common topic in Ger-
man pamphlets that were issued only few years before Pierre Bayle argued that, 
compared with the noxious effects of superstition, a society of enlightened atheists 
would be a lesser evil than a collection of superstitious Christians. The burden of 
proof with regard to religious orthodoxy was no longer on those who sympathized 
with the Antitrinitarian intellectuals of the 16th century, but rather, it was now the 
turn of comet preachers to justify themselves for declaring a comet supernatural. 
Enlightened followers of Dudith, Erastus and Squar cia lu pus were eager to 
demonstrate that true Christians had the task of distinguishing between God’s 
commandments, and natural phenomena on Earth that could be scientifically ex-
plored by reference to natural laws.
Thomas Erastus und Marcellus Scarcia-Lupus [!], Hochgelehrte Männer/ 
[haben] den Cometen das Schmachkleid allerdings abgezogen/ und mit 
sattem grund bewisen/ daß solche keines/ weder gemeinen noch sonder-
baren Jamers Zeichen/ weniger eine Vrsach weren/ wider die Cometsch-
reier (Cometomanticeis). Mich/ der ich zwaren vormals anderst gesinnet 
war/ haben sie jedoch mit etwas zwang auch auf ihre Seiten gebracht/ und 
gelehrt/ mit dapferkeit die Vernunft brauchen (fortiter philosophari) das 
ist/ ob mich in geringsten [nicht] bestürzen zu lassen.138 
Johann Jacob Müller’s Theologisches Bedencken is an answer to an anonymous 
pamphlet (Scarteck), in which ministers were suspected of abusing their office 
and were accused of misunderstanding Holy Scripture by teaching what Müller 
deemed simply his duty: “die ausser-ordentliche Himmels-Zeichen/ als die Com-
eten sind/ seyen Göttliche Schröckzeichen/ darzu geordnet/ dass sie die sichere 
Welt aus jhrem Schlaff zur Buss aufmahnen und wecken.“139 
berg 1681; Johann c. Burggrav, Wolgemeinter und Nicht weniger warhaffter Discours, Von den 
Prognosticis und Deutung der Cometen, Frankfurt a. M. 1681.
138 [Anonymous] Philologischer Discurs über der Cometen Bedeutung, Zürich 1665, p. 12, with ref-
erence to Matthias Bernegger; cf. Rudolf Wolf, “Notizen zur Geschichte der Mathematik 
und Physik in der Schweiz“, in: Mitteilungen der naturforschenden Gesellschaft in Bern 87–166 
(1847–1849), pp. 101–108. Although Anonymous agrees with Squar cia lu pus’ critique of ju-
dicial astrology and prefers Seneca’s opinion (in Naturales quaestiones VII,28) to the peri-
patetic comet theory, he does not reject the opinion, ”daß die Wunderzeichen Gottes uns 
einzig und allein zu Gott und seinem Wort weisen und leiten“ (p. 3 and 32).
139 Theologisches Bedencken/ über das Jüngsthin ohne Anzeig deß Auctoris, Zeit und Orts in Druck 
gegebene also genante Einfältige Bedencken von Cometen Als fälschlich eingebildeten/ und ohne 
Grund der Schrifft außgeruffenen Buß=Predigern/ zusampt einem Lateinischen Anhang wider 
Marcell. Squarcialupum und Andream Dudithium. Gestellet durch M. Jo. Jacob Müllern/ Ulmens. 
Deß Ehrwürdigen Ministerii zu Augspurg Seniorem und Pfarrern der Evangelischen Kirchen zu 
Parfüssern genandt, Frankfurt 1681, An den Christlichen Leser. The anti-astrological Scar-
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Müller was indignant because the anonymous pamphleteer, obviously a lay 
person, dared to teach him how to use Holy Scripture correctly. The pamphleteer 
denounced the supposed duties of comet preachers by pretending that ministers 
ought to explain the Bible instead of interpreting comets as divine messengers, 
even though the Bible does not mention them at all. Müller took pains to show 
that the prophesies in Matthew 24 and Luke 24 could be extended to the evil 
significance of comets. Müller continues by analyzing the anonymous objections 
sentence by sentence, searching for appropriate passages about all kinds of heav-
enly signs in the Holy Scripture. He distinguishes between articles of faith that 
may be deduced from the Bible, and other issues which cannot be directly derived 
from the teaching of Jesus and the prophets, but only implicitly linked to them. 
Physicotheology provides arguments from scientific observations of nature in 
favor of God’s existence, His omnipotence and His omniscience as the benign 
Creator. “Gottes aber in seinen Wercken preisen/ ist ein Gottesdienst” (p. 6). God 
not only manifests his omnipotence by anomalies of nature; his ingenuity can 
be detected by scien tists who try to trace the laws of nature according to which 
God acts. Thus, the properties of a magnet may be praised because they manifest 
the subtle wisdom of God, although these are ignored by the sacred authors, 
but these qualitates occultae can also be scientifically investigated.. The attractive 
forces inside the magnet call for an allegorical interpretation. The same is true 
of comets. Holy Scripture teaches us how to admire the works of Creation and to 
make use of them in order to gain a better understanding of God. Deus & natura 
nihil facient frustra: therefore we may expect that extraordinary phenomena such 
as comets have a divine purpose, which can be guessed from their shape and 
color. They are “ein Anzeig/ daß der Herr in seiner Ruhe verstöret/ sich auffge-
machet habe zu drohen/ zu richten und zu straffen.” (p. 9) It is Müller’s ambition 
to demonstrate that he is an expert in the hermeneutics of the Bible as well as in 
the teaching of orthodox faith. He also quotes famous astronomers of his time 
in favor of the supernatural significance of comets. Gianbattista Riccioli SJ had 
defended the central position of an immobile Earth in a cosmos where the fixed 
stars rotated at an enormous speed. Properties of celestial objects which tran-
scend our imagination were particularly appropriate to inspire our admiration of 
God’s omnipotence, for the plans of his Providence were far beyond the laws of 
nature that scien tists were able to deduce. Therefore Riccioli also recommended 
that his readers look at comets as divine messengers urging us to repentance 
(p. 55). If comets were of elementary matter and were objects in the atmosphere, 
they might still have lasting physical effects. If, however, comets were made of 
heavenly matter, they would be closer to God and have the task of warning us 
teck can be identified: Vnmaßgebliches Bedencken/ Ob die Cometen zukünfftige Vnglücksfälle/ als 
Krieg/ Theurung/ Pestilentz/ grosser Herrn Todt etc. verkündigen. Auß Veranlassung des jüngsthin 
neu-erschienenen Cometen/ Auff vielfältiges Begehren und Anhalten kürtzlich eylfertig/ und einfäl-
tig entworfen. […] 1681. 
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to be aware of His majesty and Providence, in which case their effects would be 
even more fundamental and general. 
The spiritus rector lurking behind the anonymous author of the Scarteck was still 
identified with Squar cia lu pus, whose mockery of theologians offended Müller 
in particular. In his “Opinion von Cometen” Squar cia lu pus “eifert und gaifert 
wider die Theologen/ so die Cometen für himmlische Zorn-Zeichen ansehen” 
(Müller, Vorrede). He and Dudith are the precursors of contemporaries who rid-
icule theologians („unserer heutigen Verächter berühmter Vorgänger”). Müller 
rebuffed the suspicion of manipulating his flock by pia fraus. Conscientious theo-
logians would never apply bad means in order to achieve something beneficent; 
otherwise they would be defying God’s commandments (p. 66n). Müller is aware 
that the suspicion of pia fraus undermines the authority of theologians and rath-
er encourages dissenters to mockery: “indem man den Spöttern Anlas zu sagen 
gibet: sihe/ die Priester braucht man nur/ daß sie sollen den gemeinen Mann im 
Zwang halten/ vnd ihm von der Hölle sagen/ wann er zu muthig wird/ und vom 
Himmel/ wann er zu sehr betrübt ist.” (p. 67) If this were true, the effect of a com-
et sermon would be just the opposite of what the preacher intended. Hopefully, 
the mockers are not atheists themselves. But mockers of this kind denying the 
arrival of the Last Judgment had already been named by Peter in his second letter 
(2 Peter 3:3–4). Müller protested against the impression evoked by the reformed 
historian Jacques-Auguste de Thou (1553–1617) that Charles V had fallen prey to 
comet preachers, evidenced by his deciding to retire, because he was afraid of 
the threatening consequences of the comet in 1556. 140 Actually, the Emperor was 
prompted to abdicate for other reasons.
The most intriguing mocker, however, is Squar cia lu pus. His opinio de Cometa 
inspired Müller to write a detailed refutation in Latin which covers 45 pages. 
But what means does Müller have to justify himself and save his reputation? He 
comes up with traditional polemics: Jesuits recommend pia fraus, surely not Lu-
therans! (p. 6–9) Squar cia lu pus is not able to produce scholarly syllogisms. His 
reasoning is deficient: “arguatur argutiolam illam frivolam & vulgarem, nullum 
fore cometarum finem, totumque semper coelum incendijs arsurum, si propter 
peccata cometae ex alto incendantur” (p. 40). Squar cia lu pus here talks about sins 
in general, although he does not take into account crimes which provoke God’s 
particular indignation. When the Italian physician is doubtful about the means 
of divine Providence and suggests that there were less ambivalent ways for God 
to threaten than by comets that do not just vanish as soon as His intention is ful-
filled, Müller launches Paul’s admonitio to his enemy (Romans 9:20): Who are you 
that you dare to prescribe to your Creator which means are the most appropriate 
for Him? (Appendix, p. 5) There is good evidence for the conjecture that comets 
were included among the signs that announce the Last Judgment (according to 
Matthew 24 and Luke 21). In his Historia belli Judaici, Flavius Josephus mentioned 
140 Cf. above, note 119. Thuanus, Historiarum sui temporis opera, p. 370 A.
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among the miraculous omina a comet which had the shape of a sword and antic-
ipated the ruin of the temple as well as the surrender of Jerusalem to the Roman 
enemies141 (p. 17). There are other testimonies from an tiqui ty confirming that in 
the year 72 the comet which looked like a celestial sword dangling above Jeru-
salem was extraordinary and supernatural. Objections that the apparition could 
not have been a comet, for it was stationary, hanging and quivering (libravit, vi-
bravit) in the sky for one year, were destroyed by Riccioli (p. 19). At last Müller 
pulls an argument against the adversary ab auctoritate ecclesiae from his quiver, 
owing to a lack of further scientific arguments to defend his case: Anyway, An-
titrinitarians are not trustworthy and are no experts in interpreting the Bible. 
Dudith succumbed to Squar cia lu pus’ bad influence when he characterized Holy 
Scripture as a regula Lesbia, which Müller finds scandalous (p. 41). He quotes at 
length Gisbert Voetius dealing with Squar cia lu pus and his allies Lelio and Fausto 
Sozzini and Valentino Gentile in his Exercitatio de prognosticis Cometarum. They 
were refugees who were freely admitted by the Protestant church, where they 
propagated their blasphemies without hindrance (p. 42). Likewise, Dudith wrote 
a blasphemous letter to Jan Lasicki, in which the notion of the Trinity is reduced 
to absurdity (p. 43). Müller blamed Antitrinitarians for not being trustworthy as 
theologians. The argument exactly mirrors Dudith’s and Squar cia lu pus’ appre-
hension that they might be accused of impiety because they did not accept the 
authority of theological soothsayers. While both may be credited with paving 
the way to new science by arguing from experience and common sense, Müller’s 
defense of the supernatural significance of comets ignores Dudith’s and Squar -
cia lu pus’ advice not to interfere with God’s secret council, but to focus merely on 
phenomena which were accessible to reason and to the senses. These tools served 
equally to analyze the sacred text and the book of nature. Dudith and Squar cia -
lu pus defied the doctrine of the Church as an illegitimate abstraction from the 
Biblical text. Their critical attitude and quest for knowledge based on experience 
and solid reasoning moved the two intellectuals to publicly defeat the astrologastri 
and their blasphemous theology. 
The debate about comets and astrological predictions of catastophes follow-
ing them was instigated by Dudith and his circle. They rigorously denied the 
theological framework of astrology that Me lanch thon and his followers had con-
structed. Dudith and his circle initiated a controversy that was still current when 
Pierre Bayle published his Pensées diverses sur la comète. I assume that Bayle was 
aware that his reasoning against the Aristotelian theory and against the conjec-
ture that comets are signs of a divine message took advantage of anti-astrological 
arguments by radical Protestants.142 Bayle argues that if God had created comets 
141 Flavius Josephus, “Von den jüdischen Kriegen”, book VI, ch. 31, in Conrad Lauterbach’s 
German translation Flauij Josephi […] Historien vnd Bücher: Von alten jüdischen Geschich-
ten […], Strasbourg 1574, p. 547. 
142 Bayle, Pensées diverses sur la comète (n. 71), vol. 1, §§ 57 and 75, vol. 2, § 11, 146, §§ 227–230; cf. 
Yves Bizeul, “Pierre Bayles Kritik des Aberglaubens und Plädoyer für die Toleranz”, in: 
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with the purpose of stimulating piety, he might be blamed for having supported 
idolatry. The God of the Cometomantices is a heathen deity. Bayle provides a sub-
tle caricature of the way theologians like Müller defended the popular belief in 
comets as prodigies. Bayle’s famous argument that astrological superstition, a 
legacy from pre-Christian times, is more harmful to a society than the reason-
ing of atheists who are aware of their moral responsibility, is also reminiscent of 
Dudith’s and Squar cia lu pus’ reasoning that astrologers who accuse their more 
enlightened enemies of impiety in fact abuse theology themselves to defend su-
perstition.143
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ris, Zeit und Orts in Druck gegebene also genante Einfältige Bedencken von Cometen 
Als fälschlich eingebildeten/ und ohne Grund der Schrifft außgeruffenen Buß=Predigern/ 
zu sampt einem Lateinischen Anhang wider Marcell. Squarcialupum und Andream Dudi -
thium. Gestellet durch M. Jo. Jacob Müllern/ Ulmens. Deß Ehrwürdigen Ministerii zu 
Augs purg Seniorem und Pfarrern der Evangelischen Kirchen zu Parfüssern genandt, 
Frank furt 1681.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
183Attacks on Judicial Astrology, Religious Dissent and the Rise of Skepticism 
Lubienietzki, Stanislaus, Theatrum cometicum in tres tomos distinctum, Amsterdam 1667.
Luther, Martin “Predigten des Jahres 1522“, in: Martin Luthers Werke, Weimarer Ausga -
be, vol. X/2, Weimar 1925, pp. 93–120.
—, “Vorrede auff die weissagung des Johannis Lichtenbergers,” Wittenberg 1527, in: 
Aby Warburg, Heidnisch-antike Weissagung in Bild und Text zu Luthers Zei ten, Hei-
delberg 1920, ed. by Dieter Wuttke, 1978, pp. 81–86.
Peucer, Caspar, De praecipuis di vi nationum generibus […] recognitus et auctus […], Frank-
furt 1594.
Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni, Disputationes adversus astrologiam di vi natricem (Bolo-
gna 11496), ed. by Eugenio Garin, Florence 1946–1952, vol. 1.
Plinius Secundus, Gaius, Liber II Caii Plinii [secundi] de mundi historia, cum commentari-
is Iacobi Milichii, diligenter conscriptis & recognitis, Frankfurt 1543.
Ptolemaei, Claudij, de praedictionibus Astronomicis, cui titulum fecerunt Quadripartitum 
[i. e. Tetrabiblios], Graecè & Latinè, Libri IV. Philippo Me lanch thone interprete, Basel 1553.
Sandius, Christoph, Bibliotheca Anti-trinitariorum, Freistadt 1684.
Scaliger, Julius Caesar Exotericarum exercitationum liber quintus decimus, de subtilitate, ad 
Hie ronymum Cardanum, Frankfurt a. M. 1582.
Seneca, L. Annaeus, Naturales Quaestiones, ed. by Thomas H. Corcoran, 2 vol., Cam-
bridge/ Mass. 1971–1972.
Fausti Socini Senensis ad amicos Epistolae […], De novo accesserunt quaedam A. Dudithii 
Epistolae, ed. Fratres Polonici, Irenopoli 1656.
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lie nischer Glaubensflüchtlinge im Veltlin und in den Bündner Südtälern, Chur 2015.
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Celestial Phenomena in Early Modernity:  
The Integrated Image of Comets* 
Anna Jerratsch
1 Introduction
In the early modern age, comets were regarded as frightening, near-inexplicable 
phenomena sent by God. They became the condensation core of experiments in 
knowledge production and interpretation of the world. At a time in which the 
debate about nature evolved within a novel form of communications culture and 
public domain, particularly in the German-speaking areas, the developing sci-
entific and cultural relevance of comets was expressed in media and literature 
by a bevy of small German-language publications. The chart below strikingly 
illustrates how the number of these writings grew between around 1530 and 1682 
to an unprecedented peak that was never achieved again.1 
*  This paper is loosely based on a chapter of the dissertation Der frühneuzeitliche Kometendis-
kurs im Spiegel deutschsprachiger Flugschriften, submitted in 2017 at the Humboldt University 
in Berlin. English translation by Karen Margolis. 
1 In this period, aside from several bright and impressive yet smaller comets, the four Great 
Comets of 1577, 1618, 1664/65 and 1680 appeared, as well as two supernovae (1572 and 1604); 
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It was the specific historical situation of an era when religious and political insta-
bilities and the crumbling of social and intellectual orders made people insecure, 
and the need to explain nature and cope with daily life was expressed with ref-
erence to the celestial sphere and its inexplicable phenomena. At that time, more-
over, technical, theoretical and practical methods of observation, and mathemati-
cal and physical description, made it possible to research comets empirically in a 
previously unknown way. In the sixteenth century this led to the discovery of the 
law that the comet’s tail always points away from the sun, and the superlunary 
characteristics of comets. The first discovery was made in the context of the com-
ets of 1530, and the second in relation to the Great Comet of 1577.
Such observational results, which could not be explained altogether satis-
factorily, made comets challenging objects.2 With the background of the fruitful 
intellectual renewal brought by the Renaissance and humanism—influenced by 
the re-emergence of diverse ancient knowledge stocks and traditions—comets 
aroused interest as objects of theoretical conceptualization and symbolic inter-
pretation, inspiring scholars to revisit and revise traditional explanatory and in-
terpretative models and to ask and answer old questions in new ways. This paper 
focusses mainly on the second half of the sixteenth century, which is marked 
by the formation and consolidation of what is known as the integrated image 
of comets. This image of comets has two essential pillars, first, the theologized 
natural philosophy of Philipp Me lanch thon, and second, the augmented theory 
of comets that forms the basis of the theoretical description of comets and rep-
resents a link between Aristotelian meteorology, Stoic philosophy, and astrolog-
ical prognostics. This created a dual cometary concept that closely linked the 
view of comets as causally operative and symbolically meaningful, as well as 
their causal explicability, with their astrological and theological interpretability.
Two important events, and their consequences, significantly influenced the dis-
course about comets as seen in the small publications: the invention of printing and 
the Reformation. In particular, their reciprocal stimulation made them culturally 
relevant. Whereas people in the Middle Ages largely engaged in cometomancy, in 
the Renaissance cometology became popular.3 A systematic prognostics with its 
causal underpinning in the form of meteorological theory could be more easily in-
tegrated into the contemporary attempt to promote the establishment of an obser-
these appearances were described and interpreted in a growing number of German-lan-
guage pamphlets. 
2 For the topic of challenging object, see Jochen Büttner, “The Pendulum as a Challenging Object 
in Early—Modern Mechanics,” in: Mechanics and Natural Philosophy Before the Scientific Rev-
olution, eds. Walter Roy Laird and Sophie Roux, Dordrecht 2008, pp. 225–239; Jürgen Renn/
Peter Damerow/Simone Rieger, “Hunting the White Elephant: When and How did Galileo 
Discover the Law of Fall?,” in: Science in Context 13/3–4 (2000), pp. 229–419 and Domenico 
Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects. The Transformation of Mechanics in the Seventeenth Centu-
ry, Baltimore 2006. 
3 Viktor Stegemann, “Komet,” in: Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens 5, eds. Hanns 
Bäch told- Stäubli and Eduard Hoffmann-Krayer, Berlin 1932/33, Col. 89–170, Col. 114. 
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vation-based epistemology and the scientific study of the arts. At the same time, 
the Protestant Reformation led to the flourishing of the prodigy system, which 
Tabitta van Nouhuys characterizes as the comeback of the teratological tradition 
which linked the divine with the natural and directed the focus towards the sym-
bolic dimension of comets.4 The Protestant doctrine spread primarily through the 
medium of the sermon, but also through minor literature such as broadsheets and 
pamphlets with their own developing market and readership. The authors had 
a corresponding consumers’ circle that became bigger and more heterogenous, 
opening up entirely new possibilities of influence for them and their writings.5 
The socio-cultural event of the Reformation consequently created a need for in-
formation and communication, which signaled the breakthrough of the printing 
technology that had already existed for several decades.6 
This communications revolution was an important structural factor in the dis-
course about comets—not least because it helped to disseminate and securely es-
tablish astrological practice in the consciousness of a wider public. In this process, 
the aforementioned boom in astrology was reflected in functional literature on 
astrology for lay readers as well as in scholarly treatises. Important works on as-
trology, which was a well-established science at the universities, include Johannes 
Schöner’s De iudiciis nativitatum libri tres (1545), Girolamo Cardano’s Commentaria 
(1554), and Francesco Giuntini’s Speculum astrologiae (1573).7 This academic astrol-
ogy as a self-evident part of the educational sphere in early modern Europe was 
also connected with humanism, for instance, as shown by the well-researched 
examples of Joseph Grünpeck (1473–1532) and Georg Tannstetter (1482–1535).8 
The second main pillar of this form of astrology was concerned with politics: 
many scholars with a good knowledge of astrology had close links with ruling 
families as court advisers, among them Johannes Carion (1499–1537), Johannes 
Lichtenberger (ca. 1440–1503), Georg Peurbach (1423–1461), the aforementioned 
4 Tabitta van Nouhuys, The Age of TwoFaced Janus. The Comets of 1577 and 1618 and the Decline of 
the Aristotelian View in the Netherlands, Leiden 1998 (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 89), 
pp. 415–417. 
5 Silvia S. Tschopp, “Review of Talkenberger, Heike, Sintflut. Prophetie und Zeitgeschehen in Tex-
ten und Holzschnitten astrologischer Flugschriften 1488–1528,” Tübingen 1990 (Studien und Tex-
te zur Sozialgeschichte der Literatur 26), in: Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 104/XLII (1993), 
pp. 120–123. 
6 See Holger Flachmann, Martin Luther und das Buch: Eine historische Studie zur Bedeutung des 
Buches im Handeln und Denken des Reformators, Tübingen 1996 (Spätmittelalter und Reforma-
tion. Neue Reihe 8), and the literature mentioned in this study. 
7 Cf. Marion Gindhart, “Astrologie,” in: Höfe und Residenzen im spätmittelalterlichen Reich. Bilder 
und Begriffe. Vol. 1: Begriffe, ed. Werner Paravicini, Ostfildern 2005 (Residenzenforschung 15 
II/1), pp. 235–238, p. 235.
8 See Sarah Slattery, “Astrologie, Wunderzeichen und Propaganda. Die Flugschriften des Hu-
ma nisten Joseph Grünpeck,” in: Zukunftsvoraussagen in der Renaissance, eds. Klaus Bergdolt 
and Walther Ludwig, Wiesbaden 2005 (Wolfenbütteler Abhandlungen zur Renaissancefor-
schung 23), pp. 329–347. For Tannstetter, see Franz Graf-Stuhlhofer, Humanismus zwischen Hof 
und Universität. Georg Tannstetter (Collimitius) und sein wissenschaftliches Umfeld im Wien des 
frühen 16. Jahrhunderts, Vienna 1996 (Schriftenreihe des Universitätsarchivs 8), pp. 128–144. 
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Georg Tannstetter, Peter Apian (1495–1552), Cyprian von Leowitz (1524–1574), and 
later, Heinrich Rantzau (1526–1598), Christoph Rothmann (ca. 1555–1601), Tycho 
Brahe (1546–1601), Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), and Galileo Gali lei (1564–1641).9 
The court astrologers, who sometimes also doubled as personal or municipal 
physicians, drew up astrological tables, astronomical ephemerides, and calendars 
and prognostic works such as practical manuals and almanacs. This list shows 
how narrow the distinction was between the academic and scholarly form of as-
trology and the popular or lay version, at least in terms of the media involved. 
While it was already customary to publish an almanac for the coming year in 
Italian universities in the fourteenth century, European universities began fol-
lowing suit in the fifteenth century: in time, almanacs grew to become prestige 
objects of the universities.10 As the calendars had to be recalculated every year, 
the profession of calendar calculators gradually developed. Initially they were 
highly respected and could practice their profession alongside or as part of their 
work as university professors.11 Combined with the media revolution linked with 
letterpress printing, aids such as ephemerides, oracle spread charts, and charts 
for calculating the solar cycles increasingly obviated the need to make one’s own 
calculations and contributed to taking astrology out of the experts’ study cham-
bers and bringing it into the streets and markets. This made astrology a matter 
for public discussion, which it then helped to constitute.12 The academic-scientific 
and the profane form of astrology were also combined in the pamphlets on com-
ets, helping to concretize the astrological significance of the celestial phenome-
non. In this context, astrology was, on the one hand, part of the natural history 
explanation of cometary origins and effects and, on the other hand, it referred 
 9 For details, see Günther Oestmann, Heinrich Rantzau und die Astrologie: Ein Beitrag zur Kul-
turgeschichte des 16. Jahrhunderts, Braunschweig 2004 (Disquisitiones Historiae Scientiarum: 
Braun schweiger Beiträge zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 2); John R. Christianson et al. (eds.) 
Ty cho Brahe and Prague. Crossroads of European Science, Frankfurt am Main 2002 (Acta Histori-
ca Astronomiae 16); Gadi Algazi, “Keplers Apologie. Wissensproduktion, Selbstdarstellung 
und die Geschlechterordnung,” in: Wissen, maßgeschneidert. Experten und Expertenkulturen im 
Euro pa der Vormoderne, eds. Björn Reich, Frank Rexroth, and Matthias Roick, Munich 2012, 
pp. 214–248; Mario Biagioli, Galileo Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolu-
tism, Chicago 1993; Johann Carion (1499–1537). Der erste Berliner Astronom, eds. Dietmar Fürst 
and Jürgen Hamel, Berlin 1988 (Archenhold-Sternwarte Vorträge und Schriften 67); Dietrich 
Kur ze, “Popular Astrology and Prophecy in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries: Johannes 
Lich tenberger,” in: ‘Astrologi hallucinati’. Stars and the End of the World in Luther’s Time, ed. 
Pao la Zambelli, Berlin 1986, pp. 177–194. On the political role of medieval astrology, see 
Gerd Mentgen, Astrologie und Öffentlichkeit im Mittelalter, Stuttgart 2005 (Monographien zur 
Ge schichte des Mittelalters 53). 
10 Cf. Christoph Schöner, “Peter Apian und die Universität Ingolstadt. Aushängeschild oder 
Außen seiter,” in: Peter Apian. Astronomie, Kosmographie und Mathematik am Beginn der Neuzeit, 
ed. Karl Röttel, Eichstätt 1995, pp. 39–46, p. 41.
11 Cf. Joseph H. Biller, “Die Wandkalender Peter Apians,” in: Peter Apian, ed. Karl Röttel, Eich-
stätt 1995, pp. 147–152, p. 147. 
12 In this context, Stuckrad refers to a “new formatting of the astrological discourse;” cf. Kocku 
von Stuckrad, Geschichte der Astrologie. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Munich 2003, p. 242. 
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to the symbolic character of the celestial apparition because it represented its 
primary instrument of interpretation. It was these two founding contexts of as-
trological prognostics, astronomy and the apocalyptic or, in more general terms, 
natural history and theology, that Me lanch thon referred to when he extrapolated 
astrology into a universal hermeneutic art.13 
1 Me lanch thon’s Theologized Natural Philosophy
Interpreting the comets as divine symbols is an element of a Christian theolo-
gy and a perspective on nature that took different forms according to religious 
confession in the aftermath of the Reformation. Instead of the Catholic miracles 
of the saints, Protestants interpreted highly unusual natural phenomena as mi-
raculous signs.14 Enthusiasm for prodigies was a largely Protestant phenomenon, 
particularly in German-speaking regions.15 However, the boom in literature on 
prodigies from the mid-sixteenth century was a European-wide event on a com-
prehensive scale. It occurred both in Latin treatises and in vernacular writings, 
drew sources from ancient philosophy as well as from contemporary occasional 
literature, and was equally at home in humanist-influenced elite culture and in 
popular folk culture.16 It arose from a combination of the compilation style of 
the times with a “condensation of communication” following the establishment 
of letterpress printing, and was thus an “artifact of the printing press,” with its 
success based on its function of overcoming social distress and religious uncer-
tainty.17 It is not enough to point to the masses’ appetite for sensations or the 
13 See Walter Sparn, “Astrologie im frühneuzeitlichen Luthertum. Theoretische Begründung 
und lebenspraktische Bedeutung,” in: Himmelsspektakel. Astronomie im Protestantismus der Frü-
hen Neuzeit eds. Sascha Salatowsky and Karl-Heinz Lotze, Gotha 2015 (Publication No. 52 from 
the Forschungsbibliothek Gotha 52), pp. 39–47, and Claudia Brosseder, Im Bann der Sterne. 
Caspar Peucer, Philipp Me lanch thon und andere Wittenberger Astrologen, Berlin 2004, pp. 99–109. 
14 Anna Mańko-Matysiak, Das Teufelsmotiv in der schlesischen Wunderzeichenliteratur der Frühen 
Neuzeit, Marburg 1999 (Schriftenreihe der Kommission für deutsche und osteuropäische 
Volkskunde in der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde e.V. 79), p. 81. 
15 For details, see Philip M. Soergel, Miracles and the Protestant Imagination: The Evangelical Won-
der Book in Reformation Germany, Oxford 2012. Conversely, French literature on prodigies 
seems to have been largely Catholic-influenced: see Rudolf Schenda, Die französische Prodi -
gien literatur in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts, Munich 1961 (Münchener romanistische 
Ar beiten 16), and Martin Döring, “Von der Wundergeschichte zum ‘fait divers’. Untersu -
chun gen zur Berichterstattung über Kometen in französischen canards an der Wende vom 
16. zum 17. Jahrhundert,” in: Vom Flugblatt zum Feuilleton. Mediengebrauch und ästhetische An-
thropologie in historischer Perspektive, eds. Wolfram Nitsch and Bernhard Teuber, Tübingen 
2002, pp. 129–146. The most comprehensive contemporary compendium on miracles was 
written by the Jesuit Caspar Schott—see Dietrich Unverzagt, Philosophia, Historia, Technica. 
Caspar Schotts Magia Universalis, Berlin 2000. 
16 Rudolf Schenda, “Die deutschen Prodigiensammlungen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts,“ in: 
Ar chiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens 4 (1963), Col. 637–710. 
17 Franz Mauelshagen, “Die ‘portenta et ostenta mines lieben herren unsers säligen … ’, 
Nach lassdokumente Bullingers im 13. Buch der Wickiana,” in: Zwingliana XXVIII (2001), 
pp. 73–117, p. 77. For the process of condensation of communication, see also Brendan Dool-
ey, “Die Entstehung von Gleichzeitigkeit im europäischen Bewusstsein auf der Grundlage 
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possibility of polemicizing and instrumentalizing as the main motivating fac-
tors for literature about prodigies, because it is entangled with more complex 
communicative contexts: for example, the writings often contained a sober, de-
scriptive account, which was, above all, open to interpretation, and was part of 
the communication—including the political discourse—of an educated elite, from 
whence it often found its way into publications and historiography.18 
 An important factor in the Protestant enthusiasm for prodigies was the lo-
cation of divine symbols in a framework of apocalyptic interpretation.19 Another 
European phenomenon, the eschatological world view, was spread particularly 
by Lutherans in the period from the mid-sixteenth century to the beginning of 
the Thirty Years’ War. They gave meaning to the experience of the crisis-ridden 
present by interpreting all kinds of events as apocalyptic—for example, extraor-
dinary natural and celestial phenomena such as appearances of comets or haloes, 
parhelions (sundogs), and blood moons or other meteora, as well as blood rain, 
malformed animals and monstrous births.20 The theological legitimation for this 
was based on the aforementioned Bible passages, which Luther understood liter-
ally and interpreted as political polemic, for example, describing the papacy as a 
personification of the Antichrist.21 This perspective on the Apocalypse was addi-
tionally underpinned by the concept of living in periods with particular escha-
tological connotations. For instance, various calculations of the age of the world 
were based on the Bible, and additionally referred to astronomic cyclicity and its 
astrological implications. For the year 1524, for example, a flood disaster was fore-
cast; or the year 1588, which occurred at the end of the “fiery trigon” conjunction, 
was expected to be a year of great miracles and cataclysmic changes.22 Prognoses 
like this, which created uproar in the population and were hotly debated in schol-
der politischen Nachrichtenpresse,” in: Presse und Geschichte. Leistungen und Perspektiven der 
historischen Presseforschung, eds. Astrid Blome and Holger Böning, Bremen 2008, pp. 49–66. 
18 Cf. Mauelshagen, “Die ‘portenta et ostenta mines lieben herren unsers säligen … ’,” pp. 92–95.
19 For a principal source, see Robin B. Barnes, Prophecy and Gnosis. Apocalypticism in the Wake of 
the Lutheran Reformation, Stanford 1988. 
20 See Volker Leppin, Antichrist und Jüngster Tag. Das Profil apokalyptischer Flugschriftenpublizistik 
im deutschen Luthertum 1548–1618, Heidelberg 1999 (Quellen und Forschungen zur Reforma-
tionsgeschichte 69).
21 See Hans-Georg Kemper, Deutsche Lyrik der Frühen Neuzeit, Vol. 2: Konfessionalismus. Tübin-
gen 1987, p. 34.
22 The prognosis originated from the astronomer Johannes Stoeffler, who interpreted 20 plane-
tary conjunctions—sixteen of them in water signs – as portents of an impending great flood; 
cf. Reiner Reisinger, Historische Horoskopie. Das iudicium magnum des Johannes Carion für Al-
brecht Dürers Patenkind, Wiesbaden 1997 (Gratia 32) [simultaneously a dissertation from Bam-
berg University 1995], p. 248. For the miraculous year 1588, see Matthias Pohlig, Zwischen 
Ge lehr samkeit und konfessioneller Identitätsstiftung. Lutherische Kirchen- und Universalge schichts -
schrei bung 1546–1617, Tübingen 2007 (Spätmittelalter und Reformation, Neue Reihe 37), 
pp. 207–223. For a general view of this kind of celestial prophesy, see Germana Ernst, “From 
the Watery Trigon to the Fiery Trigon: Celestial Signs, Prophecies and History,” in: ‘Astrologi 
hallucinati’. Stars and the End of the World in Luther’s Time, ed. Paola Zambelli, Berlin 1986, 
pp. 265–280. 
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arly circles, developed their social impact through numerous broadsheets and 
give a vivid picture of the connection between Christian and astrological ideas.23 
The symbolic character of comets and their sudden, frightening appearance 
predestined them for eschatological interpretation. This type of interpretation of 
comets can virtually be seen as a theological special case in astrology, based on 
the comets being integrated into a specific form of Christian religiosity rooted in 
an extreme consciousness of sin.24 Authors like Leppin have shown in detail how 
eschatological and astrological explanations mutually inspired each other in this 
process.25 The interpretive method based on the analogy principle corresponds to 
an emblematic process of interpretation that was not seen as an arbitrary, allegor-
ical presentation of readings but as the consequence of given factors in nature.26 
The more the apocalyptic-eschatological aspect was suppressed by prognostica-
tive astrology in the transition to the seventeenth century, the more the usual 
interpretation of comets as signs of warning and repentance came to the fore.27 In 
this context, comets served a dual function, first, by warning against continuing 
along the path of sinfulness, and second, by representing the negative effects, 
as it were, the punishment for the impenitent.28 Admonition and warning was 
an integrative component of the normative system of a theology of repentance 
and punishment that formed the basis of the social world that people inhabited, 
secured it, and guaranteed its future. For this reason, comets were instrumen-
talized in this function, in sermons, for example.29 These comet sermons were a 
special subsidiary form of the comet pamphlet, which could vary considerably in 
content, style, and ambition. Whereas some comet sermons were simply written 
versions of oral sermons and are typified by the flow of oral delivery and corre-
sponding brevity, others expanded into extensive treatises with long digressions 
consisting of theological discussions or polemical debates about confessions. 
The idea of comets as penitentiary warnings, which Franz Mauelshagen has 
described as “the most important paradigm of religious thought,”30 in the ear-
ly modern age, is a product of the Christianization of comet-based astrological 
prognostications combined with ideas of popular superstition that had already 
23 For details, see Heike Talkenberger, Sintflut. Prophetie und Zeitgeschehen in Texten und Holz -
schnitt en astrologischer Flugschriften 1488–1528, Tübingen 1990 (Studien und Texte zur Sozial -
ge schichte der Literatur 26). 
24 Stegemann, “Komet,” Col. 113. 
25 Leppin, Antichrist und Jüngster Tag. 
26 Cf. Kemper, Deutsche Lyrik der Frühen Neuzeit, pp. 42–43. 
27 Ibid., p. 41. 
28 Cf. Sabine Holtz, Theologie und Alltag. Lehre und Leben in den Predigten der Tübinger Theologen 
1550–1750, Tübingen 1993 (Spätmittelalter und Reformation. Neue Reihe 3), pp. 270–271. 
29 Sabine Holtz, “Predigt. Religiöser Transfer über Postillen,” in: Europäische Geschichte Online 
(EGO), Mainz 2011 (http://www.ieg-ego.eu/holtzs-2011–de, accessed 6.9.2014). 
30 Franz Mauelshagen, “Review of Um Himmels Willen. Religion in Katastrophenzeiten, ed. Manfred 
Jakubowski-Tiessen and Hartmut Lehmann, Göttingen 2003,” in: H-Soz-Kult, 2004 (http://hsoz 
kult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2004–3–004, accessed 2.3.2015). 
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appeared in the fourteenth century, long before the Reformation.31 The concept 
of symbolic interpretation of comets was extended in the sense that the comets 
became divine media of communication with a revelatory character.32 What lay 
behind this metaphysically conceptualized communication was the topos of the 
Book of Nature, with the miraculous signs of the Almighty elevated to the level of 
a holy scripture.33 The call to penitence and return to God embodied in the comets 
severed the connection between human sin and God’s divine judgment by giving 
human beings an option to act. The cosmic communication space between God 
and humans was consequently transformed into a space for interaction as soon 
as the addressees reacted to God’s wrath and began taking action themselves, 
issuing mandates, practicing repentance, holding supplicatory processions and 
praying to the Almighty.34 
In this context, the deciphering of the divine message becomes a Christian 
duty because God reveals himself in Nature and wants be recognized through 
Nature: in Me lanch thon’s doctrine, the Lutheran theology of the word of God is 
countered by a theology of Nature, and the interpretation of the “Theater of Na-
ture” complements the interpretation of God’s word as a hermeneutic process.35 
For Me lanch thon, astrology was the effective instrument of this interpretation, 
because God created Nature in such a way that humans, by exploring it, could 
make an image of the plan of creation and of divine attributes.36 In this form of a 
Christian theology, people interpreted the arrangement of the celestial spheres, 
the planetary aspects and other sidereal constellations as signs of a language by 
which God gave his Church instructions on its future behavior.37 This concept 
of astrology preserved both human freedom of will and divine omnipotence, 
offering a way out of the old dilemma of the incompatibility of deterministic 
stargazing and Christian theology.38 Me lanch thon solved the problem by stating 
that natural occurrences and human dispositions are formally conditioned by 
the influence of planetary constellations, but that these cannot be understood in 
31 Stegemann, “Komet,” Col. 111. 
32 Döring describes it as “a container of the divine act of speech,” cf. Döring, Von der Wunderge-
schichte zum ‘fait divers’, pp. 133–135.
33 Franz Mauelshagen, “Verbreitung von Wundernachrichten als christliche Pflicht. Das Welt -
bild legitimiert das Medium,” in: Medien und Weltbilder im Wandel der Frühen Neuzeit, eds. Franz 
Mau els hagen and Benedikt Mauer, Augsburg 2000 (Documenta Augustana 5), pp. 133–154, 
p. 152. 
34 Ibid., p. 153. 
35 Volkhard Wels, Manifestationen des Geistes. Frömmigkeit, Spiritualismus und Dichtung in der 
Frühen Neuzeit, Göttingen 2014 (Berliner Mittelalter- und Frühneuzeitforschung 17), p. 106. 
36 Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer, “Die Bulle ‘contra astrologiam iudicariam’ von Sixtus V., das 
astro logische Schrifttum protestantischer Autoren und die Astrologiekritik der Jesuiten. 
The sen über einen vermuteten Zusammenhang,” in: Zukunftsvoraussagen in der Renaissance, 
eds. Klaus Bergdolt and Walther Ludwig, Wiesbaden 2005 (Wolfenbütteler Abhandlungen 
zur Renaissanceforschung 23), pp. 143–222, p. 178–179.
37 Mahlmann-Bauer, “Die Bulle ‘contra astrologiam iudicariam’ von Sixtus V.,” pp. 145–146.
38 Cf. Gindhart, “Astrologie,” p. 238. 
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terms of an actual total causality, which is basically a distinction that corresponds 
exactly to the borderline between astrologia naturalis and astrologia iudicaria.39 Me -
lanch thon believed that the use of his theologized natural philosophy enabled 
him to overcome this very border. In this context, moreover, it is possible to ex-
plain miraculous signs in terms of natural causes. 
Although Me lanch thon did not invent this kind of natural theology, he was the 
person who implemented it in the Protestant tradition and, in doing, so, opened 
Protestantism to the natural sciences.40 The compensatory shift of miracula as a 
Catholic domain to a miracle of nature in the context of the Reformation’s enthu-
siasm for prodigies was reflected in a changed definition of wonders: comets as 
miracles were no longer required, at least in principle, to be explicable by natural 
causes, while comets as prodigies virtually demanded explanation, in several re-
spects: first, because God was not the sole cause of the occurrence, and second, 
because his message incorporated in the natural process required decoding. God 
communicated himself to humans through a series of hierarchically tiered me-
dia.41 This ranking corresponded simultaneously to a hierarchy of the First and 
Second Causes, which is the basis of the duality of the natural and divine dimen-
sion of the description of Nature, that often combined quite harmoniously into 
an integrated explanatory model of extraordinary natural events.42 The primacy 
of theology, which commanded the services of natural philosophy and astrology, 
was not questioned: natural causes as physically explicable were interposed, as it 
were; but their cause, in turn, was God, who deployed them and therefore no lon-
ger worked indirectly, but directly.43 The recourse to natural explanations that is 
virtually postulated by this in the Protestant understanding of nature and God’s 
image resulted in a gradual naturalization of the image of comets, although a 
secularization through rationalization did not occur: “There is no linear develop-
ment of the ‘modern natural sciences’ in which the increase of empirical knowl-
edge implies the decrease of theological and metaphysical ideas.”44
The conception of comets as miraculous signs is the starting point for a histor-
ical way of arguing, because the prodigies occupied an intermediate position be-
tween an Historia hominum and an Historia naturalis, which is why they are relevant 
both in terms of historiography and natural history.45 Belief in prodigies is thus 
an early stage of a historiography that is ultimately oriented toward the history 
39 Sebastian Lalla, “Über den Nutzen der Astrologie. Me lanch thons Vorwort zum ‘Liber de 
sphae ra,’” in: Fragmenta Me lanch thoniana 2. Gedenken und Rezeption. 100 Jahre Me lanch thonhaus, 
eds. Günter Frank and Sebastian Lalla, Heidelberg 2003, pp. 147–160, p. 158.
40 Cf. Wels, Manifestationen des Geistes, p. 106.
41 Mauelshagen, Verbreitung von Wundernachrichten als christliche Pflicht, p. 153. 
42 Ibid., p. 189. 
43 Volkhard Wels convincingly describes this for Me lanch thon’s perspective on natural philos-
ophy, medicine and astrology in his chapter “causae naturales: naturphilosophische versus 
theologische Erklärung.” See Wels, Manifestationen des Geistes, pp. 99–127. 
44 Wels, Manifestationen des Geistes, p. 128. 
45 Mauelshagen, “Die portenta et ostenta mines lieben herren unsers säligen … ,” p. 92.
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of salvation. Together, the world of nature and human society form a divine and 
divinely ordained order; the beginning of the world process with the Creation is 
also the beginning of the event of salvation. This is why, in Lutheran theology, 
there is an identity between world history and Church history, and the purpose 
of all history is established by the relationship to a history of salvation under-
stood in eschatological terms.46 The historical interpretation of comets is founded 
on a cyclic and natural conception of history inspired by the cyclicity of astro-
nomical events; this relationship between the history of Nature, the world, and 
humankind is the reason why past events are meaningful and provide evidence 
for those of the present and future.47 If only in retrospect, history documents the 
divine providence expressed by symbols, which is why studying them offers an 
empirical basis for astrology by compiling more or less statistically relevant da-
ta.48 Likewise, cometography, which was based on evaluating one’s own observa-
tions and those of others, occurred in the epistemological mode of historia.49 This 
is less a discipline than a rhetorical and epistemological instrument established 
in the literature of the early modern age that was used to link natural objects and 
events with human and social destinies, and to place them in qualitative con-
texts of meaning.50 The historical interpretation of a comet allowed its meaning 
to be retrospective attributed by declaring specific events as its consequence and 
therefore as a divine act. At the same time it offered a prospective glimpse of the 
future. This is how, in Me lanch thon’s natural philosophy, foundations were laid 
both for interpreting the past and for prophetic prognostications on a rationalistic 
basis—in other words, defined by and dependent on experience.51 
2 The Augmented Cometary Theory 
Over the centuries, the astrologization and Christianization of cometary theory 
described above gave rise to augmented meteorological theory as the dominant 
paradigm in the Early Modern Age for explaining and interpreting these celes-
tial apparitions. These characterizing descriptions show that augmented meteo-
rological theory based on Aris totle was still the starting point of interpretation 
of comets. Yet this theory was decisively extended in several respects. The link 
46 For the connection between eschatology, theology, and historiography as the grounds for 
historical argumentation, see Holtz, Theologie und Alltag. pp. 52–59. 
47 Cf. Kemper, Deutsche Lyrik der Frühen Neuzeit, p. 51. 
48 Cf. Wels, Manifestationen des Geistes, p. 105–106. 
49 Michael Weichenhan, “Neugier und Furcht. Blicke auf Kometen in der frühen Neuzeit,” in: 
Himmelsspektakel. Astronomie im Protestantismus der Frühen Neuzeit, eds. Sascha Salatowsky 
and Karl-Heinz Lotze, Gotha 2015 (Veröffentlichungen der Forschungsbibliothek Gotha 52), 
pp. 59–71, p. 63. 
50 See also Adam Mosley, “The History and Historiography of Early Modern Comets,” in: 
Christoph Rothmann’s Discourse on the Comet of 1585. An Edition and Translation with Accom-
panying Essays, eds. Miguel Á. Granada, Adam Mosley, and Nicholas Jardine, Leiden 2014 
(History of Science and Medicine Library. Medieval and Modern Science 22), pp. 282–325. 
51 Brosseder, Im Bann der Sterne, p. 111. 
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with the Ptolemaic doctrine had made the comets into prognosticable objects that 
could now be comprehensively interpreted and could even be predicted from 
specific astral occurrences. The negative consequences attributed to the comets, 
which could be astrologically specified, were understood as their effects. Like 
the celestial apparitions themselves, these effects had causes that were as natural 
as the meteora created by earthly exhalations, whose existence implied specific 
consequences that were understandable in meteorological terms. The theological 
incorporation of these ideas declared the connection between the emergence, ap-
pearance, and meaning of comets as divinely intentional action. Human sinful-
ness enraged a God who expressed himself symbolically in Nature as his creation 
and used the celestial phenomenon as a medium of communication that urged 
repentance and warned of punishment that could, however, be avoided through 
the return to God and behavior pleasing to God. The view of the past revealed in 
chronicles and documents underpins the relation of appearances of comets and 
effects of comets as a causal relationship between previously committed sins and 
the ensuing punishment by God, with a significance for future events derived 
from this historicity.
 This contemporary, and largely accepted, image of the comets reflects the 
synthesis of natural-historical formation of theory, astrological augmentation, and 
theological interpretation. It is the interplay between these three areas that made 
the image of comets so convincing, because the individual elements mutually sup-
ported each other and filled in wherever “gaps” or discrepancies appeared to orig-
inate from a single contextual field alone. Weichenhan accordingly characterizes 
these opinio communis as a compromise solution that united disparate elements 
and was open on many sides—a solution that could be used to neutralize hidden 
problems in the authentic Aristotelian doctrine. For example, the result of the as-
trologization of the comets was that, despite their sublunarity, they were brought 
ontologically closer to stars and planets. This meant that they actually achieved 
their entry into the scope of astrology, and not only that—it could be stated, for 
instance, that they not only move in straight lines, as Aristotelian teaching insist-
ed.52 The causality of the Ptolemaic worldview was transferred to the epistemolog-
ical status of astrology and augmented meteorological causality. This enabled the 
problem of the origin of comets to be solved, as the original cause that engendered 
them was also shifted to the area of celestial bodies concerned with astrology, and 
therefore natural history. Consequently, through the theological incorporation of 
the image of the comet, it was not the causa efficiens but the causa finalis that was 
attested with a divine act.53 The conceptualization of celestial apparitions as pur-
poseful messages from God formed the essential driving force of their decipher-
ment by explanations from natural history and astrological interpretation.
52 Cf. Michael Weichenhan, “Ergo perit coelum … .” Die Supernova des Jahres 1572 und die Überwin -
dung der aristotelischen Kosmologie, Stuttgart 2004 (Boethius 49), pp. 402–408. 
53 Weichenhan, “Ergo perit coelum … ,” p. 403.
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The augmented meteorological theory of comets is therefore a productive 
model responding to different audience interests. On the one hand, there was the 
need for description and explanation of the frightening phenomenon of the comet 
through factual information and rational explanation of the event. On the other 
hand, there was the meaningful classification of the comet in the concrete con-
text of individuals’ lived experience as part of a collective supratemporal destiny.54 
Both aspects helped to overcome contingencies and fears, as comet broadsheets 
explained contemporary crises through natural causes, with the abstract notion 
of the comet as a vehicle that simultaneously transmitted knowledge and carried 
meaning.55 The comets acted as a projection surface for content, information, and 
interpretation, with their perception and representation based on a specific in-
terpretation of reality.56 The meaning and explanation attributed to celestial phe-
nomena were “the product of a meaningful work” reflecting diverse practices of 
knowledge culture above and beyond the narrow area of natural history research 
on comets.57 
The complex image of comets deriving from different disciplinary approaches 
was accompanied by a plurality of methods in approaching the phenomenon and 
involved different coexisting ways of interpreting, as an extremely diverse array 
of ancient and medieval theories was constantly intermingled with new tradi-
tions of interpretation.58 Due to parameters that sometimes had to be considered 
interdependently, even a relatively simple model of astrological interpretation of 
a comet had a degree of complexity that should not be underestimated. A com-
mon model originating from the works of Ptolemy and Pliny was expanded as 
it was handed down over the generations, with the result that a relatively fixed 
canon emerged, with ten points consisting of observable characteristics of com-
ets: size, color, form, shine, place, and motion, together with tail direction, the 
comet’s position relative to the sun, the projection of the comet’s trajectory on the 
54 For a historical investigation of the concept of destiny, see Franziska Rehlinghaus, Semantik 
des Schicksals. Zur Relevanz des Unverfügbaren zwischen Aufklärung und Erstem Weltkrieg, Göt-
tingen 2015 (Historische Semantik 22). 
55 Döring, “Von der Wundergeschichte zum ‘fait divers,’” p. 143. See also Michael Kempe, “Von 
‘lechzenden Flammen,’ ‘geflügelten Drachen’ und anderen ‘LuftGeschichten.’ Zur Neutrali-
sierung der Naturfurcht in populärwissenschaftlichen Druckmedien der Frühaufklä rung,” 
in: Medien und Weltbilder im Wandel der Frühen Neuzeit, eds. Franz Mauelshagen and Benedikt 
Mauer, Augsburg 2000 (Documenta Augustana 5), pp. 155–178. 
56 Cf. Franz Mauelshagen, “Illustrierte Kometenflugblätter in wahrnehmungsgeschichtli-
cher Perspektive,” in: Das illustrierte Flugblatt in der Kultur der Frühen Neuzeit, eds. Wolfgang 
Harms and Michael Schilling, Frankfurt am Main 1998, pp. 101–136. 
57 See also the article by Rebekka Habermas, which argues that descriptions of this kind are 
meaning production, in other words, the occurrences in the pamphlets on comets are not an in-
terpretation but are actually based on and organized and produced by a reality; cf. Rebekka 
Habermas, “Wunder, Wunderliches, Wunderbares. Zur Profanisierung eines Deutungsmus-
ters in der frühen Neuzeit,” in: Armut, Liebe, Ehre. Studien zur historischen Kulturforschung, ed. 
Richard Dülmen, Frankfurt am Main 1988, pp. 38–66, p. 41. 
58 Döring, “Von der Wundergeschichte zum ‘fait divers,’” p. 132. 
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earth, and the duration of the appearance.59 In detailed astrological interpretation 
these parameters were used to differentiate the negative effects associated with 
comets.60 It could be deduced from the color, for example, which specific effects 
were associated with the dominant planet, such as a red comet being ascribed 
to Mars and denoting war, unrest, tempest, murder and tyranny, while yellow 
meteors were Venusian in nature and signified adultery and incest.61 Similarly, 
the form of a comet was connected with specific consequences and also linked to 
the nature of a specific planet. The degree of impact or the extent of the negative 
consequences of comets was often assessed as proportional to the comet’s size 
or the intensity of its glow, while the comet’s tail indicated, on the one hand, the 
region where negative effects—such as a hostile army—could be expected, or the 
direction from which these effects would come. The duration of the comet’s ap-
pearance indicated the length of time of the effects; a rapid motion, for example, 
meant that the consequences would begin quickly. Similarly, the kind of motion 
of the comet, for instance whether it was in harmony with or retrograde to the 
zodiac sign, had specific results, while the comet’s position in relation to the sun 
demarcated the beginning of its effect.
The comet’s location and its related course, and the associated projection of 
this course onto the Earth offered a wide variety of interpretative options. They 
involved situating the comet within the signs of the zodiac or relative to the sur-
rounding fixed stars or planets, as well as the zodiac signs, astrological houses 
and constellations it traversed. For example, specific regions or groups of people 
59 See also Marion Gindhart, Das Kometenjahr 1618. Antikes und zeitgenössisches Wissen in der früh -
neuzeitlichen Kometenliteratur des deutschsprachigen Raumes, Wiesbaden 2006 (Wissenslitera tur 
im Mittelalter 44), pp. 139–155. This catalog of parameters went on to become a major structur-
al element of cometary literature. Some works treated some of the points we have mentioned 
in bundles, while others, for example, presented interpretations of the relative position of the 
comets in relation to other planets and fixed stars or of its course in specific chapters. 
60 Hartmut Lehmann emphasizes that this exclusively negative viewpoint first became evident 
since the Middle Ages, and is especially evident in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; 
cf. Hartmut Lehmann, Die Kometenflugschriften des 17. Jahrhunderts als historische Quellen: Lite-
ratur und Volk im 17. Jahrhundert. Probleme populärer Kultur in Deutschland, Part II, Wiesbaden 
1985 (Wolfenbütteler Arbeiten zur Barockforschung 13), pp. 683–701, p. 692. Ancient traditi-
ons also primarily emphasized the negative effects. One exception in Christian-influenced 
historiography is the Star of Bethlehem; for details, see Sara J. Schechner, Comets, Popular 
Culture, and the Birth of Modern Cosmology, Princeton 1999, pp. 38–45. 
61 Cf. [S2] Johann Georg Schinbain, Sternen oder Cometen Buch, in welchem die fürnemsten Come-
ten, deren bey 180. so hin und her, vor und nach Christi Geburt, an dem Firmament erschienen, sampt 
an dern Meteorologicis so sich in Lüfften zugetragen: was auch gleich in jedem Jar besunder für Effect 
oder Würckung darauff gefolget, Ingolstadt 1578 (VD16 S 2843), fol. T 2 r–T 3 r. The different 
qualities of the comet are by no means always interpreted in the same way. Another text on 
comets from 1577 attributed “falling damp and arthritic frailty / and heavy fever / heretical 
riots / and rebellious princes” to Venusian comets; see [S1] Theodor Graminaeus, Weltspie-
gel oder algemeiner Widerwertigkeit deß fünfften Kirchen Alters, kürtze Verzeignuß. Darinnen deß 
Co me ten oder außgereckter Rüthen, so im Jar Christi 1577 den 11. Novembris, am hohen Himmel 
ver nomen Stand, Lauff, und Bedrewung zuersehen, so physice, astrologice, metaphysicae, oder aber 
for maliter erklert und außgelagt wirt, Cologne 1578 (VD16 G 2809), fol. I 3 r. 
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were associated with particular zodiac signs and the houses, such as areas of 
human life, or institutions.62 A comet in the ninth house might have posed an 
ominous threat to the Church or the clergy, whereas a comet in the eighth house 
signified the death of a ruler. Moreover, planets had their own houses and com-
plexions depending on aspects that determined their nature: according to the 
doctrine of the elements, Saturn, for example, was thought to be cold and dry, and 
to have a melancholy nature.63 Particular social groups such as craftsmen, schol-
ars, clerics, or doctors were associated with specific signs of the zodiac, as were 
entire national groups.64 The zodiac signs continued to be attributed with specific 
qualities, and were divided into Earth, Water and Air signs. If a comet were lo-
cated in such a sign, or passed through it, for an Earth sign this could portend an 
impending earthquake, while for a Water sign it could mean drought or floods.
Even these few remarks give an idea of the great detail and extent involved in 
an astrological interpretation of the comets. Moreover, the re-interpretation and 
extension of the traditional rules of astrological readings and the reference to 
different sources led to a coexistence of different interpretative systems that were 
sourced eclectically. This enormous complexity created a flexibility, allowing the 
interpretations of comets to proceed in a variety of directions. On the one hand 
they could be general and transferable, and on the other hand individual and 
structurally adaptable to current conditions. They could be linked to political, 
biblical, or mythical interpretations and viewed in relation to topical events, and 
were therefore open to instrumentalization for theological edification, social dis-
cipline, confessional polemics, or even political propaganda. The result was the 
emergence of regular interpretive narratives that could be widely different for 
one and the same cometary appearance. This meant that the authors of comet 
pamphlets had to legitimize their methodical approach and prove their compe-
tence, which created a pressure toward exact and extensive observation, because 
astronomical observation provided necessary material data for the interpretation.
In other words, the desire for interpretation of the frightening phenomenon 
motivated people to record it by description. This led, first, to astronomical obser-
vation methods and mathematical procedures being tailored to fit the treatment 
62 For a comprehensible overview of basic astrological terms and techniques, see Monica Azzo-
lini, The Duke and the Stars. Astrology and Politics in Renaissance Milan, Cambridge 2013 (I Tatti 
Studies in Italian Renaissance History), pp. 53–64. 
63 Cf. John C. Eade, The Forgotten Sky. A Guide to Astrology in English Literature, Oxford 1984, p. 66.
64 For example, Johann Gottfried Taust reported that a comet in the zodiac sign of Sagittarius 
was threatening Arabia, Tyrrhenian, Spain, France, England, Germany, Dalmatia, Slavonia, 
Hungary and Moravia. Taust listed further cities at risk: Toledo, Modena, Avignon, Cologne, 
Stuttgart, Rothenburg, and Buda, cf. [S3]  Johann Gottfried Taust, Cometa redivivus das ist der 
aus der Aschen viel entsetzlicher als zuvor hervorflammende und aufs Neue sich unserm Gesichte 
präsentirende Unglücks Prophete oder der nach gemeiner Art Genannte Comet und Schwantz Stern 
welcher seinen Curs und Lauff geändert und nach dem er unter der Sonnen Strahlen 3 Wochen ver-
decket gewesen nun mehr des Abends alsbald nach der Sonnen Untergang sich sehn lässet, Halle 1681 
(VD17 14: 073221Z), fol. E 3 v–E 4 r. 
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of comets, or developed to that effect, and second, the phenomenon being under-
stood as a natural process that required explanation and which could be imposed 
on questions of natural philosophy. Consequently, the interpretation brought 
together description, explanation, and interpretation of comets, with the result 
that is was often impossible to separate purely astrological and purely natural- 
historical approaches to the problem in a meaningful way. Instead, elements of 
both these contextual areas were closely entangled with each other in the image 
of the comets and were used for mutual legitimation. This is shown concretely, for 
example, in the typologizing of comets briefly described above: Aris totle regard-
ed the distinction between different types of comets as resulting from the differ-
ent kinds of meteorological creation of the comets from terrestrial exhalations. In 
other words, the classification originated from the way of looking at the problem 
in natural philosophy by describing the origin and specific qualities of the celes-
tial phenomenon in an explanatory model. The tradition of typologizing deriving 
from Pliny and others combined things that were phenomenologically perceivable 
with historical experience to develop a classification scheme from the diagnosed 
regularity. The relevance of this scheme relied solely on the context of astrological 
interpretation. It was not a matter of understanding how a horned comet acquired 
its form, for instance, but which astrological significance was peculiar to this kind 
of comet. The augmented theory of comets bundles and links the epistemological 
modi behind these typologizations and the potentials of natural history and as-
trology they are based on—symbolized by the two names, Aris totle and Ptolemy. 
3 The Integrated Image of Comets as a Synthesis
While the claim to causality of the natural-historical explanation upgraded the 
epistemological status of stargazing, the astrological techniques of prognostics 
provided the tool for establishing the meaning of the theoretically understood 
natural phenomenon, which significantly deepened its explanation. In fact, it 
is actually a major achievement of astrology to combine the abstract theoretical 
discipline of mathematical astronomy, which concerns description and demon-
stration, with a natural philosophy based on a theoretical reflection of empirical 
experience and concerned with the qualitative explanation in terms of causes.65 
This integratory function of astrology is particularly clear in the description of 
comets. Moreover, the need to interpret comets, which lay at the basis of astro-
logical interpretation, offered a connection point for theology, which also made 
reference to the symbolic nature of comets. 
That the two disciplines, with their shared ambition to interpret the world, 
did not compete but actually complemented each other harmoniously, was due 
to the particular historical situation of the post-Reformation era. In the context of 
Me lanch thon’s natural philosophy, which viewed the comets as signs of natural 
65 See also Darrel H. Rutkin, “Astrology”, in: The Cambridge History of Science, Vol. 3: Early Mod-
ern Science, eds. Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park, Cambridge 2006, pp. 541–561. 
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wonders from God, the rivalry between meteorological-causal astrology and di-
vi natory teratology almost hides the fact that a theologized form of astrology 
was being practiced in the context of natural research that was aimed toward the 
theological sphere as well.66 In Me lanch thon’s doctrine, astrology had the status 
of a natural philosophy that was based on the synthesis of Aristotelian and Ptole-
maic thought and offered insight into Nature‘s relationships of causality, whereas 
astronomy, seen as applied geometry, provided the data and described things in 
terms of theoretical models but did not offer any explanation of Nature.67 Caspar 
Peucer saw astrology as the key to Nature understood as divine creation, and 
believed that it offered the possibility of explaining miracles in terms of natural 
philosophy.68 In fact, astrology was an instrument in two respects: one, for inter-
pretation to help in spelling out the symbolically expressed divine will, and one 
for explication as a component of the causal explanation of natural processes. In 
this way astrology presented the relationship between the approach to nature 
through natural history and theology, and the interpretative context.
 Aside from this integrative function of astrology, the reference to the causality 
creates a synthesis between three contextual areas. Natural history based on Aris-
totle explained all events through natural causes. The meteorology based on this 
provided the physical explanation of comets, and the related idea of symbolic qual-
ity was also causally conceived because the comets, as natural signs, were linked 
with the things they indicated. The Ptolemaic astrology of the Tetrabiblos, and thus 
the whole idea of prognostics—whether generally as a basis for stargazing or spe-
cifically related to the forecast of a comet and its effects—was based on the concept 
of natural causes. For this reason, the disciplines of astrology and medicine were 
understood as empirical sciences that served knowledge of nature just as much as 
knowledge of divine providence, while history retrospectively documented this 
providence in Nature as divine creation.69 This is how the historia argumentation 
functioned as an interpretive approach linking theology and astrology. Moreover, 
through the time-based interpretation of comets it provided an empirical under-
pinning of the relationship between cometary origin, appearance, and effect.
This relationship should be conceived as a twofold one in which the duality 
corresponds to the dual nature of comets as symbols and causes. On the one hand 
this concerns a metaphysical-symbolic relation which is theologically charged 
in the context of theology of repentance and punishment. Humans are the root 
cause of the evil in the world through their sin seen as human wrongdoing, which 
corresponds to a disruption of the personal relationship between the individual 
and God that can be restored through penitent atonement. In this view, the sins 
66 See also Christoph Meinel, “Certa Deus toti impressit vestigia mundo. Me lanch thons Natur -
phi losophie“, in: Der Humanist als Reformator. Über Leben, Werk und Wirkung Philipp Me lanch -
thons, Fricke, eds. Michael Fricke and Matthias Heesch, Leipzig 2011, pp. 229–251. 
67 Brosseder, Im Bann der Sterne, p. 202. 
68 Ibid., pp. 165–172.
69 Wels, Manifestationen des Geistes, p. 105. 
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are part of a causal relationship of human acts and consequences in which hu-
mans’ evil deeds represent the cause of divine judgment.70 The comet is simulta-
neously an indicative sign of divine punishment and part of the punishment itself 
by way of its negative effects. This prodigious image of comets is less an element 
of a superstitious world view than part of a causal conceptualization of celestial 
phenomena through a pious and educated elite.71 In this context, the interpretation 
in terms of the theology of retribution can be seen itself as a kind of rationaliza-
tion by which suppressed fears are channeled and confronted with a meaningful 
interpretation or a promise of pardon incorporated in the prodigious symbols.72 
The parallel nature of the process of events caused by actions and warning signs 
that occurred naturally and were simultaneously prodigious was retrospectively 
underpinned and rounded out by the meteorological causality, and by making an 
astrological interpretation plausible. The causal relationship between the appear-
ance of comets and the effect of comets in meteorological theory was based on 
this metaphysical connection between the cometary appearance and aftermath in 
their conceptualization as prodigies. In this context, the consequences associated 
with comets were causally described as effects, with the astrological interpretation 
not only enabling a corresponding prognosis but also allowing topical events and 
the adversities of earthly life to be retrospectively recognized as cometary effects. 
4 Conclusion
In the image of comets in the early modern age, in the sixteenth century, through 
the combination of Me lanch thon’s theologized natural philosophy and the aug-
mented cometary theory, interpretations from natural history, astrology, and the-
ology coincided and enabled the dual—and at first glance seemingly paradoxical— 
conception of comets as symbols and causes. These connections only applied to the 
relation ship between comets and the negative events attributed to them, and not the 
cause of the comets themselves, that is, the question of whether their appear ance 
derived from natural causes or divine workings. Again, there is no clear answer to 
this question, and here, too, the different dimensions of comets could blend har-
moniously. This harmony was an essential part of the integrated image of comets.
To sum up, we can say that the combination of different methods of interpre-
tation, interpretive traditions and, finally, different epistemological approaches 
and aspirations incorporated into this image of comets, represents a compromise 
solution that is not unproblematic. A germ of inconsistency lurks in the coexis-
tence of symbolic and causal conceptions of the comets and the underlying phil-
osophical ideas. The disciplines of theology and astrology, which are concerned 
70 Holtz, Theologie und Alltag, pp. 270–271. 
71 Cf. Mosley, The History and Historiography of Early Modern Comets, pp. 291–292.
72 Rienk Vermij has pointed this out in relation to the perception and interpretation of earth-
quakes in the Early Modern Age; see Rienk Vermij, “Erschütterung und Bewältigung. Erdbe-
benkatastrophen in der Frühen Neuzeit”, in: Um Himmels Willen. Religion in Katastrophenzei-
ten, eds. Manfred Jakubowski-Tiessen and Hartmut Lehmann, Göttingen 2003, pp. 235–252. 
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with the interpretive dimensions of comets and are tied into the integrated image 
of comets, are classically seen in a competitive relationship over the prerogative 
of interpretation about natural phenomena, and as a source of strategies for deal-
ing with negative cometary effects by edification, assignment of meaning, and 
conquest of the future. The achievement of the integrated image of comets con-
sists precisely in concealing these incompatibilities to the extent that the explana-
tory gaps of the one disciplinary field would be filled by elements of the other to 
produce a reciprocal legitimation. What is revealed here is not just the processual 
character of the origin of knowledge but of knowledge itself. Where which kind of 
knowledge was relevant, and which function and claims to validity were linked 
to the images of this knowledge, was the result of collective-dynamic negotiating 
processes in which the integrated image of comets represented a metastable state 
as the temporarily successful and accepted result of these processes.
Another factor is the ambivalent character of astrology, whose integrative 
achievement was the main foundation for the image of comets in the Early Mod-
ern Age. Questioning its legitimacy raised doubts about its associated knowledge 
claims and images. Particularly problematic here is the dual nature of astrology, 
which regarded itself as responsible both for the spiritual and meaningful area of 
human existence and for the causal-rational aspect of the sciences.
Both these aspects received critical attention in the seventeenth century. In the 
long term, astrology lost its legitimacy, if only because of an increasing separa-
tion of qualitative and quantitative aspects of knowledge traditions in the Early 
Modern Age. As concerns the explanation and interpretation of frightening ce-
lestial phenomena, this development was finally manifested in the dissolution of 
the integrated image of comets.
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on Novas and Comets at the Beginning of the 17th 
Century: Two Opposing Views on the Relation  
Between Natural Philosophy and Mathematics* 
Miguel A. Granada
It is known that Me lanch thon promoted the study of mathematics at the University 
of Wittenberg with the establishment in 1536 of two chairs (inferior and superi-
or mathematics), for which Georg Joachim Rheticus and Erasmus Reinhold were 
appointed. Me lanch thon’s initiative was followed at other Protestant universities 
across Germany, thus granting the mathematical disciplines greater visibility and 
prestige than they had enjoyed customarily. Relying on Plato (Phaedrus, 246c), Me -
lanch thon praised arithmetic and geometry as the two wings of the soul enabling 
man to ascend to the heavens and, as a consequence, purify the human soul through 
contact with the superior celestial realm and approach divinity.1 In particular, the 
mathematical science of astronomy enabled man to demonstrate God’s creation of 
*  This article is the result of research conducted by the project “Cosmología, teología y antro-
pología en la primera fase de la Revolución Científica (1543–1633)”, funded by the Spanish 
Government, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Project FFI2015–64498-P (AEI/FED-
ER, UE) for the triennium 2016–2018. I wish to thank Patrick J. Boner and Robert Westman 
for their careful reading and improvements on the original English version.
 1 Cf. Me lanch thon, Preface to arithmetic (1536; the oration was held by Rheticus as a prelude 
to his course on arithmetic): “The wings of the human mind are arithmetic and geometry. 
If someone endowed with an intellect that is not mean attached these to himself, he would 
easily enter heaven and would wander freely in the heavenly company, and enjoy that light 
and wisdom” (in: Me lanch thon, Orations on Philosophy and Education, ed. by Sachiko Kusu-
kawa, transl. by Cristine Salazar, Cambridge 1999, p. 93); Preface to Johannes Vogelin’s ‘Book on 
the Elements of Geometry’ (1536): “[Geometry] took flight to the heavens, and raised human 
minds, having cast off the earth, back to that heavenly abode, and showed us the wonderful 
construction and regulation of the world. Furthermore, it led exiled minds to their home-
land and to acquaintance with the heavens, and even to the recognition of God. For that 
very teaching, in which the construction and the ruling of the world are beheld, has great 
power in strengthening worthy beliefs about God in the hearts of men”, ibid., p. 99. See also 
Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Me lanch thon, 
Cambridge 1995, especially Chapter 4 (“The Providence of God”), and Nicholas Jardine and 
Alain-Philippe Segonds, La guerre des astronomes: La querelle au sujet de l’origine du système 
géo-héliocentrique à la fin du XVIe siècle, Paris 2008, vol. I, pp. 263–271 (Appendice: “Sur l’ex-
pression Geometria et Arithmetica Alae Astronomiae”).
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the world and divine providence against Epicurean impiety, by showing that the 
perfectly ordained celestial motions could not be the product of chance.2
These different attitudes and evaluations of the mathematical disciplines 
(which we also find later in the Catholic schools, for example in the tensions 
within the Jesuit order between the mathematical school of Christopher Clavius 
and the supporters of Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics) brought 
about a great debate throughout Europe, including German universities, during 
the period of the scientific revolution. 
In what follows I intend to focus on a particular instance, which, in my opinion, 
perfectly represents the confrontation between Aristotelianism and the emerging 
ambitions of the mathematical disciplines—in our case, astronomy—to contribute 
to knowledge about the true essence of nature (to natural science or better natural 
philosophy, to employ the standard term around 1600). Mathematicians increas-
ingly opposed the Aristotelian appraisal of the so-called middle sciences or mixed 
mathematics (astronomy, optics, acustics, perspective, mechanics), as merely yield-
ing knowledge of accidents, different and inferior to knowledge of the essence of 
things claimed by the metaphysicians and natural philosophers through their 
proper methods. Beyond purely theoretical issues, the debate involved individual 
and institutional components of the academic rank and status of the mathemati-
cal disciplines as well as the salaries of mathematicians compared with those of 
the pure philosophers. The confrontation resulted in the emergence of the modest 
mixed science of mechanics as the true and proper natural philosophy, expressed in 
mathematical language, as we know it today.3 As a result, there materialized the 
very menace that Andreas Osiander had conjured in his “Letter to the Reader” 
added to Copernicus’ De revolutionibus, namely ‘that the liberal arts, which were 
established long ago on a sound basis, should be thrown into confusion’.4 
The particular subject of my inquiry is, on the one hand, the Danzig professor 
of philosophy Bartholomaeus Kecker mann and his criticism of the pretensions 
of contemporary mathematicians (especially astronomers) to reject Aristotelian 
natural philosophy through a new cometary theory founded on the detection 
and geometrical measurement of parallax and the rejection of celestial immuta-
bility assumed by Aristotelianism. On the other hand, I intend to examine the re-
sponses of mathematicians (astronomers) throughout Germany, who before and 
2 See Me lanch thon, Preface to ‘On the Sphere’ (1531): “Only those among the philosophers who 
spurned astronomy were professedly ungodly (atheoi); having done away with providence, 
they also removed the immortality of our souls. If they had reached this knowledge, they 
would have perceived the manifest traces of God in nature, and having noticed them, they 
would have been forced to acknowledge that the universe is made and governed by a mind”, 
in Orations, pp. 106f.
3 On this process, see the illuminating considerations by Peter Dear in Revolutionizing the 
Sciences: European Knowledge and its Ambitions, 1500–1700, Houndmills, Basingstoke 2001, 
pp. 17f., 72f., 104f.
4 Nicholas Copernicus, On the Revolutions, translation and commentary by Edward Rosen, 
Baltimore and London 1992, p. xx.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
211Kecker mann and Hu ni chius on Novas and Comets
after the comet of 1618 not only argued for the celestial location of comets and 
the ensuing mutability of the heavens, but also defended (regardless of whether 
they were Copernicans or Tychonians) the ability of geometry and astronomy to 
reach sound cosmological conclusions and claimed a new relationship between 
the disciplines with a higher appreciation for mathematics. Among the critics 
of Kecker mann, we can count, in the vicinity of Danzig and before the comet 
of 1618, Christophorus Hu ni chius, mathematician at the Gymnasium in Stettin; 
later, in 1619 and at various sites across Germany, Michael Maestlin in Tübin-
gen,5 Isaac Habrecht in Strasbourg, Philip Müller in Leipzig, Johannes Döling in 
Greifswald, and Peter Crüger in Danzig as well. For reasons of space, however, 
I will limit my enquiry to Kecker mann’s arguments and, beyond a few passing 
references to Maestlin and Crüger, to the response by Hu ni chius, so that the im-
portance of this secondary and quite unknown philosopher and mathematician 
may be stressed. In fact, Hu ni chius’ relevance concerns both the issue of comets 
as well as his sympathetic assessment of Copernicus’ heliocentrism, which has so 
far (at least, as far as I know) eluded the attention of the scholars.
1 Bartholomaeus Kecker mann 
Bartholomaeus Kecker mann (ca. 1572–1609) was born in Danzig to a Calvinist 
family.6 He first attended the Academic Gymnasium in his native town from 1587 
and next the Universities of Wittenberg (1590) and Leipzig (1592). When life in 
Saxony became difficult for Calvinist students following the death of Prince-Elec-
tor Christian I in 1591 and the ensuing obligation to subscribe to the Formula 
of Concord, Kecker mann joined many Calvinist exiles to the University of Hei-
delberg in 1592. There, he received his Master of Arts in 1595 and was later ap-
pointed as professor of Hebrew. In 1602, after receiving his licentiate of theology 
degree in Heidelberg, Kecker mann returned to Danzig, where he was appointed 
professor and rector of the local Gymnasium. He taught a three-year philosophy 
course at this famous Calvinist Gymnasium, which bore the character of a proper 
university, until his untimely death in 1609. 
Kecker mann wrote many works on the entire philosophy course from a strict-
ly Aristotelian point of view with some elements of Ramism.7 These works were 
printed during his years of teaching in Danzig and after his death, enjoying wide 
diffusion and influence throughout Germany as well as in other Protestant places 
such as Geneva and England. As a consequence, Kecker mann greatly influenced 
5 We may include with Maestlin the younger Wilhelm Schickard, a pupil of Maestlin at the 
University of Tübingen. Schickard did not mention Kecker mann in his manuscript treatise 
on the 1618 comet, but he adopted the same position as Maestlin. 
6 For Kecker mann’s biography, see Joseph S. Freedman, “The Career and Writings of Bar-
tholomew Kecker mann (d. 1609)”, in: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 141 
(1997), pp. 305–364 (here pp. 306ff.).
7 See Walter J. Ong, Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art 
of Reason, Chicago and London 2004, pp. 298–300; Neal W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of 
Method, New York 1960, pp. 214–220, mainly relying on Kecker mann’s logical work.
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the teaching of philosophy across Protestant Europe, practically in every disci-
pline making up the course, from a faithful Aristotelian outlook.8 
In Kecker mann’s teaching and works, natural philosophy as well as astrono-
my and cosmology (the nature of novas and comets in particular) held a signifi-
cant position. He was well informed about contemporary debates and expressed 
great admiration for Copernicus (as a mathematician, taking heliocentrism only 
as a hypothesis without cosmological import, in accordance with the so-called 
Wittenberg interpretation promoted by Me lanch thon and Reinhold),9 as well as for 
Tycho Brahe, both as an observer and a mathematical astronomer. Despite his 
high regard, however, Kecker mann accepted neither the fluidity of the heavens 
nor the geoheliocentric system postulated by Tycho from 1588. 
Kecker mann published in 1606 a large volume of Disputationes philosophicae, 
Physicae praesertim.10 Among them was a disputatio extraordinaria, titled ‘Theo re-
ma ta exegetica De Cometis in genere; et in specie de tribus illis mirabilibus faci-
bus, quae anno 1572. et denique anno praeterito 1604 apparuerunt’, with his pupil 
Peter Crüger acting as respondent. To the text of this disputation was appended 
a ‘Diaskepsis De observationibus cometarum per instrumenta Astronomica, at-
que adeo etiam eius, qui apparuit Anno praecedenti 1604, Octobri, Novembri et 
Decembri mensibus’. The above work was also printed posthumously, in 1611, as 
well as two others by Kecker mann: a Systema Astronomiae compendiosum11 and a 
Systema Physicum, septem libris adornatum, whose sixth book deals with ‘De meteo-
ris’ and features in the fifth chapter a long discussion ‘De cometis’.12
1.1 Kecker mann’s Aristotelian cosmos and the status of astronomy
Kecker mann’s world is the old cosmos of the Aristotelian tradition in the Chris-
tianized version proper to medieval philosophy and the Me lanch thonian tradition 
in Protestant countries. We can see this from an academic disputation held in 1605 
‘On the World’ (De mundo), where the world is defined in Aristotelian and Me -
lanch thonian terms as ‘systema or assemblage formed by heaven and earth and 
by all the natural beings contained in them, originally joined together in the best 
order and most beautifully by God’.13 In this disputation, Kecker mann concedes 
 8 See Siegfried Wollgast, Philosophie in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung 1550–
1700, Berlin 1988, pp. 169–173.
 9 See Robert S. Westman, “The Me lanch thon Circle, Rheticus and the Wittenberg Interpreta-
tion of the Copernican Theory”, in: Isis, 66 (1975), pp. 165–193. 
10 Bartholomaeus Kecker mann, Disputationes philosophicae, Physicae praesertim, quae in Gymnasio 
Dantiscano ad Lectionum Philosophicarum cursum paulo plus biennio publicè institutae et habitae 
sunt, sub praesidio Bartholomaei Kecker manni, Apud Guilielmum Antonium, Hanoviae, 1606.
11 Bartholomaeus Kecker mann, Systema Astronomiae compendiosum Gymnasio Dantiscano olim 
praelectum et 2. libris adornatum, Apud haeredes Guilielmi Antonii, Hanoviae 1611.
12 Bartholomaeus Kecker mann, Systema Physicum, septem libris adornatum, Et Anno Christi M–
CVII. publice propositum in Gymnasio Dantiscano, Apud Guilielmum Antonium, Hanoviae 
1610. It was reissued in 1612, 1617 and 1623 (we quote from this last edition).
13 Cursus Philosophici Disputatio XX. De mundo, in Kecker mann, Disputationes philosophicae, the-
sis 4, pp. 563f.: “systema sive compages caelo, terra et quae his continentur naturalibus cor -
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to the world the properties (affectiones) of unicity (unitas),14 connection of its parts 
(connexio partium or rejection of void)15 and sphericity (configuratio).16 Needless to 
say, the distinction in the definition between the heavens and the earth implies 
the traditional cosmological dualism between the supralunary and sublunary or 
elementary regions, each with its own kind of matter and physics. A previous dis-
putation in 1603 ‘On the Heavens’ (De caelo) stated this clearly, with the resulting 
immutability of the heavens, subject only to the perpetual circular motion of the 
ethereal spheres. As the first four ‘physical theses on the heavens’ declare:
1. The celestial body has its matter as well as its inner form. 2. But the celes-
tial matter is not elementary, and therefore it is neither fiery, nor airy, nor 
aqueous, but a different [matter] and devoid of any elementary condition, 
such as certainly agrees with a body that is first in place as well as in worth 
and virtue among all bodies in the world. 3. But just as the heavens did 
not begin from a natural generation, they will not cease through a natural 
corruption, since they are certainly free from such natural changes as al-
teration, augmentation and diminution. 4. It revolves with the most simple 
and perfect local motion, namely circular motion.17
Marginalia refer the reader to the second book of Kecker mann’s Systema Physicum, 
where, besides affirming the different, more divine and prior matter of the heav-
ens,18 it concedes the following four qualities: subtility or purity, solidity, immuta-
bility, sphaericity.19 As for immutability, Kecker mann clarifies that the heavens are 
not absolutely immutable, since this property belongs exclusively to God (against 
po ribus à Deo primitus ordinatissimè ac pulcherrimè concinnata”. This definition, coming 
from the pseudoaristotelian De mundo (391b 9–10), had been adopted by Me lanch thon in his 
Initia doc trinae physicae in: Corpus Reformatorum, ed. Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider, vol. 13, C.A. 
Schwetsch ke and Sohn, Halle 1846, col 214, and passed to the cosmological literature in Ger -
many.
14 Cursus Philosophici Disputatio XX. De mundo, in Kecker mann, Disputationes philosophicae, the-
sis 26, p. 568: “Unitas est mundi affectio, per quam nec extra se alios [mundos] habet, nec ex 
se alios producere potest”.
15 Ibid., thesis 27: “connexio partium seu fuga vacui est arctissima unio […] per quam corpus à 
cor pore separari non potest nec ullus in mundo angulus dari, in quo non sit necessariò ali -
quod corpus”. 
16 Ibid., thesis 28: “configuratio est affectio mundi, per quam corpora mundi […] vergunt in 
ro tun ditatem”. Cf. ibid., p. 585, problem 13: “Mundus est omnino rotundus, circularis, atque 
adeo sphaerico terminatur et concluditur ambitu”.
17 Cursus Philosophici Disputatio tertia, […] De caelo, in Kecker mann, Disputationes philosophicae, 
pp. 26f.: “1. Habet omnino caeleste corpus suam ut materiam, ita formam quoque internam. 
2. Sed [coelestis] materia elementaris non est; atque adeo nec ignea, nec aerea, nec aquea; sed 
di versa quaedam, ac libera ab omni elementari conditione; qualis nimirum conveniebat cor -
po ri, ut loco, ita dignitate et efficacia, inter omnia mundi corpora primo. 3. Sicut autem gene -
ra tione naturali Caelum non coepit, ita nec desinet naturali corruptione: expers nimirum 
eius modi naturalium mutationum, ut est alteratio, incrementum et decrementum. 4. Motu 
lo cali circumagitur simplicissimo et perfectissimo, id est circulari”.
18 Kecker mann, Systema Physicum, liber secundus, De coelo et elementis, p. 93, first theorem.
19 Ibid., p. 98.
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the absolute immutability conceded to the heavens by Aris totle, Kecker mann, a 
pious Christian, draws on the scholastic distinction between God’s absolute and 
His ordained power, equal to the natural order and freely imposed by Him on the 
creation).20 The heavens are respectively or naturally immutable, in that they cannot 
suffer or be changed by any other natural body.21 Kecker mann was thus a staunch 
supporter of celestial immutability at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
In addition, even if he was well informed of recent developments affirming the 
fluidity of the heavens and rejecting the solidity and impenetrability of the celes-
tial spheres,22 Kecker mann remained faithful to the traditional doctrine of their 
solidity and impenetrability. As he would say in the Systema Astronomiae compen-
diosum (1611), although famous contemporary artifices (that is, mathematicians or 
astronomers) state that celestial bodies move through a fluid medium like birds 
in the air or fishes in the water, they still admit that astronomy necessarily pre-
supposes, in order to account for celestial motion, celestial spheres and orbs, for 
whose existence probable reasons could also be adduced. ‘Therefore’, Kecker mann 
concluded, ‘we retain in this astronomical system this diversity of celestial orbs’.23
20 This distinction was of fundamental significance for Kecker mann in order to explain why 
the appearance of novelties in the heavens (the new stars or novas of 1572 and 1604) was not 
in contradiction with their natural immutability. 
21 Ibid., pp. 102f.: “Immutabilis duplex est: quaedam absoluta, qua res quae immutabilis dici-
tur, a nulla causa quaecunque tandem illa sit, pati et mutari potest. Et hoc modo solus Deus 
est immutabilis […]. Alia vero est immutabilitas respectiva et restricta, quando aliquid pati 
et mutari non potest a certo causae et agentium genere. Et hoc modo caelum dicitur immu-
tabile. Coelum enim dicitur immutabile et impatibile non eo respectu, quasi nihil pati possit 
simpliciter; nam et pati et corrumpi a Deo, qui ex nihilo coelum creavit, imo etiam ab ange-
lis, potest. Sed dicitur immutabile et impatibile respectu corporum naturalium, ita ut sensus 
sit, nullum esse in mundo corpus à quo coeleste corpus alterationem aut corruptionem pati 
queat, sive quod possit agere in coelum”. 
22 Kecker mann knew and frequently cited Tycho Brahe’s works as well as other earlier and 
contemporary authors supporting the fluidity of celestial matter, including Jean Pena, Jo-
hannes Kepler and Konrad Aslachus; ibid., pp. 100–102. The Danzig rector even rejected the 
argument of opponents that refraction of light from the stars would necesssarily be pro-
duced if it should pass through media of different density like the solid spheres of ether and 
the fluid air. See ibid., p. 102. 
23 Kecker mann, Systema Astronomiae compendiosum, pp. 3–4: “Corpus coeleste stellatum conspi-
ciendum est suis quibusdam sphaeris et orbibus distinctum, idque melioris et plenioris co-
gnitionis gratia. […]. Hinc nimirum est quod praestantissimi nostri seculi artifices statuant, 
non esse eiusmodi distinctas concamerationes coeli, sed esse coelum continuum aliquod 
et fluidum corpus, non secus ac est aer et aqua, ac idcirco sidera et stellas non circumrapi 
à distinctis quibusdam sphaeris, seu orbibus et cameris coeli, sed ita libere et per se move-
ri in corpore coelesti, prout videmus aves volare in aere, aut pisces natare in aqua. Verum 
quoniam ipsi artifices fatentur diversitatem et apparentias motuum coelestium non posse 
discentibus explicari, nec posse construi ullam scientiam Astronomicam, nisi praesuppo-
nantur ista Principia, Praecognita, et Hypotheses de distinctione coelestium camerarum et 
sphaerarum, et quia etiam probabiles rationes dari possunt quibus ista coelestium orbium 
diversitas, probetur, Idcirco eam in hoc systemate Astronomico retinebimus”. It must be 
said, however, that after Kepler’s Astronomia nova (published in 1609) and the elliptical tra-
jectories of planets, this argument by Kecker mann hardly functions. 
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Previously, Kecker mann had distinguished the three sciences dealing with 
the heavens: physics, astronomy and astrology. Leaving aside astrology as deal-
ing with the effects of the motion and positions of the stars, astronomy is defined 
as ‘a concrete mathematical science’, that is, not dealing abstractly (absolute et ab-
stracte) with quantity, like geometry and arithmetic, but concretely (in concreto) or 
inasmuch as the quantity it deals with inheres in a substance, namely the celestial 
bodies.24 In other words, astronomy is a middle science or mixed mathematics, since 
it applies mathematics to the study of quantitative aspects of the celestial sub-
stance. But inasmuch as quantity is a mere accident of substance, it follows that 
astronomy does not touch the very substance or essence of the celestial bodies 
and, as a consequence, is an inferior science, subordinate to the first science deal-
ing with the heavens, that is, physics (or celestial physics as opposed to sublunary 
physics, which deals with a totally different natural substance, namely elementa-
ry bodies): ‘[1]. Physics deals with the heavens insofar as it is a substance, that is, 
with its matter and form; 2. insofar as it has a quality, namely light. 3. insofar as its 
relation to these inferior, elementary bodies. Astronomy, however, deals with the 
heavens as quantity, insofar as [it concerns] measurement of place and motion’.25
Thus, Kecker mann was truly representative of the traditional dissociation and 
inferiority of the middle science of astronomy with respect to physics; as a result, 
only the natural philosopher or physicus is to be considered able or competent to 
make assertions on the cosmological structure and configuration of the world in 
general and of the celestial realm in particular. The mathematician and the as-
tronomer dealing only with quantitative aspects of the heavens must be aware of 
their subordinate status and not transgress this limit lest an upheaval or improp-
er overturning of the sciences occurs. Academically, it implies—as we indicated 
at the start—that the astronomer ought not pretend to rise to the higher status 
and remuneration of the Aristotelian natural philosopher. In what follows, we 
will show how Kecker mann expressed a sense of jealousy toward this inherited 
concept and relation between the disciplines. 
1.2 Kecker mann’s reaction to the novas and comets that appeared from 1572
Kecker mann was perfectly aware of the succession of novas and comets that oc-
curred in this period. He commented extensively on the novas of 1572 and 1604, 
and mentioned only once, and cursorily, the nova of 1600 in Cygnus. Though he 
did not entirely exclude that they were actually comets, even endowed with a 
24 Kecker mann, ibid., p. 1: “Diximus […] quod Astronomia sit scientia mathematica concreta, 
quia non docet absolute et abstractè de quantitate, sive de trina dimensione aut de numero, 
quod facit Geometria et Arithmetica, sed docet de quantitate, seu mensura et numero in con-
creto, quatenus nimirum inhaeret certae substantiae, nempe coelesti corpori et lucidissimis 
his quae videmus sideribus”. 
25 Ibid., p. 2: “In Physica tractatur, de coelo quoad substantiam, id est, materiam et formam eius, 
2. quoad qualitatem nempe lucem, 3. quoad relationem ad haec Elementaria inferiora corpo-
ra. Astronomia verò de coelo tractat quoad quantitatem, quoad mensuram situs et motus”. 
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proper motion (giving credit to some inaccurate observers, such as Johann Krab-
be on the nova of 1604),26 he ultimately accepted them as new stars. As for comets, 
he referred only to those of 1577 and 1607. Kecker mann was surely aware that 
the most competent artifices or mathematicians were increasingly passing from 
the initial interpretation of the nova of 1572 and the comet of 1577 as celestial 
phenomena incompatible with Aristotelian physics and its dogma of celestial im-
mutability (and consequently as miracles of God’s omnipotence and providence 
endowed with an eschatological significance), to an explanation of them as nat-
ural phenomena displaying the natural mutability of the heavens and therefore 
challenging the cosmological dualism of Aristotelian cosmology, without ever 
refusing to see them as related in some way to God’s providence. 
Against this threat to both the inherited cosmology and the established sub-
ordination of mathematical astronomy to natural philosophy (once astronomers 
had introduced comets and novas into the heavens by measuring their distanc-
es from the earth by means of the geometrical technique of calculating paral-
lax), Kecker mann wrote two special works: in 1605 his ‘Theo re mata exegetica De 
Cometis in genere; et in specie de tribus illis mirabilibus facibus, quae anno 1572. 
et denique anno praeterito 1604 apparuerunt’, followed by a ‘Diaskepsis De ob-
servationibus cometarum per instrumenta Astronomica, atque adeo etiam eius, 
qui apparuit Anno praecedenti 1604, Octobri, Novembri et Decembri mensibus’, 
both published in 1606 in the above mentioned Disputationes philosophicae; in 1607 
the sixth book De meteoris (with a large Chapter 5 ‘De cometis’) from his bulky 
Systema physicum, published in 1610.
Kecker mann’s response to the challenge (cosmological and epistemological, as 
well as professional) was twofold. As for the novas, and inasmuch as they were 
not assumed to be comets but truly new stars located in the eighth sphere and 
lacking any proper motion, he found that this opinion could be tolerated:
insofar as it neither overturns nor undermines meteorological doctrine 
nor any other part of physical science. For it does not follow that, [since] 
new stars have appeared in the heavens, therefore the doctrine conveyed 
by Aris totle and other natural philosophers concerning comets and their 
generation, as well as the purity and perpetuity of celestial bodies, can no 
longer be maintained as true. New bodies may indeed be produced in the 
heavens by the miraculous power of God, without removing any of the 
ordinary principles, forces or ways of acting in nature. […] Certainly Aris-
totle never denied that the first cause can act without secondary causes, 
nor in a different way than the secondary; it has never been denied that 
God can produce something new. It does not follow that, [since] God often 
acts extraordinarily, apart from nature, therefore he does not act ordinarily 
26 On Johann Krabbe (1553–1616) and his works as well as the criticism of him by Kepler, see 
Patrick J. Boner, “Celestial Novelty and the Science of the Stars: Kepler vs. Krabbe on accura-
cy and authority in Early Modern Germany”, forthcoming. 
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with nature. Nor does it then follow that, [since] God often makes miracles, 
therefore the foundations of natural science and the principles of celestial 
nature, and of the generation of meteors, are overthrown. Miracles are be-
yond nature, but they do not oppose or overturn nature.27
Accordingly, novas overthrow neither the received view of physical science nor 
celestial immutability once they are interpreted as miracles of God’s absolute pow-
er, which extends beyond the limits of ordained power or the established law of 
nature. Although there certainly was the problem that, according to Scripture, 
God had ceased to create on the sixth day, Kecker mann was persuaded that this 
difficulty could be avoided if it was assumed that God either had created these 
stars at the beginning with much less light and increased their illumination at 
precise moments in accordance with His providential design,28 or the inborn light 
of these old stars was increased by the differing density of the ethereal medium.29 
Comets seemed more problematic, since their celestial location was in evident 
contradiction not only with Aristotelian doctrine, but also with the dogma of 
27 “Diaskepsis De observationibus cometarum”, in: Kecker mann, Disputationes philosophicae, 
thesis 37, pp. 399f.: “eorum ego sententiam et tolerarim libentius, et non impugnarim teme-
re, utpote quae nec doctrinam Meteorologicam, nec ullam aliam scientiae Physicae partem 
labefactat aut evertit. Neque enim consequens est: Apparuerunt in caelo novae stellae; Ergo, 
doctrina, quae ab Aristotele, et aliis Physicis tradita est de cometis et eorum generatione, 
itemque de caelestis corporis puritate et perpetuitate, veritatem suam amplius tueri nequit. 
Possunt namque in caelo nova corpora produci per miraculosam Dei potentiam, ut tamen 
nihil interea ordinariis naturae principiis, viribus, et agendi modis decedat. […] Nusquam 
sane negavit Aristoteles, primam causam posse agere sine secundis, et aliter quam secun-
das; nusquam inficiatus est, Deum posse aliquid novi producere; nec sequitur, Deus saepe 
absque natura agit extraordinarie, ergo cum natura non agit ordinarie; Nec denique sequi-
tur, Deus saepe facit miracula, ergo evertuntur Physicae scientiae principia et praecepta 
de natura caeli, deque generatione Meteororum. Sunt supra naturam miracula, nec tamen 
naturam oppugnant aut evertunt”. For this account of Kecker mann’s criticism, we refer to 
Miguel A. Granada, “Michael Maestlin and the Comet of 1618”, in: Unifying Heaven and Earth: 
Studies in the History of Early Modern Cosmology, eds. Miguel A. Granada, Patrick J. Boner and 
Dario Tessicini, Barcelona 2016, pp. 239–290 (here pp. 260–266). See also Marion Gindhart, 
Das Kometenjahr 1618: Antikes und zeitgenössisches Wissen in der frühneuzeitlichen Kometenlitera-
tur des deutschsprachigen Raumes, Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 250–252.
28 Kecker mann ascribed this interpretation to “some very learned men” (doctissimis viris, 
Kecker mann, “Diaskepsis De observationibus cometarum”, theses 38 and 39, p. 401). This 
coincides with the explanation proposed by David Fabricius in his treatises on the nova of 
1604 and on Mira Ceti, discovered by him in 1596. See Miguel A. Granada, “Johannes Kepler 
and David Fabricius: Their Discussion on the Nova of 1604”, in: Change and Continuity in Early 
Modern Cosmology, ed. Patrick J. Boner, Dordrecht, 2011 pp. 67–92. 
29 “Diaskepsis De observationibus cometarum”, in: Kecker mann, Disputationes philosophicae, 
theses 40 and 41. In this case, Kecker mann attributed the explanation to the Spanish physi-
cian Francisco Vallés in his famous De iis, quae scripta sunt physice in libris sacris, sive de sacra 
philosophia, apud haeredem Nicolai Beuilaquae, Augustae Taurinorum 1587. Valles had been 
severely criticized by Tycho Brahe in his Astronomiae Instauratae Progymnasmata (Tycho Brahe, 
Opera omnia, ed. J. L. E. Dreyer, vol. 2, Copenhague 1915, pp. 87–93), and his opinion would 
also be rejected by Schickard in 1619 in his Cometen Beschreibung (see ref. 48 below), pp. 25f. 
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natural celestial immutability, inasmuch as they were increasingly explained as 
natural productions. As stated above, Kecker mann limited his commentaries to 
the comets of 1577 and 1607. He defended the strict Aristotelian concept of comets 
as warm and dry exhalations (mixed, he added, with humid and cold vapors) that 
rose to and were inflamed in the superior region of the air.30 Kecker mann did not 
even admit the optical theory of comets, increasingy accepted over the sixteenth 
century, and remained faithful to the Aristotelian concept of comets as conflagra-
tions: ‘It remains, therefore, that comets are sublunary bodies, and certainly hot 
and viscous exhalations, drawn out to the highest region of the air by the force 
of the stars and there not illuminated by the refracted rays of the Sun, but truly 
inflamed and burnt’.31 
Kecker mann thus intended to save the natural immutability of the heavens, 
but he also knew perfectly well that the strength of the innovators resided in the 
presumed accuracy of their observations and in the necessary conclusions de-
rived from the geometrical measurement of parallax. In addition, he believed that 
the celestial location of comets, conceived as natural phenomena, wholly under-
mined Aristotelian cosmology32 and implied the destruction of natural science as 
taught in the schools: 
Concerning the place and location, as well as the distance of this Torch [nova 
of 1604] from the earth, an anxious and apprehensive meditation torments 
me; and even more since I see that in the last 33 years observations of some 
comets have, from the very same foundations, led to overthrowing the prin-
cipal part of natural science so well established in the schools regarding the 
immutability, constancy and purity of the celestial body (so different in na-
ture from the remaining lower bodies), as well as the doctrine concerning 
the element of fire, air and, at the same time, almost all of Meteorology.33
30 See “De cometis”, in Systema physicum, p. 679: “Materia ergo cometae est halitu ex fumo et 
vapore mixtus, id est, partim calidus, partim frigidus, partim humidus, partim siccus”.
31 “Theo re mata exegetica De Cometis”, in: Kecker mann, Disputationes philosophicae, theorem 
12, p. 349: “Relinquitur ergo, cometas esse corpora sublunaria, et quidem exhalationes cali-
das et viscosas, virtute astrorum in supremam regionis aeris extractas, ibidemque non a Sole 
κατ’ ανάκλασιν illustratas, sed revere accensas et flagrantes”. 
32 Cf. Systema physicum, pp. 693f.: “Valde periculosa est ista sententia, utpote quae non parum 
labefactet totam doctrinam de ordine ac distinctione partium mundi, deque distinctione 
corporis coelestis a corporibus elementaribus. Si enim in ipsam usque substantiam coeli 
fumus aliquis sulphureus delatus fuit, ibique incensus, utique ipsa coeli substantia mutata 
et alterata fuit”.
33 “Diaskepsis De observationibus cometarum”, in: Kecker mann, Disputationes philosophicae, 
thesis 4, pp. 378f.: De loco tamen et situ, atque adeo distantia istius Facis [nova of 1604] a 
terra, sollicita me sane et anxia torquet cogitatio; idque eo magis, quod videam, ab annis 
nunc 33. cometarum aliquot observationes eo pertinuisse, ut bene constituta in Scholis 
scientiae naturalis pars princeps de caelestis corporis immutabilitate, constantia, puritate, 
atque adeo a reliquis corporibus inferioribus naturae distinctione, itemque doctrina de ele-
mento ignis, aeris, simulque universa pene Meteorologia ex ipsis usque fundamentis labe-
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In order to prevent this painful development, Kecker mann endeavoured to dis-
credit both the astronomical observations and the parallactic demonstrations. 
The former, he argued, lacked credibility for three main reasons: 1) the inaccura-
cy of the instruments of observation;34 2) the refraction of the rays coming from 
the cometary phenomena when they passed through fire and air, the result being 
that ‘those celestial bodies cannot be observed in their proper places’;35 3) the ec-
centricity of our place of observation on the earth’s surface.36 As a consequence, 
the geometrical determination of distance by parallactic measurement could 
be neither accurate nor precise: ‘But if they were not able to observe correctly 
through astronomical instruments, assuredly nothing certain and beyond doubt 
can be affirmed about their [comets’] parallax. But it is in the observation of par-
allax where the first foundation, as it were, of this observation is placed through 
which comets are declared to be generated and located in the ethereal region’.37
For all these reasons, observing comets could produce an error of ‘many Ger-
man miles’ in determining their distance.38 Nevertheless, in order to avoid the to-
tal discredit of astronomy, Kecker mann declared himself ready to accept that this 
criticism did not affect the observation of real heavenly bodies (stars and planets), 
but only the lights (faces) seen from 1572, which, as they were merely comets, they 
were not primary celestial bodies, perfectly round and moving uniformly.39 
The many profound discrepancies among astronomers in their observations 
and parallactic measurements of these phenomena (indeed, some placed them in 
the stellar sphere, others in the planetary region and still others in the sublunary 
region) encouraged Kecker mann to consider the parallactic method as unreliable 
when applied to comets: ‘Doubtless, heavenly bodies are observable with math-
ematical instruments. Regarding comets, however, we are allowed for still be-
factetur”. Cf. also ibid., thesis 7, p. 380: “[…] unde verendum fuerit, ne pro Systemate scientiae 
naturalis, opinionum variarum ac dubiarum Chaos in scholis simus habituri”.
34 Ibid., thesis 11, p. 382: “Haec ergo sententiae meae summa est: Nullius omnino proprie et 
vere dicti cometae situm et motum per instrumenta Astronomica sic observari potuisse 
hactenus, aut posse adhuc, ut ex observatione ista concludi firmiter et demonstrari queat, 
cometalem ullum fumum ad aethera usque evectum esse, ibique accensum”.
35 Ibid., thesis 15, p. 383: “idcirco sidera non posse in propriis et veris locis per instrumenta 
observari”.
36 Ibid., thesis 16, p. 384: “neque enim videri possit erroris expers observatio, quae centrum 
mundi cum centro instrumenti confundit; exactissima nempe observatio, ea tantum futura 
est, quae fit per instrumentum et oculum observatoris, collocatum in ipso mundi centro, 
utpote cum ex caelo, tamquam ex circumferentia radii caelestes, tamquam lineae, ad ipsum 
istius circuli centrum convenienter terminentur”.
37 Ibid., thesis 36, pp. 398f.: “Quod si autem observari recte per instrumenta astronomica non 
potuerunt, utique nec de eorum [comets] parallaxi certi quicquam et indubitati potest pro-
nunciari, in cuius tamen parallaxeos observatione primum quasi fundamentum positum est 
eius observationis, qua feruntur cometae in ipsa aetherea regione generati esse et haesisse”. 
Cf. Systema physicum, pp. 719f.
38 Diaskepsis, thesis 24, p. 389. 
39 Ibid., theses 17–22, pp. 385ff.
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lieving, persuaded by many and great reasons, that they cannot be properly ob-
served even through those so exquisite and ample instruments of Tycho Brahe’.40 
Kecker mann did not even contemplate the possibility that comets could be 
celestial bodies. Discrepancies of observational accuracy and observers’ differing 
competence as mathematicians were sufficient for him to discredit their claims. 
Rather, he took for granted the traditional view concerning the immutability of 
the heavens and concluded from it that comets were necessarily natural phenom-
ena in the sublunary region and therefore unsuitable objects for astronomical 
study. The differences among astronomers were thus seen as simply the result of 
applying to comets a method suitable for a very different class of objects. 
Kecker mann concluded with an appeal to re-establishing concord between 
astronomy and natural philosophy, a relationship that had been deplorably de-
stroyed, with ensuing disaster, by conflicting interpretations of the recent ex-
traordinary phenomena.41 Restoration of concord and the integrity of natural 
science, however, could not be gained by completely subverting the inherited 
science (that is, by means of a revolution in science). Astronomers should cease to 
deal with comets and limit themselves to the proper task of calculating celestial 
motions in their mixed mathematics, relegating the study of comets to the physi-
ci, their rightful investigators: ‘comets are not astronomical, but physical bodies; 
and they will not be properly investigated by the astronomer, but by the natural 
philosopher’.42 Otherwise, as Kecker mann had previously threatened, this sub-
versive doctrine of astronomers, mingling mathematics with physics should be 
banished from the schools:
For this reason, I strongly prefer that this opinion about smokes carried 
up to the very aether, mingled with that most pure celestial body, and set 
on fire in the very same place, would either be plainly ignored or spread 
only among the schools of philosophers with this solemn formula: IT IS 
NOT EVIDENT; since it is not as easy to restore good disciplines as it is to 
destroy them.43
40 Ibid., thesis 32, p. 394: “Nimirum corpora coelestia sunt instrumentis Mathematicis observa-
bilia: De cometis autem venia nobis datur, si multis et magnis rationibus adhuc persuasi ita 
credamus, eos nequidem per Tychonis Brahei illa tam exquisita tamque ampla instrumenta 
observari unquam recte potuisse”. Cf. Systema physicum, pp. 720f.
41 Diaskepsis, thesis 56, pp. 414f., where Kecker mann expresses his affliction: “dolorem meum, 
quo me sentio affici, cum animadverto […] viam sterni ad committendas inter se duas illas 
plane sororia necessitudine devinctas scienctias, Physicam et Astronomiam […]; venia detur 
iusto dolori, et meo pro naturalis scientiae integritate sive zelo, sive voto”. 
42 Ibid., p. 417: “neque enim Astronomica corpora Cometae sunt, sed Physica; nec de cometis 
Astronomus, qua Astronomus, legitime tractabit, sed physicus”.
43 Ibid., thesis 9, p. 381: “Quocirca vehementer optem, istam de fumis ad ipsum usque aethera 
evectis, cumque purissimo illo corpore caelesti confusis, ibidemque accensis, opinionem vel 
non audiri plane, vel ampliari saltem in Philosophorum scholis cum illa solenni formula: 
NON LIQUET; neque enim tam facile restaurantur bonae disciplinae, quam convelluntur”.
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2 Christophorus Hu ni chius on Copernicus and his response to Kecker mann
Ten years after the comet of 1607 (a transit of Halley’s comet), the appearance of a 
bright new comet at the end of 1618 occasioned the publication of many treatises 
throughout Germany. Several advocates of the celestial location of comets—all 
mathematicians—reacted in print against Kecker mann’s stance. In her signifi-
cant con tribution to the current literature,44 Marion Gindhart has described three 
such responses–those of Philip Müller, a professor of mathematics at Leipzig,45 
Jo hannes Döling in a disputation at the University of Greifswald,46 and Isaac 
Hab recht at Strasbourg.47 We have recently examined a significant reaction to 
Kecker mann in the unpublished manuscript treatise by Michael Maestlin: Astro-
no mi scher Discurs von dem Cometen, so in Anno 1618, im Nouembri zu erscheinen ange-
fan gen und bis inn Februar dis 1619 Jars am Himmel noch gesehen wirt.48
There was, however, an earlier reaction to Kecker mann’s criticism, almost imme-
diately after the publication in 1606 of his ‘Theo re mata exegetica De Cometis’ and 
‘Diaskepsis De observationibus cometarum per instrumenta Astronomica’ which 
deserves special attention. The author was Christophorus Hu ni chius (Hunnich), 
philosopher and mathematician in the Paedagogium illustre at Stettin, near Danzig.49 
Our information about Hu ni chius’ life is rather scant. Unfortunately, there are 
no biographical entries in the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie or the Neue Deut-
sche Biographie. Hu ni chius died in Stettin on 15 August 1623, but his year of birth 
is unknown. The frontispiece of a disputation chaired by Hu ni chius (De caelo 
et caelestibus corporibus. Nec non aliis quibusdam philosophicis problematibus Dispu-
tatio, Leipzig 1592) refers to him as Christophorus Hu ni chius Dipoldisylvanus. 
The Latin toponym ‘Dipoldisylvanus’ indicates that Hu ni chius’s birthplace was 
Dippoldiswalde,50 a small town in the southern region of Saxony, close to Bohe-
44 Gindhart, Das Kometenjahr 1618.
45 Philip Müller, De cometa Anni M. DC.XVIII. Commentatio PhysicoMathematica specialis et gene-
ralis, Typis Grossianis, Leipzig 1619. 
46 Johannes Döling, Discursus Mathematico-Physicus in quo De Cometis contra Aristotelicos, im-
primis vero Bartholomaeum Kecker mannum Dantiscanum pro Nobilissimo Tychone Braheo, nostro 
se cu li Atlante […] disseritur, Typis Johannis Albini, Greifswald 1619.
47 Isaac Habrecht, Kurtze und gründliche Beschreibung Eines Newen ungewohnlichen Sterns oder 
Cometen […] im November und December diß 1618. Jahr erschienen, Johann Carolus, Strasbourg 
1618. On these three works, see also Granada, “Michael Maestlin and the Comet of 1618”. 
48 Michael Maestlin, Ms. Cod math. 15b8, Württembergische Landesbibliothek Stuttgart. See 
our study in Granada, “Michael Maestlin and the Comet of 1618”; we are currently pre-
paring a critical edition of this significant manuscript. As indicated, the young Tübingen 
scholar Wilhelm Schickard, also a disciple of Maestlin, may be added. Though he did not 
explicitly mention Kecker mann in his Cometen Beschreibung In zwen underschidliche Partes ab-
getheilt, deren Erster Von denselbigen ins gemein: der Ander Von allen Insonderheit, sonderlich aber 
denen drey Jüngsten, In abgeloffenen 1618 Jahr erschienen, aussführlich handelt (Ms. Cod. math. 
qt. 43, Württembergische Landesbibliothek Stuttgart; http://digital.wlb-stuttgart. de/purl/
bsz307044173), Schickard reacted according to the same lines. 
49 See Granada, “Michael Maestlin and the Comet of 1618”, Appendix 2.
50 I owe to Patrick Boner this suggestion, which has proven right.
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mia. This could explain why he studied at the University of Leipzig, closer to his 
birthplace than that of Wittenberg.51
As far as I know, Hu ni chius began teaching in Leipzig at least from 1590, where 
he published from that year several smaller works dealing with mathematical 
and cosmological matters: a poem in Greek entitled De miraculis mathematicorum 
carmen, in which the mathematical disciplines were extolled,52 the already men-
tioned disputation De caelo et caelestibus corporibus,53 and in 1593 an academic dis-
putation over which he presided on Archimedes’ Sand Reckoner (Arenarius).54 In 
the disputation De caelo et caelestibus corporibus (from thesis 41), Hu ni chius deals 
with the most important cosmological and astronomical opinions, both ancient 
and modern, successively presenting those of the 1) Chaldeans and Egyptians, 2) 
Eudoxus, Calippus and Aris totle, 3) Ptolemy, 4) Thabit ibn Qurra and the Alphon-
sine astronomers, 5) Copernicus, and 6) Fracastoro. Hu ni chius’ representation of 
Copernicus is rather sympathetic and positive, although he does not hesitate to 
mention the opposition to the Bible implied by the attribution of a threefold mo-
tion to the simple body of the Earth. This position, significantly antecipates by 
nine years the more extensive and more positive appraisal of heliocentrism in the 
disputation De Situ Quiete Figura et Magnitudine Globi terrestris.55 
51 An inspection of the book of enrolments at the University of Leipzig (carried out online 
through the digital copy from the University of Düsseldorf) confirms this hypothesis. Cf. 
Die Iüngere Matrikel der Universität Leipzig 1559–1809: Als Personen- und Ortsregister bearbei-
tet und durch Nachträge aus den Promotionslisten ergänzt, ed. Georg Erler, vol. I, Leipzig 1909, 
where the Index of names registers “Hunichin Christoph. Dippolswald” (p. 203) and indi-
cates the dates of 1580 (entrance), 1583 (Bachelor of Arts) and 1586 (Master of Arts). In addi-
tion, Hu ni chius is listed in 1602 as Dean (p. CVI) and in 1605 as Vice Chancellor (ibidem). 
52 De miraculis mathematicorum carmen, quod in laudem mathematicarum disciplinarum […] conscrip-
sit et misit M. Christoph Hu ni chius, Haeredes Uihannis Steinmanni, Leipzig 1590.
53 De caelo et caelestibus corporibus. Nec non aliis quibusdam philosophicis problematibus Disputatio, 
Qua cùm ea, quae ad naturam caelestium corporum et eorundem contemplationem Physicam pertinent, 
tùm alia nonnulla explicantur. Instituta in celebri Academia Lipsiensi die 14. Octobr. Anno Christi 
M.D. XCII. Praeside M. Christophoro Hunichio Dipoldisylvano, Abraham Lamberg, Leipzig 1592. 
54 Archimedis opinio de arenæ nvmero explicata […] disputabitur ad 21. apr. […] præside Christoph. 
Hvnichio, Leipzig 1593. According to the World Catalogue, there is only one extant copy of 
this publication, preserved in the National Library of Sweden, Stockholm. 
55 See De caelo et caelestibus corporibus: “[thesis] XLVI. Nicol. Copernicus vir acutissimus inge-
nio, edoctus accuratis et propriis observationibus reiecit & ipse Alphonsinam caeli divi-
sionem: utque ab errore omni vindicaret Astronomiam: imitatus non Nicetam Syracis. […] 
sed Philolaum Pythagoricum, Aristarch. Samium asseverantes τὴν γῆν ἕν τῶν ἄστρων 
οὖσαν κύκλῳ φερομένην περὶ τὸ μέσον, tale caelorum systema labore plusquam Herculeo 
descriptum nobis reliquit. Extremo loco ponit octavam sphaeram immobilem; sequenti Sa-
turni. 3. Iovis. 4. Martis. 5. Orbis magni deferentis terram triplici motu mobilem: quam cir-
cundat Lunae caelum. 6. Veneris. 7 Mercurii. In mundi medio Sol haeret immotus. Asciscit 
sibi & quaevis sphaera plures orbes pro motuum varietate. XLVII. Etsi autem quae vulgò contra 
situm & motum terrae Copernici agitantur rationes, nihil evincunt: eius tamen divisionem ab ingenio 
profectam potius, quam à natura edoctam haec ostendunt: quòd scripturae sacrae adversetur: quòd 
simplici terrae corpori tres motus tribuit: quod cum recentioribus observationibus non concordet. 
Quamvis ab eruditis (ne sua quoque laude spolietur) hoc consecutus est testimonium, ex-
quisitius eum ex falsis vera, quàm Alphonsini ex veris demonstrasse”, p. B4 v. Interestingly, 
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Hu ni chius taught at the University of Leipzig until 1606, when he was sum-
moned to Stettin. Until that time, he presided over several academic disputations: 
in 1601 a disputation on De Situ Quiete Figura Et Magnitudine Globi terrestris,56 and 
in the following year another on De Magnitudine Stellarum.57 In 1606 Hu ni chius 
was active as rector of the Paedagogium Illustre at Stettin. There he published Cos-
mographia seu Disputatio Physico-Mathematica De Mundo Eivsq[ue] Praecipuis Parti-
bus.58 Hu ni chius published further disputations in Stettin, two on ethical issues,59 
as well as the disputations on comets that will be my concern. The above studies 
illustrate his prestige as both a mathematician and a philosopher. However, be-
fore examining his disputations on comets and the criticism of Kecker mann’s 
views they contained, it is worth noting Hu ni chius’ disputations De mundo and, 
especially, De Situ Quiete Figura Et Magnitudine Globi terrestris. 
Both disputations show that Hu ni chius was independent in his judgement 
and well-informed concerning contemporary debates about cosmology, meteo-
rology and astronomy. This is especially clear in the theses regarding the location 
of the Earth in the 1601 disputation. Here, in the first and larger section, covering 
theses 1–127 and dealing with the location and possible motion of the Earth, Hu -
ni chius tests the validity of the Copernican hypothesis and shows himself to be 
quite conversant with the recent writings of the leading ‘modernizers’ of the late 
sixteenth century: Tycho Brahe, Maestlin and Kepler. He affirms that Copernicus’ 
doctrine on the location and motion of the Earth has not been refuted with solid 
physical reasons.60 In addition, Hu ni chius acknowledges the plausibility of the 
arguments adduced by Copernicus in favor of the centrality of the Sun: his doc-
trine of gravity (theses 21–29); the nobility of the Sun (thesis 33); the incommensu-
Hu ni chius adds (thesis XLVIII- XLIX) that this “paradox” of Copernicus provoked the wits 
of many other astronomers (among them Fracastoro, whose proposal was rejected by Coper-
nicus as inadequate and dubious), avid to snatch away the palm of glory for this great a man, 
but all of whom were ultimately defeated in battle. 
56 De Situ Quiete Figura Et Magnitudine Globi terrestris, Capita disputationis ordinariae, Instituendae 
in Schola Philosophica celebris Academiae Lipsicae, Ad 14. Calend. Maii. Praeside M. Christoph. Hu-
nichio. Respondente, Georgio Wildeno, Artium bacul. Anno Christi M.DCI, Lembergus, Leipzig 
1601. I quote from the copy at the Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt / Gotha, 
accessible online.
57 De Magnitudine Stellarum, Capita Disputationis publicae, Habendae in Schola Philosophica Acade-
miae Lipsiensis, Ad diem 13. Novembris, Anno 1602. Praeside M. Christoph. Hunichio. Respondente 
Christoph. Spitzmachero Rochlicense, opt. art. baculario, Lembergus, Leipig 1602. 
58 Cosmographia seu Disputatio Physico-Mathematica De Mundo Eivsq[ue] Praecipuis Partibus, Typis 
Duberianis, Stettin 1606.
59 Quaestionum Ethicarum Decas prima, Typis Rhetianis, Stettin, 1608; Quaestionum Ethicarum De-
cas secunda, Typis Rhetianis, Stettin 1608.
60 De Situ Quiete Figura Et Magnitudine Globi terrestris, thesis 5: “[…] Copernici astronomiam, 
quam plerique alto supercilio, nulloque tamen ferè ipsius merito despiciunt: non pauci falsè 
derident, in eo quo de loco et motu terrae à recepta opinione discessit, nec ita certis natura-
lis iudicii rationibus labefactam hactenus fuisse”; thesis 18: the centrality of the Earth has 
not been affirmed by its supporters “rationibus, sive è naturae obscuritate eruantur, vel ex 
Astronomia promantur, non ita firmis, ut Copernici dogma infringant”. 
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rability of the Earth-Sun distance with respect to the height or magnitude of the 
stellar sphere (thesis 39).61 This is evidence that the arguments of the modernizers 
were beginning to be noticed in the universities.
As for the motion of the Earth, Hunnichius did not regard the arguments tra-
ditionally adduced against it as irrefutable.62 This applies to Ptolemy’s arguments 
of the disruptive consequences of the diurnal motion and the motion of clouds, as 
well as to the Aristotelian objection derived from the perpendicular fall of heavy 
bodies (theses 79, 84, 86). To sum up: Hu ni chius accepts the arguments presented 
by Copernicus in favor of the motion of the Earth: the rejection of the Aristotelian 
axiom that each element can only have one simple motion (theses 91, 92), the op-
tical relativity of motion (thesis 100). Accordingly, traditional arguments against 
the Earth’s motion, ‘even if they seem probable, nevertheless lack compulsory 
faith’.63 Hu ni chius further adds some recent discoveries and results: the discov-
ery by Brahe that Mars, when at opposition, is closer to the Earth than the Sun,64 
the calculations by Maestlin of the implausible speed of the diurnal motion in the 
equator of the stellar sphere,65 and the polyhedral hypothesis proposed by Kepler 
in support of the symmetry between motions and magnitudes in the Copernican 
cosmos.66 
It therefore seems that Hu ni chius accepts, from a purely astronomical and 
cosmological perspective, that the Copernican cosmos is arguably true: ‘Thus, it 
seems that Copernicus’ opinion about the place and motion of the Earth is corrob-
orated along with his thus far not invalid arguments; and on that account, if we 
have to contend only with the reasons of human judgment, this opinion should 
not be condemned’.67 This conclusion is also reinforced by the fact that those who 
oppose Copernicus ‘tacitly presuppose the motion of the Sun in the middle of the 
planets’.68 Accordingly, as far as one considers the issue according to observations 
and reason, heliocentrism and the motion of the Earth hold up perfectly. 
61 Cf. the conclusion of this set of theses: “Ita constat non invictum esse robur argumentorum, 
quae in Copernicum hactenus, propter locum terrae disputata fuerunt” (thesis 57). 
62 Ibid., thesis 58: “Nec multo firmiora sunt pleraque, quae contra illius [the Earth] motum […] 
in medium vulgo producuntur”. 
63 Ibid., thesis 102. “Atque hinc apparet, multo iam usu inveteratis eiusmodi rationibus, qui-
bus Copernici de loco et motu sententia impugnatur, non nimiam, quantumvis probabiles 
videantur, fidem habendam esse”. 
64 Ibid., thesis 105. 
65 Ibid., theses 109–110.
66 Ibid., theses 113–114.
67 Ibid., thesis 119: “Ita apparet et Copernici sententiam de loco et motu terrae, suis adeoque 
non invalidis argumentis corroborari: et iccirco si rationibus tantùm iudicii humani pug-
nandum sit, non tantopere contemnendam esse”.
68 Ibid., thesis 120: “motum et situm terrae Copernicanum impugnantes, nihilominus solem, 
etc moveri et suo loco (ex veterum sententia) inter planetas medium versari tacitè suppo-
nunt”. The middle position of the Sun among the planets refers to the Chaldean order of 
planets, adopted by Ptolemy, where the Sun is placed between the inferior (Moon, Mercury, 
Venus) and the superior (Mars, Jupiter, Saturn) planets. 
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Can we conclude from all this that Hu ni chius was convinced of the truth of 
the Copernican planetary order and his name should be included among the few 
‘realists’ from the second half of the sixteenth century? The few theses that con-
clude this first and most important section of the disputation introduce, quite 
unexpectedly, a change of perspective: ‘in any case, we must affirm that the Earth 
remains at rest and occupies the centre of this universe’.69
What is the reason for this apparent recantation? Only the biblical passages 
commonly adduced by Me lanch thon and his followers and referred to by Hu -
ni chius in the margin: ‘and this not so much from the strength and force of the 
arguments sought until now by human reason than from the authority of Sacred 
Scripture’.70 Since this hypothesis (geocentrism, as sustained by God’s revealed 
word) cannot fail or deceive, we find in it firm ground for explaining all phenom-
ena.71 There is no hint of the possibility of interpreting Biblical passages as an 
accommo dation of God’s word to common sense or vulgar understanding, as pro-
posed, for example, by Christoph Rothmann in his correspondence with Brahe, 
already published in 1596.72 
This is not the place to give a full account of this final and astonishing recan-
tation after so many theses defending the plausibility of the physical reality of 
heliocentrism. Surely, we must not suspect a hidden Copernicanism in Hu ni chius 
and it is probable that we encounter a perfectly prepared dialectical exercise. In 
any case, the situation is similar to the one that Kepler and Maestlin encountered 
at Tübingen in the previous decade and it suggests at the early date of 1601 Hu -
ni chius’ courage to confront established authority in the sciences and theological 
authority in the university. It is this same courage and bold assertion of his views 
that Hu ni chius shows toward Bartholomaeus Kecker mann’s strong Aristotelian-
ism on the issue of comets in neighboring Danzig. 
Hu ni chius chaired a disputation at Stettin on De Cometarum ortu, published 
near the end of October 1607. Though Kecker mann is never mentioned in these 
theses, their entire content seeks to refute the tenets of the famous and influ-
ential Danzig rector. Moreover, theses 55 (‘Those who deny that the art of ob-
serving can be applied to comets revolve in the greatest error, most pernicious 
69 Ibid., thesis 121: “At quo se cunque modo res habeat, statuendum tamen est, terram et medi-
um in hoc universo tenere, et immotam quiescere”. 
70 Ibid., thesis 122: “Idque non tam argumentorum, quae humana ratio hucusque pervestigavit, 
pondere et vi, quàm sacrosanctae scripturae autoritatae”. Cf. the earlier judgement on Coper-
nicus in De caelo et caelestibus corporibus (quoted above, note 55), where a physical argument 
(the attribution of a threefold motion to the simple body of the Earth) had been added. 
71 Ibid., thesis 126: “Hac quae fallere nequit hypothesi tutius innitimur: ad quam etiam quae-
cunque oculis obversantur phaenomena […] referri posse putamus”. 
72 On this see Miguel A. Granada, “Il problema astronomico-cosmologico e le Sacre Scritture 
dopo Copernico: Christoph Rothmann e la ‘teoria dell’accomodazione’”, in: Rivista di storia 
della filosofía, 51 (1996), pp. 789–828; idem, “Tycho Brahe, Caspar Peucer, and Christoph Roth-
mann on Cosmology and the Bible”, in: Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religions, vol. l.: 
Up to 1700, eds. Jitse van der Meer and Scott Mandelbrote, vol. 2, Leiden, 2008, pp. 563–583. 
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besides to astronomy’)73 and 56 (‘Inasmuch as they call in question the certain-
ty of geometrical demonstrations, approved and received by the calculation of 
everyone’)74 literally describe Kecker mann’s objections. In addition, Hu ni chius 
prepared in 1608 an edition entitled De Cometis Disputationes duae. Prior de eorum 
ortu, Posterior de significationibus: Habitae in illustri Paedagogio Stetinensi. His Prae-
missae sunt ad διάσκεψιν viri cujusdam clarissimi [i. e. Kecker mann] de Astronomi-
cis Cometarum observationibus ADVERSARIA, quibus earundem veritas ab erroribus 
obiectis vindicatur. The first of these disputations coincides with the one printed 
in 1607. They were listed, however, as a printed edition by Ernst Zinner.75 Un-
fortunately, we have not found any trace of a printed copy, but there does exist 
a manuscript copy (Ms. 0377 at the Universitäts-Bibliothek Leipzig), in which 
the Adversaria, that is, arguments against Kecker mann extend over seventeen 
pages. We may add that later, in 1619, the mathematician at the Danzig Gym-
nasium, Peter Crüger, who as a young scholar had served as the respondent in 
the 1605 disputation on comets presided over by Kecker mann, declared in his 
Uranodromus Cometicus76 that Hu ni chius in his Adversaria had refuted Kecker-
mann’s ‘Diascepsin solidè et sufficienter’. However, since these Adversaria ‘were 
not in promptu’ (not accessible; perhaps not printed?), whereas Kecker mann’s 
texts were ‘in omnium manibus’ (i. e., in everyone’s hands), he decided to inter-
vene by making public the responses of Hu ni chius, with some additions of his 
own. In this way, he would defend astronomy and the geometrical conclusions 
against what he regarded as Kecker mann’s unfounded and prejudicial criticism, 
which entailed the ruin of astronomy. Crüger did this in Chapter 16,77 to which 
he added a further chapter in which he replied to Kecker mann’s arguments in 
his Systema physicum.78 I will thus close my presentation with a succint summary 
of Hu ni chius’ reply to the ‘Vir clarissimus [Kecker mann]’, along with some later 
considerations by Peter Crüger.
73 Christoph Hu ni chius, De cometarum ortu disputatio, Typis Rhetianis, Stetini 1607: “Qui enim 
artem τῶν τηρήσεων Cometis applicari posse negant, in maximo, eoque Astronomiae per-
niciosissimo errore versantur”.
74 Ibid., “Utpotè Geometricarum demonstrationum certitudinem omnium calculo comproba-
tam et receptam in dubium vocant”.
75 Ernst Zinner, Geschichte und Bibliographie der astronomischen Literatur in Deutschland zur Zeit 
der Renaissance, Anton Hirsemann, Stuttgart 1964, nº 4181. 
76 Peter Crüger, Uranodromus Cometicus: Ein außführlicher Tractat Vom grossen Cometen deß 1618 
Jahrs/ Darinnen seine erscheinung und Lauff/ seine Höhe von der erden und andere daraus folgende 
sachen durch Astronomische rechnung dargethan/ und seine bedeutungen durch gebührliche muth-
massung gesucht werden, Andreas Hünefeldt, Danzig 1619. In this work Crüger adhered to the 
supralunarist and optical theory of comets. 
77 ‘Anacephalaeosis Διασκέψεως Kecker manni de Observationibus Cometarum Astronomi-
cis; et ad eam Adversariorum Hunichii’, pp. 98–108.
78 Chapter XVII: ‘Responsio ad argumenta Kecker manni de Cometis in Systemate Physico re-
sidua’, pp. 108–113.
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Crüger calls Hu ni chius his only teacher in mathematics, whereas Kecker mann 
had taught him the several philosophical disciplines.79 At the same time, he refers 
to Hu ni chius as ‘Philosophus et Mathematicus ingeniosissimus’.80 This double 
label must not be taken in the same sense as Galileo, who obtained in 1610 the 
title of ‘Philosopher and Mathematician’ to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. For Gali-
leo, it meant that both designations indicated one and the same thing, namely 
‘physico-mathematics’ or the mathematical pursuit of natural philosophy;81 for 
Hu ni chius, natural philosophy and mathematics (astronomy as mixed mathemat-
ics) were still two separate disciplines, each with its own method and deserving 
to be credited within its own domain, in allusion to the old proverb: ‘an expert 
should be believed in his own art’.82 According to Hu ni chius, this means that the 
mathematician (the astronomer, in the case of celestial bodies) determines the 
location and motion of bodies (sublunary or celestial) with the help of his own 
devices: observations, instruments and the geometrical technique of calculating 
parallax in order to find the distance of the observed object: 
The astronomer observes the position and location of this phenomenon 
[the nova of 1604] or other similar things, and so he does what is proper 
to his profession […]. But when the natural philosopher, relying on either 
reason alone or erring sense, ascribes to himself the exact [study] of the 
positions of the meteors or their distance, he claims for himself some right 
proper to mathematics or astronomy. As a consequence, he hears that an 
expert should be believed only in his own art. But a natural philosopher, 
when he argues about the true place and location of the celestial phenom-
ena and related matters, should not be believed, since he is not able to ad-
vance in his science beyond the distance apparent to the senses, where, if 
the distance is too great, he goes astray, inasmuch as he is deprived of the 
means of establishing the true dimension and observation.83
79 Ibid., p. 100: “Praeceptor mihi fuit Kecker mannus in Logicis, Physicis, Ethicis, Praeceptor 
Hu ni chius in Mathematicis, et quidem unicus: uterque sempiterna gratitudine colendus.”
80 Ibid., p. 99.
81 See Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences, pp. 72f.
82 Hu ni chius, De Cometis Disputationes duae, Adversaria, ad [Thesem] 4, sig. A2 v: “Artifici in 
sua tantum arte credendum esse” (note the limitation of authority to the art). The numbering 
refers to Kecker mann’s Theses in his Diaskepsis. 
83 Ibidem: “Locum verò et situm cum huius [nova of 1604] vel similis φαινομένου observat 
Astronomus, facit quod sui est officii […]. Physicus autem, cum accuratum de locis meteoro-
rum, seu distantia vel soli rationi vel sensui hallucinanti confisus sibi ascribit, ius ad se ali-
quod Mathematicae vel Astronomiae proprium rapit; itaque audit hoc: Artifici in sua tantum 
arte credendum esse; Physico autem, qua talis est, de vero situ et loco φαινομένων caeles-
tium et quae huius affinia sunt disserenti, fidem haberi non debere, cum ultra apparentem 
sensui distantiam, in qua ille, si nimia sit, aberrat, utpote verae dimensionis et observationis 
adminiculis destitutus in Scientia sua progredi nequeat”. Cf. adversaria ad [Theses] 30 and 
31, sig. B4 v. See also Hu ni chius, De cometarum ortu disputatio, theses 50, 52, 53, 54, 74.
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Thus, contrary to the errors committed by philosophers, including Aris totle, 
when they locate comets below the moon, deprived as they are of the geometri-
cal technique of measuring parallax (unknown to an tiqui ty),84 mathematicians 
(astronomers) have established in modern times, with the absolute certainty of 
mathematical demonstrations, that all comets observed since 1577 are located in 
the heavens:
Thus, it has been fully examined under the watchfulness of other most 
excellent authors, but chiefly by Tycho Brahe, the European Atlas, that all 
comets that appeared in previous years were located in the ethereal re-
gion. […] Hence, it can be argued as follows: as many comets as those that 
have been observed by astronomers through careful study and most accu-
rate instruments have shown either no parallax or one smaller than that 
of the Moon. Nor could a different example be given. Therefore, all comets 
are higher than the Moon.85
Accordingly, any discussion among natural philosophers on the generation of 
comets must necessarily depart from this proven conclusion: ‘One cannot even 
discuss the generation of new stars and comets, unless something certain has 
been formerly established about their location’.86 Therefore, when natural phi-
losophers question the natural location of comets by arguing that no sublunary 
exhalations can provide enough matter for such a great and enduring cometary 
body, they presuppose the truth of the Aristotelian theory of the generation of 
comets. But in fact they should rather proceed in the opposite manner and con-
sider that mathematical astronomy has demonstrated from the celestial location 
of comets that they are not caused by sublunary exhalations rising to the heavens 
and there inflamed: ‘To invert the argument, because the globe of the Earth can-
not supply so huge a mass of comet with enough matter, the comet cannot then 
actually have an elementary nature’.87 
84 In fact, Hu ni chius does not affirm that it was unknown in ancient times, but only that very 
scant information about celestial comets has come to us from ancient sources; see Hu ni -
chius, De cometarum ortu disputatio, theses 60–62. Instead, Maestlin explicitly affirms that 
an tiqui ty, and as a consequence Aris totle, ignored this technique, only discovered and ap-
plied in modern times by Regiomontanus. On this, see Granada, “Michael Maestlin and the 
Comet of 1618”, pp. 268–272. 
85 Hu ni chius, De cometarum ortu disputatio, theses 67 and 70: “Itaque, tum aliorum praestantis-
simorum vigilantia virorum, tum imprimis Tychonis Brahaei, Atlantis Europei opera perve-
stigatum [est], Cometas, qui superioribus annis exorti sunt, omnes in aetheris regione hae-
sisse. […] Hinc ita argumentari licet: Quotquot Cometae ab Astronomis accuratiori studio 
et accuratioribus instrumentis observati sunt, vel nullam, vel Luna minorem παράλλαξιν 
habuerunt. Nec dissimile exemplum dari potuit: Ergo omnes Cometae Luna sunt altiores”.
86 Hu ni chius, De Cometis Disputationes duae, Adversaria, ad [Thesem] 37, sig. C1 v: “De genera-
tione enim novarum stellarum et Cometarum disseri nequit, nisi de loco eorundem prius 
certi aliquid definitum fuerit”.
87 Ibid., Adversaria, ad [Thesem] 34, sig. C1 v: “inverti argumentum, quia tantae moli Cometae 
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The mathematician thus arrives at the exclusion of a physical theory of comets 
through solid (mathematical) reasons. Once he does this, however, he proposes 
another theory about the generation of comets, acting, according to Hu ni chius, 
as a natural philosopher (physicus): ‘Further, it seems that an injustice is done to 
astronomers when they are charged with seizing upon and attacking the princi-
ples of physics; since 1. when they deal with the location of comets, they do it as 
astronomers, because they are the only ones who can judge the matter. If, at the 
same time, they touch upon the cause of generation, they do it as natural philos-
ophers, as has been stated previously’.88
Hu ni chius maintains the distinction and separation between physics and 
mathematics. But as a physicus relying on mathematical conclusions, he argues 
for a new explanation of the generation of comets. They are not extraordinary 
miracles produced by the absolute power of God (as Kecker mann argued for the 
novas [for him perhaps comets] of 1572 and 1604),89 but ordinary effects of nature 
demanding a natural explanation: ‘Here a new question arises: whether [Comets] 
are produced by God extraordinarily, out of nothing; or whether they take their 
origin from natural causes and beginnings. We are persuaded that there is no 
need to take refuge in a new Creation, since it has been found that all [comets] 
are produced and perish in one and the same way. […] And so we stand by the 
opinion of those who affirm that the birth of comets is natural’.90 
Hu ni chius also expressed his preference for the contemporary optical theory91 in 
the form it had recently acquired and presented it as an accomodation to the old Ar-
istotelian theory. Indeed, if according to the Stagirite, the celestial ether can vary in 
density, exemplified by the celestial bodies themselves, as the ‘denser part of their 
orbs’,92 Hu ni chius for his part conceived of comets as a transient condensation of 
terrae globus sufficientem materiam preabere nequit, ideo Cometam quoque elementaris 
naturae haud existere”. Cf. also Crüger, Uranodromus Cometicus, p. 108.
88 Ibid., Adversaria, ad [Thesem] 17, sig. A4 v: “Astronomis praeterea videtur iniuria fieri; dum 
iis imputatur, quod in physica principia involent, eaque oppugnent; Nam 1. de loco Come-
tarum cum agunt, faciunt id, qua Astronomi, de eo etiam soli iudicare possunt: si rationem 
generationis unà attingunt, faciunt id, sicut antea dictum, quà Physici”. Cf. Kecker mann, 
Diaskepsis, Thesis 56, p. 417 (quoted above on ref. 42). Like Kecker mann, Hu ni chius also 
grants to the physicus the discourse on comets, but his natural philosopher departs from the 
sound conclusions attained by astronomers on the celestial location of comets. 
89 Ibid., Adversaria, ad [Thesem] 33, sig. C1 r, where Hu ni chius opposes any escape into the mi-
raculous through allegiance to natural limits by adducing the old proverb “Ne extra oleas” 
(Not beyond the limits). 
90 Hu ni chius, De cometarum ortu disputatio, theses 34 (erroneously given as 33), 35 and 37: “At 
hic nova succedit quaestio, an praeter ordinem a DEO ex nihilo producantur; an ex naturali-
bus initiis atque causis originem ducant. Non opus esse putamus hic ad novam Creationem 
confugere, cum uno eodemque modo omnes fieri et interire deprehensi sunt. […] Itaque 
stemus ab illorum partibus qui Cometarum ortum naturalem esse autumant”.
91 For the genesis and development of this conception of comets, see Peter Barker, “The Optical 
Theory of Comets from Apian to Kepler”, in: Physis, 30 (1993), pp. 1–25. 
92 Hu ni chius, De cometarum ortu disputatio, theses 96 and 97, with quotation of De caelo, II, 7, 289 
a 13ff. 
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the ether93 and, in accordance with their proper motion, he substituted the concept 
of solid ethereal spheres for the celestial fluid postulated by Brahe and other con-
temporary astronomers and philosophers (Christoph Rothmann, Giordano Bruno 
among others).94 Hu ni chius further claimed that solar illumination explains the 
brightness of comets: ‘With the matter of comets established in this way, it follows 
that their form […] is neither fire nor a glowing flame, but an image or the light of 
the Sun collected in the denser parts, as we ascertained previously from the precise 
position of comets with respect to the Sun or from the projection of their tail’.95
Like Maestlin in his manuscript treatise on the comet of 1618, Hu ni chius, in his 
theses from 1607 and his Adversaria from 1608, rejected every argument adduced 
by Kecker mann against the reliability of astronomical observations. Several years 
before Maestlin wrote on these matters, Hu ni chius argued that astronomical sci-
ence would be impossible if (1) astronomical instruments supply results that lack 
reliability due to the different data they provide, (2) astronomical observations 
are unreliable because of the refraction of light rays that pass through fire and 
air, and (3) because of the eccentricity of the point of observation with respect to 
the center of the earth.96
Kecker mann, however, was aware of this pernicious implication and reacted 
by weakening his claim: comets are irregular, elementary bodies unsuitable to 
astronomical observation. This sort of recantation97 seemed to Hu ni chius to rest 
on a desperate attempt to save Aristotelian celestial incorruptibility; accordingly, 
he argued that all bodies are indifferently subject to the geometrical rules of the 
determination of distance.98 In his objection, Hu ni chius imputed to these Aris-
totelians what Aris totle had ascribed (Hu ni chius quoted in Greek De caelo, III, 7, 
306b 6–9) to the Platonists: ‘they find themselves, in a discussion about phenom-
93 Ibid., thesis 99: “Atque sic, ut coitione partium densiore stellae productae sunt ita ψευδοάστερες 
[that is, cometae] per condensationem partium adhuc fieri possunt”. 
94 Ibid., thesis 98: “Neque enim existimandum est, coeli substantiam duram et solidam esse, 
siquidem corporibus quae moventur cedere potest, ut Cometae testantur: sed liquidam te-
nuem sive mollem existere admodum probabile est”.
95 “Constituta hoc modo materia Cometarum, sequitur formam […] non esse ignem vel flam-
mam ardentem, sed ἔμφασιν, sive lumen solare in densioribus partibus collectum: id quod 
antea ex positu Cometarum ad solem definito vel caudae proiectione comprobavimus”, ibi-
dem, thesis 102, with reference to theses 86–89. According to thesis 104, the ether condensed 
in the comet produces a peculiar light, much weaker than that borrowed from the sun. 
96 Hu ni chius, De Cometis Disputationes duae, Adversaria ad [Theses] 12–16, sig. A3 v-A4 r: “Eo-
dem argumento videtur astronomicarum observationum veritas in universum […] tolli; 
quod cavendum ne fiat in tam praeclarae et nobilis disciplinae despectum”.
97 Ibid., Ad [thesem] 17, sig. A4 r: “Videtur in hoc theoremate affirmari ἀντικείμενον ἐν τῷ 
προσκειμένῳ”. 
98 Ibidem: “Si enim Astronomicis observationibus nihil derogatur, qui ergo impugnantur 
astronomicae observationes Cometarum vel novarum stellarum, quarum eadem forma est, 
principia et certitudo, quae siderum? […] Quid verò iterum Astronomiae immerenti obiici-
tur, eam, quia certa Cometarum loca in aetherea regione definit, ideo doctrinas de caelesti 
corpore, eiusque puritate, perpetuitate et distinctione à corporibus inferioribus, itemque de 
elementis et corporibus in sublime generatis oppugnare? Abusata sunt ista”. 
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ena, making statements with which the phenomena conflict. This is because they 
have a wrong conception of primary principles, and try to bring everything into 
line with hard-and-fast theories’.99 
In a standard rebuke to the Aristotelians of his own time, Hu ni chius invoked 
(again anticipating Maestlin in his reply to Kecker mann) the moderate stance of 
Aris totle himself in his Meteorology, where the Stagirite had conceded that his 
cometary theory (Book I, Chapter 7) was merely incomplete, conjectural and prob-
able in character, founded more on abstract reasons than on observations.100 Were 
he alive, Aris totle would retract his own views and adopt those reached by Brahe 
and other celestial practitioners on the basis of their novel observations and the 
certainty of geometrical demonstration.101 And this all the more so as, contrary to 
what Kecker mann feared, amending Aristotelian cometary theory did not entail 
the destruction of natural science as a whole, but only the replacement of an er-
roneous conception by another more closely in line with observations: ‘For I still 
do not understand why, if we act this way, the body of natural science shall not 
remain for us safe and sound, since the astronomical observation of the location 
of comets is not the general principle of physical science; nor, if it is a particular 
principle regarding only the galaxy, comets and new stars, that it immediately 
brings the downfall of all other doctrines in this science’.102 
It may be asked whether Hu ni chius was completely sincere when he claimed 
that the new elements of the cometary theory he was proposing were really in 
accordance with the philosophy of Aris totle.103 I cannot exclude an affirmative re-
sponse, since, when he considered himself both a philosopher and a mathemati-
cian, he did not conceive (natural) philosophy in the same way as Galileo. This was 
 99 Ibidem.
100 Ibid., Ad [thesim] 6, sig. A3 r: “Quod si Aristoteles ipse Meteorologiam suam imperfectam 
agnoscit, in qua tantum aliqua se scribit attigisse, de nonnullis adhuc dubitare, 1 Meteor. 
c. 1. et de Cometis tantum rationi non sensui, atque idcirco non observationi consentanea 
tradere affirmat 7. capite lib. 1 Meteor: […]”. Cf. Hu ni chius, De cometarum ortu disputatio, the-
sis 44: “In tractatione de Cometis cap. 7 testatur qualemcunque tantum, probabilem scilicet 
rationem ortus cometarum à se proponi”. For Maestlin, see Granada, “Michael Maestlin 
and the Comet of 1618”, pp. 270f. 
101 Hu ni chius, De cometarum ortu disputatio, thesis 41: “Sed hîc procul dubio aequiorem longè 
Aristotelem (si in vivis adhuc esset) haberemus, quam ex credula eius posteritate nonnul-
los, qui hic ne latum unguem à sententia Aristotelis discedendum esse opinantur”; thesis 
42: “Primò enim proprio exemplo et verbis quoque admonuit amicos nobis esse debere 
praeceptores, at amiciorem veritatem”. 
102 Hu ni chius, De Cometis Disputationes duae, Adversaria, ad [Theses] 7 et 8: “Nondum enim in-
telligo, cur hoc si faciamus, ideo integrum et salvum nobis mansurum non sit Scientiae na-
turalis corpus: non enim de loco Cometarum observatio astronomica, principium est Scien-
tiae naturalis generale: neque, si speciale est, quod tantum Galaxiam, cometas, stellas novas 
spectat, continuò secum trahit ruinam reliquarum omnium in ista scientia doctrinarum”. 
Similarly in Maestlin; see Granada, “Michael Maestlin and the Comet of 1618”, p. 273.
103 Hu ni chius, De cometarum ortu disputatio, thesis 122: “Atque hucusque probabilis ratio ge-
nerationis Cometarum aetheriorum accommodata principiis Aristotelicae Philosophiae 
reddita fuisse videtur”. 
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certainly the case with Maestlin as well. As a consequence, neither Hu ni chius nor 
Maestlin thought that Kecker mann was right to fear that from the collapse of the 
Aristotelian cometary theory the principle of celestial immutability and the ruin 
of natural science would inevitably follow. For both Hu ni chius and Maestlin, this 
supposed ruin affected only an incorrect portion of physical science. However, the 
ultimate result of this protracted discussion, to which many other issues contribut-
ed, was the complete collapse of Aristotelian physics. Its gravedigger was precisely 
the new physico-mathematics, only partially anticipated by Hu ni chius, Maestlin 104 
and many other mathematicians who reacted to Kecker mann’s strict Aristotelianism. 
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Defending Aris totle, Constructing Chymia:  
Libavius, Logic, and the German Schools*
Bruce T. Moran
The Jesuit teacher, philosopher, and Ramist scholar, Walter Ong (1912–2003), ex-
pressively noted that ‘there is no time when method and system are more valued 
than when one is faced with utter chaos.’ How, he asked, was one to organize 
learning in the late Renaissance when developments in knowledge were out-
growing the traditional liberal disciplines? How were new disciplines to be de-
fined when what we think of today as a particular “subject” was not often, if at 
all, clearly described and the notion of an “art” was rooted in a structure of learn-
ing linked to grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic?1 In this regard, creating a defini-
tion for a new branch of learning like chymia (chymistry) required first deciding 
if a “subject“ existed and then determining what kind of subject it was. The Peri-
patetic categories of scientia (causal knowledge) as well as historia (descriptions of 
what Aristotelians would call accidents) were relevant to doing both. However, 
to decide the essence of a subject meant also to identify those characteristics that 
inhered to it alone (what was called its proprium (its peculiar properties). Here too, 
Aristotelian logic was ready to hand, and one person very eager to employ that 
reasoning to define the subject of chymia, and to introduce that subject as a dis-
cipline within the liberal arts, was the school teacher, physician, and alchemist, 
Andreas Libavius (c. 1555–1616).2 
Libavius spent most of his professional life, when he was not writing about 
practical alchemy and denouncing Paracelsian medical cosmology, as a super-
visor of public education, what Aris totle called a paedonomus (παιδονόμος). In 
*  My thanks to J. Mark Sugars who years ago helped crucially in reading difficult passages in 
Libavian texts. 
1 Walter J. Ong, “Ramist Method and the Commercial Mind,“ in: Studies in the Renaissance, 8 
(1961), pp. 155–172, here pp. 170–171; Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 
Cambridge 1958.
2 For a general discussion of the cultural shift in writing about alchemia and chymia inspired in 
great part by Libavius and his attention to pedagogy see Bruce Moran, Andreas Libavius and 
the Transformation of Alchemy: Separating Chemical Cultures with Polemical Fire, Sagamore Beach 
2007; also, “Axioms, Essences, and Mostly Clean Hands: Preparing to Teach Chemistry with 
Libavius and Aris totle,“ in: Science and Education, 15 (2006), pp. 173–187; and “Eloquence in 
the Marketplace: Erudition and Pragmatic Humanism in the Restoration of Chymia,” in: 
Chemical Knowledge in the Early Modern World, ed. Eddy, Mauskopf, Newman (Osiris, 29), 
pp. 49–62; also, Owen Hannaway, The Chemists and the Word: the Didactic Origins of Modern 
Chemistry, Baltimore, London 1975. 
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the Politics Aris totle described the superintendence of shared public education as 
the means by which vulgar things (those things useless for the actions of virtue) 
could be separated from what was useful, and the republic thus preserve a single, 
virtuous purpose.3 Libavius took the role of superintendence seriously and in his 
capacity as paedonomus at a small school in Rothenberg ob der Tauber emphasized 
two responsibilities that students needed to learn for the sake of personal piety 
and the public good. The first was a responsibility to learn Latin and Greek, so 
that they were able to interpret ‘tongues with tongues in turn.’ By then students 
should also have been introduced to a second obligation, namely, learning how to 
make ‘reasoned judgments concerning controversial matters,’ and Libavius was 
very clear about how this should be done. Proper instruction concerning logic 
required students to take part in ‘established disputative skirmishing’ [institu-
tis velitationibus disputatoriis] guided by ‘reasoning methods from the Lyceum of 
Aris totle as illustrated by Petrus Ramus’ (1515–1572).4
Ramist scholars have noted the crucial role played by German publishers in 
the spread of Ramist dialectics and rhetoric. They have also observed that the 
institutional dynamic in applying and broadcasting Ramist methods of teaching 
was a bottom up, rather than a top down, process. Ramist pedagogy, with its var-
ious Aristotelian blends (sometimes called semi-Ramism or Philippo-Ramism) 
and its emphasis upon what was efficient and useful, spread within both Luther-
an and Reformed schools not from universities to gymnasia, but from secondary 
schools, from Latin gymnasia, schola publica, and academies, into university cur-
ricula. In doing so it prompted pedagogical changes in teaching Aristotelian phi-
losophy while challenging the role of humanist philology within the arts.5 What 
became known as Ramism was in large part an attempt to reorganize knowledge 
for the sake of “youthful beginners.“ By means of a process, or method, that con-
nected the most general with the most particular, anything (a subject, an arti-
fact, an activity) could be assigned an easy-to-remember visual place on a spatial 
map of learning. Ramist method was intended to be practical and pedagogically 
useful, and what worked for subjects and activities worked for arguments and 
judgments a well.6 To the paedonomus at Rothenburg there were obvious advan-
tages to setting aside cloudy metaphysics and teaching clear principles of infer-
ence and deduction. ‘No one will ever persuade me,’ Libavius wrote, ‘that some-
one can judge well who has learned improper precepts for judging.’ ‘Ramus,’ he 
explained, had ‘put aside the commentary and interpretations’ associated with 
3 1337b4ff. Politics, transl. H. Rackham, Cambridge 1932, p. 637ff.
4 Epistolarum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber tertius […], Francofurti: in officina typogra-
phica Ioannis Lechlerri, impensis Petri Kopffij, 1599, Epistola XXX, pp. 245–253. Non abest 
rationes ex Aristotelis Lyceo per P. Ramum illustrato facultas […]
5 Howard Hotson, Commonplace learning: Ramism and its German Ramifications, 1543–1630, Ox-
ford 2007. Joseph S. Freedman, “The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central 
Europe, c. 1570–c. 1630,“ in: Renaissance Quarterly 46 (1993), pp. 98–152.
6 For the place of Ramus in Renaissance traditions of logic see Peter Mack, Renaissance Argu-
ment: Valla and Agricola in the Tradition of Rhetoric and Dialectic, Leiden 1993.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
237Defending Aris totle, Constructing Chymia
Aris totle’s logic and had extracted the most useful axioms and the clearest rules 
for a system of judgment.7 
Ramist methods helped determine what information, processes, and objects 
belonged to which sets of things, and helped establish categories for placing 
questions and making rational arguments. As such, Aris totle as well as Ramus 
(and many others who took part in debating the contours of Renaissance reason-
ing) provided key intellectual tools related to definition and explicit comparison. 
Students learned to divide areas of learning and to distribute and differentiate 
the parts that made them up.8 Crucially, what emerged was a clearly expressed 
logical statement of what was homogeneous and what was heterogeneous in a 
given subject. For Libavius, the very same tools of logic used to instruct boys in 
their responsibility to judge well, became the means by which he pursued anoth-
er goal, a personal threefold mission to discover the precepts of chymia, to accom-
modate them ‘to the form of the perfect sciences,’ and to explain them, as he says, 
‘by means of the Aristotelian constitution of the arts and the Ramist method.’9
Here is an example of how such logical division worked. In a small text that 
he called An Outline of the Art of Medicine, Libavius ventured a definition of the 
medical art, and did so, as he says, while ‘hiding behind Apelles’s canvas’ so that 
he could find out how the various medical factions would respond. His intention, 
however, went well beyond stimulating discussion, and at the very beginning of 
his text he tells us what his purpose really is. ‘We must not only be judges of the 
opinions and works of others, but also confessors and asserters of what is true, 
so that from the straight it may be apparent how much the oblique declines away 
from it.’ What was true about medicine was ancient and tied to Galen. What was 
oblique was the system advocated by Paracelsus and his followers. There was no 
middle ground. In trying to find it, one only found ridicule. ‘In truth the opposed 
sides were so filled with mutual bitterness against each other, that there was no 
 7 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber secundus, Francofurti: excudebat Ioannes Saurius, 
impensis Petri Koffij, 1595, Epistola LXXXVI, pp. 521–529; pp. 526–527: ‘Necesse itaque est 
chymicum bonum esse logicum et quidem logicum non vulgariter didicisse, sed emendate, 
quo pacto hodie praecepta a Petro Ramo elaborata circum feruntur. Nemo mihi persuadebit 
unquam bene iudicare posse eum, qui iudicii praua didicit praecepta. Multi Aristoteleam 
iacant logicam; sed ea praecepta cum commentariis exhibit, nec facile est agnoscere, quidam 
tandem pro comprobato certoque sit ponendum. Aristoteles quorundam se inuentorem iac-
tat. At unius autoritas artem non constituit. Petrus Ramus commentarium et interpretamen-
ta seposuit; genuina usuque optimo spectata axiomata excerpsit, ut iam pateant regulae ad 
iudicium rationis genericum syncerae.’
 8 Ramus, Dialecticae libri duo, ed. Sebastian Lalla and Karlheinz Hülser, Stuttgart-Bad Cann-
statt 2011.
 9 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber primus, Dedicatio: ‘Sed quo amplius eam verso, eo 
arridet magis adeo, ut ad formam perfectarum scientiarum accommodare praecepta eius, et 
Aristotelea artium constitutione methodoque Ramaea illustrare animum induxerim.’
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way that one who put himself in the middle could avoid offending both sides, 
and be met by hostility from each.’10  
At first, his definition of medicine does not appear adventurous at all. The idea 
was, in fact, ancient. Medicine, he says, is the art of healing well [Medicina est ars 
bene medendi]. Who could disagree with that? Its subject was the living human 
body, ‘insofar as it is sick or is able to become sick,’ and also ‘by a system of pro-
phylaxis and preservation in its undamaged state even insofar as it [the body] is 
healthy.’ And yet, what pertained to this art required careful division. All healing 
came from God, but miracles were not part of the art of medicine. Neither was 
magic. What was procured through angels, or occurred through evil genii with 
the permission of God, did not come under the power of the physician. Neither 
were the things done through magical incantations. This was not a denial that 
the body might be afflicted by means of magic. Someone affected by magic, how-
ever, must not be sent to the physician, but to God, for only God ‘can command 
created spirits.’ When injured by means of enchantments the first cause must 
be removed, and this is done not by medicine but by God and through theo-
logical help. Another sort of distinction separates the rational medical art from 
random experience. The physician who is aligned with the true art of medicine, 
and in whom science and praxis have been conjoined, acts skillfully by means of 
a definite system of principles that inform experience itself. a physician’s praxis, in 
other words, depends upon a knowledge of principles. ‘For there cannot be, in an 
art, any experience of that of which no scientific principle exists, since it [an art] 
is a sort of comprehension and token of theory and praxis at the same time […]. 
Where there are no principles, there is no rational praxis.’11 
Libavius‘s divisions establish what is part of, or homogeneous, and what is not 
part of, or heterogeneous, in the art of medicine. Diseases ordained as divine in or-
igin are heterogeneous to the art. Relief, in this case, is in the hands of God. What 
Paracelsus claimed concerning a certain variety of disease, the ens dei,12 that came 
from God and yet could be cured by the physician was, then, logically false. Magic 
and enchantment may cause disease, but the cure is not by means of medicine. 
Neither is experience alone enough to establish homogeneity with the medical art. 
10 “Delineatio constitutionis artis medicae, qualem his temporibus desiderant Hippocrati-
ci, Hermetici, servatis veterum inventis,” in: Appendix necessaria Syntagmatis arcanorum 
chy mi co rum […], Francofurti: exudebat Nicolaus Hoffmannus, impensis Peri Kopffij, 1615, 
pp. 118–129; p. 118: ‘Non iudices tantum alienarum opinionum et operum esse debemus, 
sed et verorum con fessores, assertoresque, ut ex recto appareat, quantum ab eo declinave-
rit obli quum […] Duae nostris temporibus factiones inter se contendunt, una est Galenica, 
alte rea Paracelsica […] Tentata est media quaedam ratio, qua ex utriusque contendentibus 
eli geretur, id quod pro bum est et genuinum […] Ita vero exacerbatae sunt in se mutuo partes 
ad versae, ut fieri non possit, quin is qui se medium interiecerit, utrinque offendat, et ab utris-
que male excipiatur.‘
11 “Delineatio constitutionis artis medicae […],” p. 119: ‘Neque enim experientia potest, cuius 
nullum extat principium scientificum, cum sit complexio quaedam et symbolum theoriae et 
praxeos simul […]. Ubi itaque non sunt principia, ibi praxis rationalis est nulla.’
12 Paracelsus, Volumen medicinae paramirum, transl. Kurt F. Leidecker, Baltimore 1949, pp. 56–63.
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Most significantly, illnesses and treatments related to celestial influence,13 a key 
Paracelsian position, were also outside, and oblique to, the true medical art. 
In defining chymia, the same method of distinguishing homogeneity from 
heterogeneity is at work. Paracelsians had used the term chymia to describe the 
making of a variety of medicines whose powers came from the stars, and which 
linked the macrocosm to the microcosm. Libavius regarded such an astral scheme 
to be a taxonomic fiction. In his knowledge tree, what was relevant to chymia had 
to have, like disease itself in regard to medicine, a terrestrial, not a celestial basis. 
‘Nothing should be received into chymia,’ he says, ‘that is not of chymia.’ In chymia 
the limit of the art was the material world. Everything else was heterogeneous; 
and ‘everything heterogeneous is false.’14 How should one understand a chemical 
essence, he asks? Should one accept that formal and specific essences could be 
separated from material things (as Paracelsians claimed) to the extent that they 
were no longer even physical, but having set aside their elementary qualities had 
passed into the nature of something celestial? This, however, would be an illu-
sion. In looking for what was homogeneous, the essence of a substance made up 
of terrestrial elements had also to be terrestrial, and not defined, Libavius con-
cludes, as some other celestial or metaphysical thing.15 
The principle of homogeneity was Libavius’s logical anchor, and was as much a 
part of Aristotelian as Ramist traditions. Ramus called it the lex justitiae, the princi-
ple by which the purpose of an art determined what was proper, or homogeneous, 
to its discussion. It was a rule that Libavius expected his students to know and use 
as a fundamental element in “judging well.” In a student thesis written later when 
Libavius directed a superior gymnasium in Coburg (a thesis that Libavius probably 
wrote himself) the discussion of the elements as composed of heavenly qualities by 
the Aristotelian professor of logic at Padua, Jacopo Zarabella (1533–1589), fell victim 
to the same logical criticism.16 Whether stemming from the views of an Aristotelian 
like Zarabella or related to the claims of Paracelsian physicians, Libavius’s students 
learned that attempts to extract celestial powers from terrestrial things was to com-
mit a mistake of categories, and thus logically and chemically wrong headed. 
 
13 Ibid., pp. 13–23: ‘ens astrale.’
14 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber primus (1595), Epistola XIII, pp. 116–124; p. 119: 
‚Iuxta hanc doctrinam nihil in chymiam recipietur, quod non sit chymicum: Nihil nisi quod 
verum. Omne enim falsum heterogeneum.‘
15 Ibid., Epistola IX, pp. 92–97; pp. 93–94: ‘Quidam vesani putant se essentias formales et spe-
cificas a rebus separare posse; ita ut non amplius ad censum elementorum pertineant, sed 
qualitatibus elementaribus spoliate transierint in coelestium αποιων naturam […] Quod 
affi citur ab elementis, id necesse est his homogeneum esse […] Quin nec fieri potest verae ab 
ele mentari materia et qualitatibus in elementaribus seiungantur. Portentosum ita que hoc 
est figmentum.’
16 De mundi corporumque mixtorum elementis et principiis Platonicis, Aristotelicis, Hippocraticis, Her-
meticis exercitatio physica […], Coburg: impressa Coburgi typis Ducalibus a Iusto Hauck, 1608, 
paragraphs 34–35.
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Although the Rothenburg paedonomus approved the usefulness of much of Ra-
mus‘s method for purposes of efficient pedagogy, Libavius spurned Ramus’s at-
tacks upon Aris totle and other ancient figures like Cicero and Quintilian. His 
judgments oscillated between praise and blame on numerous occasions, and op-
ponents took note of the reproving and derisive language that he brought to bear 
upon specific points of Ramist writing.17 After all, it was a short distance between 
claiming, as Ramus did, that Aris totle lacked method and asserting that some 
of Aris totle’s arguments were logically false. Regardless, Ramus was one thing, 
his advocates, another. And here is where the real trouble in Libavius’s Ramist 
disputes primarily lies; because the debate about logic and method, and the texts 
that Libavius produced aimed at dialectic and reasoning, did not arise in isola-
tion, but were connected to other arguments, some of them confessional and oth-
ers connected to ideas concerning the theory and practice of the arts and sciences. 
This was a struggle in great part over the minds of boys, and how the adults of to-
morrow were to be trained to view the world. It is by no means surprising, there-
fore, that the works for which Libavius is most remembered, his Alche mia (1597) 
and his three volumes of chemical letters, Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] 
liber primus, secundus (1595), tertius (1599) were conceptually knitted together with 
school texts and polemics concerning logic and method that appeared through-
out most of the 1590s, and with a searing focus in the years 1594–1596. His first 
major printing venture (1591) was, in fact, not a text about medicine or chymia at 
all, but a comparison of Peripatetic and Ramist positions concerning elements, 
qualities, and other issues of natural philosophy.18 
Aris totle as much as Ramus gave advice about what was proper to any art or sci-
ence, and to students and others Libavius explained that ‘there are some who con-
sider it shameful to agree with the ancients wherever the ancients are unique and 
disagree with modern ideas. I am not so devoted as to defend their errors. Never-
theless, when they assert things that are not definite, but probable, and my own 
reasoning seems likewise probable, I bow to them in such a way that [if necessary] 
I still have a clear path of retreat. Sometimes, however, they are filled with enough 
clear truth, and I think then it wrong not to agree with them. For they were not 
brute animals, nor did they just make statements of truth without logic or honesty. 
So, why reject them, as some of the moderns, puffed up with the pride of Ramus, 
do?’19 Some of those labeled “moderns” had used Ramist dialectics as a platform 
17 For a list as they appeared in Libavius‘s Dialecticae emendatae libri duo (1595) see Joannes Bis-
ter feldius, Nex et anatomia horridi et furfuracei, informis et infirmi apodictici monstri […], Hano-
viae, apud Guilielmum Antonium, 1597, pp. 13–16.
18 Questionum physicarum controversarum inter peripateticos et Rameas tractatus […], Francofurti: 
apud Ioannem Feirabendium, impensis Ioannis Wecheli et Petri Fischeri sociorum, 1591.
19 D.O.M.A. Singularium […] pars prima […], Francofurti: impressa a typis Ioannis Saurii, 1599, 
ad lectorem de palaestricis, p. 11: ‘Tu vero Lector scias velim, me non astrictum esse ita vetu-
stati, ut errores defensos velim: veruntamen cum aliquando non quidem plane firma, sed 
probabilia afferant, et meae rationis item videantur non improbandae; ita deflicto ut interim 
recessum retineam liberum aliquando manifesta veritate satis stipentur tunc nefas esse exi-
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from which to launch attacks upon Peripatetic philosophy as a whole, and in doing 
so had also attacked the system of logic taught in schools that pertained to the 
knowledge of medicine.20 Some detractors had gone further, not only attacking Ga-
lenic and Hippocratic thinking, but supporting the medical-philosophical system 
linked to Paracelsus as well. At the beginning of his text of 1591, dedicated to the 
Senate of Rothenburg, Libavius noted that the Ramist faction had begun making 
a great effort to oppress the truths laid out by Hippo crates, Galen, Aris totle and 
others, and this to such an extent as possibly to jeopardize the talents of students.21 
Constructing definitions, for chymia or anything else, was not an easy task, 
especially when the basis for doing so was linked to Aris totle’s view, expressed 
in the Posterior analytics, that any definition meant discovering the actual essence 
or being of a thing.22 In one of his many chemical letters Libavius acknowledged 
the complexity of the problem. Aristotelian definitions, he notes, were in great 
danger, and had even been censured by intelligent persons, since the true essenc-
es of things might never be known. In the attempt to know “being,” things were 
joined together in so many ways that a description, in terms of an immutable 
subject demonstrated by means of its proper cause, was scarcely ever immune to 
criticism. ‘In a jumble of so many things the [Aristotelian] way’ was, he had to ad-
mit, ‘prone to error.’23 In trying to define what counted as chymia, then, how was 
one to proceed? Clearly, piling up observations without rational guidelines was 
no solution. Not everything, he explained, could be waded through individually. 
Ambiguous judgments, combined with a harvest of accidents, always left open 
the possibility of contradiction. Moreover, Ramus himself had granted that for 
knowledge to be scientific it had to be grasped by means of causes and universal 
principles; and whatever was universal, according to Aris totle, proceeded from 
the inner intellect.24 Intellect and experience, while different in nature, could, 
stimo cum illis non sentire. Non enim fuerunt bruta animalia, nec nihil cum ratione et argu-
mentorum fiducia pronunciarunt. Cur ergo eos ita repudiem ut recentes nonnulli supercilio 
Rami tumentes, solent.’
20 On the relation between writing about logic and other areas of knowledge see Ian Maclean, 
Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: the Case of Law, Cambridge 1992; Logic, Signs and 
Nature in the Renaissance: the Case of Learned Medicine, Cambridge 2001; and “Logical Division 
and Visual Dichotomies: Ramus in the Context of Legal and Medical Writing,” in: The Influ-
ence of Petrus Ramus: Studies in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Philosophy and Sciences, ed. 
Mordechai Feingold, Joseph S. Freedman and Wolfgang Rother, Basel 2001, pp. 228–247.
21 Questionum physicarum controversarum inter peripateticos et Rameas tractatus […] (1591), epistola 
dedicatoria: ‘Magnus est conatus Rameae factionis in opprimenda veritate naturali, per Hip-
pocratem, Galenum, Aristotelem et alios horum studiosus explicata: adeo ut non immerito 
perturbari ingenea adhuc tenera possint.’
22 90b30ff, Posterior analytics, transl. Hugh Tredennick, Cambridge 1960, p. 183: ‘Definition is of 
the essence or essential nature, and it is obvious that all demonstrations assume the essence as 
a received fact.’
23 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber primus (1595), Epistola VIII, pp. 88–91; p. 89: ‘In 
congerie plurium prona ad errandum via est […].’ 
24 Tetraemerum autoschediasticum pro defensione sententiae Andreae Libavii […] contra mentem Petri 
Rami […], Francofurti: excudebat Ioannis Saurius, impensis Petri Kopffij, 1596, pp. 153–154.
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never theless, work in harmony. For Libavius, theory and practice supplied clarity 
and constancy to one another. At the beginning of a discussion concerning the 
preparation of chemical medicines he observed that ‘no science or art is fixed 
unless the principles and rules have been discovered through reason produced 
by opportunity and necessity, verified by use and experience, and made certain 
by the authority and judgment of wise craftsmen […]. When we call upon art, we 
turn attention to an aptness [for doing something] in accordance with knowledge 
based in theory.’25 In searching for definitions, a method of division offered a 
means of selecting and properly organizing essential attributes. In this regard, 
techne (an art or skill) and episteme (understanding) worked together; and while 
Aris totle made a distinction between programs of teaching (based in demonstra-
tions) and programs of scientific investigation (based in first principles derived 
via intuition and dialectic), both were necessary in describing the relationship be-
tween universals and particulars, and in identifying those things, as predicates 
or middle terms, that lay between.26 
Reasoning by mean of causes, principles, and axioms fixed the genus of specific 
procedures and these in turn, precisely articulated, further defined the subject 
itself. Libavius called this axiomatic homogeneity, and it was, he thought, the 
only way of instituting the arts. From a first definition, the properties of an art 
immediately followed, and the properties related to procedures and techne clar-
ified thereafter whatever in the art was held to be axiomatic and universal.27 ‘If 
therefore to all these special offices together you assign the name of a genus, you 
would not be mistaken in your definition. For the members complete the essence 
of the whole, and from this a not unacceptable definition is made.’28 
In three volumes of letters, the first two published in 1595 and the last in 1599, 
Libavius attempted to determine what sorts of actions and observations pertained 
to the procedural genus of chymia. There he announced his own views, and invited 
responses to them, concerning the definition of chemical terms, the construction 
of a common chemical language, and the best means of scrutinizing specific chem-
ical operations and techniques. Parsing out what was accidental to the subject of 
chymia, and what were its specific characteristics, its proprium, could in this way 
25 Liber hypomnematum […] in Syntagmatis arcanorum chymicorum […] tomus secundus, Francofurti: 
excudebat Nicolaus Hoffmannus, impensis Petri Kopffii, 1611, Praefatio, p. 224: ‘Nullum scien-
tiam nec artem constantem esse, quin principiis regulisque ratione ab occasione aut necessi-
tate inducta inventis, usuque et experientia comprobatis sapientumque artificium auctoritate 
et iudicio confirmatis […] Artem cum vocamus, ad efficiendi secundum scientiam theorema-
ticam facultatem respicimus.’
26 On the difference between “scientific teaching” and “scientific knowledge” in Aris totle see 
Richard W. Bauman, Aris totle’s Logic of Education, New York 1998, esp. pp. 78–86.
27 Libavius, Dialecticae emendatae libri duo, Francofurti: excudebat Ioannes Saurius, impensis 
Petri Kopffij, 1595, pp. 285–287.
28 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber primus (1595), Epistola VIII, pp. 88–91; p. 89: ‘Si ergo 
officiis specialibus coniunctis, praeposueris nomen generis; non inscite definiueris. Nam 
membra essentiam integri complent, sitque inde definitio non improbanda […].‘
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become a communal effort. At the same time (indeed, over the very same years), he 
sought to delineate the specific nature of chemical knowledge by paying attention 
to broader debates about logic and method, especially among those who defended 
the views of Philipp Me lanch thon (1497–1560) and Petrus Ramus.29 In one text, 
Dialecticae emandatae libri duo (1595) Libavius collected precepts related to dialectics 
drawn from the opinions of Aris totle, Me lanch thon, and Ramus, and added what 
he called ‘a threefold judgment concerning logical controversies,’ focusing upon 
errors among Ramists as well as those among anti-Ramists, while explicating and 
defending Aristotelian demonstrations against specific Ramist views. Libavus’s 
book is really a textbook, a catechism of logic, something for students to memo-
rize. In defining method, he chose to describe it not as ratio or via, but as dispositio,30 
as an ordered assembly. He was not alone in doing so, but in his hands method 
became a way of discovering what parts of chymia were subordinate to others, 
and how the definition of the entire subject might come to light as homogeneous 
parts fell into line as species of axioms and precepts, and, thereafter, “by a certain 
circularity,” helped further define the essence of the whole. 
Through homogeneous division and distribution what was less distinct in its 
own right became clearly subordinate to a particular subject. Near the end of vol-
ume two of his book of chemical letters, it is precisely this notion of dispositio that 
Libavius brings to bear upon the question of the difference between destillatoria 
and alchymia. There he acknowledged the stubbornness of certain Italians (he is 
thinking of the physician at Ravenna Hiero ny mus Rubeus [i. e. Girolamo Rossi], 
1539–1607) who had attacked alchemy, thinking it only concerned with the meta-
morphosis of metals and claiming it to be far different from distillation. Yet alche-
my and distillation, Libavius admonished, differed only in the way that complete 
knowledge differs from a part. Distillation, transmutation, calcination, resolution, 
and other processes were parts of a whole, no matter if the whole was called alchy-
mia or what Paracelsians, who had allowed celestial powers to be part of materi-
al things, improperly defined as chymia. Distillation pertained to both, although 
there was a key difference between the two. Alchymia represented true logic, chy-
mia in the hands of Paracelsians reflected, he warned, the logic of sophists.31 
29 These include Exercitiorum logicorum […] liber primus, Francofurti: Excudebat Ioannes Sau-
rius, impensis Petri Kopffii, 1595. Dialogus logicus secundus continens declarationem dialecticae 
P. Rami facilem et expeditam adhibitis una praeceptis et regulis D. Philippi Me lanch thonis […], Fran-
cofurti: excudebat Ioannes Saurius, impensis Petri Kopffii, 1595. Dialecticae emendatae libri 
duo, Francofurti: excudebat Ioannes Saurius, impensis Petri Kopffij, 1595. A further textbook 
in logic appeared shortly after Libavius transferred to Coburg to be become director of the 
Gymnasium Academicum Casmirianum, Dialectia Philippo-Ramaea, ex descriptionibus et com-
mentariis P. Me lanch thonis et P. Rami […], Francofurti 1608. 
30 Dialecticae emendatae libri duo, p. 285.
31 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber secundus (1595), Epistola XCIX, pp. 606–611: ‘Ver-
um, si recte sentire volumus, statuendum est ita distare alchemiam et destillatoriam, sicut 
integra scientia et membrum […] Si destillatoria est pars essentialis chymiae, quomodo tam 
longis distabit parasangis, ut vituperata alchymia illa sit immunis? […] Ita distinctam chy-
miam etiam a Paracelsia velim, quo pacto solemus inter logicam veram et sophisticam mul-
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The impetus for the intellectual mixing of logic, medicine, and chymia in Libavi-
us’s writings arose initially from a small text touting a medicinal panacea written 
by a German physician and Junker, Georg Amwald (1554–1616). The little book 
declared, on the basis of a prior and cordial letter, that Libavius had witnessed the 
medicine‘s powerful effects. Libavius, however, had intended his letter to suggest 
no such thing and denounced the panacea thereafter, exposing its components 
(quicksilver and sulphur joined together through sublimation) in a response 
called De panacea amwaldina (1594). The attack on Amwald became the first part 
of a larger book, called the Neoparacelsica (1594),32 that defended Galenic and Hip-
pocratic medicine in general and, more specifically, rebutted of the writings of 
another Paracelsian advocate, Johann Graman (fl 1593).33 
In two texts published at Erfurt in 159334 Graman condemned the practices 
of Galenic physicians within the university’s medical faculty and exhorted the 
methods of Paracelsian “chymists” who knew, he said, how to extract incorporeal 
celestial virtues from material substances and bring them to bear upon illness. In 
answering Graman, Libavius found himself also writing about the dialectics of 
Aris totle, Me lanch thon, and Ramus, and sometimes supporting ancient opinions 
against “modern” views. Questions of definition were central to these disputes, 
and Libavius noted at one point that opposing the medical and pharmaceutical 
claims of Amwald and Graman had also required him to enter the arena in which 
arguments concerning logic took place.35 Publishers loved such debates and made 
money from the printed quarrels that grew out of them. Libavius‘s publisher, 
Peter Kopff (fl. 1593–1633), conveniently located in the same city, Frankfurt am 
Main, as one of the most productive publishers in German lands of Ramist writ-
ing, André Wechel and his heirs, was therefore eager to print whatever Libavius 
could send. Using a friend and physician in Frankfurt, Johann Hartmann Beyer, 
as an intermediary, Libavius responded to a market demand for rebuke and vilifi-
cation, supplying Kopff with a printer’s elixir of dialectic, alchemy, and medicine 
that, in numerous renderings, informed, argued, examined, appraised, exulted 
and/or outraged for more than two decades.
tis contaminatam fraudibus et malo usu vera praecepta inquinantem.’ On Libavius‘s presen-
tation of alchemy in accordance with Ramist method see Owen Hannaway, The Chemists and 
the Word: the Didactic Origins of Modern Chemistry, Baltimore, London 1975. 
32 Neoparacelsica in quibus vetus medicina defenditur […], Francofurti: excudebat Ioannes Saur, 
impensis Petri Kopffij, 1594. 
33 Bruce T. Moran, “Medicine, Alchemy, and the Control of Language: Andreas Libavius Ver-
sus the Neoparacelsians,” in: Paracelsus: the Man and his Reputation, his Ideas and their Transfor-
mation, ed. Ole Peter Grell, Leiden 1998, pp. 135–149.
34 Apologetica refutatio […], Erphordiae: Baumannum, 1593. Tractatus de pharmaco purgantis […], 
Erphordiae: Georgium Baumannum, 1593.
35 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber tertius (1599), Epistola I, p. 9: ‘Soliti sunt nostri ali-
quanto acrius obsistere Paracelso, mihique luctandum simili in arena fuit cum improbitate 
et nequitia Ambaldi, Gramani, Bisterfeldii, Engelharti, Diaconi […].’
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Many of the texts concerning dialectic and method written by Libavius and 
published at Kopff’s expense were fiercely polemical and aimed at Ramist au-
thors who had simultaneously denounced Peripatetic philosophy as well as Ga-
lenic medicine. In these texts scientia and historia intersected; and they did so in 
particular in relation to occurrences at the University of Erfurt that were set in 
motion by a prominent member of Libavius’s epistolary network, a physician and 
mathematician at Erfurt named Bartholomaeus Hubner (c. 1543–c. 1603).
In an Oration on the True and immovable Foundations of the Art of Medicine and 
Philosophy, declaimed in a public assembly of the greater academy at Erfurt in 
June, 1593, Hubner decried Paracelsus’s theological views concerning the physi-
cal nature of Christ, denounced his description of creation as separation from an 
initial mysterium magnum, and assailed the Paracelsian notion of the human being 
as composed of multiple bodies, spirits, and souls. While acknowledging the ef-
ficacy of chemical preparations, he denied that these were new with Paracelsus 
and argued that new remedies did not make a new art. Most serious was Paracel-
sus’s perversion of the four elements and his view of the physical body as nothing 
more than “a cadaver,” made living, or sick, by the nature of the spirits, or astra, 
that joined the world at large to the microcosm.36 Libavius joined the debate soon 
thereafter defending Hubner and denouncing Paracelsian claims. He also added 
Hubner to his list of correspondents; and at the beginning of the first volume of 
Libavius’s three volume book of letters, Hubner added a lengthy elegy in praise of 
the book and its author, joining others, including Joachim Camerarius, Zacharius 
Brendel, and Johann Hartmann Beyer, in endorsing the epistolary project. 
Six letters addressed to Hubner appeared in the second volume, and while these 
ostensibly concerned distillation, they were equally concerned with the question 
of how one ought to establish an art, whether by reason, or by practice and experi-
ence, or by both together, or in some other way. Aris totle judged an art as a virtue 
of the intellect, but others argued that an art was to be demonstrated by means of 
practice. While Libavius confessed to being a novice among craftsmen, he knew 
enough to observe that artisans were not at all in agreement about what the disci-
pline of chymia was. Each thought that he was a chemist if he had scraped together 
some formulas and operations. But if practices were to help define the art, what 
sorts of practices should they be? Aris totle had discerned operations by means of 
ends, ends by means of skills [facultates], and skills or agency by means of meth-
ods [instrumenta]. In this regard, distillations, calcinations, sublimations, solutions, 
and the like had separate ends and none could define chymia as a whole. Practice 
alone could not define an art. So the good “chymist,” in addition to mastering tech-
niques, had to learn logic, not in the everyday sort of way [non vulgariter] but purely 
36 Oratio de veris immotisque fundamentis artis medicae et philosophiae, deque impietate, vanitate, por-
tentosis et pernitiosis erroribus Philippi Paracelsi, et sectatorem eius, quibus theologiam pariter et phi-
losophiam cum medicina nefarie conspurcarunt […], Erphordiae: apud Iohannem Pistorium, 1593.
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[emendate] as stipulated in the precepts elaborated by Peter Ramus.37 Then, through 
the method of proper division and distribution guided by the principle of homo-
geneity, practices characteristic of the art could be joined to what was axiomatic.
Someone else around this time to attack the claims of Paracelsians, and the 
specific claims of Johann Graman at Erfurt, was a professor of philosophy and 
medicine at Altdorf named Philipp Scherbe (1553–1605). Scherbe moved in heady 
circles. He had been trained in Basel and Heidelberg, before visiting universities 
in northern Italy (specifically Bologna, Rome, and Padua). His Paduan teachers 
included heavy hitters—Franciscus Piccolomini, Tommaso Pellegrini, and Jacopo 
Zabarella, but Scherbe admired Andrea Cesalpino above all, and like Cesalpino 
Scherbe made use of Galenic, Hippocratic, as well as Aristotelian texts in med-
ical instruction. Libavius referred to him as ‘a great philosopher, whose intelli-
gence the Italians admire and the Germans respect.’38 What Libavius especial-
ly liked was Scherbe’s defense of Aris totle against overenthusiastic Ramists in 
his Dissertatio pro philosophia peripatetica, adversus Ramistas (1590). There Scherbe 
had distinguished dialectical syllogisms (syllogisms showing that something is 
the case) from apodictic syllogisms (syllogisms that tell us why something is the 
case), and had attributed a better understanding and construction of the latter to 
Aris totle. While experience might give shape to knowledge, knowledge itself was 
demonstrative and followed from “first principles” or axioms that came to light 
by means of intuition or reason. Reason, not experience, made “art” possible. 39 
Scherbe became Libavius’s logical darling, and Libavius himself joined the Ra-
mist debate in 1591 by replying to the Aristotelian criticisms of a Scottish philoso-
pher named James Martin of Dunkeld whose positions had been republished and 
emended by a Ramist supporter and Cambridge professor of philosophy, William 
Temple.40 By the standards of the day, the response was measured and, for the 
most part, impersonal. After all, Libavius considered Ramus and Me lanch thon 
as having offered refinements to Aristotelian reasoning,41 and noted a number 
of Ramist scholars, including Friedrich Beurhaus (Beurhusius) (1536–1609) and 
Johannes Piscator (1546–1625), who had not refrained from correcting Ramist 
positions. Nevertheless, in creating their own rules for establishing the arts, Li-
37 Rerum chymicarum epistolica […] liber secundus, Francofurti: excudebat Ioannes Saurius, im-
pensis Petri Koffij, 1595, Epistola LXXXVI, pp. 521–529; p. 526.
38 Schediasmata medica et philosophica ad Henningum Rennemannum phiosophum M. apud Erfurden-
ses […], Francofurti: excudebat Ioannes Saur, impensis Petri Kopffij, 1596, Andreas Libavius 
D. Henningo Rennemano M. apud Erfurdenses […] epistola. 
39 Dissertatio Philippi Scherbii, medicinae ac philosophiae professoris in academia Altorfina, pro philo-
sophia peripatetica, adversus Ramistas […], Giessae: excudebat Casparus Chemlinus, 1590.
40 Quaestionum physicarum controversarum inter Peripateticos et Rameos Tractatus (1591). On de-
bates surrounding Temple see Elizabeth Anne Boran, “Ramism in Trinity College, Dublin 
in the Early Seventeenth Century,” in: The Influence of Petrus Ramus: Studies in Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Century Philosophy and Sciences, Basel 2001, pp. 177–199.
41 On Me lanch thon and Ramus see Joseph S. Freedman, “Me lanch thon‘s Opinion of Ramus 
and the Utilization of their Writings in Central Europe,” in: The Influence of Petrus Ramus, 
Basel 2001, pp. 68–91.
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bavius observed that Ramists like Tempel had ‘conspired upon the destruction 
of Aristotelian writings’ and ‘by those rules, as if they were torturers and in-
quisitors, everything peripatetic gets crucified.’42 Ramist scholars not only cen-
sured Aris totle, but often rebuked one another, doing so sometimes aggressively, 
sometimes, he acknowledged, with ‘a soft sponge.’ There was, however, nothing 
soft about Libavius‘s response to two other authors whose caustic critiques made 
them personal adversaries. Both held positions within German schools. The first 
was a reformed theologian and philosopher teaching at the Hohe Schule in Her-
born named Johannes Bisterfeld (1568–1616), the father of the better known Jo-
hann Heinrich Bisterfeld. The second was a philosopher, jurist, and Dean of the 
Saxon College at Erfurt named Henning Rennemann (1567–1646). 
Especially in regard to Bisterfeld, who revered Ramus not only as a logician, 
but also as a martyr of Christ, things got really nasty as the two exchanged in-
sults in 1596 and 1597, arguing, among many other things, about whether an ef-
fect preceded a cause in the case of election and predestination, whether justice 
is a species of nobility, and whether color occurs by means of illumination. The 
exchange, as abusive as it was even by the standards of the macho world of early 
modern academic disputation, helped Libavius get clear on his own Aristotelian 
sympathies. ‘The matter,’ he says to Bisterfeld, ‘is over the exposition of Aris-
totle, namely whether he has a doctrine and whether it is stable and suitable for 
learning [litterae] or not. The ancient Peripatetics say yes, the modern Ramists say 
no […]. the truth leans toward the Peripatetics and shies away from modern Ra-
mist factions because the latter have neither faithfully nor at all well interpreted 
the claims which the [Peripatetics] make.’43 Libavius referred to forty two argu-
ments that he had made demonstrating the fallacies of Ramist positions. As a re-
sult Bisterfeld, Libavius complained, had attacked him ‘so madly and stubbornly’ 
that he far surpassed ‘the custom of a liberally educated man,’ not only dreaming 
modern dreams in the field of logic but assaulting his medical, poetic, physical, 
and chemical dignity. In a separate response, Bisterfeld made Libavius into the 
maker of an ‘apodictic monster,’ a reference to Libavius‘s previous writing, the 
Tetraemerum autoschediasticum, a text, as he saw it, that conflated monstrous abus-
es so repulsive that one did not know whether to be afraid of it or to loathe it. 
While not condemning the chemical art, Bisterfeld observed that a ridiculous 
chymicus had attempted to write about logic and had apparently used magic to 
construct syllogisms. Libavius, he mocked, should be sent back to the grammari-
ans to learn the essence of words.44 
In replying to Rennemann (a more formidable presence at Erfurt), Scherbe and 
Libavius joined forces in several texts. In one, the Schediasmata medica et philosoph-
ica (a text running to 728 pages with 288 miscellaneous notes or schediasmata), 
42 Quaestionum physicarum controversarum […] ad lectorem de praefatione Tempelli contra Aristotelem.
43 Tetraemerum autoschediasticum (1596), preface.
44 Nex et anatomia horridi et furfuracei, informis et infirmi apodictici monstri […], Hanoviae: apud 
Guilielmum Antonium, 1597, pp. 111–112; p. 166.
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Scherbe wrote an opening letter in which he acknowledged the enormous tal-
ent, prudence, and labor that Libavius had brought to bear upon subduing ‘those 
monsters of men who had insulted Galen’ and in calling back to the form of the 
art of chymia those things that had strayed away without order. Rennemann he 
described as Erfurdianus ille Pyrgopolinices who had recently ranted against Aristo-
telian philosophy. The name is a reference to the swaggering braggart in Plautus’s 
Miles Gloriosus and Scherbe hoped that Libavius would ‘tame the quarrelsome 
Erfurdian mutt.’ Having the temper to do so would earn him distinction not only 
in the schools of physicians but also in those of the Peripatetics.45
In a separate opening epistle addressed to Rennemann, Libavius gives us a 
sense of his own disappointment in the alignment of Ramist logic with attacks 
aimed at Peripatetic reasoning and Galenic medicine. ‘Being most desirous to teach 
well,’ Libavius says, he had at first seized upon Ramist logic as if he had drunk the 
whole golden Syrenem of the chymists with eyes, ears, and mind. But in Renne-
mann’s writing he had found only arguments attacking Peripatetic learning. But 
how, he wondered, had Peripatetic learning served Rennemann so poorly that he 
could attack German schools, gymnasia, and academies so bitterly. ‘You have de-
clared yourself an enemy of the schools of Germany, yet you were raised in them, 
and you still draw breath in them.’46 At Erfurt, Rennemann used his institutional 
authority, and his judicial knowledge of logic, to support the Paraclesian views of 
Johann Graman and had rebuked arguments opposing Graman that Libavius had 
made earlier in a text suitably called Antigramania. Feeling insulted, Libavius but-
tressed his position by calling upon institutional allies at other German schools. 
‘Attacking me,’ he wrote, ‘is to attack the medical faculties at Nürnberg, Jena, and 
Tübingen, each of which recognizes the authority and reasoning of Galen.’ 
If we stitch together the logical treatises in defense of Aristotelian logic and the 
project of writing and publishing letters concerning chymical matters (both of 
which consumed the years in which he was also preparing his best-known text, 
the Alche mia (1597), the thread that binds these two apparently different projects 
is a venture aimed at defining the subject of chymia as a didactic discipline within 
the liberal arts. The true art of chymia, Libavius argued, was really nowhere to be 
found. That is why he says in one of his letters that if anything were to be written 
about chymia, much less taught, chymia had to be reduced almost to ABCs, and be-
fore teaching it, one had to learn what sort of art, what kind of thing, chymia was.47 
45 Schediasmata medica et philosophica ad Henningum Rennemannum philosophum M. apud Er fur-
denses […], Francofurti: excudebat Ioannes Saur, impensis Petri Kopffij, 1596, Andreae Liba-
vio, medico et philosopho praestantissimo, amico meo multum colendo, Phil. Scherbius […] 
epistola.
46 Schediasmata medica […] Andreas Libavius D. Henningo Rennemano M. apud Erfurdenses […] 
epistola.
47 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber primus (1595), Praefatio ad lectorem, pp. 1–14; p. 4.
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This meant distinguishing its axioms and definitions according to reasoning and 
logic. Only then could it become a true art, possessing its own disciplinary domain. 
Significantly, Libavius claimed that the subject of chymia deserved a place as 
both an art and a science, as both techne and episteme combined. As an art and 
a science chymia could then join the liberal arts, and need no longer be consid-
ered solely a handmaid to medicine. The person best prepared to do that was, he 
thought, the professor of medicine at the University of Jena, Zacharius Brendel 
(the elder, 1553–1626) and he reminded Brendel in one of his letters that the tomb 
of Archimedes had been marked by a sphere in honor of his discovery and that 
Ramus had proposed for himself a monument for his restoration of logic. Since 
Brendel possessed erudition, eloquence, experience, and method he could win 
similar praise for himself in establishing the art of chymia within the curriculum 
of his university.48 
It was, however, not at Jena, but at Marburg that what was called chymia be-
came part of university instruction,49 and the irony is that, for Libavius, this was 
an enormous disappointment. Following the principle of homogeneity meant find-
ing the essence or definition of the art and science of chymia in elementary matter, 
not in the heavens, nor in regions of magic and mysticism. But the person who 
taught so-called chymiatria (chymical medicine) at Marburg, Johannes Hartmann 
(1568–1631), was not at all concerned with this type of chemical scientia. By describ-
ing special procedures like distillation, sublimation, and calcination without first 
describing the principles and causes for what was prescribed, he had created what 
Libavius liked to call an artless art [sine arte artem].50 Hartmann taught technique at 
Marburg, but teaching the subject of chymia required much more than that. Hart-
mann taught how to make things, but simply making things did not make an art. 
Ramist dialectic was well situated at Marburg. The university‘s patron Moritz 
of Hessen-Kassel (1572–1632) had made sure of that, preferring teaching methods, 
very much in the Libavian spirit, in which the judgments of Ramus were adjusted 
by reference to Aris totle.51 But none of this entered the course in medical chymis-
try that Hartmann taught. Despite being called a “public” laboratory Hartmann’s 
students swore to keep secret the procedures learned there. They also learned 
that the reasons the medicines that they made had the effects that they did was 
because of macrocosmic-microcosmic correspondences in nature, and because of 
the action of spiritual subtleties derived from the heavens. From Libavius’s point 
of view, there was no art here, just faulty logic and the accidents of practice. The 
proper principles and axioms that defined a subject and to which all practices 
48 Ibid., Epistola XII, pp. 115–116.
49 Fritz Krafft, „Das Zauberwort chymiatria – und die Attraktivität der Marburger Medizin-
Aus bildung, 1608–1620. Eine etwas andere Frequenzbetrachtung,“ in: Medizinhistorisches 
Jour nal 44 (2009), pp. 130–178. Bruce T. Moran, Chemical pharmacy enters the University: Johannes 
Hart mann and the Didactic Care of Chymiatria in the Early Seventeenth Century, Madison 1991.
50 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber primus (1595), Epistola XII, p. 114.
51 Hotson, Commonplace Learning […], p. 29; p.105.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
250 Bruce T. Moran
should refer were nowhere to be found. Chymia, like medicine, demanded princi-
ples, not figments of principles. ‘Hence we find fault with Paracelsia in that it seeks 
causes from every which way, from heaven, earth, and others, and with such 
great discrepancies that you could not find even two agreeing among themselves, 
and Paracelsus himself, as if floating in an unknown sea, at one time alleging 
this, at another that, just as if it had flowed out of a drunkard‘s quill.’ What was 
the meaning of the practices one learned, especially if their foundation was made 
up of symbolisms and parables which only got in the way of certitude? Para-
celsia, Libavius noted, ‘discloses very many things symbolically; but with such 
inconsistency and confusion that most of it renders even its very own professors 
uncertain, and one says this and the other that. Then there are those who claim 
for themselves the keys to Paracelsian certainty, which they alone possess. And 
so anything is interpreted in any way to the extent that if Paracelsus were to come 
back to life he himself would regard them as bastards.’52 Alas, the Marburg labo-
ratory was no place to learn the subject of chymia.
From a distance Libavius’s battles may seem to be “much ado” about very little. 
Yet the controversies that interlaced logic, medicine, and chymia, and in which he 
became a formidable agent, served to mediate, albeit with polemical scruffiness, 
links between what was practical and concrete on the one hand with what was 
theoretical and abstract on the other. The enterprise of defending Aris totle while 
defining chymia taught students good habits for making judgments by means of 
proper logic and “disputative skirmishing,” and gave those habits a moral pur-
pose aimed at serving the public good. For the paedonomus at Rothenburg, the 
logic of Aris totle required nature to be moved only by what was natural (naturam 
movet per naturam).53 In education as well as in the pursuit of natural knowledge, 
what was particular and what was general needed to share homogeneous char-
acteristics. In light of this reasoning, students at German schools and elsewhere 
learned what was useful and virtuous in the republic, and what was logically 
sensible in explaining the physical world. 
52 Delineatio constitutionis artis medicae […], p. 119: ‘Hinc reprehendimus in Paracelsia, quod ra-
tiones undecunque petat ex coelo, terra, et aliis, idque adeo discrepanter, ut de duos quidem 
invenias inter se consentientes, et Paracelsus ipse tanquam in ignoto mari fluctuet modo 
hoc afferendo, modo aliud prout in Ebrii calamum defluxit.. […] Paracelsia plurima enunciat 
symbolice; sed cum ea inconstantia et confusione, ut pleraque etiam ipsos professores incer-
tos reddant, et hic hoc dicat, ille illud. Sunt et qui sibi Paracelsia certas claves arrogent, quas 
ipsi soli possideant. Itaque interpretantur quovis quidvis quos si revivisceret Paracelsus, 
ipse pro spuriis haberet.’ 
53 Rerum chymicarum epistolica forma […] liber primus (1595), Epistola II, p. 31: ‘Naturam mouet 
per naturam, sicut agricola et hortulanus ex pomo producit pyra.‘
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Reforming the Prisca Medicina:  
Libavius’ Axioms of Elements and Mixture
Elisabeth Moreau
Trained in philosophy at Wittenberg and Jena and in medicine at Basel, Andreas 
Libavius was a major actor in German alchemy at the dawn of the seventeenth 
century. In the history of science, he is mainly known for his Alchymia (1606), a 
sophisticated textbook describing the multiple instruments, tools and operations 
of alchemy. Moreover, the recent research has enhanced Libavius’ polemical, in-
stitutional and intellectual approach to alchemy as a field of knowledge.1 In the 
same way as the Swiss physician and theologian Thomas Erastus (1524–1583), 
Libavius was an effortless adversary of the Paracelsian philosophy, which he ac-
cused of subverting the Aristotelian natural philosophy, Galenic medicine, and 
medieval alchemy. He described the Paracelsian “pseudo-chymistry” as a hetero-
geneous and contradictory current with a confused terminology, which is unfit to 
provide a clear and homogeneous knowledge. In Libavius’ view, alchemy should 
be institutionalized at the university through its inclusion in the curriculum 
based on Aris totle’s rhetoric, logic and natural philosophy.
As Bruce Moran has shown, Libavius attempted to legitimize the doctrinal tra-
dition studied in universities by organizing knowledge with clear boundaries be-
tween each discipline.2 In his Alche mia of 1597, alchemy is presented as a didactic 
discipline and a demonstrative science, whose principles and axioms need to be 
determined.3 Following Aris totle’s argumentation and logic, chymia is considered 
as a specific field of knowledge studying nature according to definite principles. 
However, Libavius also applied this scheme to medicine as an art and a body of 
1 See Bruce T. Moran, Andreas Libavius and the Transformation of Alchemy: Separating Chemical 
Cultures with Polemical Fire, Sagamore Beach 2007; Owen Hannaway, The Chemist and the Word: 
The Didactic Origins of Chemistry, Baltimore 1975; William R. Newman, Atoms and Alchemy: 
Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of the Scientific Revolution, Chicago 2006, pp. 66–84; 
Peter J. Forshaw, “‘Paradoxes, Absurdities, and Madness’: Conflict over Alchemy, Magic and 
Medicine in the Works of Andreas Libavius and Heinrich Khunrath”, in: Early Science and 
Medicine 13 (2008), pp. 53–81.
2  Bruce T. Moran, “Axioms, Essences, and Mostly Clean Hands: Preparing to Teach Chemistry 
with Libavius and Aris totle”, in: Science & Education 15 (2006), pp. 173–187.
3 Moran, “Axioms”, pp. 173–187; idem, “Eloquence in the Marketplace: Erudition and Prag-
matic Humanism in the Restoration of Chymia”, in: Osiris 29 (2014), pp. 49–62; idem, “Andreas 
Libavius and the Art of Chymia: Words, Works, Precepts and Social Practices”, in: Bridging 
Traditions: Alchemy, Chemistry and Paracelsian Practices in the Early Modern Era, ed. Karen Hun-
ger Parshall, Michael T. Walton and Bruce T. Moran, Kirksville 2015, pp. 59–78. 
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knowledge.4 At the institutional level, the medical discipline follows “axiomat-
ic” precepts which the physician applies in his practice for making a diagnosis. 
Though this definition of medicine as theory and practice based on natural phi-
losophy was already established by the medical tradition, Libavius placed it in a 
didactic framework suitable to his own programmatic view on the organization 
of knowledge. In this perspective, he developed medical axioms concerning the 
notions of elements, qualities and temperament, which he strove to rehabilitate 
from the attacks of Paracelsian physicians. To this purpose, Libavius’ argumen-
tation operates on multiple plans including the tradition established by Hippo-
crates, Galen and Aris totle, some medieval alchemical texts mostly attributed to 
Arnald of Villanova and Ramon Lull, as well as the Scriptures. Moreover, Li-
bavius relied on the Paracelsian notion of tria prima (Salt, Sulfur and Mercury) as 
components of bodies, and on Renaissance medical debates on the existence of a 
celestial principle within the body.5 With this multifarious subtext, he sought to 
debunk the Paracelsian medical philosophy while replacing its religious scope in 
a framework faithful to the tradition.
This chapter aims to show that Libavius’ medical axioms, physiological the-
ory and appeal to the Scriptures make him a proponent of an alternative view 
on the “ancient medicine” (prisca medicina) promoted by Paracelsian physicians. 
Among the latter, the Danish physician Petrus Severinus (1540–1602) considered 
prisca medicina as the ancient medicine grounded on a genealogy starting from 
Hippocrates and leading up to Paracelsus.6 According to Severinus, this ancient 
medical knowledge has been spoiled by Aristotelian and Galenic mistakes and 
needs to be recovered through a doctrinal reform founded on the Paracelsian phi-
losophy, and on the broader current of prisca sapientia—the Renaissance project of 
restoring the Christian Platonic wisdom. Though Severinus’ view on prisca me-
dicina was shared by numerous Paracelsian physicians, the restoration of ancient 
medicine could also be urged against such a Paracelsian-Platonic framework. As 
Martin Mulsow has pointed out, late Renaissance glorification of ancient knowl-
edge took multiple forms featuring diverse protagonists and goals in various cul-
4 On the classification of alchemy and medicine as disciplines, see Jean-Marc Mandosio, “La 
place de l’alchimie dans les classifications des sciences et des arts à la Renaissance”, in: 
Chrysopoeia 4 (1990–1991), pp. 199–282; Ian Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance: 
The Case of Learned Medicine, Cambridge 2002, pp. 66–100.
5 Bruce T. Moran, “The Less Well-Known Libavius: Spirits, Powers, and Metaphors in the 
Practice of Knowing Nature”, in: Chymists and Chymistry: Studies in the History of Alchemy and 
Early Modern Chemistry, ed. Lawrence M. Principe, Sagamore Beach 2007, pp. 13–24. 
6 Jole Shackelford, A Philosophical Path for Paracelsian Medicine: The Ideas, Intellectual Context, and 
Influence of Petrus Severinus (1540/2–1602), Copenhagen 2004, p. 145–152; idem, “The Chem-
ical Hippocrates: Paracelsian and Hippocratic Theory in Petrus Severinus’ Medical Philos-
ophy”, in: Reinventing Hippocrates, ed. David Cantor, Aldershot 2002, pp. 59–88; Hiro Hirai, 
Le concept de semence dans les théories de la matière à la Renaissance, de Marsile Ficin à Pierre 
Gassendi, Turnhout 2005, pp. 217–265.
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tural contexts.7 For this reason, genealogies of wisdom could exclude or include 
Aristotelian philosophy, depending on their aim of removing or integrating the 
philosophical tradition in their project. In this regard, Libavius represents the 
latter position through his claim to return to the sources of Galen and Aris totle 
as authorities continued by medieval alchemists and subsequently subverted by 
Paracelsus and his disciples. In this manner, Libavius’ medical theory aims to 
offer a competing view on prisca medicina which articulates medical axioms about 
elements and temperament with medieval alchemy and Renaissance accounts on 
the body’s celestial nature.8
In what follows, I first examine the axiomatic approach to medicine as an art 
and academic discipline which Libavius proposed in the Schediasmata medica and 
philosophica [Medical and Philosophical Sketches] (1596). Then, I consider the doctri-
nal content of his medical axioms concerning elements, mixture and tempera-
ment as expounded in the Novus medicina veterum tam Hippocratica quam Hermet-
ica tractatus [New Treatise on the Hippocratic and Hermetic Medicine of the Ancients] 
(1599).9 In light of these treatises, I shall reconstruct Libavius’ medical theory by 
stressing its didactic, alchemical and religious scope. 
1 The Axiomatic Principles of Medicine
In 1596, Libavius published the Schediasmata against the Responsio apologetica of 
Hen ning Rennemann (1567–1646), a German philosopher trained at Helmstedt, 
who at that time was college dean in Erfurt and would later become college rector 
in Hildesheim.10 Rennemann’s treatise seeks to defend Ramist philosophy against 
the attacks of Philip Scherb (1553–1605), physician at Altdorf.11 To his criticism 
of Aristotelian philosophy, Rennemann joins that of Galenic medicine, and sug-
gests that Ramism and Paracelsianism share the same project of reforming the 
antiquated university model. In the epilogue of his Responsio, he advises Scherb, 
 7 Martin Mulsow, “Ambiguities of the Prisca Sapientia in Late Renaissance Humanism”, in: 
Journal of the History of Ideas 65 (2004), pp. 1–13. See also Hiro Hirai, “Prisca Theologia and 
Neoplatonic Reading of Hippocrates in Fernel, Cardano and Gemma”, in: Cornelius Gemma: 
Cosmology, Medicine, and Natural Philosophy in Renaissance Louvain, ed. Hiro Hirai, Rome 2008, 
pp. 91–104.
 8 On Libavius as a figure of “chemical compromise”, see Allen G. Debus, Science, Medicine, and 
Society in the Renaissance: Essays to Honor Walter Pagel, London 1972, pp. 151–165.
 9 Andreas Libavius, Schediasmata medica et philosophica, ad Henningum Rennemannum Philoso-
phum M. apud Erfurdenses, Frankfurt 1596; Idem, Novus de medicina veterum tam Hippocratica, 
quam Hermetica tractatus, Frankfurt 1599.
10  Henning Rennemann, Responsio apologetica, ad dissertationem pro philosophica peripatetica ad-
versus Ramistas, Frankfurt 1595. On Rennemann, see Ernst Landsberg, “Rennemann, Hen-
ning”, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, vol. 28, Munich/Leipzig 1889, p. 225.
11 Philip Scherb, Dissertatio pro philosophia peripatetica, adversus Ramistas, Altdorf 1590. On Sc-
herb, see Sascha Salatowsky, “Scherb, Philip”, in: Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. 
Marco Sgarbi, Cham 2015. doi: 10.1007/978–3–319–02848–4_334–1. On the conflict between 
Rennemann and Scherb, see Kay Zenker, Denkfreiheit: Libertas philosophandi in der deutschen 
Aufk lärung, Hamburg 2013, pp. 38–42.
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as a Galenist physician, to concentrate his efforts on Paracelsianism rather than 
Ramism, because it represents a much more dangerous threat to the tradition, as 
testify the fruitful cures of the Paracelsian physician Johann Gramann in Erfurt. 
Rennemann ironically adds that Scherb should team up with the only opponent 
to this current, the confident, yet unsuccessful, Libavius.12 In reaction to this prov-
ocation, Libavius wrote “sketches” (schediasmata) in support of his fellow Scherb, 
and more broadly, of the Aristotelian philosophy and Galenic medicine.13 Each of 
the schediasmata refutes a specific question or paragraph addressed in the Respon-
sio, and further elaborates on the foundations of medicine, logic and physics.14
Beyond its polemical stake, the Schediasmata also aim to underline Libavius’ 
own ethos as a chymist physician trained in the disciplines of the trivium: gram-
mar, rhetoric and logic.15 From his university training at Wittenberg and Jena to 
his profession as schoolmaster in Rothenburg and Coburg, Libavius always con-
sidered the teaching of the trivium indispensable, for which he relied on both 
Me lanch thon and Ramus. As Joseph Freedman has shown, the German “trivial” 
schools were then promoting a “Philippo-Ramist” program in the course of their 
university-preparatory training.16 While the Ramist philosophy provides a useful 
method for the preparatory teaching of the trivium, the Philippist logic and rhet-
oric are the basis for learning Aristotelian natural philosophy.17 Libavius adopts 
this didactic framework in his Schediasmata, which are conceived as harangues 
advocating the indispensable character of the mastery of trivium for the under-
standing of natural philosophy. He seeks to demonstrate the organization of 
knowledge by syllogisms based on universal premises following Aris totle’s Pos-
terior Analytics as well as Ramus’ Socratic method of elenchus, namely the logical 
12 Rennemann, Responsio, p. 309.
13 On Ramist logic in the Renaissance, esp. in Libavius and Rennemann, see Peter Mack, A His-
tory of Renaissance Rhetoric, 1380–1620, Oxford 2011, pp. 136–165; Walter J. Ong, Ramus: Meth-
od and the Decay of Dialogue, From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason, Cambridge/London 
1958; Joseph S. Freedman, “The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central Europe, 
c. 1570–c. 1630”, in: Renaissance Quarterly 46 (1993), pp. 98–152; Howard Hotson, Commonplace 
Learning: Ramism and Its German Ramifications, 1543–1630, Oxford 2007.
14 On Libavius’ polemic with Rennemann, see Moran, Andreas Libavius, pp. 11–30; Idem “Axi-
oms”, pp. 173–187.
15 See Richard W. Serjeantson, “Proof and Persuasion”, in: The Cambridge History of Science. 
Volume 3: Early Modern Science, ed. Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston, Cambridge 2008, 
pp. 132–175; Bert Roest, “Rhetoric of Innovation and Recourse to Tradition in Humanist Ped-
agogical Discourse”, in: Medieval and Renaissance Humanism: Rhetoric, Representation, and Re-
form, ed. Stephen Gersh and Bert Roest, Leiden/Boston 2003, pp. 115–148.
16 Freedman, “The Diffusion”, pp. 98–152.
17 Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Me lanch thon, 
Cambridge 1995; Günter Frank, “Philipp Me lanch thon (1497–1560): Reformer and Philoso-
pher”, in: Philosophers of the Renaissance, ed. Paul Richard Blum, Washington 2010, pp. 148–
162; Idem, Philipp Me lanch thon: Der Reformator zwischen Glauben und Wissen. Ein Handbuch, 
Berlin/Boston 2017; Dino Bellucci, Science de la nature et Réformation: la physique au service de la 
Réforme dans l’enseignement de Philipp Mélanchton, Rome 1998.
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refutation of an argument by syllogism.18 Moreover, he considers his definition of 
medical art as a passage from axiomatic precepts to the physician’s praxis follow-
ing the Ramist philosophy.19 This scheme supports his definition of medicine as 
a theoretical and practical discipline involving other fields of knowledge such as 
physics and alchemy.
Following the “Hermetic” filiation of prisca medicina, Libavius first mentions 
the roots of ancient medicine in Egypt, Palestine and Chaldea, allegedly familiar 
with alchemy.20 He nonetheless considers Hippocrates as the father of medicine 
as a discipline, which Galen supplemented with his own medical experience. For 
this reason, Libavius presents himself as a supporter of Galenism, to which he 
adds the precepts of his experience concerning “new” diseases—e. g. syphilis—
and alchemical preparations.21 In his view, the foundations of medicine are built 
on medical axioms and theorems as the premise of an effective diagnosis in prac-
tice. “True medicine”, Libavius explains, is composed of well-arranged principles 
observed by long experience and sharp judgement. In this regard, the “form” 
of health and disease is axiomatic and requires to be extracted from a homoge-
nous “multitude” according to Hippocratic and Galenic commentaries.22 Such a 
principle of homogeneity is inspired by Aris totle’s Posterior Analytics on the ho-
mogeneity of discourse, and further illustrated by an alchemical metaphor. The 
axioms are indeed extracted from experience just like essences are alchemically 
separated from their homogeneous substrate.
According to Libavius, Hippocrates and Galen established the axioms of med-
icine and its proper end: health. The ultimate objective of medicine, he claims, 
is the conservation of health, which is achieved by repelling diseases with the 
assistance of natura medicatrix.23 To cure the patient, the physician needs to iden-
18 Moran, Andreas Libavius, p. 21; Hannaway, The Chemist, p. 134–142.
19 Libavius, Schediasmata, p. 57: “Obtundet te Ramus tuus vi θεωρίας καὶ πράξεως, quae non 
sunt dissentanea, sed alterum alteri subordinatum.”
20 Libavius, Schediasmata, pp. 14–17. See Nancy G. Siraisi, “In Search of the Origins of Medicine: 
Egyptian Wisdom and Some Renaissance Physicians”, in: Generation and Degeneration: Tropes 
of Reproduction in Literature and History from Antiquity Through Early Modern Europe, ed. Vale-
ria Finucci and Kevin Brownlee, Durham 2001, pp. 235–261; Eadem, History, Medicine, and the 
Traditions of Renaissance Learning, Ann Arbor 2007.
21 Libavius, Schediasmata, p. 16: “[…] possimusque beneficio artis vel ipsius Galeni censores esse 
liberales, haud aegrè ferimus, artem ipsam nominari Galenicam, nosque Galeni sectatores, 
modò non habeamur pro mancipiis Galeni, sed pro his qui eadem via modoque artis inced-
unt […]. Et illa noua artis vsu, non autem praeceptis, libenter addimus priscis, quo pacto et 
de nouis tum morbis tum medicinis, et praeparatione harum chymica à multis praeclare est 
factitatum.”
22 Ibid, p. 23: “Vera medicina principiis constat his, quae ad benè medendum sunt composita, 
atque longa experientiâ et acri iudicio spectata, siue sanitatem spectes, siue morbos et re-
media. Eorum forma est axiomatica, multitudine homogenea ita contexta, ut requirit vera 
ratio, quanquam ex commentariis Hippocraticis et Galenicis laboriosius sint excerpenda.” 
See Moran, “Axioms”, pp. 173–187.
23 Libavius, Schediasmata, p. 49: “Sed fortassis Galenus noster tibi sordet. Hippocrates ait, me-
dicinae propositum esse sanare. At huius finis et perfectio ultima est sanitas. […] Vulgò 
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tify the cause of the disease by applying medical precepts or “principles” to the 
patient’s case. For this reason, making a correct diagnosis requires the theoretical 
knowledge of nature, namely physics. As the “study of natural things”, physics 
is involved in many other fields such as arithmetic (numbers), geometry (quan-
tities), and music (sounds and harmonies).24 In the case of medicine, physics is 
needed for the contemplation of the causes and effects of natural things, as a 
starting point for the study of health and disease.25 Consequently, the physician 
applies natural theorems to his praxis in order to preserve health or to bring back 
afflicted bodies to health.26 However, Libavius nuances that a skillful empirical 
physician might grasp, through observation, the precepts of medical art accord-
ing to the rules converging with “true reason”.27 Such an enlightened “empiric” 
would then follow medical axioms and endorse a finer philosophy than Para-
celsianism. Within the medical practice, alchemy plays the role of an ancillary 
field for pharmaceutical purpose. Libavius nevertheless specifies that alchemical 
pharmacy only serves to therapy, so that medicine cannot be reduced to the art of 
distilling “quintessence”, a notion I will discuss in the last section of this paper.28
Libavius does not fail to emphasize that the therapeutic objective of medi-
cine is enhanced by Paracelsus and his disciples. Yet Paracelsian pathology, like 
Rennemann’s “empirical” approach to medicine, advocates that the knowledge of 
health is not necessary to repel disease.29 For Libavius, this contradicts the defini-
tion of the state of health as resulting from the “temperament”, namely the pro-
portion of elements and their qualities. As an imbalance of the primary qualities, 
illness is cured by a “contrary” remedy whose temperament is opposite to that of 
the patient. Contrastingly, the Paracelsian system considers disease as a local and 
autonomous process of alchemical nature rather than a qualitative imbalance. For 
Libavius, such a view is improper to establish medicine as an art based on logical 
notum est: quod aegrotorum salus in medendo summa lex esse debeat. Paracelsus adeò non 
insaniuit, ut negârit, sanationem facere medicum. […] medicum non tam morbos et aduersa 
alia depellere, quam naturam iuuare seruareque, ut ita morbos potius in fine priore habeat, 
sanitatem verò in ultimo.”
24 Libavius, Schediasmata, p. 71.
25 Ibid., p. 55: “Ego dixerim, Physicum contemplari de natura, ut se habet caussis, effectis, adi-
unctis naturalibus: et eatenus etiam attingere, de sanitate et morbo. At medicum […] labora-
re in sana conseruanda, afflicta verò iuuanda et ad sanitatem adducenda. […] medici autem 
etiam porro ad sanitatem seu constitutionem secundum naturam praecepta ponere etiam 
vbi non est morbus, quod fieri sine sanitatis praeceptis et noticia non potest. Ita commune 
quid habent medici et Physici.”
26 Ibid., pp. 71–72: “Sanè tu etiam nobis videris tantum practicam medicinam fingere. Vbi verò 
Theo re mata? medicina id ad praxin transfert, quod in praeceptis habet. Hoc si est in rebus 
Physicis, euenit. Non enim per se res physicas contemplatur medicina, sed in illis salubri-
tatem aut vires ad hanc facientes, siue conseruanda sit sanitas, siue restituenda.”
27 Ibid., p. 65: “Fieri tamen potest, vt etiam Empiricus paulo attentior longo vsu tandem in-
currat in easdem obseruationes et regulas artis, atque tandem arripiat etiam praecepta sua, 
congrua quodammodo rationi verae.”
28 Ibid., pp. 179–181.
29 Rennemann, Responsio, p. 262.
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axioms, as it proposes “boorish”, “random” and “inexperienced” treatments.30 For 
this reason, Libavius considers Paracelsus and his disciples as quacks peddling 
superstitious remedies in the example of the panacea Assylvana of Georg am Wald 
(1554–1616).31 He previously condemned, in his Neoparacelsica (1594), the Bavarian 
healer’s universal cure, which was advertised as a secret preparation and became 
a commercial success in Germany.32
As Libavius explains in the Schediasmata, the physician cures illness by identi-
fying the patient’s temperament or krasis, and by seeking a “contrary organic dis-
position”.33 According to Galen, such temperament is the product of the “mixture” 
of elements and primary qualities, in reference to Hippocrates’ On the Nature of 
Man and Aris totle’s On Generation and Corruption. While Libavius fully endorses 
the Galenic definition of the temperament, he still has to justify its compatibility 
with his alchemical views. As this question is not at the center of the Schediasmata, 
I shall explore it in light of another polemical treatise of Libavius.
2 Axioms of Elements and Mixtures
In his Novus de medicina veterum… tractatus (1599), Libavius develops his medical 
theory of elements, qualities and temperament. This treatise is a critical response 
to the Apologia chymica (1597) of the Italian physician Giuseppe Micheli (Michelius), 
who accuses him of destroying alchemy because of his inexperience in practical 
operations.34 Established in Middelburg in the Dutch Republic, Michelius was a 
reformed Paracelsian scholar from Lucca in Tuscany. His Apologia mostly criticizes 
the content of some letters that Libavius published in Rerum chymicarum…liber pri-
mus (1595). In this context, Libavius’ main goal, in Novus de medicina veterum…tracta-
30 Libavius, Schediasmata, p. 54–55: “Si enim non; ars non est, quamquam rusticus fortassis tam 
benè disputet citra artem, ac Logicus cum arte. Vis nos artificiosè mederi; non fortuitò, non 
casu, non imperitè et inscienter? Ex arte promenda axiomata. Hic nulla est sanatio sine sani-
tatis et cognitione et scopo.”
31 Ibid., p. 65: “Apparuit item qui se nobilem profitetur circumgestans non tantum panaceam 
Assyluanam, sed et superstitionem specie religiosum, cum praeter imposturas, etiam magi-
cas, nihil capiat.” 
32 On Georg am Wald, see Wolf-Dieter Müller-Jahncke, “Georg am Wald (1554–1616): Arzt und 
Unternehmer”, in: Analecta Paracelsica: Studien zum Nachleben Theophrast von Hohenheims im 
deutschen Kulturgebiet der frühen Neuzeit, ed. Joachim Telle, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 213–304; Alisha 
Rankin, “Empirics, Physicians, and Wonder Drugs in Early Modern Germany: The Case of 
the Panacea Amwaldina”, in: Early Science and Medicine 14 (2009), pp. 680–710; Moran, Andreas 
Libavius, pp. 127–130.
33 Ibid., p. 67: “Non ita volumus remedia opposita morbis, ut primis, seu elementaribus, seu 
simplicibus et nudis qualitatibus contrarium contrario καθόλου sanescat, sed si morbus est 
in Crasi, quae non unam qualitatem nudam, sed totam facultatem et subtantiam secum fert, 
Crasi aduersante cum curamus, si in organo, organicam dispositionem contrariam inquiri-
mus, atque ita de disiunctis.”
34 Josephus Michelius, Apologia chymica, adversus invectivas Andreae Libaui calumnias, Middel-
burg 1597. On the quarrel between Libavius and Michelius, see Moran, Andreas Libavius, 
pp. 43–49; Didier Kahn, Alchimie et paracelsisme en France à la fin de la Renaissance (1567–1625), 
Ge neva 2007, pp. 354–357.
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tus, is to respond to Michelius’ “calumnies” and to dismantle his argument by rail-
ing against his lack of qualification in grammar, logic, rhetoric, physics, medicine 
and alchemy. This treatise is followed by an extensive commentary on alchemical 
operations attributed to the medieval physicians Ramon Lull and Arnald of Vil-
lanova.35 Although the title “New Treatise on Hippocratic and Hermetic Ancient 
Medicine” connotes the Paracelsian enterprise of uncovering the prisca medicina, 
the purpose of Libavius is somewhat different. He seeks to drown the Paracelsian 
system in the tradition by showing the historical compatibility between medieval 
alchemy and the authority of Galen and Aris totle. Libavius’ sources include some 
collections of medieval alchemical texts such as the Rosarium philosophorum and 
De alchemia, among others.36 Furthermore, the therapeutic application of Libavius’ 
philosophy is presented in the treatise attached to the Novus de medicina veterum…
tractatus, commenting on recipes attributed to Lull and Villanova.37
The first part of the treatise, entitled “De alchymia”, contains forty-five “re-
marks” (notae) on Michelius’ alchemy, while the second part, “De medicina”, in-
cludes twenty-seven “points” (puncta) on his medical theory. Throughout the trea-
tise, Libavius blames Paracelsus for usurping the “true” alchemy, for corrupting 
alchemical art by using symbolic names, and for misunderstanding the analo-
gy between macrocosm and microcosm. At the same time, he rebuts Michelius’ 
accusations of plagiarizing Thomas Erastus in his polemic against Severinus.38 
According to Libavius, the fact that he himself shares the objections of Erastus 
is hardly surprising given that “the speech of truth is simple and uniform”.39 In 
addition, Libavius requites his Paracelsian opponents the accusation of imitat-
ing Severinus’ Idea medicinae philosophicae (1571), a major treatise for the diffusion 
of Paracelsianism in the late sixteenth century. In this manner, he distinguishes 
Paracelsus and Severinus from their disciples, whom he considers as pale follow-
ers reciting the precepts of Paracelsus without really understanding them.
35 On the alchemical works attributed to Lull and Villanova, see Michela Pereira, “L’Alchimista 
come medico perfetto nel Testamentum pseudolulliano”, in: Alchimia e medicina nel Medioevo, 
ed. Chiara Crisciani and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, Florence 2003, pp. 77–109; eadem, 
“Maestro di segreti o caposcuola contestato? Presenza di Arnaldo da Villanova e di temi 
della medicina arnaldiana in alcuni testi alchemici pseudo-lulliani”, in: Actes de la ‘II Trobada 
Internacional d’Estudis Sobre Arnau de Vilanova’, ed. Josep Perarnau, Barcelona 2005, pp. 381–
412; Antoine Calvet, Les oeuvres alchimiques attribuées à Arnaud de Villeneuve : grand oeuvre, 
médecine et prophétie au Moyen-Âge, Paris-Milan 2011.
36 S.n., Rosarium philosophorum. Secunda pars alchimiae de lapide philosophico vero modo praeparan-
do, continens exactam eius scientiae progressionem, Frankfurt 1550; Geber, In hoc volumine de 
alchemia continentur haec, Nuremberg 1541.
37 Andreas Libavius, Medicinae hermeticae artificibus catholicae ad hominis sanitatem tuendam adu-
ersamque valetudinem profligandam […] Expositio fidelis, Frankfurt 1599.
38 On Erastus, see Charles Gunnoe, Thomas Erastus and the Palatinate: A Renaissance Physician in 
the Second Reformation, Leiden 2011, pp. 263–338; Jole Shackelford, “Early Reception of Para-
celsian Theory: Severinus and Erastus”, in: The Sixteenth Century Journal 26 (1995), pp. 123–
135; Newman, Atoms, pp. 45–65.
39 Libavius, Novus, pp. 48–49. See Michelius, Apologia, pp. 40–42.
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3 Reuniting Elements and Qualities with the Tria Prima
Libavius first strives to defend the notion of primary qualities against the attacks 
of Michelius, who reduces them to “vain shadows of bodies” following the Pla-
tonic formula.40 From the Paracelsian viewpoint presented in Severinus’ Idea, the 
fertile properties of seeds (dynameis), from which derive the tria prima, are distinct 
from the sterile qualities of the elements (relollacea), which are downgraded to 
simple material “rudiments”.41 On that basis, the Paracelsian philosophers dis-
sociate the figure of Hippocrates from Galen and his followers by asserting that 
the founder of medicine never stated the existence of four elements and qualities, 
but affirmed that the body’s juices were endowed with a seminal power. To this 
claim, Libavius responds that the primary qualities related to the elements are 
attested in humors and other “juices”. As “reasons” and “virtues” of bodies, pri-
mary qualities give a determined status to the elements and interact by action 
and passion during their mixture.42 Since they provide the body’s properties and 
participate in their formation during mixture, there is no reason to replace them 
by the Paracelsian seminal powers. As Libavius recalls, medieval alchemists ac-
knowledge the four qualities and elements. For instance, Bernardus Trevisanus 
advocates four efficient qualities, while Ricardus Anglicus stresses the role of pri-
mary qualities in the composition of Sulphur and the constitution of diseases.43
As Libavius explains, it is Paracelsus and the supporters of his “utopia” like 
Michelius and Severinus who claim the anteriority of the three principles to the 
elements in the composition of bodies. Libavius nonetheless remarks that, in the 
(apocryphal) treatise De pestilitate [On Pestilence], Paracelsus acknowledges that 
the elements precede the tria prima in the order of divine creation.44 Libavius then 
tries to overcome this inconsistency in Paracelsus’ works by taking the example 
of De primis tribus essentiis [On the Three First Essences].45 In this treatise, Paracel-
40 Michelius, Apologia, p. 42. On Libavius’ endorsement of the four qualities, see Forshaw, “Par-
adoxes”, pp. 53–81.
41 Hirai, Le concept, pp. 217–265.
42 Libavius, Novus, p. 75: “[…] cur vanas appellat qualitates, quas et Chymici veteres, quos pra-
edicat, agnouerunt […]? Si error est, qualitates agnoscere, non minus is Paracelsitis debetur 
quam Platonicis. Sed nec vanum est id, quod tantas ad agendum patiendumque vires obti-
net. Frigore certe calor expugnatur, siccitate humor.”
43 Bernardus Trevisanus, De chymico miraculo, quod Lapidem Philosophiae appellant, Basel 1583, 
p. 27; Ricardus Anglicus, Correctorium alchemiae, in: Geber, De alchemia, Nuremberg 1541, 
pp. 288–294. On Bernardus Trevisanus, see Didier Kahn, “Recherche sur le livre attribué au 
prétendu Bernard le Trévisan (fin du XVe siècle)”, in: Alchimia e medicina, ed. Chiara Crisciani 
and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, Florence 2003, pp. 265–336. On Ricardus Anglicus, see 
Joachim Telle, “Ricardus Anglicus”, in: Die Deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters: Verfasserlexicon, 
ed. Karl Ruh, Berlin 1992, vol. 8, pp. 38–41.
44 Libavius, Novus, p. 123: “Sed Chymici veteres omnes Mercurio elementa priora faciunt, et 
Bernhardus ait, in principio chaos ceratum [sic] est, ex quo fiebant quatuor elementa, et ex his 
bestiae (quod et Paracelsus in lib. de pestilitate repetit) item sicut omnia semina sunt ex quatu-
or elementis, ita et sulphur et Mercurius, etc. Ita scilicet consentiunt Chymici Paracelsici inter 
se, et cum veteribus Chymicis.” See Paracelsus, Bücher und Schrifften, Basel 1589, vol. 3, p. 30.
45 Paracelsus, Bücher und Schrifften, Basel 1589, vol. 3, pp. 15–23. 
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sus affirms the resolution of elements into tria prima in reference to the ancient 
distinction between “common” and “prior” elements.46 Without adhering to the 
primacy of the three principles, Libavius agrees on the distinction between pure 
elements in their natural place and the elements composing the bodies, in accor-
dance with Aristotelian physics. In the same way, he defines the first compounds 
of elements as elementata holding an essence of great strength.47 Libavius most 
likely takes this notion from his alchemical sources. For example, the Rosarium 
philosophorum defines the element (elementum) as the first body subject to compo-
sition, but states that earth, water, air and fire are not pure and simple elements, 
as they are mingled into an “elemented” part (elementatum).48 In the same way, 
Ricardus Anglicus’ Correctorium alchemiae distinguishes common elements from 
the four elements endowed with qualities, which are specific to the nature of “el-
emented” things.49 More broadly, the notion of elementatum refers to the Platonic 
medieval tradition transmitted by William of Conches in De philosophia mundi (ca. 
1129). This current defines “elemented” bodies as elemental entities perceptible in 
the physical world, contrarily to pure elementa, only accessible in thought.50 Their 
formation succeeds to the biblical chaos, from the creation of elements to that 
of organic bodies. Such explanation overlaps the medical account of the body’s 
division into “anhomeomerous” or organic parts, “homeomerous” parts (homo-
logues of the elementata), and elements.
According to Libavius, the notion of elementatum implies that the first com-
pounds enclose an essence corresponding to the Paracelsian three principles, 
46 Libavius, Novus, p. 123: “Paracelsus vulgaria elementa iterum resoluit in elementa, quod 
fortasse sic aestimaret ex veterum sententia nullum elementum circa nos in nostro loco esse 
purum, hoc est, omnia vicissim composita esse ex elementis prioribus. In lib. de essentiis 
tribus, quicquid ex elementis productum est ex tribus esse putat, quae principia vocat.”
47 Libavius, Novus, p. 42: “[…] Elementatum ex elementis tanquam membris constat. Id Para-
celsitae, maximeque Seuerinus iudicant in se comprehendere essentiam ex principiis, (quae 
tria fingunt, Sulphur scilicet, salem, et mercurium) ortam: In hac separanda laborare Chy-
micum, quanquam Seuerinus neget possibilem esse separationem totalem et longe aliam 
habeat Chymiam, quam Michelius.”
48 S.n., Rosarium, f. g2 v. On the Rosarium philosophorum, Antoine Calvet, “Étude d’un texte al-
chi mique latin du xive siècle: le Rosarius philosophorum attribué au médecin Arnaud de Ville-
neuve (ob. 1311)”, in: Early Science and Medicine 11 (2006), pp. 162–206; Joachim Telle, “Re mar-
ques sur le Rosarium philosophorum (1550) avec une liste sélective d’ouvrages sur l’alchi mie 
mé diévale”, in: Chrysopoeia 5 (1992–1996), pp. 265–319; Giuliana Camilli, “Il Rosarius phi lo-
sophorum attribuito ad Arnaldo da Villanova nella tradizione alchemica del trecento”, in: Ac-
tes de la I Trobada Internacional d’Estudis Sobre Arnau de Vilanova, ed. Josep Perarnau, Bar ce lona 
1995, vol. 2, pp. 175–208.
49 Ricardus Anglicus, Correctorium, p. 302.
50 See Theodor Silverstein, “Elementatum: Its Appearance Among the Twelfth-Century Cos-
mogonists”, Mediaeval Studies 16 (1954), pp. 156–162; Idem, “Guillaume de Conches and the 
Elements: Homiomeria and Organica”, Mediaeval Studies 26 (1964), pp. 363–367; Danielle 
 Jacquart, “Minima in Twelfth-Century Medical Texts from Salerno”, in: Late Medieval and Ear-
ly Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, ed. Christoph Lüthy, John E. Murdoch and William 
R. New man, Leiden 2001, pp. 39–56; Dorothy Elford, “William of Conches”, in: A History of 
Twelfth- Century Western Philosophy, ed. Peter Dronke, Cambridge 1988, pp. 308–327.
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which alchemists attempt to separate. Therefore, he insists on the conventional 
character of the distinction between impure elements and pure alchemical prin-
ciples. The distinction between the “elemental part” designating the residues 
resulting from the separation, and the “essence” related to the tria prima only 
concerns the alchemical art.51 As Libavius explains, the tria prima are principles 
only by analogy, because the principles of art differ from those of nature. Conse-
quently, the tria prima are “pure” in the context of the magisterium, but in nature, 
they correspond to “elemented” bodies.52 For Libavius, it is the Paracelsians who 
misunderstand the symbolic dimension of the terms “principles” and “essences” 
that the ancient alchemists used in their art.53 From this, Libavius concludes that 
the three principles pertain to Aristotelian physics, hence obeying to the axioms 
of elements and mixture. For this reason, he attributes a qualitative constitution 
to the tria prima: Mercury is cold-moist and composed of water, Sulphur is hot and 
composed of fire and air, and Salt is hot-dry and composed of earth.54 Moreover, 
the sensory properties of the tria prima, for instance the thick and liquid texture 
of Sulphur, come from their secondary qualities.55
It still remains for Libavius to explain the origin of the alchemical properties 
contained in the tria prima, which he defines as first elemental bodies (elementata). 
In his view, God created, mingled and tempered these compounds by infusing 
into them an “efficient and prolific” seminal power. The material in which this 
seminal force has been infused is nonetheless elemental and comes from the pri-
51 Libavius, Novus, p. 42: “Ego re perpensa video, has assertiones posse in Chymia ita ferri, vt 
institutum eius artis proprium, relatumque, neutiquam autem vniuersales toti Philosophiae 
naturali esse. Nam in separatione partis potissimae in qua et vis maxima est, sordes quae-
dam et veluti recrementa abiectanea inueniuntur. Haec pro artis propria consideratione vo-
cantur partes elementariae. Pura vero natura ex his fecibus elicita essentiae nomen sustinet. 
At si haec ad Physicam vniuersalem accommodare velis, non habebunt locum.”
52 Ibid., pp. 118–119: “Si pro mercurio ponas aquam, pro sulphure aëream igneamque partem 
quanquam haec etiam aquae forma latere possit, pro sale, terram: ita enim plerique expon-
unt; sed tamen diuersimodè in arte, et extra artem, cum in arte signent elaborata ad purum 
extra artem vero impura: non absurdus est syllogismus, ita tamen, vt vox Omnia non exten-
datur vltra composita corpora, et elementata.”
53 Ibid., pp. 47–48: “Quod autem attinet ista tria, patior quidem Chymicos intra artis suae sep-
ta manentes ita symbolice loqui. Sed si vniuersalem Physicam spectes et ista succumbent 
mistionum Elementorumque axiomatis. Ita Michelius per mercurium intelligit aquam; per 
Sulphur, oleum; per salem, terram.”
54 Libavius, Novus, p. 45: “Ita Michelius in resolutione opii Mercurio huius ascribit frigidi-
tatem. […] Cum qua necessario est humiditas. Dicitur enim aqua essentialis esse. Sulphur, 
oleum et aëream igneamque partem nominant. Calidum ergo. Sal terra est, et simul calidus 
siccus.”
55 Ibid., p. 119: “Oleum, seu sulphur coagulat ex liquido. Ipso Michelio teste necesse est, duos 
humores in eo fuisse, liquidum, et crassum. Crassum vero secundarum qualitatum è mi-
stione est: et indicat idem flamma, quae simplicem ignem, aërem, aquam, terram, aut si ita 
volunt, omnino simplex principium non prehendit. […] Nec elementa Chymica sunt vltima 
compositionis. Sunt enim duntaxat artis, et ex analogia nomen acceperunt.”
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mordial “viscous silt” composed of water and earth.56 The divine nature of the 
seminal force is thus limited to the episode of Creation, when it was introduced 
into the elemental compounds by the divine breath in order to be subsequently 
immanent in them.57 After the divine creation, the transformations occurring in 
all bodies follow the laws of Aristotelian physics. Their seminal property is in-
volved in the constitution of beings to operate the physiological functions and the 
alchemical properties.
Having stated the elemental composition of bodies and their seminal proper-
ties, Libavius moves on to discuss the medical implications of his theory for the 
body’s temperament.
4 The Krasis of the Living Body
To introduce his interpretation of temperament, Libavius first reacts to Michelius’ 
denial of the notion of temperament (krasis) as a mixture resulting from the union 
of elements achieved by a substantial form.58 Against this view, he recalls that the 
krasis is to be understood in two ways, first as an elemental mixture, and second, 
as the “form of the mixt” related to the seminal principle.59 He refers this descrip-
tion to the Rosarium, reporting mixture according to the Aristotelian formula of 
“union of altered miscibles”.60 The “first elements” are the “material principles” 
of things, as agent and patient “miscibles” through their qualities.61 The process 
of mixture ensures their composition into a single entity endowed with matter 
56 Ibid., p. 120: “Terram autem quam? Illam, quae erat ante species distinctas. Certum autem 
est, eam fuisse tunc rude elementum, et ancipitem ad omnes species, quas postea diuino 
iussu produxit, materiam. Haec sunt vltima elementa […]. Videmus item etiamnum, hodiè 
ex aqua et terra fieri limum viscidum, et hunc conglutinari, aut concrescere in lapidem. Si 
hic resoluitur in vltima; non in mercurium, sulphur et salem, nisi haec sint elementorum 
Symbola, sed in elementa vulgata soluetur.”
57 Ibid., p. 48: “Non fugit nos, autorem creaturae initio miscuisse contemperasseque ista prima 
et pos tea efficaciam prolificam seminariamque inspirasse. Sed tamen eius rei vestigia vide-
mus in ruditer compositis, in imperfecte mistis, in resolutionibus, in nutritione et augmenta-
tione, in vita inter Elementa. Nemo est, quin intelligat hominis corpus ex semine et sanguine 
agente in terno principio ad similitudinem generantis, post primum Adamum effectum esse. 
At ora cu lum diuinum dicit, ex terra creatum, et terram esse, et in terram reuersurum. Con-
spirat ita que haec nostra Physica cum sacris literis, quae nihil sciunt de mercurio, nec de sale 
et sulphure.”
58 Michelius, Apologia, pp. 84–94.
59 Libavius, Novus, p. 38–39: “Ego soleo dupliciter de crasi loqui. Intelligo enim interdum prima-
rum qualitatum conspirationem, qua aliquid calidum, humidum, frigidum, siccum, etc. dici-
tur: interdum formam misti, quâ mistum est, licet substantiam habeat non ex concursu ele-
mentorum, qualis fit, […] sed ex seminaria propagatione instituta in elementis et ex materia 
vniuersi à Creatore, vt […], quod tamen postea tum elementis conseruatur, tum mistis. Esse 
autem in illa materia elementa, si argumento nutritionis et generationis non credunt, credant 
saltem oraculo diuino, quod testatur hominis corpus ex terra factum in terram reuersurum.”
60 Rosarium, f. o3 v.
61 Libavius, Novus, p. 104: “Aristoteles mistionem appellat mistilium alteratorum vnionem, 
quasi sit elementorum (ita vocantur principia materialia siue prima omnium sint elementa, 
siue certi generis) agentium et patientium mutuo (haec enim sunt mistilia) per qualitates seu 
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and form. As Libavius explains, the resulting krasis is also a substance associ-
ated to the form of the compound, derived from the seeds introduced into the 
water-earth primordial dyad during the divine creation.62 Infused by God, these 
“seminal reasons” are propagated in the body’s seed with the divine blessing to 
be fruitful and multiply.63 Within the human body, they act in blood and the seed 
for the perpetuation of species, and operate through its “substantial innate heat”.
Libavius’ account of krasis merges different sources, overall Aris totle’s Mete-
orology and Renaissance medical philosophy, in order to debunk the flourishing 
Paracelsian interpretations of the body’s transformations in relation to the Gen-
esis.64 On the one hand, he takes up Aris totle’s account of homogeneous bodies 
as first compounds of elements made of water and earth. As Aris totle explains 
in the Meteorology, such bodies include the “homeomerous” body parts (skin, 
bones, veins, muscles, etc.) and metals, both subject to coagulation. On that basis, 
Libavius draws a parallel between the alchemical transformation of metals and 
the physiological processes of the human body, in continuity with the recurrent 
medical analogies in medieval alchemy.65 Upon this framework, the alchemist’s 
material can be considered as endowed with a temperament and experiencing 
processes of generation, nutrition and digestion in the same way as the human 
body. On the other hand, Libavius’ interpretation of krasis follows Renaissance 
medical theories of temperament, in particular that of the French physician Jean 
Fernel (1497–1558). In his Universa medicina (1567), Fernel relates the living body’s 
temperament to a vital principle of ethereal nature, the “innate heat” inserted 
in the body’s elemental mixture, following a Platonic interpretation of Galen.66 
vires pugnaces compositio ad vnum quiddam similare tota substantia, et viribus. Talis vnio 
est mistionis modus et forma.”
62 Ibid., p. 100: “Vbi vero iam illa mirifica crasis? Intelligitur facta esse in institutione naturae, 
et postea cum illis principiis semper propagari, ita tamen, vt quia indiuulsa est comes ge-
nerationis mistorum, et se accommodat ad cuiusque speciem et naturam intimam ; non sit 
absurda per eam explicatio.”
63 Ibid., p. 107: “Sane ita Deus ex elementis constituit mista, iisque inseuit seminarias rationes, 
iuxta quas vnumquodque produceret suum semen et gigneret simile, sicut in animalibus 
vox oraculi iubet ea crescere et multiplicari. Illae rationes seminariae in ea parte sunt, quam 
Chymici essentiam vocant, […] calidum innatum substantialem […]. Haec doctrina nec Ari-
stoteli nec Galeno repugnat quanquam explicatione egeat, et collatione.” See Genesis 1:28.
64 On the Paracelsian accounts of Genesis, see Michael T. Walton, Genesis and the Chemical Philo-
sophy: True Christian Science in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, New York 2011; Didier 
Kahn, “L’interprétation alchimique de la Genèse chez Joseph Du Chesne dans le contexte de 
ses doctrines alchimiques et cosmologiques”, in: Scientiae et artes: Die Vermittlung alten und 
neuen Wissens in Literatur, Kunst und Musik, ed. Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer, vol. 2, Wiesbaden 
2004, pp. 641–692.
65 See Chiara Crisciani, “Il corpo nella tradizione alchemica: Teorie, similitudini, immagini”, 
in: Micrologus 1 (1993), pp. 189–233; Barbara Obrist, “Les rapports d’analogie entre philoso-
phie et alchimie médiévales” in: Alchimie et philosophie à la Renaissance, ed. Jean-Claude Mar-
golin and Sylvain Matton, Paris, 1993, pp. 43–64.
66 See Hiro Hirai, Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy: Renaissance Debates on Matter, Life 
and the Soul, Leiden 2011, pp. 46–79.
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In the same way as Fernel, Libavius considers the krasis as a union of elements 
crowned by a supra-elemental form of divine origin. For the body’s functioning, 
it runs through the innate heat and operates physiological functions like repro-
duction, growth and nutrition. 
Building on Fernel’s view on innate heat, Libavius further anchors his inter-
pretation of the body’s krasis in medieval alchemy by relating it to the notion 
of quintessence. In medieval alchemy, quintessence relates to a spiritual nature 
within the body, which is intermediate with the soul, as theorized in the Testa-
mentum attributed to Ramon Lull in the fourteenth century.67 To this conception 
of quintessence, John of Rupescissa (c.1310–c.1370), in De consideratione quintae es-
sentiae [Consideration on the Fifth Essence], added a pharmacological dimension.68 
From Rupescissa, Libavius takes up the celestial origin of the quintessence, which 
is nonetheless enclosed in the elements and associated with the body’s vital prin-
ciple.69 He further links the notion of quintessence to the distinction between ele-
mentum, elementatum and quinta essentia developed in the Rosarium.70 Accordingly, 
the quintessence is a body subsisting by itself, which is distinct in nature from 
elements and “elemented” bodies. For this reason, quintessence is devoid of any 
cause of corruption but can be extracted from elemental bodies. As Libavius ex-
plains, such a definition of quintessence takes root in the natural alchemy of the 
ancients, which was continued by medieval authors. The latter, he insists, were 
aware that the alchemical terminology is restricted to a practical context and re-
lates only by analogy to natural philosophy.71
With this explanation of innate heat, quintessence and elements, Libavius 
aims to endorse the Galenic notion of temperament by showing its coherence 
with medieval alchemy and the Scriptures, while absorbing the theory of seeds 
developed by Paracelsus and his disciples.72
67 Michela Pereira, “Heavens on Earth: From the Tabula Smaragdina to the Alchemical Fifth 
Essence”, in: Early Science and Medicine 5 (2000), pp. 131–144.
68 On Rupescissa, see Leah DeVun, Prophecy, Alchemy, and the End of Time: John of Rupecissa in 
the Late Middle Ages, New York 2014; Robert Halleux, “Les ouvrages alchimiques de Jean de 
Rupescissa”, in: Histoire littéraire de la France, ed. Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, 
Paris 1981, vol. 41, pp. 242–277; Robert P. Multhauf, “John of Rupescissa and the Origin of 
Medical Chemistry”, in: Isis 45 (1954), pp. 359–367.
69 de Rupescissa I., De consideratione quintae essentiae rerum, Basel 1561, pp. 15–21.
70 Rosarium, f. g2 v.
71 Libavius, Novus, p. 43: “Nam et veteres mentionem faciunt mysterii seu arcani, magisterii, 
quintae essentiae, et similium. Sed in sua arte permanserunt, nec nisi analogia quadam ad 
explicationes naturales, quatenus arti inseruirent suae, accommodarunt.”
72 Ibid., p. 80: “Haec Paracelsici quidem corruperunt, sed Galenici sciunt ab Aristotele, Galeno 
caeterisque eadem scribi de […] calidi innati substantia, vnde postea dependent tertiae […] 
qualitates viresque quarum motus non est elementalis. […] Sed rectius semineo tribuitur 
principio, nec tam est aliena ab elementis, quin in eis conseruetur, imo initio creationis eti-
am ex iisdem sit concinnata, accedente diuina virtute in eis instituta. […] Haec et similia non 
sunt aliena à Galenica doctrina, sed eiusdem partim manifesta praecepta, partim consecta-
ria, quae tamen illustrari altius ex Theologia repetitis causis possunt.”
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
267Reforming the Prisca Medicina
5 Conclusion
Libavius expounds the institutional nature of his medical project according to a 
logical approach. His Philippo-Ramist training leads him to renew the demar-
cation of medicine with alchemy while insisting on the continuity of knowledge 
from the trivium to theology. Within a Galenic and Aristotelian framework, his 
argumentation emphasizes the role of divine intervention in the constitution of 
bodies in a similar way as Renaissance Platonic medical interpretations enhanc-
ing the divine nature of life and its principles. Nonetheless, Libavius’ explanation 
of temperament is not anchored in the Platonic scheme of prisca sapientia, but 
in an alternative hermeneutic emphasizing the role of logic, nature and divine 
providence at all levels of knowledge. In this perspective, Libavius seeks to limit 
the body’s divine part to the episode of Creation, whereas Platonic physicians, 
either Galenist like Fernel or Paracelsian like Severinus, exalt the body’s celestial 
imprint. With his own interpretation, Libavius thus works to naturalize and in-
stitutionalize alchemical medicine by using the “divine oracle” as a theological 
evidence for a reformed prisca medicina. 
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Johann Ludwig Han ne mann (1640–1724)  
and the Defence of Paracelsism in Kiel
Bernd Roling 
1 Introduction
Even in the eighteenth century Paracelsism could still function as a definitive 
account of the world for scholars in the Baltic region, especially if they rejected 
not only the gradually fading scholastic Aristotelianism but also Cartesianism, 
which had become widespread since 1680. In Sweden, as has been shown by Sten 
Lindroth, Susanne Åkerman and above all Håkan Håkansson, Paracelsism was 
given wide attention by Georg Stiernhielm, Johan Bureus and Friedrich Menius, 
despite considerable opposition.1 It is often forgotten how readily Paracelsus was 
read in Uppsala even in the eighteenth century. Gustaf Bonde, chancellor of the 
university there and one of its greatest patrons, may have been one of the most 
enthusiastic followers of his doctrine.2 And the successes of Paracelsism in Den-
mark have been demonstrated by Jole Shackleford and Sten Ebbesen.3 Less atten-
tion has so far been paid to the history of reception of this Scandinavian Paracel-
sism. I here wish to present one figure in particular, Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, 
1 As a selection of classical studies see Sten Lindroth, Paracelsismen i Sverige till 1600–talets mitt, 
Uppsala 1943, pp. 93–252, id., Svensk Lärdomshistoria, 4 vols, Stockholm 1975, vol. 2, pp. 152–
160, Susanna Åkerman, Rose Cross over the Baltic. The Spread of Rosecrucianism in Northern 
Europe, Leiden 1998, pp. 29–67, id., “The Gothic Kabbala: Johannes Bureus, Runic Theoso-
phy, and Northern European Apocalypticism”, in: The Expulsion of the Jews. 1492 and after, 
eds. Raymond B. Waddington and Arthur H. Williamson, London 1994, pp. 177–198, and 
id., “Alruna Rediviva. Johannes Bureus‘ Hyperborean Theosophy“, in: Rosenkreuz als europä-
isches Phänomen im 17. Jahrhundert, ed. Bibliotheca Philosophica Hermetica, Amsterdam 2002, 
pp. 311–338. In addition see now Matthew Norris, A Pilgrimage to the Past. Johannes Bureus and 
the Rise of Swedish Antiquarian Scholarship, 1600–1650, Lund 2016, there pp. 328–579, Håkan 
Håkansson, Vid tidens ände. Om stormaktstidens vidunderliga drömvärld och en profet vid dess 
yttersta rand, Halmstadt 2014, there pp. 307–359, and with regard to alchemy, id., “Alchemy of 
the Ancient Goths: Johannes Bureus’ Search for the Lost Wisdom of Scandinavia”, in: Early 
Science and Medicine 17 (2012), pp. 500–522.
2 On Gustaf Bonde as alchemist and paracelsian see Susanna Åkerman, Fenixelden. Drottning 
Kristina som alkemist, Möklinta 2013, pp. 256–266, Lindroth, Svensk Lärdomshistoria, vol. 3, 
pp. 643–644, and esp. Carl Michael Edenborg, Gull och Mull. Den monstruöse Gustaf Bonde, 
Lund 1997, pp. 126–159. 
3 On a figure like Cort Aslakssøns see Sten Ebbesen—Carl Henrik Koch, Dansk filosofi i Renæs-
sancen 1537–1700, Kopenhagen 2003, there e. g. pp. 284–289, on the much better known Petrus 
Severinus esp. Jole Shackelford, A Philosophical Path for Paracelsian Medicine. The Ideas, Intellec-
tual Context, and Influence of Petrus Severinus (1540/2–1602), Kopenhagen 2004, pp. 318–353.
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professor at the University of Kiel and at once one of the great Paracelsists and 
Anti-Aristotelians of the early eighteenth century. 
 Han ne mann’s family were from Amsterdam; they had moved, perhaps for re-
ligious reasons, to the largely Dutch town of Friedrichstadt, which Frederick III, 
Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorf, had founded as a safe destination for Re-
monstrants and Mennonites from all over Europe. Han ne mann’s mother, Anna 
Gysia, had remarried, to a burgher of the town. Han ne mann completed his med-
ical studies in Copenhagen and Kiel; he practised as a doctor first in Friedrich-
stadt, then in Stade and in Buxtehude.4 In 1675 he became Professor of Medicine 
at Kiel, a university that had been founded ten years previously by the local ruler, 
Duke Christian Albrecht of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorf. Han ne mann remained 
loyal to the university of the House of Gottorf until his death. The young scholar 
achieved scientific recognition early. Han ne mann had already published in vari-
ous academic journals during his time as a practising doctor; after a period as as-
sessor he became a member, under the name Nestor II, of the Leopoldina, whose 
journal he henceforth filled with his studies. After retiring, he returned again to 
his hometown of Friedrichstadt. Of his otherwise rather uneventful life it may be 
reported that his son, shortly after correcting a large book-manuscript for his fa-
ther, was stabbed to death by a fellow student in a brawl. Whether this blow was 
the reason Han ne mann’s publication activities fell silent for many years, I cannot 
say, but it is not unlikely. Han ne mann died in 1724 at the age of 84.5 
 Leaving aside for a moment the works that will be discussed in more detail 
below, Han ne mann, like so many natural scien tists of his era, published numer-
4 As only result of Han ne mann’s short and intermediary activity as Urbis Buxtehudae physicus 
exists a short advertising leaflet to possible students, see Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Oc-
ulus Tauri artis medicae, ceu Epistola ad Medicinae studiosos, qua Autor, quemlibet studiosum (qui 
humaniora absolvit) universam medicinam biennii spatio sic docere, in Academiis promoveri queat, 
promittit et pollicetur, Buxtehude 1673, passim. 
5 As fundamental source for Han ne manns biography, with a catalogue of publications, see in 
the dossier of his elegies, stored in Wolfenbüttel, his contemporary Epicedion, Prorector et Se-
natus Academiae Kiloniensis ad iusta Viro amplissimo et experientissimo, Io. Ludovico Han ne manno, 
Doctori Medico et Professori Physices […] decenti prolixoque comitatu solvenda omnes omnium ordi-
num cives academicos, litteratorumque ordini bene cupientes […] invitant, Kiel (without year) 1724, 
passim. All later reports depend on this summary of Han ne mann’s life. In a fitting way, one 
of his students in his funeral poem declares, as F. C. Franck, Die Vortrefflichkeit der Artzney-
Kunst, in Verlängerung des Menschlichen Lebens, wolte an dem Exempel des Hoch-Edel-Gebohrnen, 
und Hoch-Erfahrnen Herrn, Johann Ludwig Han ne mann […] vorstellen, Kiel 1724: Wie man sein Le-
ben nicht mit etwa tausend Jahren, / Nein, mit der Ewigkeit vermögend sey zu paaren. /Da man indes-
sen hier der Glieder mürben Rest, / Der Erden schwarzer Schooß in Hoffnung überlässt; / Daß, wann 
die Erde soll durch Flammen einst vergehen, / Du gleich dem Phoenix wirst, in Klarheit auferstehen. 
A collegue of him, is lamenting in the same volume, J. F. Rahtge, Bey Beerdigung des Wohlse-
ligen Hoch-Edel-Gebohrnen, Hoch-Gelahrten und Hoch-Erfahrnen Herrn Johannis Ludovici Han ne-
manns […], zur Bezeugung seiner schuldigsten Observance […], Kiel 1724, str. 5: Weshalben da den 
itzt erblaßt, der Cimbrer Musen edles Alter, / Der Wissenschaften Thron und Zierd, ja deren Aufnahm 
Miterhalter, / So sollte das gelehrte Chor / Zwar billig auch im schwarzen Flor / Den schmertzlichsten 
Entriß beklagen / Und für empfindlichen Verdruß nichts als von saltzen Thränen sagen.
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ous works on medical questions and wrote handbooks, but was also responsible 
for genuinely theological studies. To date, much attention has been accorded only 
to the dispute that Han ne mann pursued over a period of several years with the 
Wolfenbüttel scholar Leonhard Christoph Sturm;6 its subject was the defence of 
astrology and chiromancy as science. Han ne mann was a passionate defender of 
astrology but, in the whole gallery of treatises that the controversy generated, he 
could not move Sturm to waver from his critical attitude.7 Only occasionally does 
Han ne mann turn up in the established literature on the subject. Eric Leibenguth 
mentions him as a transmitter of the ideas of Michael Maier;8 Joachim Telle de-
scribed him a few years ago, quite rightly, as a “dyed-in-the-wool hermetic”.9 In 
his own setting he was regarded as a solid medic and natural philosopher, but 
above all as an indifferently successful alchemist who pursued the ‘Great Art’ all 
his life. The alchemist Johann Conrad Creiling stayed for many years with Han-
ne mann in Kiel, in order to learn from him how to produce the lapis philosopho-
rum, and finally even composed eulogies upon his works. However, in his own 
Ehrenrettung der Alchemie (‘Saving the Honour of Alchemy’) of 1730, six years after 
Han ne mann’s death, Creiling lamented bitterly that he had spent so much time 
with the old scholar and had again and again fallen for his pleas and promises to 
generate the philosopher’s stone. Creiling ultimately regarded Han ne mann as a 
charlatan and later would repeatedly express outrage at Han ne mann’s imposturae, 
though, admittedly, without losing his own faith in alchemy.10 
 6 On the dispute between Han ne mann and Leonhard Christoph Sturm see Claudia Brosse-
der, Im Bann der Sterne. Caspar Peucer, Philipp Me lanch thon und andere Wittenberger Astrologen, 
Berlin 2004, pp. 295–297.
 7 As writings of Han ne mann on this subject see in three continuations Johann Ludwig Han-
ne mann, Verthädigung der Astrologie, oder rechtmässige Erklärung der Sprüche, so von d. Herrn 
Pro fes sore Sturmio in seinem Tractat, genandt: Die Abfertigung Bileams gegen die artes di vi nandi 
sind angeführet worden, worinnen gezeiget wird, daß die Astrologia judiciaria, Chiromantia, Meto-
posco pia und Geomantia aus den Gründen der Heiligen Schrifft und der Natur füglich können be-
haup tet wer den (3 vols.), Hamburg 1699–1701, and as counterpart Leonhard Christoph Sturm, 
Bi leams Abfertigung, oder Gründliche Wiederlegung der Astrologie und aller anverwanten Wahrsa-
ger- Künste, aus der Heiligen Schrifft, der realen Philosophie, der unfehlbaren Mathesi, und der Histo-
rie, Braunschweig 1699, id., Antwort, Auf die Verthädigung der Astrologie, welche Hr. D. Joh. Lud-
ewig Han ne mann auf der berühmten Albertinischen Universität wohlverdienter Prof. Ordin. Philos. 
Na tur wider seine Abfertigung Bileams, oder Die daselbst angeführte Auslegung verschiedener Oer-
ter H. Schrifft heraus gegeben, Braunschweig 1699, and id., Die Letzte und völlige Abfertigung Bi-
leams, Oder nochmahliger sonnen-klarer Beweiß, daß die heilige Schrifft nicht vor, sondern wider die 
Wahr sa ger-Kunst spreche, in einer Replica auf die I. Continuation der Vertheidigung des Hn. Johann 
Lu dewig Han ne manns außgeführet, Braunschweig 1700. 
 8 Eric Leibenguth, Hermetische Poesie des Frühbarock. Die “Cantilenae intellectuales” Michael Mai-
ers. Edition mit Übersetzung, Kommentar und Bio-Bibliographie, Tübingen 2002, p. 16, p. 490.
 9 Joachim Telle, „Jacob Böhme unter deutschen Alchemikern der Frühen Neuzeit“, in: Offenba-
rung und Episteme. Zur europäischen Wirkung Jacob Böhmes im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, eds. Wil-
helm Kühlmann and Friedrich Vollhardt, Berlin 2012, pp. 165–182, here pp. 173–174.
10 Johann Conrad Creiling, Ehren-Rettung der Alchymie, oder Vernünfftige Untersuchung, Was von 
der herrlichen Gabe, welche denen Menschen geschencket, und insgemein mit dem verächtlichen Nah-
men der Alchymie beleget wird, zu halten seye: Durch Rationes, auch viele curiose Exempla und Ex-
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 In what follows I aim to do two things. I wish to cut a cross-section through 
Han ne mann’s hundreds of works and so try to reconstruct the largely Paracelsist 
natural philosophy on which they are based. He remained committed to this in 
its essential lines for over forty years, and it also provided the theoretical founda-
tion of his own undertakings in alchemy. Beyond this, I shall attempt to do justice 
to Han ne mann’s works against the background of his times, a context that arises 
from the distinctive position of Kiel, and thus of the House of Gottorf. Kiel lay 
between Sweden and Denmark; both powers had major influence on the political 
situation in Gottorf and so also on the local university, but, as we have already 
seen, both countries were also centres of Paracelsism both inside and outside 
the universities. Given Han ne mann’s interests, it was almost inevitable that he 
would be forced to operate within the tense overlap between these two academic 
networks, which themselves hardly came into contact with each other due to the 
war. It was the University of Kiel that made these contacts possible.
2 From Swedish Stade to Kiel: A Paracelsist in Northern Germany
Han ne mann’s publications began in Stade, after his first years working as a doc-
tor in Friedrichstadt. He would remain committed to Stade for many years. Un-
like Friedrichstadt, part of the Gottorf Duchy, Stade was part of the Duchy of 
Bremen and Verden and hence, from the end of the Thirty Years’ War, part of 
the Swedish empire.11 Its academic elite had made their peace with Swedish rule 
rather promptly, comparatively speaking, as is revealed by numerous speeches 
of praise of the period. Han ne mann, too, dedicated his writings of these years 
to the Swedish ruler and his local governor. We will see in more detail later just 
how strongly Han ne mann felt his ties to Sweden. Two works by Han ne mann 
are notable here, above all because they can stand programmatically for his later 
output. In a short work on blood infusions, the Ars clynastica, Han ne mann em-
phatically announced the authorities to whom he would show allegiance in his 
future scholarly career: they are Basilius Valentinus, Paracelsus, Van Helmont, 
Isaac Holland and, most importantly, Hermes Trismegistus.12 The second work 
sketched the outline of a cosmology to which, as I wish to show in what follows, 
perimenta abgehandelt. Wobey noch von der Medicina Universali Meldung geschiehet, Herrenstadt 
1730, Vorrede (without pagination).
11 On Bremen and Verden as part of the Swedish Empire see e. g. Klaus-Richard Böhme, Bre-
misch-verdische Staatsfinanzen 1645–1676. Die schwedische Krone als deutsche Landesherrin, Upp-
sala 1967, and also Beate-Christine Fiedler, Die Verwaltung der Herzogtümer Bremen und Verden 
in der Schwedenzeit 1652–1712. Organisation und Wesen der Verwaltung, Stade 1987, passim.
12 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Nova ars clymastica, enervata, Stade 1670, there on Han ne mann’s 
authorities already fol. 3 rf. The same year Han ne mann published a large encyclopedia of 
medicine, consisting of more than 600 pages, see Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Prodromus 
Lexici utriusque Medicinae practicae, Hamburg 1670. Han ne mann published on medicine until 
the end of his life, see as selection e. g. Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Sylloge philosophico-med-
ico de anomalis et paradoxis morborum curationibus aliquot disputationibus, Kiel 1706, or Johann 
Ludwig Han ne mann—Stefan Grafe (resp.), Dissertatio Fridericiana visus et oculorum thaumato-
graphiam recensens, Kiel 1711, these writings won’t be taken into account further.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
275Johann Ludwig Han ne mann (1640–1724)  
Han ne mann would remain committed in different variants and disguises, the 
Ruah in mundo restitutus of 1670.
 The followers of Aris totle, so Han ne mann begins, had made the great mis-
take of denying the Platonic dogma of the world soul, the anima mundi. In truth, 
however, no thinker had demonstrated the immortality of the soul with more 
philosophical soundness than Plato and the many who had not been deceived 
by Aristotelian scholastic philosophy.13 Platonic, Hermetic and Paracelsist philos-
ophy could be combined with each other, as Hanneman then sets out to demon-
strate. The world soul of the Platonists was called archeus universalis by the Para-
celsists. It was identical with the Biblical Ruah, the spirit that, according to the 
Bible, moved upon the face of the waters.14 Only a universal final nexus of the 
entire cosmos such as this, an ultimate shaping force, made it possible to explain 
all the sympathies and antipathies, the occult qualities as well as the processes of 
transformation, without which a coherent natural science and medicine could not 
be conceived.15 According to the Bible, God had created the heavens, the Hebrew 
shamayim, a term that, so Han ne mann explained, was composed of the esh, fire, 
and mayim, waters.16 To fire corresponded the world soul, the Archeus, which as 
vis creata universalis structured the still formless stellar matter, that is, the ‘water’. 
The Archeus provided the virtus plasmatica for the natural order, but it was only 
with the Archeus, as the first creature, that the process of creation had begun at 
all.17 The ongoing formation of the universe was carried out, so Han ne mann con-
tinues, according to the measures of number, order and form. God bore the Ideas 
in himself; as idea ideans, the Archeus as creating principle pressed them into the 
matter and generated the multiplicity of creatures. If the Archeus created with-
out reference back to God, which was not to be excluded, it produced subaltern 
monsters such as the comets. When materialised, the Idea functioned as form.18 
Its actual relation to the other forms was responsible for the harmonious order of 
the whole creation.19 The most important instrument of the Archeus or world soul 
were the celestial bodies, above all the sun, which condensed the spiritual prin-
ciple into warmth and made it fertile for the creatures.20 The individual effects of 
the celestial bodies on the sublunary sphere were explained by the young Han-
ne mann with the help of the Swedish royal physician at Stade, Johann Heinrich 
Voigt.21 But the decisive momentum remained with the Archeus itself. as natura 
13 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Ruah: Spiritus universalis mundo restitutus, Stade 1670, Praefatio, 
pp. 6–8.
14 Ebd., §§ 1–2, pp. 9–11.
15 Ebd., § 3, pp. 11–14.
16 Ebd., § 5, pp. 15–16, § 9, pp. 20–22.
17 Ebd., §§ 6–7, pp. 15–19, § 10, pp. 22–26, §§ 12–13, pp. 27–29.
18 Ebd., § 18–19, pp. 35–37.
19 Ebd., §§ 21–22, pp. 38–39, 
20 Ebd., § 23, p. 40.
21 Ebd., § 24, pp. 40–44. Johann-Henrich Voigt was the most important astronomer in Bremen 
of his age, see e. g. Johann-Henrich Voigt, Colloquium Calendario-Graphicum, Von der Vergleich- 
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naturans it was responsible for the fertility of the seed; and the Archeus’ all-gener-
ating force as fermentatio and vegetative energy was also what, according to Han-
ne mann, kept the cosmos alive despite all its continuous changes.22 The planets 
were responsible only for the range and variations of this primordial force. No 
follower of Aris totle, so Han ne mann, had grasped the scope of the world soul.23
 When in 1675 Han ne mann moved to Kiel, his alma mater at which he would 
teach for the following forty years, he encountered a circle of scholars with whom 
he had been in contact already while he was in Friedrichstadt and Stade.24 As at 
almost no other university in Germany, the professors of the Gottorf university 
operated within the difficult overlap of Danish and Swedish interests, without 
surrendering entirely to one side or the other.25 Of necessity the university was in 
this way responding to the position of the Gottorf Duchy between the two Baltic 
great powers. It was terrain marched over by the armies of the Northern Wars that 
smouldered on almost continuously in the second half of the seventeenth century, 
and the ducal house made strenuous attempts to save itself by a marriage politics 
that paid dues to both sides. A daughter of Duke Frederick III, Hedwig Eleonora, 
had already married King Charles X Gustavus of Sweden; Frederick’s son, Duke 
Christian Albrecht, the founder of the university, then, despite his marriage to 
the daughter of the Danish king, had to engage in bitter struggles with his father-
in-law that had even driven him into temporary exile in Hamburg. The Gottorf 
Duchy moved closer to Sweden again after Christian’s son Frederick IV married 
Hedwig Sophie, daughter of Charles XI and sister of Charles XII of Sweden.
 The university could in this period boast not only theologians like Christian 
Korholt or mathematicians like Samuel Reyher; it had, in particular, a strong fac-
ulty of medicine and natural science which was for the most part very open to 
Paracelsism. Via Denmark the works of Peder Sörensen, in particular his Idea 
medicinae philosophicae, had reached Holstein early; they had given the teachings 
of Paracelsus a very engaging scholarly form. Later there had also been good 
oder Vereinigung des alten Julianischen und des neuen Gregorianischen Calenders, Hamburg 1668, 
passim, and close to Han ne mann esp. Id., Der Obern Himmels-Magnaten Vom Anfange der Welt 
biß hieher, in den unterschiedenen Himmels-Kreissen gehaltene Reichs- Kreiß- und Land-Tage: und was 
in der untern Welt darauff schon erfolget, und künfftig zu vermuthen sey, Hamburg 1676, passim. 
22 Han ne mann, Ruah: Spiritus universalis, §§ 25–27, pp. 44–48.
23 Ebd., §§ 29–31, pp. 50–63.
24 As summaries on the early modern history of the university of Kiel see e. g. Henning Ratjen, 
Geschichte der Universität zu Kiel, Kiel 1870, there, structured according to the faculties pp. 64–
80, and more recently Oliver Auge (ed.), Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel. 350 Jahre Wir-
ken in Stadt, Land und Welt, Hamburg 2015, there e. g. Uta Kuhl, „Wissenschaften und die Ge-
lehrsamkeit um ihrer selbst willen—Die Gottorfer Herzöge als Förderer der Wissenschaft“, 
pp. 51–67, or Swantje Piotrowski, „Von der Fakultätenhierarchie und der Entwicklung des 
Lehrkörpers an der Christiana Albertina in der Zeit von 1665 bis 1815“, pp. 450–497.
25 As a good summary of the political situation of Holstein-Gottorf during these decades see 
e. g. Joachim Krüger, “Das Herzogtum Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorf im 17. Jahrhundert“, in: 
Staat – Militär – Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Jens. E. Olesen zum 65. Geburtstag, eds. Robert Ol-
dach and Thomas Wegener Friis,Greifswald 2015, pp. 93–116.
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contacts with the learned clan of the Bartholins and Simon Pauli; Ole Borch’s 
writings, too, had been read in Kiel at an early stage. Pauli’s student Joel Lange-
lott had worked in Gottorf itself, having been made personal physician to Duke 
Frederick III. Langelott had spoken out passsionately in favour of alchemy and 
published a whole series of works on the topic.26 Sympathies for alchemy and 
Paracelsus had arisen also from another direction. Langelott’s son-in-law Johann 
Nicolas Pechlin and his colleague, the medic Wilhelm Ulrich Waldschmidt, had 
paid some attention, at least, to these topics.27 A stronger interest in alchemy was 
maintained especially by the most famous member of the Kiel professoriate at 
this time, the polyhistor Daniel Georg Morhof. In 1673 Morhof published a whole 
treatise with the title De metallorum transmutatione, which was still addressed to 
Langelott; his enthusiasm for alchemy would never entirely cease afterwards.28
 It is hence no surprise that Morhof, if one can believe Han ne mann, soon be-
came one of the latter’s best friends, straight after he arrived in Kiel, and one 
whom he would praise all his life as amicus amicissimus. Han ne mann’s publica-
tions in his first years in Kiel reveal him as an exponent of a medicine that was 
rather sceptical towards new directions. In 1675 he published a treatise against 
William Harvey’s De generatione animalium,29 and shortly thereafter a work against 
Thomas Willis and a treatise on the use opiates,30 whose side effects he was crit-
icizing.31 In 1679 a treatise appeared in which Han ne mann gave more pointed 
26 As examples see Joel Langelott, Epistola ad praecellentissimos naturae curiosos de quibusdam in chy-
mia praetermissis, quorum occasione secreta haud exigui momenti proque non-Entibus hactenus habita, 
candide deteguntur et demonstrantur, Hamburg 1673, and also Johannes Tilemann, Chymiatri olim 
in Germania Clarissimi Experimenta circa veras et irreducibiles Auri solutiones, Hamburg 1673.
27 As exemples of modest interest in Paracelsism see Johannes Nicolas Pechlin, De aeris et ali-
menti defectu, et vita sub aquis meditatio, Kiel 1676, c. 1, pp. 5–20, and see Johann Jacob Wald-
schmidt – Wilhelm Ulrich Waldschmidt (resp.), Dissertatio chymica de auro, Kiel 1685, passim, 
and Johann Jacob Waldschmidt – Wilhelm Ulrich Waldschmidt (resp.), Dissertatio chymica de 
argento et cypro, Kiel 1685, passim.
28 Daniel Georg Morhof, De metallorum transmutatione ad virum nobilissimum et amplissimum 
Joe lem Langelottum, Serenissimi Principis Cimbrici Archiatrum celeberrimum Epistola, Hamburg 
1673, and in a german translation id., Vom Goldmachen, oder physikalisch-historische Abhandlung 
von Verwandlung der Metalle, Lübeck 1764.  
29 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Exercitatio philosophica-medica academica prima de vero et genuino 
sanguificandi organo, Kiel 1675, and id., Ovum harvaeanum generationis animantium curiosum seu 
Exercitatio philosophica curiosa vel Prodromus, quo demonstrator adversus materialistas, quod ge-
neratio animalium fiat ex nihilo, Hamburg 1675. Later on Han ne mann was less sceptical about 
Harvey, see Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Johann Augustin Fasch (resp.), Exercitatio physica 
Fridericiana de motu cordis, Kiel 1706, Thesis III, pp. 5–9.
30 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Aetiologia philosophico-medica curiosa facultatis purgatricis qua 
ostenditur contra Willisium et Willisianos in Resinosis particulis non esse collocandam Catharsin, 
Hamburg 1677. During the same year Heinemann published also a treatise, which debated 
different possible reasons for coloured skin of Africans see Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, 
Curiosum scrutinium nigredinis posterorum Cham, i. e. Aethiopum, iuxta principia philosophiae cor-
puscularis adornatum, Kiel 1677, passim.
31 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Dissertatio Pharmaceutico-Therapeutica de usu et abusu inebriami-
num, Nürnberg 1679, pp. 27–40.
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form to his reflections on the natural sciences and now gave them a clearly Para-
celsist orientation, the Phoenix botanicus.32 The topic of the treatise is palingenesis, 
and again it is the continuity of matter and its complete imperishability that Han-
ne mann moves to centre stage. Previously, as he himself stresses, he had already 
treated the key issue of the work on the margins of his botanical work, which had 
appeared two years previously,33 and in his introduction to medicine, which he 
had written already during his time at Stade. Was it possible to cause a plant to be 
resurrected from its ashes? Did matter conceal in itself the roots of its own resto-
ration? The reconstitution of the burnt rose, as is well known, was the crowning 
experiment of Paracelsism, the widely publicised touchstone of its truth. Han-
ne mann draws on it in order to adduce it emphatically in argument against the 
supporters of Aristotelian scholastic philosophy. It was the proof of the existence 
of a universal matter which, at the same time, could also underlie all alchemical 
transformations. What arguments had the opponents of the recreation of plants 
presented? Could life be recalled?
 Out of privation, so the Aristotelians argued, there was no route back to habi-
tus. If soul and body, be it in the case of a human being or of a plant, as form and 
matter, were sundered from each other, death ensued. Only a miracle could then 
reconstitute the individual in its identity, so the orthodox Aristotelians had main-
tained—and here Han ne mann names Albert Kyper and Johannes Sperling. Life 
as actus corporis, however, was lost.34 Against this, Han ne mann offers a Paracelsist 
definition of life. Life must be understood as exercitium efficax, as an efficacious 
exercise of harmonious complexio, the syncrasis of the elements, which permitted 
differing degrees of vitality. Syncrasis was constituted by the basic Paracelsic el-
ements of sulphur, quicksilver and salt, which, according to Han ne mann, a lex 
adrastea of weight, number and mass necessarily weaves together. God had, in the 
moment of creation, in his freedom created a mutable matter, as the Cartesians 
too might admit, which could be repeatedly reconfigured, but the quantity of 
which God had in the same act of creation fixed in its immutability. This matter 
remained identical to itself forever; it could never be robbed entirely of its essence 
and the life principle. God upheld it, so a total privation, an extinguishing of mat-
ter, could therefore come only from Him. Instead of death, there were differing 
degrees of rest and motion. Each object strove to return to the original state that 
God had foreseen for it, Han ne mann adds.35
 The second argument that had been adduced against the reconstitution of 
plants was more concrete in character. Evidently, even a small degree of burning 
32 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Phoenix botanicus, ceu diatriba physica curiosa de plantarum ex suis 
cineribus resuscitatione, Kiel 1679. 
33 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Nova et accurata methodus cognoscendi simplicia Vegetabilia iuxta 
triplicem cognitionem 1. grammaticam, 2. philosophicam, 3. Medicam, neotericorum philosophorum et 
medicorum propriisque principiis superstructa, et curiose adornata, Kiel 1677, e. g. § 48, pp. 103–108.
34 Han ne mann, Phoenix botanicus, §§ 3–4, fol. A2 v–A3 v.
35 Ebd., §§ 5–6, fol. A3 v–A4 v. 
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or a gnawing mouse could prevent the seeds from germinating anew. Must it 
not therefore, under this premise, be remarkably easy to drive the life force out 
of the organism? Han ne mann responds with well worn Paracelsist arguments, 
which he was able to draw in part from Peder Sörensen and in part also from his 
own works for the Leopoldina.36 The decisive mistake of the Aristotelians was 
the assumption that there was a forma specifica that was needed to preserve the 
generative force for the body. Such a thing had never existed, however; rather, oil 
and salt, as the primordialia entia, magnetically drew nutrition to themselves and 
were responsible for the growth of creatures. Rather than a form, there existed 
as productive motor a complexio harmonica, a generative continuum of the elemen-
tary particles, which could dissolve just as easily as it could be reconstituted. A 
plant, too, that was reduced to ash or to its elementary salts, therefore preserved 
the option of its restitution; it was anchored in its particula, its atoms, and was ulti-
mately not dependent on its specific seeds. Plants could be reconstituted precise-
ly because they had no forma specifica. The general panspermic force of nature, but 
above all the flux and ongoing reshaping and transformation of the supposedly 
coherent and distinct arrangement of the species, revealed how little weight could 
be accorded to the old Aristotelianism. ‘No seed is univocal’ is how Han ne mann 
formulated it. No individual was therefore necessarily obliged to reproduce itself 
exclusively within the bounds of its own species.37 Through the all-forming spir-
it, the Archeus, and the heavenly bodies new, superordinate, forming instanc-
es could additionally arise, which were able to shake up the structure of plant 
species. From wheat came pasture grass, out of rocket came mint. In the human 
embryo, the fantasy of the mother, as every doctor could confirm, could give rise 
to such an independent force that the original human nature of the child could 
be overtaken. In the case of the rose that arose from its own remains, it had been 
reduced in the fire to its salia volatilia, the volatile salts, which as a critical mass 
were able to bind to themselves the amount of sulphur and quicksilver capable of 
reproduction and to unite them into a new conglomerate.38
 Han ne mann would have been no Paracelsist if he had not accompanied these 
remarks with the expected chain of experimental designs, that adequately sup-
ported his claim that the theoretically established possibility of reconstituting a 
creature out of its reproducible remains and the continuously fermenting basis of 
matter was also a practical fact. It was the chain of authorities that are cited also 
in other similar treatises and which had given Paracelsism its great history of suc-
cess through a series of extremely heterogeneous phenomena from the natural 
36 Petrus Severinus, Idea Medicinae Philosophicae, Fundamenta continens totius doctrinae Paracelsi-
cae, Hippocraticae, et Galenicae, Basel 1571, there esp. c. 8, pp. 78–132, and see Johann Ludwig 
Han ne mann, Fasciculus miscellanearum quaestionum sexaginta, una exhibens 1. mantissam anti-
Hoffmannianam de vero genuino, et legitimo sanguificandi organo, 2. ideam dispensatorii Han ne-
manniani, Bremen 1672, Decas VI, q. 7, pp. 57–59. 
37 Han ne mann, Phoenix botanicus, §§ 7–11, fol. A4 v–B3 v.
38 Ebd., §§ 12–14, fol. B3 v–B4 v.
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world.39 These included Martin Kerger with his treatise on yeast,40 Johannes Karl 
Rosenberg with his Rhodologia,41 Johann Christian Mergenius,42 Peter Johannes 
Faber,43 Philipp Sachse,44 Christian Adolph Balduin with his Hermes in Phosphoro,45 
but also many others. The best known was certainly the experiment that Joseph 
du Chesne had ascribed to a Polish medic, who had succeeded, so he believed, 
in setting the ashes of a rose in motion again, like a swarm of bees, by means of 
warmth and light, and to force it to take on its old form again, though now only 
ashen grey.46 The salt of absinth, Sal Tartari, ‘morning dew’ or tartar, had been the 
materials that formed the starting point for such experiments.47 Han ne mann is 
able to add a local note to this chain of Paracelsian laboratories. The Kieler Joel 
Langelott, the Frisian chemist Jodocus de Haen and the great Danish scholar Ole 
Borch had succeeded in bringing forth new plant forms from salt or sulphur, or 
in bringing forth a new cypress from the remains of an old one. Finally, in 1673 
it had been vouchsafed to Han ne mann himself, in the presence of Caspar Bar-
tholin, the son of Thomas the Elder, to observe a tree grow out of a glass jar. Fire, 
the great destroyer, had reduced the physical substance to its seminal elements, 
the natural complexio of the elementary particles had returned and the plant had 
formed itself anew according to the lex adrastea, the law of mass, form and size.48 
Even in 1718 Han ne mann still repeats his results in a work on the doctrine of 
39 As basic summary see Joachim Telle, „Chymische Pflanzen in der deutschen Literatur“, in: 
Medizinhistorisches Journal 8 (1973), pp. 1–34, and Bernd Roling, „Die Rose des Paracelsus: Die 
Idee der Palingenesie und die Debatte um die natürliche Auferstehung zwischen Mittelalter 
und Neuzeit”, in: Zoology in Early Modern Culture. Intersections of Science, Theology, Philology 
and Political and Religious Education, eds. Karl A. E. Enenkel and Paul J. Smith, Leiden 2014, 
pp. 263–297, here pp. 281–293. 
40 Martin Kerger, De fermentatione Liber Physico-medicus, cui de inseparabilitate formarum materiali-
um et Vita singularia sunt innexa, omnia perpetuis experimentis firmata, Wittenberg 1663, Sectio I, 
c. 6, pp. 54–56.
41 Johannes Karl Rosenberg, Rhodologia seu philosophico-medica generosae rosae descriptio, Straß-
burg 1628, Pars II, c. 33, p. 311.
42 Johann Christian Mergenius, Democritus reviviscens, sive vita et philosophia Democriti, Leiden 
1648, Disputatio II, c. 2, pp. 183–185.
43 Peter Johannes Faber, Panchymicum seu anatomia totius universi, in quo omnibus, quae in et sub caelo 
sunt spagyricae tractantur, in: Opera omnia, 2 vols, Frankfurt 1652, vol. 1, Liber III, pp. 324–326.
44 Philipp Sachse von Lewenhaimb, Gammarologia sive Gammarorum vulgo cancrorum considera tio 
physico-philologico-historico-medico-chymica, Frankfurt 1655, c. 13, § 6, pp. 262–263.
45 Christian Adolph Balduin, Aurum Superius et Inferius Aurae Superioris et Inferioris Hermeticum, 
Frankfurt 1674, there as appendix Phosphorus hermeticus, and id., Hermes Curiosus, sive In-
venta et Experimenta Physico-Chymica Nova, s.l., c. 7, fol. B3 v–B4 v.
46 Joseph DuChesne, Ad veritatem hermeticae medicinae ex Hippocraticis veterumque decretis ac the-
rapeusi necnon vivae rerum anatomiae exegesi responsio, Frankfurt 1605, c. 23, pp. 231–232.
47 Han ne mann, Phoenix botanicus, §§ 14–16, fol. B4 v–Cv.
48 Ebd., §§ 17–18, fol. C2 r–C3 v, and see Tilemann, Experimenta, Praefatio, fol. A4 v, and Tho-
mas Bartholin, Acta Medica et Philosophica Hafniensia, 5 vols, Kopenhagen 1673–80, vol. 1, § 42, 
pp. 78–79.
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signatures;49 indeed, the motif of universal restitution out of the universal matter 
was so important to the Kiel scholar that he even followed this with a disputation, 
committed to the same maxims, on the wide-ranging palingenesis of all things. 
Perhaps, so Han ne mann argued here, the prophet Elisha had even succeeded in 
waking the dead in the Second Book of Kings with the help of the revitalising 
force of his own body salts.50 In this Han ne mann, with his belief in natural res-
urrection, was being no less optimistic than other Paracelsists. Johannes Tacke, 
Johann Rosenberg and above all Robert Fludd had shared his view.51
3 Hermeticism and Alchemy in Kiel
3.1 The great transformation
In the following period Han ne mann would remain committed above all to al-
chemy. Perhaps the whole Paracelsian cosmology had served him in essence to 
back up in theory the transformation processes of the Ars magna and the trans-
mutation of gold. In 1690 there appeared the Cato chemicus, an introductory work 
that contained a defence of alchemy, a genealogy that linked it to Hermes and 
ancient Egypt, and its own catalogue of authors. Especially important to the Kiel 
professor was the conclusion, not unusual among supporters of alchemy, that 
many of the mythological traditions of the past should be understood, in their 
character of mysteries, as cyphers for alchemical transformation.52 A predecessor 
for Han ne mann here, as is perhaps to be expected, was the adeptus Holsaticus 
from Rendsburg, Michael Maier, whose Arcana arcanissima and Symbola aureae 
mensae Han ne mann had read with care.53 Four years later his first major work 
appeared, the Ovum hermeticum-paracelsico-trismegistum, which took the construc-
tion of tradition even further. Han ne mann dedicated it directly to Duke Chris-
tian Albrecht.54 Like the majority of his works, it had little resonance. I would 
49 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Gerhard Gottlob Richter (resp.), Curiosum specimen physices 
characteristicae, sive disputatio Fridericiana de naturae characteribus in triplici regno, Kiel 1718, 
Thesis IV, pp. 38–41.
50 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Johann Michael Eckard (resp.), Triumphus naturae et artis seu 
Dissertatio physica Friedericiana Naturae Phoenicem sistens, Kiel 1710, Thesis VI, pp. 28–32. 
51 Robert Fludd, Utriusque cosmi maioris scilicet et minoris metaphysica, physica atque technica hi-
storia, 2 vols, Frankfurt 1617–26, vol. 2, Tractatus II, Sectio I, Portio 3: De anatomia triplici, 
Pars II: De mystica sanguinis anatomia, c. 6, p. 233.
52 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Cato chemicus, tractatus quo verae ac genuinae philosophiae her-
meticae, et fucatae ac sophisticae pseudo chemiae et utriusque magistrorum characterismi accurate 
delineantur, Hamburg 1690, c. 2–3, fol. A4 r–A10 r.
53 On the symbolic language see e. g. Michael Maier, Arcana arcanissima, hoc est, Hieroglyphi-
ca Aegyptio-Græca, vulgo necdum cognita, ad demonstrandam falsorum apud antiquos deorum, 
dearum, heroum, animantium et institutorum pro sacris receptorum, originem, ex uno Aegyptiorum 
artificio, quoad aureum animi et Corporis medicamentum peregit, deductam, Regensburg 1614, the-
re esp. Liber I, pp. 1–55.
54 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Ovum hermetico-paracelsico-trismegistum, id est Commentarius 
philosophico-chemico-medicus, in quondam epistolam Mezahab dictam de auro, in quo et 108 quae-
stiones chemicae ab Morhofio propositae ab autore solvuntur, Frankfurt 1694, fol. A2 r. The book 
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like to draw attention to at least some aspects of this work that are important in 
particular for their distinctive period colour. The Ovum consists of two parts. The 
first part is a detailed commentary on a treatise by a Jewish alchemist from Ham-
burg, Benjamin Mussafia, the Epistola Mezahab, on aurum potabile, ‘drinkable gold’, 
which Mussafia had published a few years previously. This Kabbalist and nat-
ural philosopher, too, had been in the service of the House of Gottorf. His work 
provided a biblical genealogy of alchemy, the achievements and secret knowl-
edge of which Mussafia traced directly to the Bible.55 The second part of Han ne-
mann’s work is a catalogue of answers that the Kiel professor had collected to 108 
questions that his colleague Morhof had put to him. The result was a 400–page 
encyclopaedia of alchemy and the transmutation of gold, and at the same time a 
detailed genealogy of the ars magna that attempted, via Hermeticism, Egypt and 
the Old Testament, to elevate Paracelsism to a primeval revelation.56 Han ne mann 
prefaced the treatise with a short cosmology, the premises of which are already 
familiar to us. The natural order had no substantial forms, but only a contextus 
materiae, which permitted differing degrees of interaction of elementary particles 
depending on whether minerals, plants or more noble substances were involved. 
The formative force of the Archeus was responsible for their cohesion, but also for 
their periodic transformation. Minerals were held together by a contextus granu-
laris, Han ne mann remarks, a condensed stream of quicksilver, sulphur and salt, 
which was able to concretise into ever new metals. Matter itself existed as an 
undivided one; in its essence, as Paracelsus and the Tabula Smaragdina had taught, 
it was entirely indestructible and, through the spagyric art, it could be returned 
again and again to its original form.57 
 Han ne mann’s commentary on the alchemical treatise of Mussafia and his re-
sponse to the questions of Morhof undertake a systematic dignification of chryso-
poetics, relying largely on established authorities, such as Petrus Johannes Faber, 
Michael Maier and Paracelsus himself, on Ole Borch’s writings on the history of 
chemistry,58 but also on less common works, such as the Lanx peripatetica of Valeri-
ano Bonvicini and the Experimenta Osiandrina that Johann Ulrich Resch had pub-
lished a few years previously.59 Gold was to be understood as an ideally balanced 
took him quite a lot of energy, as Han ne mann confesses, see id., Sciagraphia thaumatographiae 
curiosae microcosmi physico-medico-theologico-historicae, s.l. 1694, fol. Bv.
55 Han ne mann, Ovum hermetico-paracelsico-trismegistum, Text, pp. 1–10, Commentary, pp. 11–
251, and see Benjamin ben Emmanuel Mussafia, Sacro-medicae sententiae, Hamburg 1640, 
with the ‚Epistola de auro potabili’ as Appendix.
56 Han ne mann, Ovum hermetico-paracelsico-trismegistum, pp. 251–379. 
57 Ebd., Discursus praeliminaris (without pagination).
58 Ole Borch, De Ortu et Progressu Chemiae dissertatio, Kopenhagen 1668, and id., Hermetis Aegyptio-
rum et chemicorum sapientia ab Hermanni Conringii animadversionibus vindicata, Kopenhagen 1674.
59 Valeriano Bonvicini, Lanx peripatetica, qua vetus arcani physici veritas appenditur et auctoris 
mundi subterranei nova obiecta revocantur ad pondus, Padua 1667, and Johann Ulrich Resch, 
Osiandrische Experiment von sole, luna et mercurio, welche in fürnehmer Herren Laboratoriis probirt 
worden sammt andern Observationen u. Explicationen, Nürnberg 1659.
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composition of the three Paracelsian elements; it was the most noble metal that 
the cosmic Archeus could bring forth.60 The obscure ‘drinkable gold’, the aurum 
potabile, Han ne mann stresses, was a liquor, a tincture, that was able to transform 
all metals into gold through its solvent power, since it was able to reduce them 
to their basic substance. It was identical to the Azot of the alchemists and to the 
perfect elixir and was also able to release the gold present in all clinkers.61 Han-
ne mann sets alongside it further variants of gold; his particular interest is in the 
aurum vegetativum, ‘growing gold’, which was able to concentrate the force of the 
Archeus and in particular its seminal force.62 The Israelites had known about the 
tincture of ‘drinkable gold’, as shown by the Golden Calf, and about the other va-
rieties of alchemical chrysopoetics. Adam, Tubalcain, Moses, David and Solomon 
had passed down this secret knowledge.63 The Egyptian hieroglyphic system had 
likewise been able to keep its secret hidden in the treasury of its symbols, accord-
ing to Han ne mann, as the Tabula Smaragdina had in part revealed. This system 
had arisen around three hundred years after the Flood, so Han ne mann, when 
rulers such as Osiris had held power in Egypt.64
3.2 A Swedish impact: Atlantic Alchemy
Han ne mann’s genealogical speculations would not in themselves have been un-
usual if he had not been able to add to them a distinctive and, as it were, Scan-
dinavian note. Already in his catalogue of authorities he had set great weight on 
the Germanic-Nordic tradition of alchemy, which once again picked up the Bibli-
cal-Hermetic thread, and therefore, like Michael Maier, he gave a special role not 
only to Paracelsus, but also to Albertus Magnus. Great German scholars such as 
Maier or Khunrath, so Han ne mann recalled, had even raised the suspicion that 
Hermes Trismegistus himself might have been of Germanic origin.65 However, 
the decisive link in the chain between the Holy Land, Egypt and Old Europe that 
would make plausible the Hermetic transfer of knowledge was to be found not in 
Germany but, so Han ne mann believed, in Sweden. Morhof had familiarised the 
scholars of the University of Kiel with a work that had finally caused the Swedish 
national mythology, Gothicism, to go global—the Atlantica of the titan of scholar-
ship from Uppsala, Olaus Rudbeck the Elder.66 Sweden, so Rudbeck and his fol-
lowers had believed, had been not just the legendary Thule of the ancient world 
and the land of the Hyperboreans and the first Scythians from which Abaris had 
come to the Greeks, but also the Atlantis glorified by Plato, the source of all cul-
60 Han ne mann, Ovum hermetico-paracelsico-trismegistum, §§ 4–5, pp. 15–20.
61 Ebd., § 6, pp. 20–26, § 11, pp. 38–42, § 14, pp. 59–63.
62 Ebd., § 15, pp. 63–77.
63 Ebd., § 12, pp. 42–50.
64 Ebd., § 20, pp. 116–135.
65 Ebd., § 20, pp. 126–127.
66 Daniel Georg Morhof, Unterricht von der Teutschen Sprache und Poesie, deren Ursprung, Fortgang 
und Lehrsätzen, sampt dessen teutschen Gedichten, Lübeck 1700, Erster Theil, c. 1, pp. 11–17, c. 2, 
pp. 24–26.
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tures and sciences, with its great temple of Poseidon and its exalted priestly caste. 
Rudbeck had also developed a Euhemeristic exegesis of myth, which believed that 
all myths could be explained by the light of the midsummer night and elevated 
them to cyphers of the Nordic natural world; Sweden was where they originated, 
so from a Swedish perspective they could be made meaningful.67 But why should 
these myths in their Nordic reading, so Han ne mann asked with Maier’s Atalanta 
fugiens backing him up, not then also have been symbols of alchemy, metaphors of 
the Great Work that had come down from the Egyptians and Israelites to the Hy-
perboreans and so to Sweden? Latona, the mother of Apollo, the primeval Swed-
ish god, could be understood as a signum of the lapis philosophorum; Apollo and 
Diana, given the stories associated with them, were images of its transformation. 
But above all, so Han ne mann, the golden temple of Uppsala, which had once been 
described by Adam of Bremen, that sanctuary in which Odin, Thor and Freya 
had been worshipped, must be a complex of symbols of alchemical transforma-
tion, and at the same time the place where it had been successfully carried out. 
Could it be mere chance that Adam of Bremen had given the temple a golden 
chain as palisade and a roof of silver? And the stele inscribed with runes that, if 
Rudbeck was to be believed, had glorified Jupiter at its very site, could it not have 
been the Tabula Smaragdina? Was it mere chance that Freya too, the Nordic Isis, 
chose to dazzle with her golden tears in the colours green, white and black, the 
colours of transformation? And wasn’t the dragon, the hieroglyph of the first mat-
ter, shown on so many runestones? But there was more: one of the first students of 
the legendary Jewish primeval alchemist Maria, shrouded in legends, had borne 
the name Edda and so revealed how closely the two traditions were interwoven. 
Han ne mann finds alchemical correspondences for a whole gallery of images that 
he draws from Rudbeck’s Nordic-Greek conglomerate of myths. The Arimaspians 
of the North, the mythical custodians of gold in Herodotus, had been the keepers 
of the treasures of the ancient world, but above all they must be understood as the 
ur-Swedes, the Hyperboreans, who had known about alchemy in all its facets and 
had preserved this tradition for Europe.68 
 If one recalls the legend, often retailed especially in Sweden, that Paracelsus 
himself had once travelled to Lapland in search of secrets, and if one also bears 
in mind the long and successful history of Paracelsists in Sweden, as mentioned 
at the outset of this paper, then Han ne mann’s Gothicist invention of alchemical 
tradition no longer seems as eccentric as it may do at first sight. Johan Bureus, 
too, had with great imagination tried to settle the genesis of alchemy in Scandi-
navia and had revaluated the imagery of Nordic mythology accordingly. Olaus 
Rudbeck had studied under the alchemist Johan Frank in Uppsala, who for pa-
67 On Rudbeck’s allegorical interpretation of mythology see e. g. Mats Malm, Minervas äpple. 
Om diktsyn, tolkning och bildspråk inom nordisk göticism, Stockholm 1996, pp. 73–106, and Mats 
Malm, “Olaus Rudbeck’s Atlantica and Old Norse Poetics”, in: Northern Antiquity: the post 
medieval reception of Edda and Saga, ed. Andrew Wawn, Enfield Lock 1994, pp. 1–26.
68 Han ne mann, Ovum hermetico-paracelsico-trismegistum, § 21, pp. 135–146.
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triotic reasons had argued strongly for a similar genealogy.69 That all metallurgy 
was Swedish in origin had been asserted even by the Swedish Gothicists who 
had themselves taken no interest in alchemy. And among the professors of Kiel 
Han ne mann was not the first to articulate his sympathy for Gothicism openly.70 
Morhof had sung the praises of Rudbeck’s Atlantica and accepted it into his Poly-
histor; even earlier, the physicist and scholar of an tiqui ty,71 Johann Daniel Maior, 
who had catalogued the natural science collection of the House of Gottorf, had 
been conspicuous as a passionate supporter of the Swedish national ideology and 
had begun, above all, to load artefacts with interpretations along these lines.72 In 
the meantime the wedding of the Gottorf prince with Hedwig Sophie, daughter 
of the king of Sweden had taken place, as already mentioned.
3.3 Paracelsism: a Swedish network in Kiel
More than in the case of his colleagues, Han ne mann’s professorial chair, it seems, 
would develop into a bridgehead to the Caroline empire in the following period. 
The Ovum paracelsicum of 1694 was swiftly followed by further, extensive works 
on alchemy—just two years later a large treatise on the Philosophers’ Stone and 
a commentary on the Tabula Smaragdina,73 and later also a collection of experi-
ments intended to demonstrate the efficacy of the Great Art.74 The most famous 
example of the successful goldmaker’s art cited by Han ne mann had taken place 
in Sweden. The Livonian count Otto Arnold von Paykull, who had been facing 
execution for high treason during the Northern War, had during his imprison-
ment succeeded, so he himself had claimed, in creating a gold coin by means of 
69 Johannes Franck, Colloquium philosophicum cum diis montanis, thet är: Ett lustigt och liuflighit 
samtaal emillan the förnembsta och edelste berg-gudar och een högförfaren philosopho Zamolxides 
benämbd, om then edle och dyrbare klenodien lapide philosophorum, huru och på hwad sätt then 
samme rätteligen skall praepareras och tillberedas, Uppsala 1651, there on the genealogy of the 
Philosophers’ stone fol. Ciiir–Cvr.
70 On the role Gothicism in Kiel see so far Sonia Brough, The Goths and the Concept of the Gothi 
in Germany from 1500 to 1750. Culture, Language and Architecture, Frankfurt 1985, pp. 163–166, 
and Dieter Lohmeier, “Das gotische Evangelium und die cimbrischen Heiden. Daniel Georg 
Morhof, Johann Daniel Major und der Gotizismus” in: Lychnos (1977–78), pp. 54–70.
71 Daniel Georg Morhof, Polyhistor in tres tomos literarium, philosophicum et practicum divisum 
opus postumum, ed. by Johannes Möller, 2 vols, (Third edition), Lübeck 1708 (first 1688–92), 
vol. 2/1, Liber IV, c. 3, § 3, pp. 21–23, vol. 2/2, Liber I, § 14, pp. 8–9.
72 As example on a gemmic stone see Johann Daniel Major, Prodromus Atlanticae vel Regnorum 
septentrionalium in Achate albo expressorum declaration praeliminaris chrorographica, Kiel 1691, 
c. 13–21, fol. D2 v–G2 v.
73 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Pium, Castum et Devotum Philosophiae Adeptae et Theologiae Or-
thodoxae Osculum, i. e. Exercitatio Philosophico-Mystico-Theologica, qua pio quodam Zelo et studio 
adumbratur et instituitur Analogia Quorundam Mysteriorum Theologicorum, cum Lapidis Philoso-
phorum Arcano Magisterio, Hamburg 1696, there esp. c. 11, pp. 95–108.
74 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Jason seu catalogus testimoniorum veritatis metamorphosin metallo-
rum ignobiliorum in aurum nativo praestantius asserens, Kiel 1709, passim, there on alchemy in 
Sweden e. g. p. 43, and see Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Heinrich Adolf Wettering (resp.), 
Dissertatio physica Fridericiana sistens Hermetem Trismegistum intra Sindonem cognoscendum et 
per Tabulam Smaragdinam Naturae et Artis Pandoram mundo porrigentem, Kiel 1707, passim.
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alchemy.75 The apparent transformation had drawn considerable attention among 
his contemporaries. Charles XII nonetheless, despite the intercession of promi-
nent Swedish Paracelsists such as Urban Hjarne,76 had the count beheaded, and 
the alchemist had taken his secret to the grave.77 Two expansive commentaries 
on two works by Jean d’Espagnet that Han ne mann had repeatedly cited in other 
contexts, the Arcanum Philosophiae and the Enchiridion Physicae, would follow;78 the 
latter even earned a second edition.79 
 But the northward thrust of the works remains striking. Evidently Hanneman 
was from then on determined to pursue Paracelsism in service to the Swedish 
crown. Not only did the Kiel scholar himself undertake disputations with Swed-
ish respondents on the pearls that,80 to the glory of the North,81 could be won 
from oysters and on the Old Norse doctrines on the gods,82 but there was a meth-
od to his approach. From 1701, after the vexing controversy about astrology had 
been argued out, we find Han ne mann as Praeses of a whole series of disputa-
tions devoted to a fixed range of themes. They treat the materialistic-Paracelsian 
cosmology whose basic features Han ne mann had already developed in Swedish 
Stade. But, even more than the content, what seems remarkable here is the schol-
ars with whom these disputations, for which Han ne mann himself was almost 
always responsible, were conducted. The majority of the respondents came from 
75 For a contemporary summary of the Paykull-case see Otto Arnold von Paykull, Problema 
Chymicum oder des weyland Herren General Lieutenants O. A. v. P. Chymischer Proces, wodurch 
nach Proportion eines Quentleins praeparirten Sulphuris Antimonii, anderthalb Loth Bley in das 
schöneste und feineste Gold verwandelt worden, Berlin 1719, passim, and as manuscript e. g. Otto 
Arnold Paykulls 1707 giorda anbud, emot lifwets behållande, uptäcka konsten, huru man kan för-
wandla bly och ringare metaller i fint guld (Stiftsbiblioteket Växjö, MS. 4° 3, Några historiska 
acter, Nr. 8, pp. 133–168).
76 On Hjärne in general and his role in the Paykull-affair see Hjalmar Fors, The Limits of Matter. 
Chemistry, Mining and Enlighment, Chicago 2015, pp. 21–41, and esp. Sten Lindroth, “Hiärne, 
Block och Paracelsus. En redogörelse för Paracelsusstriden 1708–1709”, in: Lychnos (1941), 
pp. 191–231.
77 As personal report of Urban Hjärne see Urban Hjärne, Tanker om Paikulls Guldmakerij (Upsala 
Universitets Biblioteket, MS. D 1415).
78 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Instructissima Pharus in Oceano Philosophorum ostendens Viam 
veram et tutam ad Ophir Auriferum, i. e. Commentarius Hermetico-Spagyricvs in Arcanum Phi-
losophiae Hermeticae, Autoris, qui latet sub Aenigmate penes Nos Unda Tagi, Kiel 1712, and id., 
Synopsis Philosophiae Naturalis Sanctioris Illustrata, id est, Commentarius in Physicae Restitutae 
Enchiridion olim a Viro Illustri editum, Opus vere Aureum, Tübingen 1718.
79 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Pharus ad Ophir Auriferum, i. e. Commentarius in Anonymi Galli 
Arcanum Philosophiae Hermeticae, Lübeck 1714, and id., Veteris Philosophi profundissimi Physica 
Restituta cum Exegesi, Opus Curiosis Naturae scrutatoribus utilissimum et jucundissimum nunc 
demum restitutum, Tübingen 1725.
80 That Han ne mann was visited especially by Swedish students is demonstrated e. g. by the 
diary of Sven Bredberg, see Henrik Sandblad, Greifswald – Wittenberg – Leiden – London. Väst-
götamagistern Sven Bredbergs resedagbok 1708–1710, Göteborg 1982, p. 50.
81 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Hans Roslin (resp.), Dissertatio physica ostrea Holsatica exhi bens, 
Kiel 1708, there with material taken from Urban Hjärnes c. 3, pp. 23–31.
82 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Eric Notmann (resp.), Diacepsis historico-physica de superstitio-
ne veterum Gothorum, Kiel 1706.
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the Swedish domain, from Stralsund, Greifswald—that is, Swedish Pomerania—
from Courland or from Sweden itself; the others were from the Gottorf territory 
of Holstein, or, at furthest, from the area of Lower Saxony. Some works are dedi-
cated to Swedish scholars, including Rudbeck’s son Olaus Rudbeck the Younger, 
Laurentius Roberg and Urban Hjarne, at this time the most important represen-
tative of Paracelsism in Sweden, who himself had written many works in defence 
of Paracelsus. All the works treat partial aspects of a model that admits only one 
sole matter, which condenses and transforms itself, dissolves into its component 
parts and re-forms, and the Archeus, the world soul, whose plasmatic power ex-
tended into eschatology. There are works on light, fire, on ‘fluor’ as universal sub-
stance, on the sun, several treatments of the metals, the kingdoms of nature, the 
nexus of matter in causal and vertical-hierarchical perspective, and finally on the 
microcosm. Its basic thesis, as Han ne mann again and again makes clear, was the 
thoroughgoing coherence and continuity of matter in all spheres and the absence 
of substantial forms. The most frequently cited authorities for Han ne mann are 
Kenelm Digby and the Güstrow physicist Sebastian Wirdig;83 in much of it Han-
ne mann does not name any source.
 The cosmos knew three manifestations of the universal matter, to which Han-
ne mann gives the title fluor: the most subtle, to which light, fire and air were to be 
reckoned; subtler ones, for example water; and less subtle variants. In its realisa-
tion in finest material form the ur-substance formed the real bond of all things; it 
pervaded all other materials, but at the same time constituted them in their dif-
fering densities.84 The more purely the most sublime variants were to be found in 
crude materials, the more vegetable power, but also the more beauty must inhere 
in them. The inherent light ennobled gold as the most precious of metals; it was 
also detectable in the alchemical purum naturae, the elixir purified of all specific at-
tributes. At the same time, so Han ne mann, this fluor in fine material form was able 
to guarantee the continuity of all substances and their capacity to be transformed. 
While heat and cold were the basic forces of mutation and could always reduce 
everything back to sulphur, quicksilver and salt, it was the highly subtle basic ma-
terial that was responsible for the final coherence. It upheld the causal connection 
that conferred identity and at the same time, as motive force, it brought about the 
constant reconstitution of the elementary components once again. All nature pos-
sessed a drive to return to its origin in fine material form.85 But the monistic theory 
had a yet far greater reach: even miracles could be explained, Han ne mann insist-
83 Sebastian Wirdig, Nova medicina spirituum, curiosa scientia et doctrina unanimiter hucusque neg-
lecta et a nemine merito exculta, medicis tamen et physicis utilissima, in qua primo spirituum natura-
lis constitutio, vita, sanitas, temperamenta, dehinc spirituum praeternaturalis seu morbosa dispositio, 
causae, curationes per naturam, per diaetam, per arcana majora demonstrantur, Hamburg 1673. 
Wirdig had been physicus regius of the Dukes of Mecklenburg.
84 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Adolph Wilhelm von Buren (resp.), Exercitatio physica Frideri-
ciana secunda de fluido, Kiel 1702, Thesis I–III, pp. 1–15.
85 Ebd., Thesis IV–VI, pp. 15–20. 
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ed, by reference to a unitary substrate in their cause-effect relation; the same was 
even true of resurrected bodies, which otherwise, Han ne mann stressed, would 
be hard to explain in their organic continuity, necessary for identity.86 The basic 
light-matter must be the starting material of the glorified body and at the same 
time of the infernal fire. It is not difficult to see here how Han ne mann is trying to 
give a broader foundation to the model of palingenesis.
 At a cruder level the ur-matter manifested itself, so Han ne mann continues, as 
contextus granularis and as somewhat firmer contextus filamentalis.87 No metal was 
held in shape by an ontological form; they all differed from each other only by de-
gree. It must hence be correspondingly easy for the alchemist to bring about their 
reduction and transformation. Far superior to the metallic-material manifestations 
were fire and light. Light too was matter, and not an accidental, as Han ne mann in-
sists; it constituted that first universal quantity that God had founded with his Fiat 
lux in the act of Creation; thanks to its finegrainedness it passed through all other 
bodies or remained within them, as every sparkling emerald could demonstrate. 
As the formative force of the cruder elements, as energetic transmitter and inher-
ent principle of creation, it was responsible for the maintenance of the subaltern 
manifestations of reality; as the ontic precondition of every further qualitative 
formation, and at the same time the most noble basic substance, it ensured the 
ultimate material identity of all creatureliness. It was entirely indestructible. Like 
the obscure liquid basic substance, it would survive the calcination and purifica-
tion processes of the Apocalypse and was responsible for the reconstitution of all 
things. Han ne mann leaves open the question of whether angels or souls might 
consist of this matter, even though he apparently finds something to be said for 
this option.88 Less pure than light is its first condensation, fire, which likewise has 
the character of, so Han ne mann, a spiritual substance, as it were, and provides the 
active precondition for the decomposition of all metals into the three Paracelsian 
foundational elements. As a material bearer of energy brought from the sun, the 
largest concentration of light in the cosmos, down into the world, like light fire, 
86 Ebd., Thesis XI–XIII, pp. 24–26.
87 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Adolph Wilhelm von Buren (resp.), Exercitatio physica Frideri-
ciana omnium corporum naturalium in sextiduo creationis a Deo conditorum oeconomiam, in suas 
partes potiores, scilicet in Atalantam et Hippomanen divisam exhibens, Kiel 1701, Thesis II–III, 
pp. 2–5, and in detail Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Adolph August Heick (resp.), Exercitatio 
physica de contextu corporum naturalium, Kiel 1703, Thesis I–XIII, pp. 1–15, and regarding the 
coherence and the substance of metals Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Anton Lütgens (resp.), 
Thubalcain ad fornacem et incudem stans, id est metallorum naturam et differentias explicans disser-
tatio physica, Kiel 1707, Thesis III, pp. 14–44, and again Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Anton 
Lütgens (resp.), Agricola, seu dissertatio Fridericiana de metallis, Kiel 1709, pp. 1–46. 
88 Han ne mann—Buren, Exercitatio physica Fridericiana omnium corporum naturalium in sextiduo 
creationis, Thesis IV–V, pp. 6–10, and in detail once more Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—
Chris toph Pyl (resp.), Exercitatio physica Fridericiana omnium creaturarum naturalium fluidissi-
mam sistens substantiam, id est Lucem, Kiel 1704, Thesis IV–XII, pp. 5–16, and also Johann Lud-
wig Han ne mann—Conrad G. Stohlmann (resp.), Dissertatio physica systematis coeli et terrae 
atlantem sistens, Kiel 1708, Thesis I, pp. 3–7.
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according to Han ne mann, is the source of the panspermic earth and in its seminal 
force it drives the subterranean metals from the underworld up to the surface. The 
great extent to which fire, sun and light merge into each other and must be under-
stood only as variations of the same substrate, can be easily demonstrated by any 
experiment starting a fire with a magnifying glass.89
 Han ne mann does not neglect to devote disputations also to the animal king-
dom. These works, which were structured essentially as eulogies of Swedish col-
leagues, are, with their commonplace content, certainly among the weakest of 
the whole series.90 It is only the electric ray, the Torpedo, which since Athanasius 
Kircher had been of special interest to the followers of Paracelsus due to its in-
terior electricity, its productive fire as it were, that allows Han ne mann to pro-
duce something of more interest, in a study devoted specially to it.91 However, 
as already hinted, the point of this whole series of disputations, which ended, 
perhaps not by chance, with the Great Northern War, may have been less in the 
generation of new discoveries than in bringing to general university attention a 
Common-sense Paracelsism.92 This was intended to prepare the ground for the 
Swedish empire rhetorically too. Nonetheless, the Kiel professor remained true to 
Paracelsism and alchemy in the following years.93 Like many professors, he used 
his close retirement as an opportunity finally to pursue his own interests to the 
full. Two further works on the Philosophers’ Stone followed, written in Friedrich-
stadt, where he spent his retirement; both defend its achievability, place special 
weight on phosphorus as an auxiliary agent and continue to hit a strong note of 
local patriotism by repeated praises of the exemplary role played by Michael Mai-
89 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Christoph Wasmundt (resp.), Exercitatio physica Fridericiana 
Furtum Promethei, id est Fluidissimam Naturae substantiam Ignem, nexum corporum naturalium 
solventem et combinantem sistens, Kiel 1705, Thesis II–V, pp. 5–21. Sun and Moon, as the opposi-
te sources of heat and cold were treated in addition in Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Johann 
Ludwig Roslin (resp.), Exercitatio physica Fridericiana de sole, Kiel 1706, passim, and Johann 
Ludwig Han ne mann—Johann Michael Eckhard (resp.), Exercitatio physica Fridericiana saeviti-
am Saturni elapsae hyemis sistens, id est De frigore, Kiel 1709, there esp. Thesis IV–V, pp. 7–11, the 
law of divine causality in Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Friedrich Finck (resp.), Dissertatio 
Physica Fridericiana Systematis Coeli et Terrae Legem Adrasteam id est Mechanismum, exhibens, 
Kiel 1710, and Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Joachim Ernst Cappell (resp.), Dissertatio physi-
ca Systematis Caeli et Terrae Auream Catenam exhibens, Kiel 1710, passim.
90 As a kind of survey see Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Johann Augustin Fasch (resp.), Exer-
citatio physica Fridericiana de tribus naturae regnis, Kiel 1705, passim.
91 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—Georg Abias Cramer (resp.), Dissertatio physica piscem torpedi-
nem, eiusque proprietates admirandas exhibens, Kiel 1710, Thesis II, pp. 7–14.
92 The ultimate disputations were dealing with anthropology and epistemology, see Johann 
Ludwig Han ne mann—Stefan Grafe (resp.), Dissertatio qua aliqid Urim et Tumim analogiam ho-
minis menti a Deo esse jehot inscriptum ostenditur, Kiel 1711, and Johann Ludwig Han ne mann—
Jo hannes Ratenburg (resp.), Aurea Poma in argenteo vase seu Dissertatio physica Fridericiana Lu-
cer nam Jehova Proverb. XX. 27. suspendens, Kiel 1711. 
93 As short and basic defence of the Ars magna against its critics see Johann Ludwig Han ne-
mann, Dealbatio aethiopis, id est demonstratio epistolica ad chymiae Europae nostrae primates qua 
ostenditur quod solutio auri radicalis ad confectionem L. P. sit non ens et prorsus inutilis labor, Kiel 
1714, passim.
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er.94 By including palingenesis, which was at the same time being defended once 
again by Georg Frank von Frankenau,95 these works also attempt a make a link 
to previous works. The option of reconstitution in the natural order, as occurred 
most clearly in the plant kingdom, Han ne mann once again insists, provided the 
empirical key to the functionality of the Ars magna of alchemy as a whole.
4 Conclusion
To his dying day Han ne mann remained a convinced alchemist. His last work in 
its defence was delivered by the now elderly scholar in 1719.96 Han ne mann must 
have kept a large number of further, unpublished treatises in his files in Kiel 
and Friedrichstadt, or in preparation, for already while at Stade he continually 
cited from manuscripts that were apparently never published. His final works, 
too, contain references to texts that were to follow. Whether these manuscripts 
still exist, I have not been able to establish. Henning Ratjen’s 1873 catalogue of 
the manuscripts of the University of Kiel lists no titles by Han ne mann.97 The 
early collections of the City Archive of Friedrichstadt were largely destroyed by 
the devastations of the German-Danish War in the nineteenth century. Inquiries 
there have unfortunately yielded no such documents.98 
 A few words in conclusion: Johann Ludwig Han ne mann’s popular-Paracelsist 
cosmology can certainly not be classed among the strokes of genius of the ear-
ly eighteenth century. It continued to batter away at Aristotelian hylemorphism; 
and it continued to draw on the great standard works of the seventeenth century. 
That is why it insists so firmly on the quantitative unitariness of all matter, since 
the latter was necessarily an essential precondition of the art of creating gold, to 
which Han ne mann was so committed. In a way, Han ne mann’s physics stands 
between the eras. Its universal light-matter, generated in the primordial act of the 
Creation, which preceded as substrate all further development of the creatures, 
94 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Xystus, in Hortum Hesperidum, id est Parasceue ad Aureum Vellus!, 
Kiel 1715, id., Horae Subcisivae, Fridrichstadienses seu Nodus Gordii de L. P. elaboratione a Sophitis 
connexus, solutus, Kiel 1715, id., Otium Fridrichstadiense, seu Tantalus chemicus, id est commenta-
rius physico-chemicus de L. P. B. scala sapientiae, non altum volare, sed humi morari, ratio stultitiae 
sublime scrutari, et penes solem nidulari, Hamburg 1717, and see also once more with Maier on 
the role of symbolic language already id., Nebo Chemicus ceu Viatorium ostendens viam in Pale-
stinam auriferam,  id est Hortum Hesperidum, in quo aurea crescunt Poma, una et verum Menstruum 
Philosophorum ostendit, Kiel 1714, pp. 1–9.
95 Georg Friedrich von Frankenau, Palingenesia Francica, oder: Tractätlein von der Künstlichen Auf-
erweckung derer Pflanzen, Menschen und Thiere aus ihrer Asche, Leipzig 1716, there §§ 38–44, 
pp. 63–70, and id., De Palingenesia sive resuscitatione artificiali plantarum, hominum et animalium 
e sui cineribus liber singularis, commentario illustratus, Halle 1717, there §§ 38–44, pp. 237–258.
96 Johann Ludwig Han ne mann, Aurora Oriens, id est assertio, duo in natura homogenea esse materi-
am L.P.B. adaequatam ceu alloquium ad omnes Europae chemicos de L. p. B. materia vera, Plön 1719.
97 Henning Ratjen, Verzeichniss der Handschriften der Kieler Universitätsbibliothek, Abtheilung 1–4, 
Kiel 1873.
98 According to personal information by the City Archive of Friedrichstadt, no manuscripts of 
Han ne mann are stored in the Archive anymore.
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will for medievalists recall, and perhaps not just by chance, the cosmology of 
a Robert Grosseteste, whose ingenious writings were printed already in 1514.99 
There too we find continual talk of light, the extension and de-sublimation of 
which was a necessary precondition of all further matter, which was understood 
as unitary, in its mutability; according to Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, no one 
has ever inquired into a possible early modern reception of these models.100 For 
the attempt to derive angels and the resurrected body similarly from the one fluc-
tuating ur-substance, half a century earlier in Sweden the Paracelsist Friedrich 
Menius had almost been excommunicated by the Lutherans;101 yet Han ne mann’s 
own reflections also anticipate those physico-theological speculations that would 
enjoy such favour in the second half of the eighteenth century.
 There is something else that seems important. Han ne mann, in his biogra-
phy, his academic migrations, his position as professor in Kiel and his interests, 
strikingly documents for us the closely interwoven educational landscape of the 
North Sea and Baltic regions. It created a scholarly and discursive formation that 
endured for two centuries, that was held together by the Latin language, with 
the help of Swedish, Danish and Low German, and the bond of Lutheranism and 
broke up only in the nineteenth-century world of nation states. What they had 
in common was educational paradigms, which in part superseded each other, in 
part reacted against each other, such as scholastic Aristotelianism, Cartesianism, 
late baroque Paracelsism and physico-theology, but also Gothicist or other Scan-
dinavophile national myths. Even later, a comparable role in this cultural and 
linguistic area would still be played by the reading of Herder or Kant and even by 
romanticism. Geographically the area included large parts of northern Germany 
as well as Sweden and with it the whole Baltic, Denmark and Norway. The ma-
jority of these men, and the few women, who made up this scholarly landscape 
had studied all over Europe, but their attention turned northward. If it is indeed 
the case that the Nachlass of the admittedly not outstanding but for his time still 
very striking Han ne mann did indeed go up in flames in the Schleswig-Holstein 
War of 1850, then that too may be a sign.
 99 Robert Grosseteste, Opuscula dignissima, nunc primum in lucem edita et accuratissime emendate, 
Venedig 1514, there ‘De inchoatione formarum’ fol. 11 va–12 vb. 
100 Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Philosophia perennis. Historische Umrisse abendländischer Spiri-
tualität in Antike, Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, Frankfurt 1998, pp. 446–454.
101 Salomon Maius (Friedrich Menius), Consensus hermetico-mosaicus. Von dem wahren Anfange 
aller siechtigen und unsiechtigen Dingen, sodann auch von der warhafften einigen Universalm-
aterie (so wol seiner Natur als Kunst gehörigen) höhesten Arcani der gantzen Welt, o. O. 1644, 
pp. 169–173, and against Maius e. g. Errores praecipui in Consensu hermetico-mosaico Fr. Menii 
et Declaratio Menii (Upsala Universitets Biblioteket, MS. Palmsk. 106), pp. 949–992, there 
‘Errores’ pp. 950–952.
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Knowledge, Community and Authority  
at the Academia Naturae Curiosorum
Simon Rebohm
1 Introduction
The scientific academies of the Early Modern period are often portrayed as or-
ganizations, which explicitly distanced themselves from the universities and 
especially from the dominance of Aristotelianism in favour of a new, modern 
concept of science. The Academia Naturae Curiosorum (ANC), later known sim-
ply as Leopoldina, was the first persistent and formally instituted academy in 
the German lands, and even though its foundation in 1652 predated the Royal 
Society, it is mostly excluded from the historical narrative on the early modern 
European academies.1 More recent studies focus on the social, political and or-
ganizational aspects of this academy in different periods.2 The academy’s way 
of producing knowledge however has so far only received limited attention. How 
did the ANC work as a community of scholars? How did it deal with the author-
ity of traditional knowledge? To better understand the ANC, this essay will look 
at the way, in which it dealt with authority on different levels. The first part will 
briefly show that the academy initially stressed the idea of a group of peers and 
the importance of collaboration in science. At least in part, it wanted to distance 
itself from the universities’ culture of debate. The second part will look at the 
ANC’s attitude towards the authorities of antique medicine and philosophy. The 
third part examines the academy’s journal, the Miscellanea curiosa, and its editors’ 
approach towards the interpretation of observations.
1 Richard Toellner, “Die Leopoldina – eine terra incognita in der deutschen Akademiege-
schichts schreibung. Johannes Laurentius Bausch zum 400. Geburtstag”, in: Die Gründung 
der Leo pol di na—Academia Naturae Curiosorum—im historischen Kontext, eds. Richard Toellner, 
Uwe Mül ler, Benno Parthier and Wieland Berg, Stuttgart 2008 (Acta historica Leopoldi-
na 49), pp. 177–187.
2 350 Jahre Leopoldina—Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. Festschrift der Deutschen Akademie der Natur-
forscher Leopoldina 1652–2002, ed. Benno Parthier and Dietrich von Engelhardt, Halle (Saale) 
2002; Die Gründung der Leopoldina—Academia Naturae Curiosorum—im historischen Kontext, ed. 
Richard Toellner, Uwe Müller, Benno Parthier and Wieland Berg, Stuttgart 2008 (Acta his-
torica Leopoldina 49); Marion Mücke and Thomas Schnalke, Briefnetz Leopoldina. Die Korres-
pondenz der Deutschen Akademie der Naturforscher um 1750, Berlin/New York 2009.
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2 The foundation of an academia in Schweinfurt
The Academie Naturae Curiosorum was founded in 1652 by four physicians in 
Schweinfurt. One of them was the town physician Johann Laurentius Bausch 
(1605–1655), who had inherited an extensive medical library from his father and 
became the academy’s first president. Schweinfurt was a free imperial city and a 
protestant centre amid the catholic Franconia. During the Swedish occupation of 
the Thirty Year War Gustav Adolf had planned to found a university here as the 
counterpart to the catholic university of Würzburg, but nothing came of it.3 As we 
shall see, town physicians and the situation in Schweinfurt would be important 
influences on the academy’s way to become an official institution.
The social and educational background of the foundational members was re-
markably homogenous: Besides the fact that they were physicians, they all came 
from families, which had managed to ascend in the social hierarchy of Schwein-
furt, and they all had toured Italy as a part of their medical studies.4 As town 
physicians they had not only secured a certain social status inside of the city, 
they also distinguished themselves from the university doctors or the mere prac-
titioners. Together with the court physicians they formed a distinct group within 
the medical community, which even had its own favoured mode of publication: 
the observatio, which would play a crucial role in establishing a successful model 
of publication for the ANC.5
The goals of the academy were strongly connected to the medical profession of 
its founders and thus provided a stronger focus for its activities than in the case of 
other early modern academies: By establishing a cooperation between physicians 
in the study of nature and by the exchange of knowledge, the academy wanted 
to enhance practical knowledge for the common good.6 This also entailed strict 
formal requirements: Membership was at first limited to medical doctors, and 
even in the 18th century other professions were apparently only represented in a 
very small percentage.7 In principle, this made the academy an early organization 
of professionals in contrast to the heterogeneous group of virtuosi at the Royal So-
ciety or the members of the Académie des sciences, who were appointed as state 
3 Thomas Horling, Uwe Müller and Erich Schneider: Schweinfurt. Kleine Stadtgeschichte, Re-
gensburg 2014, p. 40.
4 Uwe Müller, “Johann Laurentius Bausch und Philipp Jacob Sachs von Lewenhaimb. Von 
der Gründung der Academia Naturae Curiosorum zur Reichsakademie”, in: Die Gründung 
der Leo pol dina – Academia Naturae Curiosorum – im historischen Kontext, eds. Richard Toell-
ner, Uwe Müller, Benno Parthier and Wieland Berg, Stuttgart 2008 (Acta historica Leopoldi-
na 49), pp. 13–41, here pp. 23–25.
5 Gianna Pomata, “Observation Rising: Birth of an Epistemic Genre 1500–1650”, in: Histories of 
Observation, eds. Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck, Chicago/London 2011, pp. 45–80, 
here p. 59.
6 Müller, “Johann Laurentius Bausch”, p. 18–29.
7 Uwe Müller, “Die Leges der Academia Naturae Curiosorum”, in: Die Gründung der Leopoldi-
na – Academia Naturae Curiosorum – im historischen Kontext, eds. Richard Toellner, Uwe Müller, 
Benno Parthier and Wieland Berg, Stuttgart 2008 (Acta historica Leopoldina 49), pp. 243–264, 
here p. 255.
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officials. Initially the academy had struggled to gain enough members to sustain 
itself, but in the following years it relied on already existing networks of physi-
cians to expand as is evident from a study on early members from Switzerland.8
The internal organisation of the ANC consisted in three representatives: The 
president originally had the responsibility to assign research topics to the mem-
bers. He was to be informed, when members wanted to publish their work on 
assigned topics, and he had to keep the archive of the academy, which would con-
sist of these publications. The president took office by election through the mem-
bers, but only after his predecessor had died. Helping the president in his work 
were two adiuncti, whose main task was to invite new members. Also, they were 
the candidates for the next presidency. The academy later added the position of 
a director ephemeridum, who had to compile the contributions for the academy’s 
journal and organise the publication. The internal regulations, which describe 
these positions, emphasize their tasks and say almost nothing about privileges or 
power, not even in the case of an internal argument.9
Since Schweinfurt already had a strong connection to the Holy Roman Empire, 
the academy’s second president Johann Michael Fehr (1610–1688) turned towards 
Emperor Leopold to earn official approval. The court was willing to grant the acad-
emy most of the requested privileges: Even though there would be no financial 
support, the ANC was exempted from censorship, and its president and the two 
adiuncti gained the title of a Hofpfalzgraf upon election. Interestingly enough how-
ever, the court had a problem with the name academia: Since universities were often 
also called academies the name was considered confusing, and the court request-
ed to change it to societas. Commonly this is interpreted as a reluctance to grant the 
ANC the privileges of a university, but this is partly contradicted by the fact, that 
the president in the end actually obtained the right to promote people to medical 
doctors by the imperial privilege.10 Yet there is another possible explanation for the 
resistance against the name academia: The imperial court might not have wanted to 
give the impression that it sanctioned the foundation of a protestant counter uni-
versity in Schweinfurt, which was, as mentioned, a protestant enclave in a catholic 
region. It is interesting to note in this regard that once the ANC had made it clear 
to the court, that they had no intention of teaching students, the court allowed the 
name academia to prevail without any further argument and officially instituted 
the academy as the Academia Caesareo-Leopoldina Naturae Curiosorum in 1687.11
However, the omission of teaching was not the only way, in which the acade-
my distanced itself from the universities: The ANC made it a rule to keep out of 
all the harsh controversies, which were going on between the different medical 
 8 Heinrich Buess, “Der Beitrag der Schweizer Ärzte zu den Miscellanea curiosa der Deutschen 
Akademie der Naturforscher”, in: Sudhoff‘s Archiv für die Geschichte der Medizin und der Natur-
wissenschaften 37 (1953), pp. 1–22.
 9 Müller, “Leges”, pp. 248, 251–252, 254, 257–258.
10 Müller, “Johann Laurentius Bausch”, p. 38.
11 Müller, “Johann Laurentius Bausch”, p. 36–38.
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schools, and it requested its members to refrain from any hurtful remarks to-
wards each other.12 Considering the very few instances of quarrels, which were 
reported in the academy’s internal history, it appears to have achieved this goal 
quite successfully.13 This was a deliberate step away from the culture of debate 
represented by the universities and a call for a greater acceptance of different 
opinions on matters of medicine and natural philosophy. Since the members of 
the early academy adhered to philosophical notions ranging from pansophism to 
modified Cartesiansim it was probably a necessary step.14
3 Jason, Phosphorus, Hippocrates, Aris totle: the academy’s relation to an tiqui ty
In addition to the plea for moderate behaviour, the academy employed various 
symbols to strengthen the community sense of its members. Towards the outside 
world, this was done by wearing a ring with the academy’s symbol.15 Addition-
ally, the members received names: While the founders took their cognomina from 
the tale of Jason and the Argonauts to remind themselves of their common goal, 
later members first took other names from antique mythology.16 In addition to the 
aspect of unity through the second identity offered by them the names gained a 
semantic level at one point. In most cases there are no explanations offered as to 
the meaning of the specific names, but Philipp Jacob Sachs von Lewenhaimb (1627–
1672) explicitly received the name Phosphorus as a mark of honour for his work, 
which was welcomed as a forecasting light by the members of the early academy.17
Soon the favour shifted from mythology towards the names of antique schol-
ars. The first of these references probably was the name of Melissus, given to 
Hiero ny mus Conrad Virdung von Hartung (1640–1708) in 1664.18 Then, around 
1678, the names of scholars started to eclipse the mythological references.19 What 
do these names tell us about the academy and its members? First of all, some 
names seem to have been more popular than others as they were taken more 
12 Frances Mason Barnett, Medical Authority and Princely Patronage: The Academia Naturae Curio-
sorum 1652–1693, Diss., Chapel Hill University 1995, pp. 232–235.
13 For the few instances of disputes see Protocollum Academiae Caesareo-Leopoldinae Naturae Cu-
riosorum. Edition der Chronik der Kaiserlich-Leopoldinischen Akademie, ed. Uwe Müller, Danny 
Weber and Wieland Berg, Stuttgart 2013 (Acta Historica Leopoldina 60), pp. 63, 103–105, 107.
14 Buess, “Schweizer Ärzte”, pp. 4, 12; Ralf Bröer, Salomon Reisel (1625–1701). Barocke Naturfor-
schung eines Leibarztes im Banne der mechanistischen Philosophie, Leipzig 1996 (Acta Historica 
Leopoldina 23), p. 54.
15 Müller, “Leges”, pp. 251, 260.
16 Barnett, Medical Authority, pp. 81–83. For lists of the cognomina see Protocollum, pp. 405–426, 
443–455.
17 “Mense Junio censure academicae submissit Ampelographiam suam Dn. D. Phil. Jacob. 
Sachsius, qui pro studio praestito Phosphori agnomine fuit honoratus, verè Phosphorus, 
cum aliis omnibus Collegiis hoc Libro suo praeluxisset […]” (Protocollum, pp. 40–41). Cogno-
mina were first given as an honour after publishing one of the requested books, later on they 
were given or taken at the confirmation of membership (Müller, “Leges”, pp. 254, 258).
18 Protocollum, pp. 44, 405. This could either have been a reference to the eleatic philosopher 
Me lissos of Samos or the mythological king Melissos of Crete.
19 Protocollum, pp. 407.
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than once; sometimes even at the same time. The earliest example for this was 
unsurprisingly the name Hippocrates, which was first given to Lorenz Gieseler 
(† 1685) in 1678, and then again to Johann Jakob Döbel (1640–1684) in 1682.20 An-
other, even more striking example is the name of Aris totle, which was given to 
two members, who both joined in 1685: Theodor Zwinger (1657–1724), received 
the name Aristotelis Stagirites, while Philipp Jacob Hartmann (1648–1707) was just 
called Aristotelis II.21
The reasons for the assignment of this particular cognomen are not as simple 
as in the case of Sachs. Zwinger probably received it due to his interest in a wide 
range of topics: At the time, he was professor of rhetoric in Basel, but soon he 
became the professor of physics, then of botany and anatomy, then of theoretical 
medicine and at last of practical medicine. However, he was more interested in 
experimental than traditional natural philosophy, as is revealed by his plans to 
found an experimental college in Basel around 1700.22 Hartmann on the other 
hand was extraordinary professor of medicine in Königsberg and then became 
professor of history for two years before returning to the medical faculty as a full 
professor.23 The relevance of Aristotelianism for Hartmann is evident in a disser-
tation by one of his pupils on ancient anatomy published in 1684, but it presents a 
rather critical interpretation of Aris totle in comparison with Galen.24
20 Protocollum, pp. 407.
21 In addition to being both admitted to the academy in the same year and with the same 
name, both of them indirectly gained membership in the academy through the same person: 
Georg Wilhelm Wedel (Hercules I.) had proposed Georg Franck von Franckenau (Argus I.) 
and Johann Ludwig Han ne mann (Nestor II.) as members, who in turn proposed Zwinger and 
Hartmann respectively (Protocollum, p. 384).
22 Rudolf Wolf, “Theodor Zwinger von Basel, 1658–1724”, in: idem, Biographien zur Kulturge-
schichte der Schweiz, Zürich 1858–1862, 4 vols., vol. 3, pp. 119–132, here pp. 119–125.
23 Christian Gottlieb Jöcher, Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon, 4 vols, Leipzig 1750–1751, vol. 2, 
p. 1383. Hartmann’s book on amber (Succini Prussici physica & civilis historia cum demonstrati-
one ex autopsia & intimiori rerum experientia deducta, Frankfurt 1677) is normally listed among 
the monographs published as a semi-obligatory step to join the ANC (Wieland Berg and 
Jochen Thamm, “Die systematische Erfassung der Naturgegenstände. Zum Programm der 
Academia Naturae Curiosoum von 1652 und seiner Vorgeschichte, in: Die Gründung der Leo-
poldina—Academia Naturae Curiosorum—im historischen Kontext, eds. Richard Toellner, Uwe 
Müller, Benno Parthier and Wieland Berg, Stuttgart 2008 (Acta historica Leopoldina 49), 
pp. 285–304, here p. 297). However, the book was actually printed five years before Hart-
mann became a member and does not display the typical references to the academy. It is 
also worthy of note that Hartmann at this time had not been promoted to medical doctor yet, 
which would have been required for joining the ANC.
24 Philipp Jacob Hartmann and Johannes Sigismund Lange, Exercitationum anatomicarum in pu-
blicas lectiones de iis quae contra peritiam veterum anatomicam afferuntur in genere, prima, König-
berg 1684, especially p. 15. Given the slight difference in the name, it could even be consid-
ered, whether Hartmann was perhaps named after another Aris totle than great the natural 
philosopher, for example the historian from Chalcis in Macedonia (Johann Heinrich Zedler, 
Grosses Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste, Halle/Leipzig 1731–1754, 64 vols, 
vol. 1, pp. 1484–1485).
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Thus, neither Zwinger nor Hartmann were called Aristotelians because of an 
affiliation with Aristotelian philosophy. The name of the philosopher was rath-
er used in a fashion, which was also common at the early modern universities: 
Here references to Aris totle often focused on certain works or aspects from an 
ahistorical perspective to establish a disciplinary identity.25 In a similar way, the 
cognomina of the academy members helped to establish a community with med-
icine as a framework, which was closely connected to a single discipline and in 
consequence was more focused than that of other early modern academies. The 
names of antique scholars were used as a sign to merely indicate a certain direc-
tion (or width) of interest inside this frame.26 Furthermore, they emphasized a 
supposed continuity of knowledge: The referenced philosophers and physicians 
were no longer the authorities behind opposing schools, but rather landmarks in 
an additive development of knowledge.
The idea of continuous and additive knowledge from various sources as well as 
the compatibility of different authorities is one of the principal ideas of the ANC 
during its early years: Each member was required to publish a book on a natu-
ral object of medical value consisting mainly in a compilation of already existing 
knowledge on the subject. This however was not a successful project, since only 
a few books were actually published, while the members did not sufficiently in-
crease in numbers.27 As an alternative the ANC started to publish its own journal 
in 1670 titled Miscellanea curiosa. While here the focus was less on compilation, the 
disciplinary perspective on antique scholars is still present: Since the contributions 
focus on medicine, they only refer to a small range of works, which are always 
closely connected to the issue at hand. For example, references to Aris totle almost 
exclusively mention the Historia animalium, De partibus animalium and De generatione 
animalium. Most of these references are of an ahistorical nature in the sense that 
they focus on the descriptions of phenomena contained in this texts and do not 
discuss Aristotelian philosophy. An example for this is an observation by Georg 
Wolfgang Wedel (1645–1721) about a human heart situated on the right side of the 
body. As Wedel remarks, similar cases were not only describes by William Harvey, 
25 Alternatively, metadisciplinary connections surfaced as the consideration of a wider range 
of works under a historical perspective (Ulrike Zeuch, “Aristoteles in der historia literaria—
transdisziplinäres Bindeglied oder disziplinenspezifische Referenz?”, in: Der Aristotelismus 
an den europäischen Universitäten der frühen Neuzeit, ed. Rolf Darge, Emmanuel J. Bauer and 
Günter Frank, Stuttgart 2010, pp. 333–356) Both perspectives on Aris totle have also been 
pointed out in the works of Athanasius Kircher by Thomas Leinkauf, “Athanasius Kircher 
und Aristoteles. Ein Beispiel für das Fortleben aristotelischen Denkens in fremden Kontex-
ten”, in: Aristotelismus und Renaissance. In memoriam Ch. B. Schmitt, ed. Eckhard Keßler, Char-
les H. Lohr and Walter Sparn, Wiesbaden 1988 (Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 46), pp. 195–216.
26 There are cases easier to understand, for example Friedrich Christian Lesser (1692–1754), 
who joined the academy in 1735 during his work on an Insectotheologia, was fittingly named 
after Aristomachus of Solis, a devoted scholar of bees (Zedler, Universal-Lexicon, p. 1469).
27 Müller, “Johann Laurentius Bausch”, p 29. For a bibliography of the monographs see Berg 
and Thamm, “Programm der Academia Naturae Curiosorum”, pp. 295–302.
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but already by Aris totle in the Historia animalium and by Plato.28 This juxtaposition 
of antique authorities like Pliny, Hippocrates or Galen with contemporaries again 
stressed similarities and continuity but pointed out differences in notably fewer 
cases. At the same time, this diminished the authority of these scholars to a certain 
extent, since they were now referenced to primarily as sources for facts.
But the Miscellanea curiosa also introduced a new level of authority within the 
academy, which soon started a debate among the members.
3 Communication and authority: the Miscellanea curiosa 
3.1 Thematic focus, structure and authorship in the Miscellanea curiosa
Since the ANC’s members lived across the German lands, one of the main goals of 
the Miscellanea curiosa as a journal was to establish a means of communication.29 It 
quickly became the academy’s most important project. When its continuation in 
1693 was at risk, the academy saw it as a real danger to its own existence.30 This 
crucial role for the academy is the first aspect, which sets the Miscellanea apart from 
other learned journals of the time: The Journal des sçavans was the work of an anon-
ymous group, which apparently had no other goals than to publish the journal.31 
The Philosophical Transactions on the other hand were a private enterprise of Henry 
Oldenburg, which only in the 18th century became the official journal of the Royal 
Society, although from the beginning much of its contents related to this academy.32
Another important difference is the thematic focus, which was a consequence 
of the ANC’s goals: According to the title page of the first volume, the journal 
would feature medico-physical observations consisting in contributions on anat-
28 Georg Wolfgang Wedel, “Observatio CXCIV. Cor in Dextro latere pulsans”, in: Miscellanea 
curiosa 1671, p. 296.
29 This has been stressed a number of times: Uwe Müller, “Die Leopoldina unter den Präsi-
denten Bausch, Fehr und Volkamer (1652–1693)”, in: 350 Jahre Leopoldina – Anspruch und Wirk-
lich keit. Festschrift der Deutschen Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina 1652–2002, ed. Benno 
Parthier and Dietrich von Engelhardt, Halle (Saale) 2002, pp. 45–93, here pp. 52–56, 61–62); Ri-
chard Toellner, “Im Hain des Akademos auf die Natur wißbegierig sein: Vier Ärzte der Freien 
Reichsstadt Schweinfurt gründen die Academia Naturae Curiosorum”, in: 350 Jahre Leopoldi-
na—Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. Festschrift der Deutschen Akademie der Naturforscher Leo poldina 
1652–2002, ed. Benno Parthier and Dietrich von Engelhardt, Halle (Saale) 2002, pp. 14–43, here 
37–38; Frances Mason Barnett, “Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. Reformen in der frühen Acade-
mia naturae curiosorum”, in: Gelehrte Gesellschaften im mitteldeutschen Raum (1650–1820), ed. 
Detlef Döring and Kurt Nowak, 2 vols, Stuttgart/Leipzig 2002 (Abhandlungen der Sächsischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig 76/75), vol. 2, pp. 47–72, here p. 71. However, there is 
little information about, how the communication and editorial process actually worked.
30 Protocollum, pp. 130–133.
31 Jean-Pierre Vittu, “La formation d’une institution scientifique. Le Journal des Savants de 
1665 à 1714”, in: Journal des savants 2002, pp. 179–203, 349–377, here pp. 180–189.
32 Noah Moxham, “Fit for Print: Developing an Institutional Model of Scientific Periodicals Pub-
lishing in England, 1665–ca. 1714”, in: Notes & Records of the Royal Society 69 (2015), pp. 241–260.
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omy, botany, pathology, chirurgy, therapeutics and chymia.33 The invitation to 
new authors at the beginning of the first volume stressed the close connection 
of these topics to medicine: Observations on minerals, plants and animals were 
linked to the invention of new pharmaceutica, and of the chymical matters only 
those were to be published, which had a specific use.34
This was much narrower than the topics found in other journals: The Jour-
nal des sçavans had announced to review the most important books and provide 
news concerning physics, chemistry, mathematics, anatomy, the arts as well as 
the decisions concerning censorship at the ecclesiastical and secular courts or 
the universities.35 As for the Philosophical Transactions, Oldenburg had explicitly 
envisaged ‘perfecting all Philosophical Arts, and Sciences’.36
The Miscellanea’s focus on medicine led to a different structure of the volumes 
than in other journals: The main part of the Miscellanea consisted of shorter ob-
servations, which were printed in the order of their arrival at the editor’s and 
thus without regard to any similarities or relation of content.37 These observa-
tions reported from the activities of the members (and other contributors) and 
made the academy visible as an active network for the first time. The Philosophical 
Transactions on the other hand initially consisted of a wider range of genres like 
letters, reports from meetings of the Royal Society, reviews, book extracts and so 
on, which were grouped together according to thematic similarities.38
33 ‘Observationes medicas & physicas, vel anatomicas, vel botanicas, vel pathologicas, vel 
chirurgicas, vel therapeuticas, vel chymicas’ (Miscellanea curiosa 1670, title page).
34 ‘His praegnantibus rationibus mota Curiosa Societas opem & operam summorum Medico rum 
& Physicorum implorans Ephemerides Medicas quotannis colligere & conscribere, tan demos-
q[ue] typis divulgare sibi proposuit, in quas varias Physicas & Medicas observationes ra rio res 
sed fide dignans tam Practicas Medicas quàm Chirurgicas, nova experimenta tam Physica quàm 
Anatomica, nova inventa in Regno minerali, Animali, Vegetabili, remedia selectoria & chymica ge-
nerosiora singulari usu comprobata tam per literas communicata quàm ex rarioribus & pe-
regrini saepè idiomatis libris exhausta tanquam in viridarium quoddam multifariis flo rum 
blanditiis exornatum disponere constituerunt’ (Johann Michael Fehr, “Epistola invita to ria 
ad celeberrimos Europae medicos. Viri magnifici, amplissimi, nobilissimi, excellentis si mi, 
experientissimi medicinae anstites scrutatores naturales arcanorum solertissimi”, in: Miscel-
lanea curiosa 1670, separate pagination, here p. 6).
35 ‘Le dessein de ce Journal estant de faire scavoir ce qui se passé de nouveau dans la Re-
publique des lettres […] Premierement d‘un Catalogue exact de principaux livres […] En 
troisième lieu on sera scavoir les experiences de la Physique & de Chymie […] les nouvelles 
decouvertes qui se font dans les Arts & dans les Sciences […] Mathematiques: les observa-
tions du Ciel […] & ce que l‘Anatomie […]’ (Anonymous, “L’Imprimeur au lecteur”, in: Journal 
des sçavans 1665, January 5th, without pagination).
36 ‘[…] contribute what they can to to the Grand design of improving Natural knowledge, and 
perfecting all Philosophical Arts, and Sciences’ (Henry Oldenburg, “The Introduction”, in: 
Philosophical Transactions 1665, No. 1, pp. 1–2, here p. 2.).
37 Müller, “Leges”, pp. 259.
38 David Banks, “Starting science in the vernacular. Notes on some early issues of the Philo-
sophical Transactions and the Journal des Sçavans, 1665–1700”, in: ASp 55 (2009), pp. 1–17, 
here pp. 11–14.
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In the Miscellanea other texts genres were limited to the appendices, which 
would at first feature mostly longer, formally more heterogeneous treatises. 
Those were in part written by members of the ANC, in part they were reprints or 
translation of texts, which the editors deemed important additions to their read-
ers’ libraries. Later volumes also included lists of new books, excerpts and other 
genres, but the main part was still reserved for observations only.39
Both the observations and the texts in the appendices were attributed with 
a high visibility to their authors, who all were medical doctors though not nec-
essarily members of the ANC. In fact, in the early years of the Miscellanea there 
were more contributions by non-members than by members.40 Also there were 
almost no anonymous contributions, while in the Journal des sçavans anonymity 
was the rule, and in the Philosophical Transactions the authors’ names were often 
dropped in the editing process, apparently in a deliberate effort of Oldenburg to 
emphasize his personal importance for the journal.41 In the Miscellanea the au-
thors were not only named, a separate list would also reveal their occupation and 
residence.42 This means that besides communicating knowledge through the ob-
servations and the texts in the appendix, the Miscellanea also encouraged a direct 
communication between its readers and its contributors.
3.2 Text genres: observations and scholia
The choice of observations as the main part of the Miscellanea was deliberate: Ob-
servations were already well established as a text genre and epistemological mod-
el in the medical community. The collections of medical observations, which had 
been published since the middle of the 16th century, presented themselves as the 
result of a collective empirical effort, which tried to separate the descriptions of 
phenomena from their interpretation. This lead to a typographical distinction of 
the explanations and references to literature under the separate header of a scholi-
um. This also allowed for a wider reception of these texts, since they could be 
used as collections of facts independent of philosophical preferences.43 The ob-
39 Later volumes also contained obituaries for the wider known members. The treatises still 
require a detailed analysis just as much as the observations, especially since the authors of 
both parts of the Miscellanea overlap to a certain extent.
40 See the table by Buess, “Schweizer Ärzte”, p. 5.
41 Banks, “Starting science in the vernacular”, pp. 4–7; Noah Moxham, “Authors, Editors and 
News mongers: Form and Genre in the Philosophical Transactions under Henry Olden burg”, 
in: News Networks in Early Modern Europe, ed. Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham, Leiden/ 
Boston 2016, pp. 465–495.
42 ‘Syllabus Excellentiss. Dn. Medicorum qui pro augendo Tomo I. Ephemeridum Phyico-Me-
dicarum Observationes communicarunt: Secundum Ordinem Alphabeticum’ (Miscellanea 
curiosa 1670, n. p.). In the first volume this list preceded the table of contents, in later years it 
was sometimes put at the end of the volume.
43 Pomata, “Obervation Rising”, pp. 55–56, 64; Barnett, “Anspruch und Wirklichkeit”, p. 71. In 
con sequence, most of the norms, which are established for journal texts in the Enlighten-
ment are already present in the Miscellanea (Thomas Habel, “Gelehrtenzeitschriften”, in: His-
to ri sches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, ed. Gert Ueding et al., 12 vols, Tübingen/Berlin 1992–2012, 
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servations as a model or genre also emphasized the expertise of the observer or 
author, since they were not random notes on phenomena but were presented as 
the result of a refined perception.44
The conventions incorporated in the observations as a genre matched with the 
idea of an academy of professionals engaging in knowledge production without 
polemics. This is also apparent in the constant naming of the title of medical 
doctor for the contributors, and in the fact that there was almost no distinction 
between the contributions of members and non-members.
At the same time, the conventions of the observations were the cause of the 
problem between the editor and some of the contributors of the Miscellanea: Sachs 
von Lewenhaimb, the aforementioned Phosphorus, was instrumental in the prepa-
ration and publication of the Miscellanea, but he also received criticism after the 
first volume. In a letter to fellow academy member Georg Hiero ny mus Welsch 
(1624–1677) he wrote that some people were displeased, that he had added scholia 
to some of the observations. To his defence, he added that these scholia were only 
meant to further illustrate the cases through similar ones from rare books and that 
they would not contain any judgement. Furthermore, they would be necessary to 
also make the Miscellanea appeal to various scholars as well as noble men.45
Generally, in the published collections of observations the same person wrote 
the observations and the scholia, not a second party.46 To some extent, this discrep-
ancy is even visible in the academy’s leges: The original 1651 version was conceived 
before the idea of the Miscellanea, and it mentions the possibility of a commentary 
from a second party only in respect to the monographs, which the members were 
to write. The revised version from 1671, i. e. one year after the first volume of the 
Miscellanea, simply extends this paragraph to include publication in the journal but 
never the less continues to refer to the commentary as mantissa or corollarium, not 
scholium. In fact, the leges mention the scholium explicitly in another paragraph as 
the possibility for an author to comment on his own observations.47 In the actual 
volumes of the Miscellanea however, the scholia were in most cases added after-
wards by the editor, meaning that description and interpretation were not only 
separated but now had different authors all together. Furthermore, Sachs’ claim 
that only a few observation had been supplemented by a scholium was an un-
derstatement: Of the 160 observations in the first volume 59 had a scholium, 43 of 
vol. 10, pp. 318–328, here p. 323). But this should less be attributed to some progressive atti-
tude of the editors than to their reliance on an already established text genre.
44 Pomata, “Observation Rising”, p. 49–53, 59.
45 ‘Audio quibusdam scholia observationibus addita displicere. Paucis ista sunt addita, nec 
ἐπίκρισω faciunt, quod a nobis maxime alienum. Historica sunt, non critica, rariorem histo-
riam ex rarioribus libris, analogis historiis illustrantia: praecipue cum Ephemerides nostrae 
non pro solis Medicis conscribantur, quibus instructae Bibliothecae, sed et in gratiam aliorum 
cu riosorum, virorum illustrium, religiosorum, aliorumque eruditorum’ (Protocollum, p. 104).
46 Pomata, “Observation Rising”, pp. 50, 64.
47 Müller, “Leges”, pp. 250, 256, 259–260.
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which were written by Sachs, while the rest was either by the authors themselves 
(13) or by the person, who had transmitted the observation for publication (3).
Sachs may have actually intended to make the Miscellanea more appealing to 
a broader audience by adding non-critical commentary, but his intention was not 
necessarily evident to the reader. If a scholium had not been written by the author 
of the observation, this was only announced in small print at its end. On the one 
hand, the readers could have easily overlooked this, opening the possibility for 
a misattribution of interpretations to an author. If the readers, on the other hand, 
did notice the distinction of author and commentator, they were given no real 
explanation as to why this specific observation had been commented on, while 
others were not. Though contradictions between the observation and other re-
ports usually did not lead to an open judgement in the scholium, its consideration 
of alternatives at least pointed towards the possibility that the author may have 
misinterpreted the case. Adding to the whole problem was probably that Sachs 
did not only refer to literature for his comments on other’s observations but also 
to his own experience as a physician, while he supplemented only a single one 
of his own 13 observations with a scholium. At least in some instances the refer-
ences to similar phenomena and their causes could have been understood as an 
attempt to seize authority over the interpretations of the observations.
A good example for this problem is an observation by Johann Wepfer (1635–
1670), who was a physician from Basel and not a member of the academy.48 In a 
contribution to the first volume of the Miscellanea, Wepfer conveyed the medical 
history of the countess Franziska Elisabeth von Fürstenberg, who had suffered 
from an enlarged spleen. The failure of her usual purgative led to a different 
medication and set in motion a chain of events, which ultimately had led to her 
death in 1668. Wepfer was allowed to perform an autopsy, and he described the 
enlarged and disfigured spleen, which was coloured entirely black by blood. Fur-
thermore, he detected some inflammations nearby and a gastric ulcer.49 Sachs’ 
scholium to this observation starts with the information that Wepfer had already 
written about the countess’ spleen in 1661 in a letter to the famous Danish physi-
cian Thomas Bartholin (1616–1680). In this letter, Wepfer had surmised that blood 
serum had filled up the spleen and caused the enlargement. Bartholin, on the 
other hand, was of the opinion that the swelling was caused either by wandering 
matter from a previous illness or by blood from the arteries. Sachs now comment-
ed that the autopsy would clearly support Bartholin’s earlier explanation of the 
disease. After this statement, Sachs continued with other reports on similar cases 
from the books of Bartholin and other authors.50 While Wepfer seems to have cho-
48 Wepfer was born in Schaffhausen, studied medicine in Basel, Strasbourg and Paris, was 
assessor of the medical faculty in Basel and worked as physician in Schaffhausen (Jöcher, 
All gemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon, vol. 4, p. 1892). 
49 Johannes Wepfer, “Observatio II. Lien Magnus”, in: Miscellanea curiosa 1670, pp. 15–18.
50 Bartholin is probably the most referenced author in the scholia of the first volume, and he 
also contributed 13 observations of his own, just as much as Sachs.
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sen deliberately to omit his own interpretation of the case, Sachs not only added 
explanations. He also made a decision on the right explanation.
The aforementioned complains about this questionable shift of authority in 
the handling of the observations had no further consequences: Even though the 
number of scholia dropped significantly in the next volumes, this was more the 
result of Sachs untimely death in 1672. Over the following years, the new editors 
continued to comment on observations, leading to another protest from contrib-
utors in 1688, this time including Gabiel Clauder (1633–1691), who was at the time 
one of the adiuncti of the academy. Lukas Schroeck (1646–1730), who at this time 
was the editor of the journal, discussed the matter with the third president of 
the academy, Johann Georg Volckamer (1616–1693). Both again decided against a 
change and even referred back to Sachs’ reasoning as an explanation.51 Original-
ly, the scholia may not have been intended to establish authority, but the discus-
sion between the contributors and the editors shows, that the academy had seized 
control over the observations and was not willing to let go of it.
Interestingly enough, there were other comments on observations in the Miscel-
lanea, which did not attract criticism: Throughout the years, it became quite com-
mon for observations to refer back to contributions on similar topics in earlier 
volumes. In addition to this, some members wrote longer comments regarding a 
larger number of observations under the title of Parallelismus.52 In each of these cas-
es, the comments could be easily recognized as the additional opinion of a sepa-
rate person, and consequently none of them seem to have caused any controversy.
3.3 Editorship as power over the academy
As mentioned before, the publication of the Miscellanea was quickly considered 
the most important project of the Academia Naturae Curiosorum. However, the 
relationship between the president and the editors soon became strained: Johann 
Michael Fehr, the second president of the academy, put a stronger emphasis on 
hierarchy than his predecessor. This soon brought about a clash with the editors of 
the Miscellanea, who continued the work of Sachs in Breslau after his death. When 
Fehr, who was still located in Schweinfurt, ordered them to publish some docu-
ments in honour of one of the academy’s patrons in 1678, the editors refused for 
now unknown reasons. This started a series of conflicts between the president and 
the editors, which included the demand of a financial compensation for their ef-
forts but was mainly about their perceived lack of respect towards Fehr. At times, 
51 Protocollum, p. 104.
52 The first of these longer commentaries came from Rosinus Lentilius, “Parallelismus ad Ob-
servationes in Ann. II. Decad. I. Ephem. Curios. Contentis”, in: Miscellanea curiosa 1694, Ap-
pendix, pp. 124–134. Lentilius continued this commentary in the three subsequent volumes 
of the Miscellanea (1696, 1700, 1702) and the first volume of its’ successor the Ephemerides (1712). 
This overlapped with another commentary by Georg Detharding, “Observationes paralle-
lae, in Ephemeridum Curiosorum Decad. I. Ann. I”, in: Miscellanea curiosa 1700, pp. 147–156. 
Detharding’s commentary continued in the two subsequent volumes (1700, 1712).
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the editors completely broke off communication with the president. The problem 
was only solved, after the plague had made it impossible to continue printing the 
volumes in Leipzig and one of the editors in Breslau had died. Fehr now appoint-
ed a new editor and contracted a printer in Nuremberg.53 The whole conflict, but 
especially Fehr’s helplessness towards the editors shows, that they had expanded 
their power beyond the authority over the journal’s content due to its importance 
for the academy. But despite his problems, in a way Fehr was the one, who finally 
acknowledged the authority of the editors in respect to the observations: While 
Sachs and his immediate successors had simply been called collectores, the editor 
now was added to the leges of the academy as the director ephemeridum.54
4 Conclusion
The Academia Naturae Curiosorum is often characterized as a representative of 
modern science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, since it so strongly 
emphasized collaboration and empirical research. However, in contrast to other 
academies of the time, the ANC never openly criticized the universities or the 
more traditional fractions of medical and natural knowledge. Instead, the ANC 
called for a neutral collaboration of professionals and highlighted the continu-
ities from traditional to more recent knowledge: The members took on the names 
of antique philosophers or physicians and continued to reference their works, 
albeit by limiting the perspective to the description of phenomena.
With the Miscellanea curiosa, the academy started a journal to pursue its goal of 
enhancing medicine through communication of knowledge between profession-
als. But by trying to appeal to a broader audience, the academy transformed the 
established conventions of observation and scholium, turning the latter into com-
mentaries by the editors. This, at least in principle, meant a shift towards authori-
ty for the academy and led to protests from the members, which the president re-
peatedly decided to ignore. At the same time, the editors unexpectedly emerged 
as a power inside the academy and a threat to the authority of the president.
The early history of the Academia Naturae Curiosorum thus presents an effort 
to change the structures of knowledge production and communication. One can 
discern two phases: Initially the academy stressed the equality among members 
(or even physicians in general). The personal authority of antique scholars was 
in part dissolved by the appropriation of their names by the members as well as 
the use of their works as mere collections of facts interspersed with references to 
contemporary literature. In the second phase however, a new authority supersed-
ed this attempted equality: Sachs and the successive editors did not only compile 
observations but tried to establish a new model for the communication of knowl-
edge. This again led to a diminishment of personal authority, this time on part of 
the journal’s contributors. The forces responsible for this, i. e. the director ephemeri-
53 Barnett, Medical Authority, pp. 264–277.
54 Barnett, Medical Authority, p. 277.
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dum and the academy’s president, represented a new form of authority, which was 
less focused on specific items of knowledge than on the rules of communication.
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The Reconfiguration of Natura and Ars  
in Cartesian Rhetoric and the Epistemological Reflections 
in the Prize Questions of the French Academies1
Martin Urmann
1 Aristotelianism and natural knowledge from the perspective of rhetoric
Loin cet orgueil philosophique
Qui séduit la crédulité:
Le doute sage et méthodique
Seul éclaircit la vérité.
Interprète de la nature,
C’est à toi qu’elle a sans mesure
Prodigué ses secrets divers.
Viens disputer, nouveau Lyncée,
Aux fiers élèves du lycée,
L’honneur d’instruire l’univers.
[…]2 
This ode to Descartes, for which Father Lisle from the congregation of the Doc-
trinaries was awarded the prix de poésie by the eminent Académie des Jeux Flo-
raux in Toulouse in 1710, presents its protagonist as a truly epoch-making figure, 
setting his work apart from tradition. The author, a professor of rhetoric at the 
Collège de l’Esquille in Toulouse, subsequently guides the reader through the 
different areas of Descartes’ philosophy, with which he is clearly familiar. Be-
yond Cartesian astronomy and theory of matter,3 he is most impressed by the 
psychology, the theory of passions, that Descartes had developed. Lisle’s song 
of praise demonstrates his keen awareness of the ambivalence of this conception 
of the soul, which from its first appearance had led both to deterministic and to 
idealistic interpretations.4 As the ‘esclave souveraine’, in the author’s paradoxical 
1 The research for this article was conducted at the Collaborative Research Center 980 “Epis-
teme in Motion” (Freie Universität Berlin) as part of the project A07 Erotema. The Question as 
an Epistemic Genre in the Learned Societies of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.
2 “Descartes”, in: Recueil de plusieurs pièces d’éloquence et de poésie présentées à l’Académie des Jeux 
Floraux, pour les prix de l’année 1710, Toulouse 1710, pp. 1–6, here v. 1–10, p. 1.
3 See ibid., v. 41–60, pp. 3–4.
4 Cf. Stéphane Van Damme, Descartes. Essai d’histoire culturelle d’une grandeur philosophique, Pa-
ris 2002, pp. 61–72 and pp. 96–110 and François Azouvi, Descartes et la France. Histoire d’une 
passion nationale, Paris 2002, p. 32–35.
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phrase, the soul is subjected to the ‘lois du corps’, while at the same time it is 
the realm where ‘la matière, sans connaissance, reçoit […] des sentiments’ and 
gains spiritual qualities.5 Although the ode does not explicitly invoke the pineal 
gland, the famous bridge connecting the Cartesian dualism of body and mind, 
it shows considerable knowledge of Descartes’ conception of the passions and of 
the far-reaching epistemological consequences of the ‘doctrine nouvelle’.6 
The new philosophical principles had a particular impact in the theory of af-
fects which Descartes developed, or rather summed up, in Les passions de l’âme 
(1649).7 This conception of the passions in a way condenses the transformative 
elements that put rhetorical theory on a new basis in the second half of the 17th 
century. This leads us to one of the main issues of this article: the reconfiguration 
of natura and ars in concepts of rhetoric inspired by Descartes. Accordingly, I seek 
to show from the perspective of the history of rhetoric how Aristotelianism and 
natural knowledge interacted in this particular field. This article deals with the 
complex processes of amalgamation between, on the one hand, the knowledge of 
the textual tradition based ultimately on the principles of Aristotelian dialectic 
and rhetoric and, on the other, empirical knowledge based on the observation of 
nature. This interaction led to a remarkable epistemic ‘transfer’ in the rhetorical 
tradition.8 In order to reconstruct this transfer, I will first examine the reception 
of Cartesian philosophy in the universities and the collèges in France in the second 
half of the 17th century. I will then turn to the conception of a “new” rhetoric in 
Bernard Lamy’s Art de parler (1675) before focussing finally on the epistemological 
reflections in the rhetorical prize contests held by the French academies in the 
18th century. As a case study in early modern institutional history of knowledge, 
this essay is a contribution to this volume on science and Aristotelianism in Prot-
estant Europe by means of a comparative study in a different setting, that of an 
intellectual history of scientific and philosophical ideas in a Catholic context.
This approach seems fruitful when we seek to understand Aristotelianism as a 
dynamic tradition of knowledge open to (certain) debate(s) in several ways. First, 
it allows us to see that also at the Catholic universities in France the Aristotelian 
corpus could be applied to new contexts and, to a certain extent, be reinterpret-
ed. Moreover, the case of Lamy demonstrates how difficult it was to forsake the 
enduring power of tradition, even when the endeavour was essentially founded 
on the new notion of nature. Finally, consideration of the prize contests of the 
French academies is not merely an end in itself. The prize questions allow us to 
5 Lisle, “Descartes”, v. 66, v. 77 and v. 83–84 (pp. 4–5).
6 Ibid., v. 26, p. 2.
7 Cf. Panajotis Kondylis, Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus, Hamburg 
2002, pp. 188–196. 
8 On the notion of transfer as the gradual change of knowledge that results from the complex 
inter action of traditional and novel epistemic elements see Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum/Anita Tra-
nin ger, “Institution – Iteration – Transfer. Zur Einführung”, in: Wissen in Bewegung. Insti tu tion – 
Ite ra tion – Transfer (Episteme in Bewegung. Beiträge zu einer transdisziplinären Wis sens ge-
schich te, vol. 1), eds. Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum and Anita Traninger, Wiesbaden 2015, pp. 1–13.
© 2019, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 
ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11265-9 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19890-5 
317The Reconfiguration of Natura and Ars in Cartesian Rhetoric 
examine how the contestants reflected on the intricate relationship between Ar-
istotelianism and natural knowledge at that time. After the 1720s, this particular 
genre of public knowledge exchange actually stimulated an intense discourse on 
the relation between the textual tradition and the new sciences. This discourse 
bears witness to the reconfiguration of natura and ars which can be observed in 
the major rhetorical theories of the second half of the 17th century.
2 Descartes in the university
Research has established a very precise understanding of the reception of Des-
cartes’ work in France in the 17th and early 18th century.9 Despite the strong res-
onance among the leading researchers of the age and before its triumph in the 
years after 1700, Descartes’ philosophy had to pass through a critical phase 
during which it met fierce opposition from the three major institutions: the 
Church (particularly from the Jesuits), the theological faculties in the universities, 
and ultimately the Crown. The most spectacular occurrence of this confrontation 
undoubtedly took place in 1663 when the Church placed Descartes’ writings on 
the Index Librorum Prohibitorum (even though with the somewhat milder notation 
of donec corrigantur, i. e., until corrected).10
After the theological faculty of the university of Leuven officially forbid Des-
cartes’ notion of substance in 1662,11 the ban of his teachings in the French uni-
versities soon followed. In 1664 the University of Paris issued the first of several 
decrees demanding that physics classes should be based only on Aristotelian 
philosophy. In 1671 finally, the Sorbonne imposed an overall ban on the teachings 
of Descartes. Renewed in 1691 and 1704, it halted the introduction of Cartesian 
metaphysics into the theological curricula. The idea that matter and extension 
coincide was absolutely incompatible with the doctrine of transubstantiation. 
Many of the collèges, too, implemented restrictive measures against Cartesianism, 
in part because of pressure from the Crown.12
At the centre of one of the most intense controversies, we find Bernard Lamy 
(1640–1715), the professor of rhetoric and philosophy at the Oratorian collège in 
Angers.13 Lamy, to whose rhetorical work I will turn in the next section, early in 
his career had defended Cartesian ontology in metaphysical questions and con-
tinued to teach his positions on the res extensa in Angers (from 1673). When, like 
other Cartesians, he was suspected of advocating democracy as a more rational 
form of government than monarchy, he was suspended from office in August 
 9 See especially Van Damme, Descartes, pp. 27–137 and Azouvi, Descartes et la France, pp. 15–93.
10 With Descartes’ death in 1650, however, this ban was actually definitive. Cf. Roger Ariew, 
Descartes and the Last Scholastics, Ithaca/London 1999, pp. 173–181 and Azouvi, Descartes et la 
France, pp. 23–28.
11 See Van Damme, Descartes, p. 90.
12 See ibid., pp. 96–102 and Azouvi, Descartes et la France 38–42.
13 On the following see ibid., pp. 43–45. See also François Girbal, Bernard Lamy (1640–1715). 
Étude biographique et bibliographique, Paris 1964, pp. 28–42.
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1675 by royal decree. The collège of Angers, which had long tried to protect him, 
was now forced to prohibit the teaching of Cartesian positions and to exile Lamy 
to the abbey of Saint-Martin-de-Miséré near Grenoble. But thanks to the protec-
tion of the cardinal Le Camus, Lamy could again take up his courses of philoso-
phy at the séminaire de Grenoble as well as publish his theories. 
The outcome of the Lamy affair already shows that, in the practice of universi-
ty or college teaching, there remained some room for manoeuvre with regard to 
Cartesian philosophy, despite official prohibitions. In fact, there was a sustained 
interest in Descartes’s theories at the French universities and collèges from the 1660s, 
as especially Laurence Brockliss has shown.14 This interest came from a number of 
professors who were willing to confront the new teachings and introduce them 
into their classes. The first to do so were the professors of physics, who discussed 
mechanistic principles within a system that was still dominated by the Aristotelian 
tradition. This process of assimilation continued to broaden with the result that by 
1690, due to the work of various professors at the University of Paris and beyond, 
the basis for a more heterogeneous system of physics had been created. This system 
was capable of absorbing the main tendencies in contemporary natural philoso-
phy—without abandoning the Aristotelian foundation of university physics.15 
The 1690s, then, marked a turning point as, from that time, the agenda was 
increasingly set by convinced adherents of Cartesian philosophy who sought to 
establish mechanics as the defining system of physics at the university. After the 
University of Paris had been won over in the early 1700s, the Cartesian cause 
soon became widely accepted. By 1720 ‘there was hardly a collège de plein exercice 
or a regular convent that had not succumbed’ to the mechanists. Even though the 
professors may not have been wholesale supporters of every Cartesian position, 
the ‘rejection of Aris totle was rapid and universal’.16 The new teachings then pen-
etrated even into the classes in logic and to a certain extent even in metaphysics.17
It is particularly interesting to see how the professors dealt with the new phi-
losophy of nature, especially in the period between 1660 and 1690 when it had 
not yet become the new consensus at the universities. In fact, they discussed 
Descartes’s theses within the traditional framework of the disputatio in order 
to see how they measured up against the Aristotelian system.18 The axioms of 
mechanist physics, including its empirical discoveries, thus fed into the dialec-
14 See the fundamental work of Laurence W. B. Brockliss, French Higher Education in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries. A Cultural History, Oxford 1987, pp. 197–216, 332–333 and pp. 345–376.
15 Aristotelian physics, as Brockliss notes, had by then ‘become a highly eclectic philosophy’. 
Ibid., p. 350. See also idem, “Der Philosophieunterricht in Frankreich”, in: Die Philosophie des 
17. Jahrhunderts, vol. 2/2: Frankreich und Niederlande, ed. Jean-Pierre Schobinger (Grundriß der 
Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. Friedrich Ueberweg), Basel 1993, pp. 3–32, here pp. 23–25.
16 Brockliss, French Higher Education, pp. 350–351. Brockliss consequently speaks of the ‘Carte-
sian era’ between 1690 and 1740. The last Aristotelian textbook by the Jesuit Gaspard Buhon 
actually appeared in 1723, ibid., p. 187.
17 Cf. ibid., pp. 197–216. 
18 See ibid., pp. 337–350. 
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tical logic of the disputation, which was originally designed to verify or refute 
propositions. This seeming paradox is understandable if one considers the fact 
that the disputatio remained an essential form of knowledge debate in the early 
modern period.19 Moreover, there are important parallels between the two modes 
of knowledge on a formal level, which facilitated this epistemic transfer. Both 
Aristotelians and Cartesians conceived of physics as a science based on deductive 
principles. Neither of the camps regarded physics as founded on observation and 
empirical data. The fact that the two deductive systems, axiomatic on the one 
hand, dialectical on the other, were quite different in nature was not a major 
problem to the professors; at least it did not stop them from combining the two 
modes of demonstration.20 Besides, both of these theories of physics were based 
on logical, rather than mathematical principles. Descartes and his followers, to be 
sure, attached crucial importance to mathematics, but principally as a model for 
clear deductive reasoning. It was only with Newton that the laws of nature were 
expressed in a purely mathematical language.21
In their discussions of Descartes’s theories, the professors must certainly have 
realised substantial divergences from the Aristotelian tradition. In this regard, it 
is particularly interesting to see how they dealt with these differences and thus 
to examine the terms of the epistemic transfer. The most common attitude was 
the position of Aristotelian eclecticism, which basically preserved the traditional 
principles of physics while at the same time seeking to integrate the findings of 
the new philosophy of nature.22 It is striking to see how important it was to the 
professors to make the new teachings appear as traditional as possible. Conse-
quently, they preserved the Aristotelian notions of form and element, and they 
referred to their positions as Aristotelian although they were based on the prin-
ciples of matter and motion. In this way, Descartes could even be presented as 
a materialist Aristotelian. This was the perspective taken by François Bayle, a 
professor of philosophy at the university of Toulouse, who in 1700 dedicated an 
entire textbook to the reconciliation of Aris totle and Descartes.23 The more “radi-
cal” professors on the other hand tended to present Aris totle as a mechanist avant 
la lettre whose theories had been wrongly interpreted later by the scholastics.24 
19 On the persistence of the disputatio see especially the contributions in: Frühneuzeitliche Dispu-
tationen. Polyvalente Produktionsapparate gelehrten Wissens, eds. Marion Gindhart, Hanspeter 
Marti and Robert Seidel, Köln/Weimar/Wien 2016 and Hanspeter Marti, “Disputation und 
Dissertation. Kontinuität und Wandel im 18. Jahrhundert”, in: Disputatio 1200–1800. Form, 
Funktion und Wirkung eines Leitmediums universitärer Wissenskultur, eds. Marion Gindhart 
and Ursula Kundert, Berlin/New York 2010, pp. 63–85. See also Emmanuel Bury, “Les lieux 
de l’argumentation dans les discours médicaux du XVIIe siècle”, in: Archives internationales 
d’histoire des sciences 55/154 (2005), pp. 35–54.
20 See Brockliss, “Der Philosophieunterricht in Frankreich”, p. 29.
21 See ibid., p. 30.
22 Cf. Brockliss, French Higher Education, pp. 352–359.
23 See idem, “Der Philosophieunterricht in Frankreich”, p. 27.
24 See ibid.
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When the divergences from the Aristotelian model were too serious, they were 
either tacitly ignored or reinterpreted; sometimes the new facts were simply de-
nied. The latter applies especially to the cases of superlunary comets, new stars, 
and solar maculae.25 Regarding the sunspots, the professors in fact denied their 
existence in order to prevent harm to the Aristotelian system. Although they had 
to admit the empirical observation of the phenomena they countered by denying 
that the spots were situated on the sun.26 
The reception of Descartes in the French universities and collèges is also sig-
nificant in terms of the confessional dimension natural knowledge had assumed 
in the early modern period. It clearly shows that, in the 17th century, the dynamic 
tradition of Aristotelianism was not the privilege of the Protestant universities. It 
is true that many of the professors who were particularly open to Cartesian theo-
ries were reform-oriented Oratorians27 or even close to Jansenism and hence in a 
certain way theologically predisposed to the Augustinian heritage in Descartes’ 
philosophy.28 Moreover, the secular philosophy professors played an important 
part, especially at the University of Paris. Nevertheless, all of these university 
lecturers were, of course, of the Catholic faith and, more importantly, they taught 
at Catholic institutions. Finally, even among the professors of physics who were 
receptive to Cartesian philosophy there were many Jesuits.29
In the next section, the analysis of Bernard Lamy’s Art de parler will demon-
strate the epistemic transfer that resulted when the Cartesian notion of nature 
was introduced into the field of rhetoric.
3	 Bernard	Lamy	and	the	Reconfiguration	of	Natura and Ars in Cartesian 
Rhetoric
‘Les passions ont des caractères particuliers avec lesquels elles se peignent 
elles-mêmes dans le discours.’30
In the first place, it has to be emphasised how Cartesian philosophy fundamen-
tally challenged rhetoric.31 According to Descartes, the reasonable inner nature 
25 See Brockliss, French Higher Education, pp. 342–344.
26 See ibid., p. 342.
27 Cf. the detailed prosoprographic documentation in ibid., pp. 459–477, here especially pp. 463–
468; see also ibid., pp. 348–350.
28 On this relation see Azouvi, Descartes et la France, pp. 24–27 and Kondylis, Die Aufklärung, p. 182.
29 On the confessional dimension see also Brockliss’s conclusion regarding France and other parts 
of Catholic Europe in The Cambridge History of Science (ed. Roy Porter, vol. 4: Eighteenth-Cen-
tury Science, Cambridge e.a. 2003, p. 46): ‘The Jesuit and other Aristotelian professors’ did not 
teach ‘a physics completely oblivious of contemporary developments in the natural sciences: 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Aristotelianism was a vibrant and eclectic physical phi-
losophy that successfully incorporated most of the new observational discoveries’.
30 Bernard Lamy, La Rhétorique ou l’art de parler, 4th Ed., Amsterdam 1699 (repr. Brighton 1969; 
abbreviated below as ‘Adp’), book II, chap. 7, p. 108.
31 On the following see in particular Thomas M. Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric: 
Varieties of Cartesian Rhetorical Theory, Carbondale/Edwardsville 1990, especially pp. 1–5 and 
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of man representing the rational external order is the only legitimate and valid 
source of knowledge, at least as far as the programmatic level of Cartesian epis-
temology is concerned. The central position of nature (both external and internal 
to man) as the field of methodical investigation, the deeply rooted scepticism to-
wards all (verbal) media interfering with the direct study of the objects of nature 
and the inward turn in the interior monologue of reason with itself were all fac-
tors that not only undermined the status of rhetoric, but compelled Descartes to 
reject it in the Discours de la méthode (1637): 
J’estimais fort l’éloquence, et j’étais amoureux de la poésie; mais je pensais 
que l’une et l’autre étaient des dons de l’esprit, plutôt que des fruits de 
l’étude. Ceux qui ont le raisonnement le plus fort, et qui digèrent le mieux 
leurs pensées, afin de les rendre claires et intelligibles, peuvent toujours 
le mieux persuader ce qu’ils proposent, encore qu’ils ne parlassent que 
bas-breton, et qu’ils n’eussent jamais appris de rhétorique. Et ceux qui ont 
les inventions les plus agréables, et qui les savent exprimer avec le plus 
d’ornement et de douceur, ne laisseraient pas d’être les meilleurs poètes, 
encore que l’art poétique leur fût inconnu.32 
As Descartes had stated earlier in the Regulae ad directionem ingenii (1628/29), rheto-
ric, only probabilistic in nature, was not part of the ‘cognitio certa et evidens’ that 
‘omnis scientia’ was to be.33 
Nevertheless, this denial of rhetoric, presented itself in a highly rhetorical 
manner,34 did not lead to the end of rhetoric. Instead, it provoked a new interest 
in the traditional art of persuasion: it re-focussed the question regarding what 
actually made a speech effective, or, more generally, how the spoken or written 
word could most effectively convey the intended message to the public. Besides, 
there was an urgent need to redefine the specific role of rhetoric among the vari-
ous and evolving branches of learning.35
pp. 26–31, Gilles Declercq, “La rhétorique classique entre évidence et sublime (1650–1675)”, 
in: Histoire de la rhétorique dans l’Europe moderne (1450–1950), ed. Marc Fumaroli, Paris 1999, 
pp. 629–706, here pp. 638–645 and Kondylis, Die Aufklärung, pp. 174–190.
32 René Descartes, “Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la vérité 
dans les sciences”, in: Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, vol. 6, new 
Ed., Paris 1965, pp. 1–78, here p. 7. 
33 ‘Omnis scientia est cognitio certa et evidens […]. Atque ita per hanc propositionem rejicimus 
illas omnes probabiles tantum cognitiones, nec nisi perfecte cognitis, et de quibus dubitari 
non potest, statuimus esse credendum’. René Descartes, „Regulae ad directionem ingenii,“ 
in: ibid., vol. 10, pp. 349–488, here p. 362. 
34 Cf. Marc Fumaroli, “Ego scriptor: rhétorique et philosophie dans le Discours de la méthode”, 
in: Problématique et réception du Discours de la méthode et des Essais, ed. Henry Méchoulan, 
Paris 1988, pp. 31–46; Roger Ariew, “Descartes’s Fable and Scientific Methodology”, in: Ar-
chives internationales d’histoire des sciences 55/154 (2005), pp. 127–138.
35 See Dietmar Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik. Untersuchungen zum Wandel der Rhetoriktheorie 
im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Tübingen 2004, pp. 297–302; Rudolf Behrens, Problematische Rheto-
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Cartesian rhetoric—that is seventeenth-century conceptions of eloquence in-
spired by Descartes, including essentially the works of Bernard Lamy, Nicolas Male-
branche, Géraud de Cordemoy, and the Logic of Port-Royal—36 is one distinct and 
particularly influential way to investigate these questions. In Bernard Lamy’s work 
La Rhétorique ou l’art de parler, first published in 1675, the tensions between tradition 
and innovation resulting from the reconfiguration of natura and ars become most 
apparent.37 A success from the start, the book reached its sixth edition in 1701 and re-
mained a crucial reference in France throughout the 18th century. Lamy’s work was 
also widely read beyond France, thanks to an early translation into English and a lat-
er one into German. In Germany, Gottsched was one of its most fervent admirers.38 
In Lamy’s Art de parler, the crucial shift that is typical of the new Cartesian con-
ception of rhetoric becomes especially evident. Eloquence is no longer conceived 
as an ars, that is as a learnable technique based upon certain normative rules. On 
the contrary, Lamy wants to develop a theory of language which analyses com-
munication by means of linguistic and psychological methods.39 Accordingly, he 
seeks to explore the empirical mechanisms operating when the written or spoken 
word is used effectively and convincingly. This implies a fundamental redefini-
tion of the relation between natura and ars. This transformation was already axi-
omatic in the Logique of Port-Royal (1662), whose authors declare: ‘Ainsi cet art ne 
consiste pas à trouver le moyen de faire ces opérations, puisque la nature seule nous 
le fournit en nous donnant la raison: mais à faire des réflexions sur ce que la nature 
nous fait faire.’ 40 By denying the foundations of logic and rhetoric in the normative 
principles of an ars, Arnauld and Nicole also delegitimize, like Descartes in the 
passage quoted from the Discours de la méthode, the benefit of rules for those seek-
ing to reason logically and to speak eloquently: ‘Tout cela se fait naturellement, et 
quelquefois mieux par ceux qui n’ont appris aucune règle […], que par ceux qui 
les ont apprises.’41 This theoretical idea is diametrically opposed to the rhetorical 
tradition which had, of course, recognised the dimension of ingenium, the natural 
gift of the orator. But that had always been secondary to exercitatio and studium, 
the constant learning and practising of one’s skills by means of the authoritative 
rik. Studien zur französischen Theoriebildung der Affektrhetorik zwischen Cartesianismus und Früh-
aufk lärung, München 1982, pp. 30–32.
36 The term is used as in Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric and Till, Transformationen 
der Rhetorik, pp. 297–340.
37 For the following analysis, I rely heavily on the reconstruction and interpretation of Lamy’s 
work by Dietmar Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 319–340. See also the crucial analysis 
by Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric, pp. 125–167.
38 See John T. Harwood, “Introduction”, in: The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy, ed. 
idem, Carbondale 1986, pp. 131–163, here p. 131 and Girbal, Bernard Lamy, pp. 47–48.
39 See Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, especially p. 303 and p. 314.
40 Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l’Art de penser, ed. Pierre Clair and François 
Girbal, 2. rev. Ed., Paris 1993, p. 38 (my emphasis). On the Logic of Port-Royal see Carr, Des-
cartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric, pp. 62–87; Behrens, Problematische Rhetorik, pp. 33–83 and 
Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 302–313.
41 Arnauld/Nicole, La Logique, p. 38.
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classical texts.42 This demonstrates once again how deeply embedded the episte-
mological ideal of the ‘mirror of nature’ had become, even in rhetoric.43 
What sets Lamy’s and the Port-Royal authors’ conceptions of rhetoric apart 
from Descartes, however, is the role attributed to language in the cognitive pro-
cess. Even for Arnauld and Nicole, who in this respect are much closer to Des-
cartes’s universal epistemological ideal of the esprit géométrique than Lamy, it is 
clear that, apart from the fields of logic and the exact sciences, language does 
influence human understanding. At least they concede that the established use of 
words and their polyvalence cannot be simply done away with and that this fact, 
though irrelevant to logic, is not irrelevant in a broader epistemological perspec-
tive.44 What is more, Arnauld and Nicole, along with Augustine and the Doctrina 
Christiana, consider religious experience as the legitimate field for the evocation 
of strong affects. This realm is hence crucial to the ‘return’ not of rhetoric but of 
the ‘rhetorical’ in the Logique.45 Its source and its aim are the passions of the heart.
The strongest criticism of Descartes in this context comes from Pascal. Assum-
ing that different forms of reasoning and specific rationalities are involved in 
human understanding and, more fundamentally, that man’s cognitive faculties 
are inextricably linked to the passions of the soul and ultimately founded in an 
intuitive contemplation of the world, Pascal distinguishes the ‘esprit de justesse’ 
and the ‘esprit de finesse’ from the ‘esprit de géométrie’.46 The ‘esprit de finesse’ 
in particular is the expression of spontaneous judgement beyond rational grasp. 
It relies on a sense of certainty conveyed by the human heart (‘cœur)’, which for 
Pascal represents the ultimate source of truth: 
Nous connaissons la vérité non seulement par la raison mais encore par le 
cœur. C’est de cette dernière sorte que nous connaissons les premiers prin-
cipes et c’est en vain que le raisonnement, qui n’y a point de part, essaie de 
les combattre […]. Cette impuissance ne doit donc servir qu’à humilier la 
raison, qui voudrait juger de tout, mais non pas à combattre notre certitude 
comme s’il n’y avait que la raison capable de nous instruire.47 
42 See the fundamental article by Florian Neumann, “Natura-ars-Dialektik”, in: Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, ed. Gert Ueding, vol. 6, Tübingen 2003, col. 139–171 and Till, Trans-
formationen der Rhetorik, pp. 77–87; see also Henri-Irénée Marrou, Histoire de l’éducation dans 
l’antiquité, 2. rev. Ed., Paris 1950, pp. 268–282 and pp. 359–389.
43 The allusion is of course to Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, new Ed., Prince-
ton/Oxford 2009, especially pp. 45–67.
44 See the reflections on the ‘signification propre’ in Arnauld/Nicole, La Logique, p. 94 and p. 100. 
This aspect is especially underlined by Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric, pp. 84–86.
45 Ibid., pp. 68–75. In this context, Carr also speaks of ‘the rhetorical without rhetoric’, ibid., 
pp. 85–87. See also Behrens, Problematische Rhetorik, pp. 77–83.
46 See Blaise Pascal, Pensées, in: idem, Œuvres complètes, ed. Michel Le Guern, vol. 2, Paris 
2000, fr. 465 and fr. 466, pp. 741–744. On these specific forms of reasoning see Claude Chan-
talat, À la recherche du goût classique, Paris 1992, pp. 64–70, Eduard Zwierlein, Blaise Pascal, 
Hamburg 1996, pp. 73–83 and Declercq, “La rhétorique classique”, p. 645 and pp. 650–654. 
47 Pascal, Pensées, fr. 101, pp. 573–574. See also the famous passage from the Art de persuader: 
‘Personne n’ignore qu’il y a deux entrées par où les opinions sont reçues dans l’âme, qui 
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Lamy’s Rhétorique takes a position that, like the Logique of Port-Royal, affirms 
the Cartesian idea of methodical science but at the same time gives considerably 
more weight to rhetoric.48 The latter is considered the fundamental medium and 
propaedeutic tool without which philosophical findings could not be conveyed.49 
According to Lamy, only through rhetoric are the abstract notions of philosophy 
made understandable to man as a sensual being, who is above all exposed to the 
suggestive powers of the passions. What is more, Lamy believes in the episte-
mological complementarity of mathematics and rhetoric which goes beyond the 
traditional ideal of a formal analogy between the two disciplines dating back to 
Quintilian. 50 For Lamy, rhetoric’s task is to develop a natural language of affects 
which at the same time makes the passions of the heart work towards reason and 
the methodical ideal of the esprit géométrique. To develop a deeper understanding 
of this theoretical approach, we now have to turn to Lamy’s argument presented 
in the Art de parler and especially to his conception of the passions.
What is particularly interesting about Lamy’s chief work is the fact that, in 
some respects, it seeks to establish once more a system of rhetoric, even though 
the ars rhetorica had come under such severe criticism in the 17th century, especially 
in France, that the authors of the major treatises renounced the term “rhétorique”, 
preferring instead titles like Art de persuader (as for example Pascal’s work from 
1660).51 Lamy, who explicitly refers to Augustine, Horace, and Quintilian, does 
not simply dismiss the tradition of rhetoric. He wants to revise it and take it to a 
new (theoretical) level. In fact, his work is originally divided into two independent 
parts, the first one dealing extensively with the ‘art de parler’ in terms of an ana-
lytical theory of language, the second one, much shorter, treating the ‘art de per-
suader’.52 The latter part is, in a way, Lamy’s tribute to the officia-rhetoric, that is to 
the classical teaching system of eloquence which goes back to Cicero and Quintil-
ian. It is highly significant that the traditional pillars of the ars rhetorica—to which 
Lamy refers symptomatically as ‘la science de gagner les cœurs’53—are treated so 
sont ses deux principales puissances, l’entendement et la volonté’, Œuvres complètes, ed. 
Jean Mesnard, vol. 3, Paris 1964, p. 413. For the on-going debate on the notion of cœur in Pas-
cal see Vincent Carraud, Pascal et la philosophie, Paris 1992, especially pp. 250–273, Wilhelm 
 Schmidt- Biggemann, Blaise Pascal, München 1999, pp. 46–50 and Hervé Pasqua, “Le cœur et 
la raison selon Pascal”, in: Revue Philosophique de Louvain 95/3 (1997), pp. 379–394.
48 See also Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric, pp. 137–141.
49 See Lamy, Adp, pp. 316–339. On the relation of philosophy and rhetoric in Lamy see also Lyn-
dia Roveda, “Des épines aux fleurs des mathématiques: l’enseignement des sciences chez 
Bernard Lamy”, in: Archives internationales d’histoire des sciences 55/154 (2005), pp. 193–202 and 
Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 324–325.
50 See especially Roveda, “Des épines aux fleurs des mathématiques”, pp. 199–201.
51 Cf. Declercq, “La rhétorique classique”, p. 632.
52 It is only with the quoted edition from 1699, that the ‘discours’ on the ‘art de persuader’ is 
integrated into the work as the ‘livre cinquième’ (comprising less than one fifth of the entire 
book). See also Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, p. 322.
53 Lamy, Adp, p. 330.
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briefly in the Art de parler.54 In fact, Lamy speaks very little of the rules of inventio 
and dispositio,55 two of the five major canons of the art, thereby marginalizing the 
logical and analytical dimension of rhetoric, which gets ‘amputée de l’art de la 
preuve’.56 This low esteem, notably for the system of topics, was well-established 
in the rationalist critique of rhetoric in France, especially in the Cartesian context.57 
It must appear even more symptomatic, however, that the principles of elo-
cutio, that is the rules of style and tropes, which had constituted one of the key 
aspects of rhetoric since an tiqui ty, do not figure at all in the framework of the art 
de persuader. Lamy intentionally removes these major topics from the traditional 
context and elaborates on them from the Cartesian perspective on language and 
the human passions developed as the art de parler in the first section of the book.58 
Indeed, this new theoretical view of elocutio constitutes the centre-piece of Lamy’s 
(re-)definition of rhetoric, which Dietmar Till has described as an ‘Affekt-Gram-
matik’, a grammar of affects.59
Dismissing the rules of the ars, Lamy seeks to demonstrate that eloquent speech 
stems rather from the natural use of language, that is from its use in accordance 
with certain natural principles. Instead of prescribing rules with which to struc-
ture an eloquent speech, he wants to disclose its non-intentional mechanisms in 
order to explain what actually happens when communication achieves the effect 
of convincing others. For Lamy, the key lies in the passions. In essence, he assumes 
that ‘les passions sont bonnes en elles-mêmes: leur seul dérèglement est criminel. 
Ces sont des mouvements dans l’âme qui la portent au bien, et qui l’éloignent du 
mal’.60 Moreover, the effective regulation of the passions is not a normative matter 
but rather depends on their correct internal economy. Believing that ‘l’on ne peut 
faire agir les hommes que par le mouvement des passions’,61 Lamy makes the case 
for fighting passions with counter-passions, even if the latter are dangerous as 
such.62 Rightly conceived, rhetoric must hence be a rhetoric of affect that represents 
54 This fact puzzled contemporary critics until the end of the 18th century. Cf. Till, Transfor-
mationen der Rhetorik, pp. 321–324. On the traditional system of the officia oratoris see ibid., 
pp. 71–97 and Karl-Heinz Göttert, Einführung in die Rhetorik. Grundbegriffe, Geschichte, Rezep-
tion, 4th rev. Ed., Paderborn 2009, pp. 27–71.
55 See Lamy, Adp, pp. 306–314 and the critical conclusion regarding ‘cette méthode des lieux’ 
(pp. 314–316). On dispositio see ibid., pp. 354–365. 
56 Declercq, “La rhétorique classique”, p. 644.
57 See ibid., pp. 632–646 and Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 89–92 and pp. 305–307.
58 See especially the ‘livre second’ of the Art de parler, pp. 85–152.
59 Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 328–334. Regarding the Logique of Port-Royal, Behrens, 
Problematische Rhetorik, pp. 77–83, also speaks of a ‘grammaire affective’.
60 Lamy, Adp, p. 343.
61 Ibid., p. 344.
62 Lamy thus thinks that the evocation of stimulating affects is the best remedy against inhib-
iting passions, even when it comes to strong emotions like anger. If ‘la colère’ is considered 
‘un mouvement, une affection de l’âme qui nous anime à vaincre les empêchements qui nous 
retardent la possession de quelque bien’, no one can say ‘raisonnablement qu’il n’est pas per-
mis d’exciter la colère et se servir de son mouvement pour animer les hommes à chercher le 
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the natural movements of the heart—‘les mouvements du cœur’.63 This means not 
only that the orator must appeal to the emotions of the audience—that, to be sure, 
had been a founding principle of the ars rhetorica since Aris totle. According to 
Lamy, eloquent speech is the direct expression of the human heart which uses the 
natural means of passions to articulate itself. Thus, the passions themselves are 
reflected in language, ‘les passions se peignent elles-mêmes dans le discours’.64 
For Lamy, the language of the heart is superior to any form of knowledge written 
in books: ‘Il n’y a point de meilleur livre que son propre cœur; c’est une folie de 
vouloir aller chercher dans les écrits des autres ce que l’on trouve chez soi’.65
In the Art de parler, the human heart takes on exceptional significance as the 
primordial, natural source of rhetoric. The crucial means for turning the ‘move-
ments of the heart’ into language are the tropes and figures of speech. They are 
of fundamental importance to Lamy since there is no ‘langue assez riche et assez 
abondante pour fournir des termes capables d’exprimer toutes les différentes fac-
es sous lesquelles l’esprit peut se représenter une même chose’.66 Again, this is 
only partly surprising against the backdrop of rhetorical tradition and especially 
given the appreciation of the tropes in early modern rhetorical theory.67 What is 
new, however, is Lamy’s theoretical explanation of the origins of the tropes: ‘Ce 
n’est point l’art qui les règle; ce n’est point l’étude qui les doit trouver [sic], ce sont 
des effets naturels de la passion’.68
Moreover, in Lamy’s description of the tropes the physiological conception of 
language typical of the Art de parler—a work that starts with a chapter on the ‘or-
ganes de la voix’ and discusses style in the context of the ‘qualité de la substance 
du cerveau et des esprits animaux’—69 becomes particularly evident. The tropes 
are in fact considered the immediate correlate of the physiological impact of af-
fects. They directly represent the movements of the passions and ‘imprint’ them 
into the mind of the reader: ‘Les figures impriment dans l’esprit des lecteurs les 
passions dont elles sont les caractères’.70 From here the impressions find a direct 
way into language, which in Lamy appears, of course, a peculiarly passive medi-
um: ‘Le discours est l’image de l’esprit: on peint son humeur et ses inclinations 
dans ses paroles sans que l’on y pense’.71 Here, Lamy shows himself as a firm 
bien qu’on leur propose.’ Lamy even concludes that: ‘dans les passions les plus déréglées […] 
il y a toujours quelque chose de bon’. Ibid., pp. 343–344. 
63 Ibid., p. 263. See also p. 108 and pp. 251–254. Lamy also speaks of the ‘mouvements de l’âme’, 
ibid., especially pp. 231–232. 
64 Ibid., p. 108 (see also above, footnote 30). 
65 Ibid., p. 136. See also Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, p. 332.
66 Lamy, Adp, p. 90.
67 Cf. Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 310–313, Declercq, “La rhétorique classique”, pp. 644–
649 and Göttert, Einführung in die Rhetorik, pp. 149–166.
68 Lamy, Adp, p. 137 (my emphasis).
69 Ibid., pp. 1–5 and pp. 249–252. The physiological approach is very pronounced throughout 
the entire work. 
70 Ibid., p. 293. 
71 Ibid., p. 249.
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adherent of Cartesian language theory in general and in particular follows the 
approach of Géraud de Cordemoy’s Discours physique de la parole (1668).72
Compared to Lamy’s theoretical conception, the discussion of the diverse 
tropes and figures of speech, which constitutes a major part of the second section 
of the Art de parler, appears fairly traditional.73 This contrast is symptomatic of 
a greater ambivalence, that is to say the hybrid character of a work throughout 
which traditional and novel elements are inextricably linked and overlap one an-
other. This is due to the specific way in which Lamy redefines the relation be-
tween natura and ars. Actually, Lamy merely inverts this constellation and gives 
new theoretical explanations to well-established rhetorical issues. Lamy’s reinter-
pretation of Quintilian’s famous comparison of the art of rhetoric with fencing is 
particularly symptomatic in this respect.74 Quintilian refers to a fencer who, fight-
ing without art and tactical training, acts merely impetuously. It is only by means 
of those qualities that he can overcome his adversary, like a good orator outdoes 
his opponent with well chosen and well prepared words. Lamy actually inverts 
this similitude by arguing that every fighter (or as he says ‘soldat’) in imminent 
danger resorts by natural impulse of the passions to the feints and postures that 
will save him from defeat.75 Yet, despite the pronounced re-interpretation, the 
traditional image symbolising the role of the ars rhetorica remains untarnished. 
Lamy alters the theoretical background which leads to essentially different expla-
nations. But he does not change the substance of the rhetorical tradition in itself.
Nevertheless, the new theory of rhetoric as the natural language of the passions 
emanating from the human heart was most influential on the way eloquence was 
conceived until well into the 18th century. This becomes particular evident when 
we turn to the prize questions of the French academies.
4	 The	Epistemological	Reflections	in	the	Prize	Questions	of	the	French	
Academies
‘C’est un sentiment […] auquel il faut se livrer pour le connaître, et que l’âme 
est d’autant moins capable d’étudier, qu’elle en est plus affectée.’76
Finally, the prize competitions held by the French academies offer us a source that 
is particularly suitable to assess how deeply the transformations of rhetorical the-
ory penetrated into the wider practice of eloquence in France in the 18th century. 
72 On Cordemoy see Behrens, Problematische Rhetorik, pp. 87–95 and Till, Transformationen der 
Rhe torik, pp. 314–319.
73 See the listing of the over thirty tropes and figures of speech which Lamy treats in short 
articles like entries in a dictionary, Adp, pp. 92–100 and pp. 114–135.
74 Cf. ibid., pp. 137–141 and pp. 362–363. See also Göttert, Einführung in die Rhetorik, pp. 165–166.
75 ‘La passion le rend adroit et ingénieux; elle lui fait trouver des armes’. In the case of the 
orator, these weapons are none other than the tropes: ‘Les figures sont les armes de l’âme’. 
Lamy, Adp, pp. 137–138.
76 Recueil des ouvrages de poésie et d’éloquence, présentés à l’Académie des Jeux Floraux, en l’année 
1765, Toulouse 1765, pp. 58–59.
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In fact, the prize questions represent a genre that mostly attracted authors of av-
erage intellectual backgrounds. The participants were typically members of the 
lower clergy, of the parlements or the artes faculties of the universities, but also, to 
a minor (though increasing) extent, gens de lettres.77 Especially after the 1720s, the 
concours académique turned into a popular medium of the Republic of Letters, ap-
pealing to more and more participants all over France and beyond. This is above 
all due to the fact that the contests, judged on the basis of strict anonymity, were 
open to the general public without any restrictions based on social rank, gender, 
money, or institutional membership.78 The prize questions of the French acade-
mies, more specifically the eloquence competitions, must thus be considered a su-
premely valuable source for an intellectual history of rhetoric at an intermediate 
level: beneath the lofty heights of the preeminent rhetorical theories, they provide 
rich evidence of the actual practice of eloquence in 18th century France. 
It is all the more significant then that the discours (by a certain M. Taverne) 
that won the prize at the Académie des Jeux Floraux in Toulouse in 1733 leaves 
no doubt that it is the specific task of eloquence ‘d’exprimer dignement les senti-
ments de notre âme’ and, what is more, that ‘la nature, qui veut conduire tous les 
hommes à la connaissance de la vérité, a profité des dispositions de leurs cœurs 
pour parvenir à ses desseins’. To do so, nature only employs, according to the 
author, ‘les moyens les plus conformes à nos inclinations. Telle est l’origine de 
l’éloquence’.79 The same view is taken by the two other texts submitted that the 
academy did not select for the prize, but nevertheless decided to publish in its 
annual recueil. One of them draws the concise, very Lamy-like conclusion: ‘La 
vraie éloquence […] trouve dans les passions mêmes de quoi vaincre les pas-
sions’.80 These positions are indeed very common among the authors writing 
77 On the sociology of the participants see the chapter on the concours académique, which is still 
fundamental to the study of this particular genre, in Daniel Roche’s magisterial work Le siè-
cle des lumières en province. Académies et académiciens provinciaux, 1680–1789, 2 vols, Paris 1978, 
vol. 1, pp. 324–355, here pp. 336–339.
78 On the regulations of the concours académique and its practical implications see the detailed 
descriptions in Jeremy L. Caradonna’s essential monograph: The Enlightenment in Practice. 
Academic Prize Contests and Intellectual Culture in France, 1670–1794, Ithaca/London 2012, 
pp. 40–87, especially pp. 50–53 and pp. 78–87. 
79 “Discours qui a remporté le prix, par le jugement de l’Académie des Jeux Floraux, en l’année 
1733”, in: Recueil de plusieurs pièces de poésie et d’éloquence présentées à l’Académie des Jeux Flo-
raux, pour les prix de l’année 1733, Toulouse 1733, pp. 131–148, here p. 134 and pp. 142–143.
80 “Troisième discours”, in: ibid., pp. 168–188, here pp. 180–181. The second discours argues like-
wise that eloquence essentially ‘sert à toucher le cœur des auditeurs’ and regards the human 
heart as the seat of truth: ‘la vérité a des droits si incontestables sur son cœur’. Following the 
inclinations of the heart eloquence must even ‘donner à la vérité et à la sagesse les mêmes 
attraits qui lui faisaient préférer la volupté’. Ibid., pp. 149–167, here pp. 150–151 and p. 166. 
Everything thus depends on ‘maîtriser le cœur de l’homme pour régler ses penchants’, as 
the third discourse notes. Eloquence in this way realises man’s natural disposition towards 
truth, ‘les rappelle aux premières sources du vrai, à ces dons que la nature a faits à tous les 
hommes pour leur servir de guide’. Ibid., p. 169 and p. 171.
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on the nature and function of eloquence in the rhetorical prize questions of the 
18th  century.81 The competition held by the Académie de Pau in 1739: ‘La sagesse 
n’interdit pas les plaisirs; mais elle en règle l’usage’ even adopts one of the new 
axioms as its subject matter.82 So in this particular genre and context, too, we find 
the redefinition of eloquence as a rhetoric of affect, focussed essentially on the 
passions of the human heart (cœur), permitting their natural and thus their most 
effective expression. As such, rhetoric persuades less by normative prescriptions 
than by appealing to the (right) dispositions of the heart.
What is particularly remarkable about the prize competition of 1733 in Tou-
louse is the fact that the question (or rather the thesis) proposed by the Académie 
des Jeux Floraux, one of the strongholds of rhetorical tradition in France,83 had 
an explicit focus on truth: ‘L’éloquence ne doit avoir d’autre objet que de faire 
connaître la vérité’. Nevertheless, none of the texts published by the academy con-
tains any explanations of how truth can be established by means of a traditional 
or revised system of topics. The whole logical and analytical tradition of rhetoric 
thus seems cast aside and irrelevant to its actual purpose. Instead, the emphasis 
is essentially placed on the style and the effects to be evoked by the rhetoric of the 
passions. Truth seems indeed to have become a matter of the heart. 
81 See as another, earlier example the answers to the question ‘Si la sagesse qui vient du tempéra-
ment est aussi sûre que celle qui vient de la raison’, proposed by the Académie des Jeux Flo-
raux in 1725, in: Recueil de plusieurs pièces d’éloquence et de poésie présentées à l’Académie des Jeux 
Floraux, pour les prix de l’année 1725, Toulouse 1725, pp. 65–84., pp. 85–108 and pp. 109–128. The 
discourse selected for the prize also argues that ‘les passions nous fournissent elles-mêmes 
des preuves incontestables de la force de l’homme […]. Si quelquefois elles maîtrisent son 
cœur, il peut les dompter à son tour; et en les sacrifiant les unes aux autres, il n’en est point 
qu’il ne puisse soumettre […]. L’homme est naturellement porté à la perfection […]. Il ne peut 
donc trouver son bonheur que dans la connaissance et dans la possession d’un bien auquel il 
puisse aspirer. Il faut qu’il remplisse son cœur’. Ibid., p. 68 and pp. 77–78. The second discourse 
is even convinced that ‘la sagesse qui vient de la raison est moins sûre dans son principe, 
parce qu’elle est plus sujette à l’erreur que celle qui vient du tempérament’. This is due to the 
fact that ‘la sagesse qui est fondée sur un penchant naturel au bien, sera plus ferme dans son 
attachement pour la vertu, que celui qui n’a que la raison en partage’. Ibid., p. 88. On the shift 
towards a rhétorique du cœur in the eloquence prize questions see also my article, “Les médias 
de la réflexion sur le savoir: concours académique, journalisme savant et les discours sur la 
question du goût”, in: Friedrich Melchior Grimm – philosophe et homme de réseaux dans l’Europe 
des Lumières, eds. Kirill Abrosimov and Jonas Hock (Romanische Studien, Beiheft 2018), forth-
coming.
82 Accordingly the discourse selected for the prize (by the père Chabaud) argues that ‘la sagesse 
[…] ne nous fait point pratiquer la vertu par contrainte et par devoir; mais elle nous la rend ai-
mable et nous donne du goût pour ce qu’elle nous prescrit. Elle nous enseigne une philosophie 
d’usage qui n’a rien de rebutant’. Pièces d’éloquence et de poésie qui ont remporté le prix au jugement 
de l’Académie royale des sciences et belles lettres établie à Pau, Paris 1746, pp. 3–19, here p. 12.
83 Not only was the tradition of poetry contests held in Toulouse since the 14th century one 
of the origins of the academic prize questions. The statutes of the Jeux Floraux also served 
as the model for the structure and regulations of the concours when it was introduced at the 
Académie française in 1670. See Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice, pp. 15–16, 21–26 
and p. 42.
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This tendency is not the only noteworthy aspect in the evolution of the rhetorical 
prize competitions. Since the 1730s, the questions set aimed explicitly at launch-
ing a debate over the contemporary development of knowledge. This led to what 
one can call a self-reflection of knowledge;84 a self-reflection based amongst other 
things on the beginning specialisation of knowledge and further stimulated by 
the appearance of the Encyclopédie in the 1750s.85 This development is especially 
striking when one considers the early history of the prize questions at the French 
academies. The genre seemed hardly predestined, in fact, for such a self-reflective 
turn. 
Established in 1670 at the Académie française in the disciplines of poésie and 
éloquence (the prizes being distributed annually in one of the categories) the con-
cours académique was, on the one hand, first of all the medium of the panegyric 
on Louis XIV and a forum for the discussion of traditional theological and moral 
topics on the other. This was the case both in the capital and in the provincial 
academies.86 It is only in the course of the eighteenth century, in the wake of the 
second wave of academy foundations after the 1720s, that new fields of knowl-
edge were explored and that the range of subjects treated in the prize compe-
titions started to increase. This was above all due to the new disciplines of the 
concours académique, namely the scientific prize questions, established first at the 
Académie de Bordeaux in 1715 and then at the Académie Royale des Sciences in 
1720, and the historical contests held at the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-
Lettres since 1734 and soon spreading to the provincial academies, too.87 The con-
cours thus mirrored the contemporary spectrum of knowledge in its tendency 
towards growing differentiation. At the same time, this meritocratic medium 
of emulation, which registered an increase from 48 contests in the decade from 
1670 to 1679 to 476 competitions in the 1780s, appealed to more and more aspir-
ing members of the Republic of Letters. When it was abolished by the National 
Convention in 1793, the concours académique had mobilized altogether over 10,000 
participants.88
84 Cf. Martin Urmann, “Zwischen prix de dévotion, Wissensreflexion und Reformdiskurs. Die 
Preisfragen der französischen Akademien als literarische und epistemische Gattung und 
die Frage nach dem ‘Jugement du Public’ an der Akademie von Besançon aus dem Jahr 1756”, 
in: Aufklärung 28 (2016), pp. 105–133, here pp. 128–129.
85 On the specialisation of knowledge which at the time, to be sure, still took place within the 
one community of scholars called the Republic of Letters, see the contributions in: La répub-
lique des sciences, eds. Irène Passeron, René Sigrist and Siegfried Bodenmann [Dix-huitième 
siècle 40 (2008)], especially the introduction by the editors (pp. 5–27) and the articles by Jean-
Pierre Schandeler (pp. 315–332) and René Sigrist (pp. 333–357).
86 Cf. Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice, pp. 23–32.
87 See ibid., pp. 88–89 and also the most valuable Appendix F listing all the prize contests offered 
by academies, scholarly societies, and agricultural societies in Continental France from 1670 
to 1794, URL: http://www.jeremycaradonna.com/appendix-f, 28.02.2018 (pp. 335–515 ).
88 Cf. ibid., p. 45. Caradonna estimates the total number of participants in the concours acadé-
mique between 1670 and the abolition of the academies in 1793 at between twelve and fif-
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The scientific prize competitions undoubtedly represented an important 
source of innovation within the concours académique. The questions produced 
genuine contributions to contemporary scientific research. Very quickly, they be-
came a medium —like scholarly journals, much more accessible and flexible than 
books— where current problems were collectively discussed by major and (still) 
un known researchers. The numerous successes of the Bernoulli family (Jean and 
his two sons), the Euler family (above all Leonard, but also Charles and Jean-Al-
bert) and of Lavoisier are only the most obvious evidence in this context.89 More-
over, the prix de science continuously gained in epistemic as well as in quantitative 
importance representing 60 per cent of the whole number of contests in 1793.90 
The new empirical knowledge of nature thus found its way into a genre that had 
originally been established for cultivating the tradition of poetry and eloquence 
and hence, epistemically speaking, the knowledge of the textual tradition.
Despite the changing functions and topics of the concours académique, the rhe-
torical and poetical prize questions remained one of the pillars of this popular 
medium for the entire 18th century. Contrary to the opinion so dear to current 
research on the prize questions, the eloquence contests must not be considered as 
the progressive forum for the factual debate of new knowledge.91 Neither should 
they be seen in the sceptical tradition of the early modern essay. In fact, the dis-
courses of the prix d’éloquence were heavily influenced by the dialectical tradition 
of the question as an ‘epistemic genre’.92 It is thus a technique of knowledge deep-
ly rooted in scholasticism, in the quaestio and notably the practice of disputations 
at the universities,93 that strongly shapes the academic genre of the prize contests. 
teen thousand. In comparison, the total number of academicians in France over the period 
amounts to 6.000 (male) persons.
89 See James E. McClellan, Science Reorganized. Scientific Societies in the Eighteenth Century, New 
York 1985, p. XXVII and p. 94; see also Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice, p. 92 and 
p. 149. The brothers Jean and Daniel Bernoulli personally noted, as mentioned by McClellan 
(Science Reorganized, pp. 11–12), that their research on the theoria magnetis was launched by 
the corresponding prize contest at the Académie Royale des Sciences which they won in 1746 
together with Euler and Dutour.
90 Furthermore, the scientific prize questions had numerically outrun the poetic and rhetorical 
competitions, which constituted 30 per cent of the whole number of contests, by the middle 
of the 18th century. Cf. Roche, Le siècle des lumières en province, vol. 1, pp. 343–344.
91 The article by Gunhild Berg, “Sind Preisfragen die aufklärerisch-öffentliche Form der dis-
putatio? Ein Antwortversuch am Beispiel der Berliner Volksbetrugs-Frage von 1780”, in: 
Disputatio 1200–1800, pp. 167–199, is symptomatic of this tendency. The prize questions are 
presented as the future-oriented replacement of the disputatio as they allowed the open re-
flection of new knowledge.
92 It is especially Gianna Pomata who has employed the notion of ‘epistemic genre’, in order to 
designate a ‘standardized textual format […] handed down by tradition for the expression 
and communication of some kind of content […] primarily cognitive in character’.  Gianna 
Po ma ta, “Observation Rising: Birth of an Epistemic Genre, 1500–1650”, in: Histories of Scien-
tific Observation, eds. Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck, Chicago/London 2011, pp. 45–
80, here p. 48.
93 On the disputation and its epistemological as well as its practical implications, see Anita 
Tra ninger, Disputation, Deklamation, Dialog. Medien und Gattungen europäischer Wissensverhan-
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That is all the more surprising since early modern academies actually presented 
themselves in strong opposition to the universities and reproved the old methods 
of the “schools”.94
The mode of arguing, especially in the early rhetorical prize questions, is 
therefore astonishingly close to the form of debate known from university dis-
putations. In fact, the texts submitted to the eloquence contests all seek to defend 
a thesis by refuting the arguments put forward against it. Apart from this tech-
nique of argumentation based on clear-cut oppositions and the traditional rhe-
torical ways of amplification, the subjects of the prize questions at the Académie 
française also remind us of the contemporary university context. The genre had 
actually been established as a prix de dévotion with a quite narrow focus on con-
ventional moral and theological topics.95 The discourse which won the prize in 
1673 on the question—proposed in the form of a thesis to be defended: ‘De la 
 Science du Salut opposée aux vaines et mauvaises connaissances, et aux curiosités 
blâmables et défendues’ consequently argues in favour of religious knowledge 
which is praised in the starkest possible contrast to idle philosophical curiosity.96
In the course of the 18th century, however, the eloquence contests also under-
went an important change, both regarding the modes of argumentation and the 
subjects proposed. Under the influence of Enlightenment discourse the prize 
questions, notably at the provincial academies, dealt more and more with the new 
philosophical topics of the age, in particular with the changing role of the arts and 
sciences and the epistemic status of rhetorical knowledge in relation to the obser-
vational knowledge of the flourishing natural sciences. The self-reflective turn 
of the rhetorical prize contests is induced, on the one hand, by the specific focus 
of the questions proposed, as for example: ‘Combien les sciences sont redevables 
aux belles-lettres’/‘Combien les belles-lettres sont redevables aux sciences’ (Jeux 
Floraux, 1753/1757), ‘Si la multiplicité des ouvrages en tout genre est plus utile que 
dlungen zwischen Scholastik und Humanismus, Stuttgart 2012. On continuities and changes in 
this essential medium of the early modern Republic of Letters, see the contributions in: Früh-
neuzeitliche Disputationen (as mentioned above, note 19).
94 Cf. McClellan, Science Reorganized and Roger Hahn, “The Age of the Academies”, in: Solo-
mon’s House Revisited. The Organization and Institutionalization of Science, ed. Tore Frängsmyr, 
Canton 1990, pp. 3–12. For a critical revision of this self-fashioning of early modern acade-
mies which points out important continuities between these institutions and the universi-
ties, see Mordechai Feingold, “Tradition versus Novelty. Universities and Scientific Societies 
in the Early Modern Period”, in: Revolution and Continuity. Essays in the History and Philosophy 
of Early Modem Science, eds. Peter Barker and Roger Ariew, Washington 1991, pp. 45–59.
95 Cf. Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice, pp. 23–30.
96 See the selected ‘discours’ (by the abbé de Melun de Maupertuis), in: Recueil de pièces d’élo-
quence, présentées à l’Académie française pour les prix qu’elle distribue, vol. 1, 1671–1685, Amster-
dam 1750, pp. 129–154. For a more detailed analysis see Urmann, “Zwischen prix de dévotion, 
Wissensreflexion und Reformdiskurs”, pp. 117–20. The texts of eminent literary quality for 
which Mademoiselle de Scudéry (‚De la gloire’, 1671) and Fontenelle (‚De la patience’, 1687) 
won the eloquence contests of the Académie française must thus be considered as the excep-
tions to the standard of conventional rhetoric that is characteristic of the prix de dévotion.
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nuisible aux progrès des sciences et des belles-lettres’ (Académie de Pau, 1754), 
‘En quoi consiste l’esprit philosophique?’ (Académie française, 1755), ‘Quelle a 
été l’influence de la philosophie sur ce siècle?’ (Académie de Besançon, 1772) and, 
naturally, ‘Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer les 
mœurs’, the most famous competition won by Rousseau at the Académie de Di-
jon in 1750. On the other hand, such reflections can also come up in contests less 
directly related to epistemic matters, as for example the numerous questions on 
taste (‘goût’) at the provincial academies after the 1730s,97 on ‘L’utilité des bib-
liothèques publiques’ (Académie de Pau, 1746) or, as we shall see in detail, in 
the competition of the Académie de Dijon for 1757: ‘Est-il plus utile d’étudier les 
hommes que les livres?’. 
Most remarkably, in these eloquence prizes we can witness how the rhetoric of 
affect is used as a fundamental critique of the claim to universal knowledge as-
serted by the exact sciences. This critique of science and of its belief in method is 
at the same time a self-reflection of the rhetorical production of (text-)knowledge. 
To conclude, I want to analyse two examples from the eloquence prizes in which 
the typical arguments of this critique, based on the central notion of cœur,98 are 
developed in a particularly elaborate manner.
The prize contest of the Académie française for the year 1755: ‘En quoi consiste 
l’esprit philosophique?’ is actually one of the very rare occasions when this illus-
trious institution took up a much debated, contemporary philosophical issue be-
fore its eloquence competitions began to be devoted almost exclusively to eulogies 
on the grands hommes, which lasted until the abolition of the concours.99 The answer 
selected for the prize, by the Jesuit Father Guénard, begins with a survey of the 
development of contemporary knowledge. The author cannot but pay tribute to 
the ‘nouvel ordre de choses’ arising from the ‘génie d’observation’ which has kept 
accumulating more and more findings, ‘mille vérités particulières’.100 This process 
was launched by no other than Descartes, ‘le père de la philosophie pensante’, 
who placed ‘la nature et l’évidence’ at the centre of his investigations.101 Although 
some of his positions and assumptions needed to be corrected by his successors, 
there is no denying that Descartes and his method were essential to the ‘heureuse 
et mémorable révolution dont nous goûtons aujourd’hui les avantages’.102 
 97 On these competitions see Urmann, “Les médias de la réflexion sur le savoir”.
 98 Instead of the ‘rhetoric of affect’ I will hence speak more specifically of the rhetoric of the 
heart in the following analysis.
 99 On the widespread academic genre of the eulogy (‘éloge’) see Roche, Le siècle des lumières 
en province, vol. 1, p. 344 and pp. 166–171. Beyond the prize contests, the eulogy was an im-
portant medium for the shaping of a collective identity among the academicians. As such, 
it did not remain uncriticized by the philosophes. 
100 “Discours qui a remporté le prix en l’année 1755”, in: Pièces d’éloquence qui ont remporté le 
prix de l’Académie française, 1750–1763, vol. 3, Paris 1764, pp. 73–98, here pp. 75–76 and p. 81.
101 Ibid., pp. 79–80.
102 Ibid., p. 80. 
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However, this development has reached a point where, according to the au-
thor, it becomes clear that the intrinsic tendency of the ‘raison géométrique’ to 
transcend all borders needs to become aware of its limits.103 In fact, this kind of 
philosophical spirit and its methodical quest for knowledge are characterized for 
Guénard by a profound ‘intempérance’ and ‘ivre[sse]’: ‘cette raison qui ne connaît 
plus de retour, quand une fois elle a franchi les bornes’.104 The idea of human 
knowledge being related to certain boundaries beyond which it starts losing its 
sense constitutes the epistemological centrepiece of Guénard’s critical reflections. 
The author consequently asks, ‘quelles sont donc […] les bornes où doit se ren-
fermer l’esprit philosophique’; more specifically ‘les bornes qu’il doit se prescrire 
relativement aux divers objets dont il s’occupe’.105
The answer is obvious‚ as Guénard immediately concludes: ‘la nature elle-
même l’avertit à tout moment de sa faiblesse’.106 This leads us to the anthropological 
basis of the argument which is essential to the rhetoric of the heart: the funda-
mentally finite character of human nature.107 It is precisely in its will to disregard 
this primordial condition and the needs of the ‘cœur humain’108 that a wrongly 
conceived esprit philosophique finally becomes dogmatic, carried away by its own 
‘intempérance’, turning into the opposite of what it set out for. Faced with this ‘ex-
cès’, the author brings to mind the very foundations of the philosophical spirit and 
advocates the ‘exacte sobriété’.109 It thus becomes clear that the text, far from simply 
repeating orthodox religious arguments, is not critical of the esprit philosophique as 
such. The critique starts at the point where methodical reasoning transgresses and 
ignores the multiple borders within which human knowledge is situated. The text 
thus makes the case, typical of the rhetoric of the heart, for an augmented epistem-
ic sensitivity to boundaries and transitions. This becomes particularly manifest 
when the author addresses the relation of the esprit philosophique with religion as 
well as with matters of taste (‘goût’), especially the arts.
Religion and the ‘esprit éclairé’ are anything but contradictions to Guénard.110 
Again, the legitimate range of knowledge in these matters depends on how the 
line ‘séparant les opinions humaines des vérités sacrées de la religion’ is drawn.111 
In this particular realm however, the ‘faiblesse’ of man and the shortcomings 
of the esprit géométrique are particularly striking. Hence, when the rationalistic 
viewpoint is hypostatised reason turns into its opposite and ‘votre sagesse est 
convaincue de folie et […] à force d’être philosophe, vous cessez d’être raisonna-
103 Ibid., p. 89. 
104 Ibid., p. 94.
105 Ibid. and p. 84 (my emphasis). See also ibid., p. 74.
106 Ibid. p. 94 (my emphasis).
107 See also ibid., pp. 96–97. 
108 Ibid., p. 90.
109 Ibid., p. 92 and p. 94.
110  Ibid., p. 92.
111  Ibid.
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ble’.112 With its unifying gaze overlooking the necessity of boundaries, the phil-
osophical spirit must especially be blind to the depth (‘profondeur’) of the phe-
nomena it tries to grasp. The dimension of ‘profondeur’, accessible only through 
the specific insights of the heart (‘cœur’), actually becomes the central epistemic 
objection to the universal claims of the esprit philosophique.113 What this reasoning 
fundamentally lacks, is the ability ‘de […] comprendre l’infini’114 since it perma-
nently treats this dimension like a quantifiable entity.115
At the same time, questions concerning taste and the arts reveal that the ‘rai-
son géométrique’ is too monolithic a conception to represent the diverse intellec-
tual faculties of man which require a plurality of methods. Hence for Guénard, the 
‘discours méthodiques’ trying to explain the logic of art which is ‘presque toute 
entière dans le cœur et l’imagination’ are doomed to fail. They especially fall short 
of the in-between-dimension of ‘nuances’.116 This reveals the universal categories 
of the philosophical spirit as being simply ‘[des] abstractions idéales’, too remote 
from the phenomena at stake.117 Against the geometric reasoning à la Descartes 
which is ‘accoutumé […] à dépouiller les objets de leurs qualités particulières, 
pour ne leur laisser que des qualités vagues et générales qui ne sont rien pour le 
cœur humain’,118 Guénard thus becomes the advocate of the irreducible material 
and sensual dimension of all worldly phenomena. It is only the ‘faits éclatants et 
sensibles’ which make truth graspable and understandable.119 And that, for the 
Jesuit Guénard, also applies—or rather especially applies—to religious truth.120 
It is ‘touchante dans ses preuves comme dans sa morale’ and destined to ‘entrer 
dans l’âme par tous les sens’.121 A form of rhetoric which is acquainted with the 
secrets of the heart is conscious of the limits of reason and hence for Guénard 
the more appropriate—and the more valid kind of knowledge. Above all, it is the 
expression of the various intellectual faculties of man and possesses a sufficiently 
complex notion of human practice and experience. 
112 Ibid., p. 96.
113 Ibid., especially pp. 95–96.
114  Ibid., p. 96.
115 ‘Ce grain de sable que je foule aux pieds est un abîme que tu ne peux sonder; et tu voudrais 
mesurer la hauteur et la profondeur de la sagesse éternelle […] par cette pensée, trop étroite 
pour embrasser un atome?’, ibid., pp. 96–97.
116  Ibid., p. 91.
117 Ibid., p. 90.
118  Ibid.
119 Ibid., p. 95. This is indeed a crucial conviction for the defenders of the rhetoric of the heart: 
‘Combien peu sont assez dégagés des sens pour être touchés de la vérité, si on ne la rend 
sensible et agréable! L’éloquence, pour ménager notre faiblesse, nous présente cette vérité 
sous l’appas du plaisir’. Recueil […] des Jeux Floraux, pour les prix de l’année 1733, p. 171 (cited 
above, note 80).
120 On the Jesuit tradition of this conception of religious truth see Stéphane Van Damme, 
“Culture rhétorique et culture scientifique: crise ou mutation de la poétique des savoirs 
dans la Compagnie de Jésus en France (1630–1730)”, in: Archives internationales d’histoire des 
sciences 55/154 (2005), pp. 55–69, here especially pp. 59–62. 
121 “Discours qui a remporté le prix en l’année 1755”, p. 98.
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The latter idea is developed particularly in the answer by the Abbé Millot se-
lected for the eloquence prize of the Académie de Dijon for 1757: ‘Est-il plus utile 
d’étudier les hommes que les livres?’.122 Millot’s argument (in favour of studying 
men rather than books) is essentially based on a conception of cœur as the crucial 
intellectual and sensible faculty of man. The text actually develops the central an-
thropological assumptions of the rhetoric of affect, which has left such a strong 
mark on the rhetorical prize questions of the 18th century, by giving an especial-
ly dense and detailed description of the paradoxes of the human heart. Man is 
thus depicted as ‘ce mélange singulier de perfections et de défauts’.123 His heart, 
‘ce théâtre fertile en scènes toujours variées’, is nothing less than the fiercely con-
tested site of pure becoming, ‘où les désirs se choquent, s’engloutissent perpétuel-
lement les uns les autres; où les passions, sous une infinité de formes, produisent 
une infinité d’effets étranges et presque incroyables’.124 In light of the conflicting 
energies that run through his soul (‘âme’) man must remain a stranger even to 
himself: ‘tant de fibres entrelacées et confondues qui composent le cœur humain; 
ces contrastes d’humeurs, de passions, de sentiments qui mettent entre les âmes 
plus de différence, que l’œil le plus perçant n’en aperçoit entre les visages; ces 
métamorphoses rapides et fréquentes qui souvent nous rendent méconnaissables 
à nous-mêmes; ces variétés si délicates et multipliées à l’infini’.125 According to Mil-
lot, only a self-reflective thinking grounded in introspection, ‘la connaissance de 
soi-même’126, and focussing essentially on human practices is able to shed at least 
some light on this overwhelming complexity. Believing that ‘la vraie peinture des 
hommes, ce sont leurs discours et leurs actions’127 and that ‘le premier devoir de 
l’homme est de contempler son être, d’en étudier à fond la nature,128 Millot dismiss-
es the ‘méditations abstraites’ of purely theoretical book knowledge.129 This is why 
he is also sceptical of the capacity of the natural sciences (‘les sciences exactes’130)—
which Millot, himself a partisan of the Enlightenment,131 admires and endorses 
122 Cf. Claude-François-Xavier Millot, “Discours qui a remporté le prix à l’Académie de Dijon 
en 1757”, in: idem, Discours académiques sur divers sujets, Lyon 1760, pp. 78–134.
123 Ibid., p. 85.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., pp. 88–89.
126 Ibid., p. 90. On this self-reflective dimension see also ibid., p. 92. It has to be emphasised 
again that the turn towards the inner nature of man is typical of the rhetoric of the heart: 
‘L’éloquence […] nous fait puiser en nous-mêmes et développer ces connaissances’. Re-
cueil […] des Jeux Floraux, pour les prix de l’année 1733, p. 171 (cited above, note 80).
127 “Discours qui a remporté le prix à l’Académie de Dijon en 1757”, p. 89. Accordingly, the 
value of rules and methods for Millot essentially depends on how ‘je tâche de les mettre en 
pratique’, ibid., p. 104.
128 Ibid., pp. 90–91.
129 Ibid., p. 113.
130 Ibid., p. 114.
131 After the success of his works on French and English history from the late 1760s, Claude-
François-Xavier Millot (1726–1785), who had originally been a teacher of rhetoric at the Je-
suit collège of Lyon (which he had to leave for an eulogy on Montesquieu in 1757), won the 
support of the philosophes and became a member of the Académie française (1777) where 
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in his text more firmly than Guénard—to illuminate the nature of man beyond a 
certain point. The scientific method fails to recognise the extent to which human 
knowledge is grounded in practices and tends to construct abstract systems of 
nature ‘tandis que ceux qui l’habitent […] nous sont à peine connus’.132 The most 
fundamental form of knowledge is hence the study of ‘les abîmes profonds du 
cœur humain’ and no other branch of learning could be more suitable for that pur-
pose than rhetoric.133 For Millot, ‘le grand art de persuader’ had always possessed 
the theoretical insight into the passions of man and at the same time the ability to 
influence and alter his actions.134 Revised, in an age of sciences, as an instrument 
‘méthodique et profonde’ ‘[qui] creuse les principes, développe les conséquenc-
es, démontre à l’homme ce qu’il doit être’, while simultaneously preserving its 
distinctive aesthetic sensitivity, rhetoric turns for Millot into the new leading dis-
cipline connecting theory to practice.135 As the most outstanding example of this 
novel ‘science des mœurs’ the author mentions Montesquieu and his approach in 
the Esprit des Lois.136 This is why Millot can finally conclude: ‘l’étude des hommes, 
loin de mettre obstacle aux autres études, les anime et les dirige […]. Peut-on trop 
se livrer à une étude aussi propre à satisfaire l’esprit qu’à former le cœur?’137
5 Conclusion
To sum up, I want to point out the specific constellation into which the knowledge 
of the textual tradition and the empirical knowledge of nature enter in the light 
of the rhetorical prize questions of the French academies in the 18th century. Yet, 
it has to be emphasised again that none of the arguments we have encountered in 
the context of the concours is genuinely new. In particular, the critique of science 
analysed in the two examples above had been presented in its main aspects in 
the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, in the answers given by Longepierre and 
Huet to Fontenelle’s and Perrault’s astonishing extension of scientific method to 
the realms of arts and rhetoric.138 Vico should then elaborate quite similar philo-
sophical arguments in De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1708), though this text 
he was especially endorsed by d’Alembert. Later he also became the preceptor to the duc 
d’Enghien. See Dictionnaire historique, ou Biographie universelle des hommes qui se sont fait un 
nom […] par F.-X. de Feller, vol. 4, 8th Ed., Paris 1839, p. 451.
132 “Discours qui a remporté le prix à l’Académie de Dijon en 1757”, p. 87. For this critique of 
the scientific method see also ibid., pp. 113–116. 
133 Ibid., p. 94.
134 Ibid., p. 124. See also ibid., pp. 121–123.
135 Ibid., p. 117.
136 Ibid., p. 116. For the praise of Montesquieu see ibid., pp. 109–113. Here, Millot also reacts 
to criticism which his defence of Montesquieu had provoked before and which may have 
been the origin of his demission at the Jesuit collège of Lyon.
137 Ibid., p. 132 and p. 134.
138 See especially Larry F. Norman, The Shock of the Ancient. Literature and History in Early Mod-
ern France, Chicago/London 2011, pp. 153–155, 200–223 and p. 257; Marc Fumaroli, “Les 
abeilles et les araignées”, in: La Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, XVIIème–XVIIIème siè-
cles, ed. Anne-Marie Lecoq, Paris 2001, pp. 7–218, here especially pp. 178–196.
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did not become an important reference in the contemporary debates in France.139 
Here, the critical discussion of the esprit philosophique and its epistemological lim-
its was further nurtured, albeit from a sensualist point of view, by Jean-Baptiste 
Du Bos in his Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture (1719) which re-
mained very influential throughout the century.140 
What is particularly striking about the prize questions is the fact that at a certain 
point in the evolution of this genre a critique of the exact sciences and their claim 
to universal knowledge arises; a critique that is developed and presented from a 
rhetorical point of view. At the same time, the selected discourses—at least a signif-
icant part of them, which were also awarded the prizes of renowned conservative 
academies like the Jeux Floraux—reflect the shifts in the epistemological founda-
tions of rhetoric related to the rise of the natural sciences and the insight into the 
sensual and affective nature of man. Clearly, we are dealing with a changed kind 
of rhetoric that has reacted to the major epistemic transformations in the Republic 
of Letters. It must also be noted, however, that this particular perspective on affects 
remains rather metaphorical. It is not interested in an interpretation based on a 
more empirical description of emotions which was a central aim of contemporary 
philosophy in its search of ‘une esthétique des passions […] centrée sur l’étude de la 
subjectivité cognitive et affective’.141 Notably, the rhetoric of the heart—at least as it 
appears in the specific medium of the prize questions—does not get to the level of 
individual emotions as it basically follows a pre-subjective conception.142
The affective turn of rhetoric, its change into an instrument essentially con-
ceived to understand the passions of the human heart, was certainly not exclu-
sively the result of the Cartesian rethinking of language and eloquence by Lamy 
and the logicians of Port-Royal. All of the major treatises on les passions humaines 
since the 17th century, from Coeffeteau to Senault and Bouhours, raised the status 
of affects in the interaction of body and soul against the traditional theological 
doxa and sought to reconceive morals as the right use of passions.143 And there is 
139 See ibid., pp. 202–203. On Vico’s epistemological position see Kondylis, Die Aufklärung, 
pp. 436–444.
140 See Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment. A Genealogy, Chicago/London 2010, pp. 24–29; on 
the deeper philosophical implications of Du Bos’ arguments see Kondylis, Die Aufklärung, 
pp. 314–319.
141 Daniel Dumouchel, “L’emprise du ‘Mitleiden’. Mendelssohn et Lessing sur les émotions 
tragiques et la moralité du théâtre”, in: Revue germanique internationale 4 (2006), pp. 121–136, 
here p. 121. See also Elisabeth Décultot, “Kunstgenuss. Zu Rousseaus Anthropologie der 
Kunst wahrnehmung”, in: Genuss bei Rousseau, eds. Helmut Pfeiffer, Elisabeth Décultot and 
Va nessa de Senarclens, Würzburg 2014, pp. 115–135.
142 It is therefore neither an expression of the ‘personale Prägnanz’, a distinct articulation of 
the person as such, as in the Enlightenment culture of letter writing. Robert Vellusig, “Auf-
klä rung und Briefkultur. Wie das Herz sprechen lernt, wenn es zu schreiben beginnt”, in: 
Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert 35/2 (2011), pp. 154–171, here p. 167. 
143 See Jean-Claude Rambach, “À propos des passions. Ombres et lumières avant Descartes”, 
in: Travaux de linguistique et de littérature 15/2 (1977), pp. 43–65; see also Frank Baasner, “The 
Changing Meaning of ‘Sensibilité’: 1654 till 1704”, in: Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 
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of course the influential moralist tradition which for one of their chief exponents, 
La Rochefoucauld, makes it possible to note in his Maximes (1665), in a way as nat-
ural as axiomatic: ‘Les passions sont les seuls orateurs qui persuadent toujours. 
Elles sont comme un art de la nature dont les règles sont infaillibles; et l’homme 
le plus simple qui a de la passion persuade mieux que le plus éloquent qui n’en 
a point’.144 The fact that the Académie de Dijon chose one of La Rochefoucauld’s 
maxims for its concours in 1757—‘Il est plus nécessaire d’étudier les hommes que 
les livres’ –145 shows not only the high esteem for the authors of the siècle classique 
but also how strong the influence of the moralist tradition was at the academies 
and among the public addressed by the concours in the 18th century. 
What is more, this way of thinking did not share the Cartesian affirmation 
of science. On the contrary, it was, both in its style and in its philosophical out-
look, fundamentally sceptical of the scientific claim to truth. This becomes most 
evident, as mentioned above, in Pascal’s notions of cœur and esprit de finesse. Be-
yond Lamy, the moralist tradition must hence be considered a major source of 
inspiration for the rhetoric of the heart in the prize questions and for its critique 
of science.146 As far as the latter is concerned, Anthony Grafton is certainly right 
when he warns us not to assume that ‘the two cultures’ of scien tists and human-
ists were ‘locked in the battle that the pamphleteers of the New Philosophy called 
for; they coexisted and often collaborated’.147 Yet in France since the end of the 17th 
century, notably since the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, there is, at least on 
the theoretical level, an intense discourse on the methodological differences and 
epistemological incompatibilities between them. 
Believing that the intuitions of the heart are a ‘sentiment […] auquel il faut se 
livrer pour le connaître, et que l’âme est d’autant moins capable d’étudier, qu’elle 
en est plus affectée’148 the rhetoric of affect, as presented in the rhetorical prize 
15 (1986), pp. 77–96 and Jean Mesnard, “Le classicisme français et l’expression de la sensi-
bilité”, in: Expression, Communication, and Experience in Literature and Language, ed. Ronald 
G. Popperwell, London 1973, pp. 28–37.
144 François de La Rochefoucauld, “Réflexions ou sentences et maximes morales” (Ed. 1678), 
in: idem, Œuvres complètes, ed. Louis Martin-Chauffier and Jean Marchand, new Ed., Paris 
1964, pp. 387–471, max. 8, p. 404 (my emphasis). It is also clear that ‘la force et la faiblesse de 
l’esprit sont mal nommées; elles ne sont, en effet, que la bonne ou la mauvaise disposition 
des organes du corps’, ibid., max. 44, p. 409.
145 Ibid., Maximes posthumes, max. 550, p. 481.
146 With the moralist authors not explicitly quoted (neither is Lamy) and footnotes remaining 
rare in the texts submitted to the rhetorical prize questions—a medium deeply rooted in 
the ideal of orality—there is no direct evidence of this obvious philosophical relation on 
the philological level. Pascal is mentioned once however by Millot, “Discours qui a rem-
porté le prix à l’Académie de Dijon en 1757”, p. 107. At the same time, it is clear that as a 
medium at the intersection of diverse common opinions, positions and theories the prize 
questions are too hybrid a source to look for one direct, “original” line of inspiration. 
147 Anthony Grafton, Defenders of the Text. The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450–
1800, Cambridge, Mass./London 1991, p. 5.
148 This fundamental assumption of the rhetoric of the heart is taken from one of the (published) 
discourses of the concours held by the Académie des Jeux Floraux in 1765: ‘Déterminer ce 
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questions, turns against the epistemological ideal of science. Essentially assum-
ing that human knowledge is finite and valid only within certain boundaries 
and that man’s various intellectual faculties are founded in an intuitive compre-
hension of the world beyond conceptual knowledge, it formulates a fundamental 
critique of the exact sciences and their belief in method.
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